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ABSTRACT 
This thesis uses the photographic portrait as an example of contemporary art practice to examine 
developments in aesthetic sensibility and constructions of meaning with particular address to 
ineffable qualities in both the subject and in the photograph. It examines the contribution of 
practice to a wider cultural debate, predominantly described as poststructural. 
Thomas Ruff's contention that it is impossible to photographically depict an individual, ' establishes 
a methodology that interrogates assumptions and directs examination toward reconfiguring issues 
of theory and practice. In the photographic portrait, what is `essential' equates with the expectation 
of visual statements that are definitive and what is `ineffable' is that which transcends words. The 
persistent premise of capturing the `essence' is dependant on the notion of `presence', the certainty 
of pure perception or essential meaning, now undermined by poststructuralism in terms of 
conceptions of meaning and authorship. If essential depiction is problematic, how might a 
correlative adjustment to conceiving and validating photographic meaning be framed? How are 
essential or ineffable qualities displaced, formed and manifested? What constitutes the 
contemporary `meaningful' portrait? 
Realigned as `depictions of people', the `portrait' serves a complex function, adjusted in the light 
of psychoanalysis and poststructuralism and visibly manifested as metaphor for contemporary 
consciousness. With particular reference to texts by Julia Kristeva, Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques 
Derrida and Jean Baudrillard, this thesis demonstrates photographic practice as a form of discourse 
that visualises implicit truth-values, and participates in debate. It asserts figural interpretations to 
photographs over literary systems like narrative, and immanent property over aspirations to 
`transcendence' or `essence' and proposes reconfigurations of psychological, critical or poetic 
`fiction' as alternatives. It repositions the ineffable as a conceptual domain of possibility that 
assimilates the dynamic of differance as its poststructural equivalent and proposes a conceptual 
aesthetic that celebrates aspects of poststructuralism and is rooted in what the photograph provokes 
rather than what it depicts. 
Keywords: photography, portrait, posts tructuralism, ineffable, conceptual, meaning, fiction, 
Derrida, Baudrillard, Kristeva 
I Wulffen, T., 'Thomas Ruff: Reality So Real It's Unrecognisable', an interview with Thomas Ruff, Flash Art, JanFeb 1993 
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Preface 
The subject of this thesis emerged during the course of my photographic project that 
attempted to portray the essential qualities of a series of friends. Around the same time, in 
1996, I visited the exhibition of Jeff Wall's work at the Whitechapel Gallery, London. These 
stunning photographs awakened my interest in the possibilities of meaning production besides 
those made by authorial signature. In contrast in 1998 I saw the exhibition Snapshots, The 
Photography of Everyday Life 1888 to the Present, curated by Douglas R. Nickel at the San 
Francisco Museum of Modem Art. Here I was curious as to how such insignificant images 
could be so powerful; how did they work? Always fascinated by what and how intangible 
qualities occur in material works such as drawing, these two experiences, responding to two 
very different sorts of photographic works, confirmed a pursuit of the extension of 
`intangible' in the more philosophical implications of the `ineffable'. 
INTRODUCTION 
CONTEXTS 
This thesis uses the example of the portrait as a focus in art photography to examine constructions 
of meaning with particular address to ineffable qualities in both the subject and in the photograph. 
This is not a history of the photographic portrait, nor a reiteration of approaches to the portrait 
throughout the C20, but an examination of developments in the constitution of aesthetic sensibility 
and ineffable effects in attempts to present `others' photographically. It uses the photographic 
portrait as an example of contemporary art practice to scrutinize the directions of content and 
emphasis that might contribute to a wider cultural debate, predominantly described as 
poststructural. 
In their writings on the photograph, both Roland Barthes at the onset of poststructuralism, and Jean 
Baudrillard as a central figure of postmodernism, confront notions of `realism' and make reference 
to a delight and `ecstasy' that is entirely personal and provocative. Baudrillard in particular, 
challenges on a number of levels, in terms of his utopian vision of contemporary `reality' and more 
specifically with statements about the photograph that entirely contradict endeavours to describe 
the appearance or `essential' nature of an individual: `It is impossible to bring someone into focus 
photographically when you are so little able to get them into focus psychologically'. ' The 
photographer Thomas Ruff also denies the possibility of being able to represent a `person or 
character': `They are not depictions, they're just images" [fig.! ] and thus it is Baudrillard and Ruff 
who provoke my central question. If essential depiction is problematic, how might a correlative 
adjustment to conceiving and validating photographic meaning be framed? How are essential or 
ineffable qualities displaced, formed and manifested? What are the possibilities for the 
contemporary photographic portrait? What constitutes a meaningful portrait? Does visual practice 
contribute to an understanding of the contemporary condition and discourse? 
Using Ruff s position of refutation, I establish a methodology that directs examination toward 
disassembling and reconfiguring issues of theory in relation to photographic practice, by 
interrogating assumptions and expectations, by reviewing recurrent themes and strategies, and by 
identifying developments in reaction to an established photographic aesthetic. It necessitates 
simultaneous address to the phenomenon of the photograph as a text that can be read and 
interpreted, the nature of meaning in the photograph, and the nature of the relationship between the 
photographer and the 'subject'. It raises a number of key problematics. Baudrillard's assertion 
' Baudrillard, Jean , 
'For Illusion isn't the Opposite of Reality... ' . 
In Wiebel, Peter (ed. ) Photographies 1985-1998 Within the Horizon 
of the Object, Objects in this Mirror. Hatje-Cantz Publishers, 1999, pp. 136-7 
2Wulffen, T. 'Thomas Ruff: Reality So Real It's Unrecognisable', an interview with Thomas Ruff, Flash Art, Jan/Feb 1993. Thomas 
Ruff, born in Germany, 1958, taught by Bernd Becher at the Dusseldorf Academy (as too were Andreas Gursky and Thomas Struth). In 
1981, he began a series of portraits of friends and students. 
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challenges the expectation of visual statements that are both definitive and transcend words, which 
equate with what is `essential' on the one hand and what is `ineffable' on the other. The persistent 
premise of capturing the `essence', being dependant on the notion of `presence', the certainty of 
pure perception, interaction or essential meaning, is now undermined by poststructuralism in terms 
of conceptions of meaning and authorship. Thus the photograph itself serves as a metaphor for the 
perpetual debates of realism and truth, arrested in tautological self-referentiality. The `portrait' as 
metaphor for a mirror of consciousness and as such suitably positioned to visually demonstrate our 
response to others and the world, confronts the phenomenological experience of the encounter, and 
psychoanalytically, the exchange between the photographer and photographed subject. 
Il 
In examining the ineffable in relation to the photographic portrayal of an individual, this thesis rests 
on the complexities arising in the amplification of how the indefinable is presented in the 
photograph, by the elusive quality of `face'. The history of aesthetics repeats the premise that 
`some part of any work of art is ineffable" and in this respect `art photography' expects a 
dimension of `meaning' suitable to this context. As the ineffable condition contradicts the 
photograph's property of resemblance, it indicates that the manner of description is significant and 
needs to be addressed, and interpretations of the quality of the ineffable recur in different forms 
throughout the thesis. The term `ineffable' touches the possibility or impossibility of speaking of a 
thing; the condition of `naming' and being named. If one assumes that what remains unnamed can 
retain its ineffability, then it follows that once named, a `thing' becomes known and transparent. If 
the principle of `naming' is applied to the photograph - where an object is `named', by virtue of its 
resemblance, one could assume that the photograph will reveal its meaning transparently in that 
3 Kelly, Michael, editor in chief, Encyclopedia of Aesthetics. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 493 
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imitation. But there are elements in photographs besides the naming of objects that I seek out here 
in how these elements occur and how they are ineffable. 
Barthes's Camera Lucida4 contains descriptions of photographs too full of visual meaning to 
verbalise and it is this impossibility of significance that articulates the ineffable and is central to the 
thesis. Barthes's punctum, as the ineffable element that inserts what is potent in a photographic 
image, characterises a condensation of meaning, a dependency on details and incidentals that 
provoke me to ask how might this phenomenon be formed and manifested? As most `things' 
depicted in a photograph have a `name', it would seem that these elements will reside in those 
qualities that result from attributes / capacities / concepts which have not been assigned a `name'. 
This as a photographic characteristic is not confined to `art' but is evident in snapshots and it is 
pertinent, that in recent years, artists have sought to emulate and eventually subsume properties of 
the vernacular photograph. Without notions of `good' in an aesthetic sense, the snapshots indicates 
the derivation of an aesthetic that avoids the more formal and `traditional' approach to `bringing 
someone into focus photographically'. 
The notion of the photograph as a reflector of our encounter with reality provides a substantial 
background of ontological debate. ' But using a specific aspect of practice - the `portrait', I can 
more easily identify characteristic strategies that avoid too great an emphasis on metaphorical 
implications derived from the physical phenomenon itself and examine its possibilities as text 
instead. How does the image insert something else about the relationship between the photographer 
and subject? How does it articulate the implicit? In order to address such questions, my theoretical 
investigation has run interdependently with a visual project that aims to portray an intimate friend. 
This subject matter examines the external appearance of individual existence and what is internal, 
hidden or implicit; what aspects of internal motivation can be perceived in the photograph, what is 
constructed in one's mind when looking and interpreting and what they confirm for us as 
responding individuals. The project confronts both subject matter associated with the snapshot and 
the `artistic' pretensions that are hard to relinquish. It serves to situate theory within the real 
process of description and the real encounter with another individual. 
This thesis is structured thematically and is founded on a re-configuration of ideas in relation to the 
photographic portrait rather than an attempt at a comprehensive survey. It avoids reiterating aspects 
of theory already clearly articulated in the context of photography (e. g. semiotic translations, ' 
4 Barthes, Roland, Camera Lucida [1980], trans. Richard Howard, London: Vintage, 1993 
5 Nickel, Douglas R., Snapshots, The Photography of Everyday Life 1888 to the Present. San Francisco Museum of Modem Art, 1998 
6 For example see Jeffrey, Ian, 'Fragment and Totality in Photography'. History of Photography, Vol. 6, No. 4, Winter 1992, pp. 351- 
356; Iverson, Margaret, 'What is a Photograph? '. Art History, Vol. 17, No. 3, September 1994, pp. 450-464; Charlesworth, Michael, 'Fox 
Talbot and the 'White Mythology of Photography'. Word & Image, Vol. 11, No. 3, July/September, 1995, pp. 207-215 
For example Eco, Umberto, 'Critique of an Image' [ 1970]. In Burgin, Victor (ed), Thinking Photography. London: Macmillan Press, 
1982 
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perspectives framed by the ideas of Lacan8 or Foucault 9) and uses the photographic portrait as a 
form of text that is influenced by, and speaks to, psychoanalysis, phenomenology and 
poststructuralism. As different sorts of theoretical writing frame implications provoked by the 
question, my choice of texts relies on interdisciplinary modes of thought emerging from earlier 
French post structural ism that introduces the reading of culture (including the visual) as text, and 
redefines thinking in a way that questions assumptions. Following the position of uncertainty and 
contradiction provoked by Jacques Derrida's critique of logocentricism and the endearing 
introduction of subjectivity by Barthes, there evolves a more fluid process of seeing, which 
acknowledges the impossibility of objectivity. Derrida's procedures, in particular the fundamental 
premise of differance, 1° frame my central emphasis in terms of the assertion of difference over 
identity and certainty, and the disruption of temporality and spatiality. Overall, Derrida's ideas, as 
they circumvent presence in discussions of the supplement and (point)lessness, are pertinent to my 
project of chasing the indescribable and contribute a number of angles from which to explain it. 
The significance of differance not only provides a model that embodies changes in attitudes to 
visual representation but also parallels a chronology in the development of ideas affecting uses of 
the photograph (Derrida's Speech and Phenomenon, translated into English 1973, Martha Rosler's 
Bowery 1974). 
loopy groggy boozy 
tight steamed up bent 
folded flooey 
in one's cups 
under the influence 
liquored up tanked up 
juiced up slopped up sloppy 
bloated loaded full 
Fig. 2 Martha Rosier, The Bowery in Two Inadequate Descriptive Systems, 1974 
There are a number of chronological parallels that one could follow, with no clear distinction 
between them; ideas emerging concurrently and ideas that can be seen as an influence. As this 
study is restricted to a Western tradition of photography, and as it aims to make connections 
between verbal and visual poststructural practices, any parallel relies on the availability of texts in 
English. Derrida's paper `Structure, Sign and Play', delivered at the John Hopkins University 
8 For example Burgin, Victor, in Thinking Photography; Laura Mulvey, `Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema'. In Wallis, Art after 
Modernism, reprinted from Screen 16, no. 3, Autumn 1975 
9 Tagg, John, The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories. London: Macmillan, 1988 and Tagg, John, 
Grounds of Dispute: Art History, Cultural Politics and the Discursive Field. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992 
10 Derrida, Jacques, Speech and Phenomenon [1967], trans. David B. Allison, Evanston: North Western University Press, 1973 
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(1966) marks a significant point of transition and heralds the American appropriation of 
`deconstruction' in the following decades. In this regard I largely restrict my frame to the move of 
instability indicative of ideas becoming influential in UK and United States following translation in 
the early 1970s, which also marks a point of change for photography with regard to authenticity, 
authorship and meaning. Derrida's teaching divided between Paris and US universities physically 
illustrates the significant cross-Atlantic exchange of ideas, which in terms of the influences of 
photography, tends to work in reverse. At about the same time, in the context of art history, Joseph 
Kosuth demonstrates art as a form of theory in practice; his essay Art after Philosophy (1969) 
questions aesthetic formalism and One and Three Chairs (1965) articulates similar concerns to 
Derrida, of differentiation. Ideas introduced by Gilles Deleuze invite an alternative investigation, 
but as these are generally not available in English until later (1980s, 1990s), I do not pursue them 
here. Principally it is the challenges to thinking initiated in the 1960s, changes to conceptions of 
practice emerging in the 1970s and most particularly those established in the 1980s, 1990s, in 
which I am interested. By which time art practice has assimilated the influence and knowledge of 
both Conceptual art and models of poststructuralism. 
Because this thesis relies on the premise that practice enters the post-structural debate, I construct a 
framework of interconnecting visual and theoretical ideas that support this premise and have 
deliberately chosen specific texts that provoke speculation and extension in the context of practice. 
I employ texts by Julia Kristeva, Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas, Barthes and Derrida, all of 
whom have confronted phenomenological issues (central to the portrait encounter) and who inter- 
relate on several fronts throughout; Derrida, like Sartre tackles the encounter in a personal way; 
Levinas (whom Derrida critiques) uses the encounter to frame ethical thought. Sartre's encounter is 
appropriated by Barthes who tackles photography directly, as does Baudrillard, whose later writing 
echoes much of Barthes, Derrida and Levinas more provocatively ... and so on. Applying theories to 
photography from other contexts can be an arbitrary exercise but can generate a number of 
questions in the reading of images that otherwise may not have been asked. " For example 
Kristeva's address to the creative process and `poetic language' provides a useful perspective from 
which to look at images. And in some instances, as a methodological device, I have appropriated, 
paraphrased and reconfigured texts in a more personal or photographic context in an attempt to 
firstly, amplify the potential exchange between different discourses and secondly, verbally translate 
the simultaneity of visual meaning. It is a contradictory strategy that points to the mismatch 
between verbal and visual description. 
"Bat's 'narratology' applies theories such as focalization, derived from narrative literature to paintings. Bal aptly notes that applying 
verbal abstractions and terms to visual experience is in itself contradictory and smacks of logocentricism. She also neatly identifies three 
aspects of Derrida's work most pertinent to art history as intertextuality, polysemy and the shifting location of meaning. See Bat, Miieke, 
Looking In, the Art of Viewing. Amsterdam: G+B Arts International, 2001, p67 
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Kristeva aptly suits my discussion of subject portrayal because of her simultaneous address to 
aspects of subjectivity and the development of meaning. My choice of Levinas's texts focuses on 
his metaphorical use of `shadow' and `face' that assigns images to the description of complex 
ideas. He provides a more limited perspective to the discussion of interaction within the bounds of 
portrait than for example Maurice Merleau-Ponty's materiality in looking, " which opens up 
developments in thinking about different forms of embodiment developed in later feminist 
postructuralism. Discussion could alternatively proceed, from this and Kristeva's consideration of 
corporeality, to other examinations of subjectivity that break down the logocentric in different 
ways, such as Luce Irigaray's possibilities of the female imaginary or Judith Butler's 
performativity. 13 
As my focus lies with conceptual reverberation, my discussion of theorists' engagement with art 
practice is deliberately confined to subtleties of concept (e. g. the parergon essential to the ineffable 
in the photograph), except where the concern is with photography itself as with Baudrillard's 
writing or Derrida's demonstration of reading photographs in Droits de Regards. Direct address by 
thinkers to specific art practices (for example Merlau-Ponty and Deleuze to painting) can prove 
problematic as they introduce values and expectations that are not relevant to photography or 
digress from my point at issue and dissipate my conception of possibilities. Whilst I discuss 
Kristeva's Powers of Horror as it indicates a positive motivating force, I avoid her address to 
instances of art practice as it incorporates troublesome assumptions. The notion of a link with 
subjectivity and borderline states - of perversion, ugliness and fragility that are `scandalous', is 
interesting. She suggests them as `research' in `the anticipation of the difficulty of living' but then 
also suggests that these `traumatic states' can be swallowed up by `almost documentary style 
photography', 14 which implicitly she sees as failing to invest in new thoughts. 
Discussion is restricted to the context of fine art, as distinct from other functional uses of 
photography such as journalism' or `fashion'. 15 `Art photography' encompasses both the history of 
art that in recent years has subsumed the use of photography and by default, the history of 
photography that has aspired to be `art'. My choice of photographic texts is framed by a history of 
complex exchange between notions of `art' and ideas of `realism'. As my context is the 
development of the photographic aesthetic and the possibility of cultural exchange reframing 
practice, links between theory and practice are similarly rooted in this inherited culture. As the 
12 Merleau-Ponty, 'The Intertwining - The Chiasm'. In The Visible and Invisible (1964), trans. A. Lingis, Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1968, pp. 130-155 and Signs (1960), trans. McLeary, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964 
13 See for example Rosi Braidotti who outlines the challenge of transforming conceptions of subjectivity initiated by poststructuralist 
thought in Nomadic Subjects, Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1994, p. 99'The acquisition of subjectivity is... a process of material (institutional) and discursive (symbolic) practices. ' 'Feminist 
thought rests on a concept that calls for deconstruction and deessentialism in all of its aspects. ' 
'4 Zivancevici, Nina, An interview with Julia Kristeva, Paris, March - April, 2001, http: //evans- 
'Zricntialism freenwebspace. comikristeva. htm, Accessed April 4te 2005. In 1998, the Louvre invited Kristeva to curate an exhibition 
Vision Capitales. sacrifice, decapitation, representation, which she describes in 'Capital Vision'. Art Press 235, May 1998, pp-20-27 
15 As with for example G. Kippen, 'The Critical Language of Photography', Ph. D., Manchester, 1997 
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paradigms of modernist photography were determined largely by American photography and its 
extension in Europe and as I scrutinise the practice following modernism, so it is that my choice of 
photographers emerge from a succession to this tradition and, with the exception of Boris 
Mikhailov and Arsen Savadov from the Ukraine, all were born or educated (Yokomizo in London, 
Lee in New York) in the US or Western Europe. This tradition, supported by its institutions and 
cultural histories, to some degree dictates both what is showcased and my choice as they have been 
featured (thereby available and validated) by significant UK venues such as the Whitechapel, 
Photographers' and Saatchi Galleries. It is notable that its influence extends increasingly to include 
Asia, promoted by such publications as Imago (Slovakia), Photofile (Australasia) and exhibitions 
as Between Past & Future: New Photography & Video from China at the V&A, 2005 or Araki: 
Self. Life. Death at the Barbican in 2006. 
A revised aesthetic emerging in the 1960s secured an authoritative position for photography. This 
confidence was attributable in some degree to John Szarkowski's 1966 New York exhibition The 
Photographer's Eye, 16 which promoted photography's potential to transform the everyday into the 
transcendental. Photography and its history continues to be influenced by such ideologies. One can 
see that themed exhibitions, such as Cruel and Tender (Tate Modern, 2003), significantly adopt 
metaphoric umbrella terms to render disparate practices more coherent. Cruel and Tender, derived 
from Lincoln Kirstein's description of Walker Evans's work, defines the discourse by referencing 
the authorial conflict of portrayal (distance and intimacy, objectivity and subjectivity). As with the 
Family of Man exhibition in 1955 (exemplifying a modernist humanism) and Pictures in 1977 
(defining `postmodernism'), Cruel and Tender, by collating in `obvious' thematic groupings, 
confirms a coherent overview of the state of play and presents one dominant aspect of photographic 
vision that underlines `realist' traditions and the `masters' of C20 Western photography. It 
reiterates aspects of the `everyday' and perpetuates the central photographic theme of revealing the 
hitherto unseen. Whilst we may applaud the first photography exhibition held at the Tate as at least 
heralding the arrival of photography as a proper form of art, it also maintains the position of being 
named in order to be legitimised. 
Douglas Nickel" identifies the agenda for the history of photography as being more dependent on 
changing technologies and a concern to confirm its status as a fine art than by its content, which 
has remained secondary. Appraisal of the history of photographic art is unpractised in terms of 
content, thought and ideas, and persistently confirms values derived from a judgement dependent 
on the equivalence of integrity with its physical properties. 18 For example, Beaumont Newhall, 19 
16 The Photographer's Eye, exhibition curated by John Szarkowski (appointed as director in 1962) at the Museum of Modern Art, New 
York, 1966 
"Nickel, Douglas R., `History of Photography: The State of Research'. History of Photography, September 2001, p. 554 
'8 Newhall, Beaumont, History of Photography: From 1839 to the Present. New York: Museum of Modem Art, 1949 
"Newhall, Beaumont, In Focus: Memoirs of a Life in Photography. Bullfinch, 1993, pp. 45 
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reappraising his own earlier history admits his bias towards `realism' and failure to discuss 
pictorialism. Nickel points out that commentators follow each other's conceptions of photography 
without question so that the assumed necessity to define `photography's essence' and subsequent 
reconfigurations of `essences' are constructed by previously reiterated assumptions, ideologies and 
consequent omissions. 20 There follows then the possibility of aesthetics being disturbed by 
ideologies or theories. Just as Szarkowski established a respectable base for modernist 
photography, so writers (Krauss, " Burgin and Tagg) contributed a repositioning of photography as 
central to postmodern criticism and legitimised photography by turning it on its head and assigning 
anti-aesthetic procedures to its evolution. `Photography theory' established the beginnings of a 
critical history of the photographic image but as Nickel explains it, what the present has inherited 
from the 1970s and 1980s, is photography as a cultural subject over one of aesthetic analysis and 
that much of the ontological debate was actually but a metaphor for something else, `never truly 
photographic at all'. Nickel identifies the central issue determining perceptions of photography's 
history as being the suspicion of theoretical interpretations over the possibility of aesthetic values, 
which in effect amounts to a reiteration of a continued debate circulating round photography as art 
or not. Where art photography in the 1990s might have still been reiterating modernist pretensions 
to authorship and expression, the assumption of photography into mainstream art practice, has only 
in some respects displaced this philosophy with one that forefronts `idea' over expression. That this 
has caused tension is evident in references to the 1970s-1980s era as one burdened by too much 
theory and in an undercurrent of resentment in audiences at recent photography conferences in the 
UK for example. 22 
Generally the construction of any aesthetic articulates its derivation from various fields of 
knowledge and understanding and what makes it persistent is its link with that knowledge and the 
subsequent political impact. ' As the divisions between criticism, history and practice have become 
less rigid, so the relationship and exchange between them has shifted in the development of what is 
termed `visual culture'. ' In the wake of `New Art History', 25 we understand that practitioners do 
not function by themselves, do not operate without `interest', and do not establish reputation and 
response without being influenced by a very selected exposure. John Roberts discusses the role of 
intention and agency as crucial and is careful to warn against a social or psychic distance between 
author and critic. And following the recognition of feminist approaches (e. g. Mary Kelly, Barbara 
Kruger, Griselda Pollock) and the interdisciplinarity of visual culture, the remit of content has 
20 Nickel relates Batchen echoing Newhall's `desire to make pictures' 1937 in Burning of Desire: the Conception of Photography. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997 
21 See for example Krauss, Rosalind, `Photography's Discursive Spaces'. In The Originality and the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist 
Myths. Cambridge, M lass: MIT Press, 1986 
"What Happened here? Photography n Britain Since 1968, conferences held at Derby University and Tate Britain, 2005 (e. g Simon 
Watney's paper typifies the mood - `Tunnel vision: photographic education in Britain in the 1980s' reproduced in Afterimage 1/1/2006. 
=' de Man, Paul, The Rhetoric of Romanticism. 1984, p. 264 cited in Roberts, John, Art has no History! The Making and Unmaking of 
Modern Art. London; New York: Verso, 1994, pp. 31-32 
34 Roberts, Art has no History!, pp. 2-3 
I For example Harrison, Jonathan, The New Art History, London; New York: Routledge, 2001 
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effectively been extended. The insertion of culture to the discussion of aesthetics changes the 
parameters of aesthetic determination by challenging and compromising its boundaries. It moves 
the consideration of practice from the more abstract and isolated reaches of theoretical aesthetics 
and resituates it in relation to a wider debate, suggesting at least that practice is more centrally 
responsible for changes in understanding. Running parallel to the critics' careful theoretical 
positioning is the artists' ultra self-consciousness of role in this same process. The study of art 
practice potentially becomes another means to understand the role that ideologies play in history. 
More fundamentally the conjunction of aesthetic, cultural and political concerns are now part of a 
visual discourse. Thus writers such as Roberts and Tagg26 reframe the terms of art history that 
support a view of photography as critique and as an important means of challenging the grand 
narratives of modernism - as fictions. And a conversation between Cheetham, Holly and Moxey27 
typically recognises an evolutionary theory of artistic development that implicitly requires that 
attention should be paid to what is neglected in commentary and practice in order to trouble what 
may have been seen as the 'story'. ' 
Attempts then to understand the process of meaning are not possible within the context of 
philosophies alone, and stand dependent on preceding theories such as those inserted by 
Conceptual art in 1960s. Conceptual art is particularly pertinent to photography (and to this thesis) 
as it questioned the apprehension of a work of art as being dependent on mimetic reference, which 
the photograph embodies. It shifted the emphasis from the material and visual to the conceptual 
content -a shift from looking to reading (Terry Atkinson) and posited that the idea itself can be 
considered as art (Joseph Kosuth). Sol LeWitt represented a version of art that placed the idea and 
the visual as being interdependent where the process of conception and the process of visualisation 
are of equal importance. 29 In the 1960s, the adoption of photography to effect ideas runs parallel to 
mainstream photography; Ed Ruscha introduces an indifference to the skill and integrity of 
photographic conventions in presentations of subject matter (Twentysix Gasoline Stations 1963) `as 
a system, an economy mirrored in its structure' ; 30 artists such as Allan Sekula and Rosier assimilate 
the methodology of using photographs to discuss concerns beyond what is depicted; Bowery refers 
to homelessness and the city `as a set of relationships... .a geopolitical system'. 
31 One could say that 
Conceptual art liberated the photograph and enabled photography to develop in other ways, away 
from its own aesthetic; it provided for example the ideal means for visual intertextual reference. 
21 Tagg, John, Grounds of Dispute, Art History, Cultural Politics and the Discursive Field 
27 Cheetham, Mark, Michael Ann Holly and Keith Moxey, `Visual Studeie, Historiography and Aesthetics'. Journal of Visual Culture, 
Vol. 4 (1), 2005, pp. 75-90 
21Moxcy. Journal of Visual Culture, Vol. 4 (1), pp. 86-87 
29 Kelly, Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, pp. 415-416 
10 Wall, Jeff, "Marks of Indifference": Aspects of Photography in, or as, Conceptual Art' (1995). In Fogle, Douglas (ed. ) The Last 
Picture Show, Artists Using Photography, Minneapolis: Walker Art Centre, 2003 
Rosier, Martha. 'Fragments of a Metropolitan Viewpoint'. In Wallis, Brian (ed. ) If you lived here: the city in art theory, and social 
activism: a project by Martha Rosler. Seattle: Bay Press, 1991, p. 15. Martha Rosier, born 1943 Brooklyn, New York, has worked with 
photography, video, photo-text, performance and written criticism since the early 1970s and has been influential on forms of 
documentary and commentary. 
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Subsequently photography has facilitated, and to a large degree defined, many of the familiar 
aspects of what is commonly termed `postmodern art' practice more generally, which assumed the 
role of critiquing representation via intervention and provocation. The spate of reviews in the 
1980s32 both constituted and reiterated what has become recognised as the characteristic features of 
appropriation, irony, seriality, simulation, with repeated reference to works by Cindy Sherman, 
Barbara Kruger, Sherrie Levine and Richard Prince. But whereas more recently Peter Muir 
provides a useful review of the impact of October in defining histories, 33 relating procedures of 
deconstruction and marking the breakdown of normative conceptions of the photographic, and 
Howard Singerman' an interesting perspective of Levine as `art historian', there is little in the way 
of review of practice post poststructuralism beyond references to the same tired features. There is 
little discussion of more subtle traits that have developed, which betray poststructural themes. 
I emphasise a feature of poststructural discourse as the inter-relationship between theory, 
consciousness and (photographic) art practice; if philosophical / theoretical discourse concerning 
our consciousness affects conceptions of `reality' and its representation, then its influence affects 
cultural (including visual) debate and will be reflected in the attitudes that drive practice. The 
profound influence of ideas such as the emphasis on intertextuality or the rejection of 
transcendental signification can be located in conceptual shifts of understanding and ultimately our 
aesthetic assumptions. It can be seen in the impact on modernist photographic certainties and 
subsequently aspects of current photography - in strategies that dictate the manner of depiction. 
Looking at depictions of people over the last twenty years, a pattern emerges, which is unstated but 
evident in the concerns and the methods used. Current photographic themes echo poststructural 
concerns, such as non-determinacy, and circumvent the impossible task of making definitive 
photographic statements - assuming methods of avoidance / obliqueness / blandness / ordinariness 
/ artificiality / attenuation / contradiction. A reciprocal effect is evident in photography's continuing 
contribution to the evolution of the aesthetic framework and what is considered tradition. 
I need to clarify my conception of photographs as `text'. By `text' I do not imply that photographs 
can be translated literally into verbal text, but that they can necessitate a `reading' that requires the 
reader to be more actively engaged than `looking' passively, and can be considered in terms of an 
interrelation with aspects of theory. My argument depends on the premise that understanding 
artwork is a reciprocal process that cannot be separated from or subsumed by theory. Indeed 
terminologies become misleading as borderlines are blurred; if `practice' using images can be seen 
;' The history of postmodern art photography can be traced back to such essays by Douglas Crimp, 'Pictures'. October No. 8, Spring 
1979 and'The Photographic Activity of Postmodernism'. October No. 15, Winter 1980; Craig Qwens'The Allegorical Impulse' 1980; 
Hal Foster, 'Re: Post'. Parachute 26,1982 and his volume Anti Aesthetic, 1983; Abigail Solomon-Godeau, 'Playing the Fields of the 
Image'. In Wallis, Brian (ed. ) Art After Modernism. New York: Museum of Contemporary Art, 1984 and 'Photography after Art 
Photography' 1984; Burgin , 
Victor, The End of Art Theory, 1986; Steve Edwards, 'The Snapshooters of History', 1989 
33 Muir, Peter, 'Signs of a beginning: October and the Pictures exhibition'. Word & Image, vol. 20, no. 1, January-March, 2004, pp. 52-62 "Singerman, Howard, 'Sherrie Levine's Art History'. October 101, Summer 2002, pp. 96-121 
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to theorize then `theory' using words can be seen to practice. A conception of theory practicing 
can be seen in Kristeva's work for example, and recent years have seen an interest in alternative 
forms of writing criticism to the linear and didactic, to synthesis and the conclusive. Such writing 
relates to Derrida's work in the way that it encounters aesthetic categories, and challenges the 
boundaries between disciplines and the rational and the subjective. 35 This thesis thereby tests 
instances where both practice and theory inform each other and contribute to a discourse of ideas. 
But I do assume that photographic discourse is determined by the specific nature of photography 
and its histories of representation and truth. Because it is not verbal, the visualisation of attitudes 
implicit in practice is one that contributes a different understanding - one that is sensed rather than 
verbalised. One logical way to demonstrate this would be presentation in the form of photographic 
essay without words. However, I endeavour to discuss the manner in which photographs can 
present ideas without resort to words; how photographs can explore subjectivity via procedures like 
seriality and adjustments to the conception of authorship or the manner of control (described in Part 
One); how photographs argue by means of their visual dynamics (described in Part Two); how 
photographic works participate in the debate; how they can theorize. 
My expansion contributes an assimilation of photography's histories into the broader context of 
cultural practice and seeks to emphasise two things - recognition of the conceptual shift that 
enlivened photographic practice in the 1980s, but which appears to have been neglected in reviews 
since, and the contribution that practice makes not only to changes in aesthetic consciousness but 
to conceptual configuration more generally. As I am concerned to explore contemporary works in 
relation to written theory, with the exception of Walker Evans (whose work performs a recurrent 
theme), examples of photographic practice are largely restricted to the last thirty years. I restrict 
discussion to an era of portrait photography that tests what might be termed `portrait', that takes 
either one of two stances, both of which `play' with convention and formality: extreme instances of 
intimacy or positions of distanciated and irreverent banality. Whilst a range of photographs is cited 
to establish context or history, I focus on a limited selection for analysis, as representative of key 
trends and in order to concentrate discussion on content. And I focus on ideas associated with the 
photographic encounter as they mirror attitudes more widely. I seek out the more subtle themes that 
reverberate around the limits of intimacy and distance and the possibilities of the ineffable in 
insignificant content or those that are determined by their extreme strategic direction. In some 
35Peggy Phelan's 'performance writing' has responded to Derrida's Postcard (1980), which addresses the relation between philosophy, 
speech and writing or Glas (1974) which suggests possibilities of thinking through ideas, non-oppositionally and in parallel. Phelan's 
response (P. S. ) attempts to bring critical and creative imaginations together, to insert critical theory with a 'certain affective emotional 
force' in Journal of Visual Culture, Vol. 2(3), pp. 291-302). With a background in architecture, Jane Rendell emphasises debates around 
space and subjectivity, and draws on aspects of conversation as a mode of writing art criticism, ('Research Project at CRASSH', 
htt "ý Nww\v. crassh. cam. ac. ukfellowships/2004-6/biorendell. html. Accessed 4th November, 2005). Yve Lomax's writing practice is 
concerned with the relationship between the physical and conceptual, which is paralleled by her photographic works that similarly create 
a multiplicity of directions and interplay. Works such as 'Better Than' (Camera Austria 53,1995, pp. 3-19) and 'Common Notions' 
(Camera Austria, 62, '63,1998, pp. 44-52) present dialogic expansions that travel through a range of notions that bring together visual 
practice and theoretical writing and confront assumptions held about them. 
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instances photographs amplify the written text and in others they determine the direction of 
discussion. In both instances written and visual texts parallel each other's themes. 
I establish a realignment of practice in the light of psychoanalysis and the influence of 
poststructuralism. I demonstrate the interface between visual practices, philosophies and 
interpretations and establish that current visual practice presents a discursive reflection of the 
contemporary condition. I introduce Baudrillard's and Derrida's writings about photography as 
summarising contemporary attitudes to making and reading photographs. In confronting the 
compulsion to seek out `essential' meaning, the thesis forefronts the poststructural disturbance of 
certainty, phenomenological address to self and other and psychoanalytic motivations. It explores 
how meaning resides outside `likeness' and argues that the contradictory aspects of the non-literal 
are central to our understanding photographs. By examining conceptual configurations of the 
image, I assert figurative over literary interpretations like narrative, and immanent property over 
aspirations to `transcendence', `truth' or `essence' and reconfigure a conceptual aesthetic. I move 
increasingly toward Lyotard's conception of `figural' force as a term that exceeds the literary 
implications of the term `figurative' and encompasses a number of the dynamics I describe. I 
reposition a conception of the ineffable that assimilates poststrucural ideas and propose a view of 
practice, more appropriately termed the poststructural portrait, which celebrating these aspects, is 
rooted in what the photograph provokes rather than what it depicts. 
This introductory section proceeds to outline the implications for any discussion of `portrait' and its 
terminologies. It identifies assumptions and expectations, explores their boundaries and establishes 
a base from which following sections can question conventions and explore aesthetic changes. I use 
Nelson Goodman to clarify aspects of photographic terminology and Max Kozloff represents the 
extensive commentary on the `photographic portrait'. I introduce Walker Evans's Polaroid portraits 
as one of the key photographic texts used in this thesis. Part One outlines the influence of 
phenomenology on the relationship between photographer and subject. It identifies Levinas, 
Kristeva, Derrida and Baudrillard as offering alternatives to the existential view of objectification 
and examines directions in which the contemporary portrait deviates from it. It relates aspects of 
psychoanalytic theory that impact on the particular condition of the `portrait' using my engagement 
as a photographer and, with reference to Kristeva's texts particularly, I affirm a dialogical and 
participative engagement both in constructing the `portrait' and in the reading of photographic 
texts. Part Two explores dynamics of meaning in photographic representation, post 
poststructuralism and situates them in relation to Derrida's procedure of differance and to theories 
of metaphor, principally those of George Lakoff and Paul Ricouer. It establishes the conceptual 
space of the photograph as motivating the ineffable and as an alternative to validating meaning 
through literary forms such as narrative, rather than the properties of the photographic. It collates 
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writings that explain the ineffable in images, draws parallels between the different terminologies 
and establishes the key property of 'resonance'. I re-assert a conceptual dimension to photographs 
over that of mimesis and the dominance of `thing', and offer alternative readings to those of 
narrative and transcendence. Part Three examines directions in aesthetics that counter expectations 
of the 'portrait'. I consider the literal and the non-literal in photographic presentations and the 
assumption of strategies of practice as having assimilated aspects of poststructural thinking such as 
indeterminacy. I position practice in relation to motivations that destabilise meaning, and appraise 
contemporary practice in the light of Jean-Francois Lyotard's `postmodern', Jeff Wall's 
`photoconceptualism' and reviews of postmodern practice. 
THE PHOTOGRAPHIC PORTRAIT 
An examination of more contemporary directions in the photographic portrait requires firstly a 
review of ideas about the photographic `portrait', principally of traditions, of expectation and of the 
function and problematic of the 'pose'. The tradition of the `portrait' goes beyond simple record or 
document and carries with it the myth of revelatory vision, of showing the person beneath the 
`mask' and of the consequent role of the photographer as the expressive agent in that event. 
`Portrait' brings to mind a certain formal configuration, and because I encompass notions of 
`portrait' in the broadest sense, I favour the word `depiction', which is less value-laden and avoids 
more formal traditional aspects. Therefore, throughout this thesis when I use the word `depiction', I 
am referring to a generic form of photograph portraying an individual or individuals with the 
expectation of it conveying meaning and not merely `denoting', whilst avoiding the paraphernalia 
of a more specific photographic tradition associated with portrait. And when I use the term 
`portrait', as a convenient shorthand for the longer label `depictions of people', I am qualifying 
this with the quote marks of irony and contemporary application. But even `depiction' bears the 
legacy of, for example, Goodman's analysis of classification, or is shown to be fraught with the 
self-consciousness of media analysis, such as is implied by Thomas Ruff's statement `photographs 
aren't depictions they're just images'. Such a statement alerts us to the fact that `depiction' refers 
back to the person depicted and the questionable possibility of describing them, and `image' refers 
us to the image in front of us. Ruff's logic insists that the whole affair must be pared down to its 
minimum, thus avoiding the impossible project of description, which necessitates interpretation. 
His belief that one cannot portray an individual leads us to the opposing, but contingent, positions 
of the definition of portrait being `likeness of a real person' and the idea of portrait incorporating 
desire. 
The portrait as motif has become so established that it could be seen as metaphor for an ultimate 
formal statement of judgement, maintaining the relation of power between `subject' and `object'. I 
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do not intend to give an exhaustive account of the status or history of `portrait photography', but 
shall concentrate here on indicating expectations, of description, reality, likeness, expression and 
objectivity that determine our understanding of `portrait' and which impact on current reactions in 
practice and the disturbance of the genre. Moving on from a review of assumptions of what a 
portrait `is' or `should be', I shall look more closely in Part One at the implications of the `pose', 
the key problematic of the dynamic between photographer and the depicted-subject, and later at the 
features, which maintain an insistence on depicting fellow human beings, but which deviate from 
those expectations in the many forms of subversion of the `portrait'. This introduction indicates 
that the `portrait', having lost the certainty of its genre category, has come to serve a much more 
complex function, or rather its function is adjusted in the light of psychoanalysis and the influence 
of post-structuralism. 
I need to clarify, at the outset, some of the terminology used in discussion. Nelson Goodman's 
Languages of Art (1969) makes sense within the parameters and constraints of structuralism, and 
provides some definition to the structure of meaning in pictures, but is devoid of psychological 
considerations and is prior to Althusser's influence (1971)36, which introduces the essential 
significance of social condition, of the `subject' as merely agent within it and subsequently the 
need to identify the particular `horizon of thought' that is required in its analysis. Thus Goodman's 
analysis, when applied to art photography, is stretched to its own limits and raises questions of the 
relevance of classification and of what sort of analysis is possible. Art photography, which I 
suggest, has itself contributed to the development of the wider cultural debate with regard to 
meaning and representation, does not fit comfortably within the constraints of this sort of structural 
analysis. However, contemporary uses of photography have confused (often deliberately) all 
manner of category, genre and function and Goodman's definitions at least help to identify the 
derivation of confusion. 
There are very few facts that one can attribute to a photograph - in contrast to what may be 
popularly believed. It is a `dense' structure of features that indicates meaning on a number of levels 
and which is modified by the context in which one is looking. Few photographic properties are 
merely informational, and yet with the facility of the medium of photography, we very easily will 
state a property as fact when it is not. At the outset, the photograph presents contradiction and 
deceit. Goodman clarifies some important and obvious facts in the abundance of terminology used 
to describe elements of `visual language' and he usefully distinguishes between the different 
functions of meaning operating in the image, and what they are termed varies accordingly. He uses 
`picture' (for which I shall substitute `photograph') as the generic term, which he classifies in 
36 The influence of Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault has been discussed extensively in Tagg, John, The Burden of Representation, 
Essays on Photographies and Histories. Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave, 1988 and `Ideology and State' Althusser, 1971 cited for 
example in Burgin, Victor, The End of Art Theory. Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave, 1986, p. 17 
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various forms. Most importantly he states that what the (photograph) denotes does not determine 
the kind of (photograph) it is and that representation is more complex. Denotation (the most literal 
or `obvious' meaning) and representation can be equivalent only as far as we can say that a 
(photograph) represents (denotes) `the object so described'. Representation depends on the 
relationship between references and on the kind of representational system within which it is seen. 
He defines representation and description as being forms of denotation. Depiction (visual) and 
description (linguistic) refer to objects and events and each are independent of resemblance. 
Descriptions are distinguished from depictions by belonging to articulate, rather than dense, 
schemas. 37 Expressions (of feelings) and exemplifications (of properties) lead us away from more 
articulate references. Exemplification depends on what properties are important in the system at 
that time. Description necessarily involves interpretation in its articulation and an expression would 
require rather more words with which to describe it adequately, as there are `no set tolerances' with 
which to measure an expression. A description might be less ambiguous but is more laden with 
intention, whilst `density' may be more ambiguous and using Barthes's terminology, more 
connotative. Importantly Goodman clarifies the distinction between reference, property and feeling 
and identifies a key condition of relationship between these and context. Thus a photograph 
possesses certain properties and refers to certain objects or events and expresses by `metaphorical 
exemplification'. But this kind of comfortable schematic separation is later to be problematised by 
Derrida. This and the implications of the photograph's metaphoricity will be discussed in Part Two. 
Goodman classifies representation, as being of three types. One of which is literally fictive, whilst 
significantly for the `postmodern photograph', all may be classified as aspects of fiction. `A picture 
that represents a man denotes him; a picture that represents a fictional man is a man-picture; and a 
picture that represents a man as a man is a man-picture denoting him. ' Goodman here confirms the 
importance of classification to our perception of the depiction, which is both denotation and 
classification simultaneously. Thus `portrait' will be recognized as a category of photograph even if 
`resemblance' is poor. However, what describes in some systems, depicts in others. In a more 
informational context, a photograph may be descriptive, although it is doubtful that a photograph 
can be merely informational. In the context and history of `portrait' photography it may be 
depiction constrained by classification, and in the history and context of fine art, it may be the idea 
of `portrait' and thus a sort of fiction. Any reference to history in the image itself (such as in a Ruff 
portrait) complicates and makes it more dense. In Goodman's terms, if denotation is equivalent to 
saying and spelling out meaning without ambiguity, then the photograph, contrary to popular 
expectation, is more a display (an `exemplification') than description, more ambiguous, possessing 
properties of simultaneous differentiation and discontinuity, which disrupts simple denotation. He 
defines `picture' as provoking two questions - `what it represents or describes and the sort of 
37 Goodman, Nelson, The Languages ofArt: an approach to the theory of sonbols. London: Oxford University Press, 1969, pp. 26-30, p. 
230 
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representation it is'. The photograph inserts further questions relating to our understanding of the 
reality (or fiction) it describes. What it is, is insufficient to classification, firstly post `conceptual 
art' and the subsequent insertion of an additional dimension to aesthetic apprehension beyond the 
perceptual qualities of mimesis, expression and form, 38 and secondly, post post-structuralism and 
its troubling of the certainty of essential being and definition. Classification of the `portrait' 
category is insufficient now as a category, as most photographic portraits are complex amalgams of 
a number of categories and the reliance on this procedure - the determination of what it is, is 
insufficient when recent cultural debate has disturbed the simple procedure of determining `what 
is', reliant as it is on the existence and definition of the `essential object'. 
Fig. 3 Yousuf Karsh, Albert Einstein, physicist, 1948 
We might say that the portrait in photography over the last thirty years has introduced new 
classifications, which can in turn be subdivided (documentary-style-portrait, snapshot-style- 
portrait, `subversive'-portrait-style). Much of the classic modernist `portrait' genre presents a 
definitive example of `representation as', for example Yousuf Karsh's Einstein 1948 `man as 
thinker' [fig. 3] or John F. Kennedy 1960, `as visionary'39. This too is an easy instance of 
objectification. But when the classifications become more subtle, elusive and subdivided, it is more 
difficult to determine the level of objectification. `Representations, then are pictures that function 
in somewhat the way as descriptions, '40 for example man-as-genius, woman-as- hispanic (Nikki S. 
Lee)4 'etc. [fig. 4] But such classification is insufficient in explanation of what happens in a Tina 
Barney photograph that depicts individuals `as' an aspect of society and which, in using members 
of her own family, injects poignancy, fiction, irony and reality42. [fig. 5] And the contemporary 
38 Seamon, Roger, `The Conceptual Dimension in Art and the Modern Theory of Artistic Value'. The Journal ofAesthetics and Art 
Criticism, 59: 2, Spring 2001 
39 For example Yousuf Karsh's Einstein 1948 as 'thinker' or John F. Kennedy 1960, as `visionary', viewed at Tom Blau Gallery, London 
October 2002 
40 Goodman, The Languages of Art, pp. 26-30. 
41 Nikki S. Lee. Born in Korea, moved to the USA and graduated from NYU in 1994. Her working process for the Project series is to 
infiltrate an identifiable group, gain the trust of her subjects, adapt her looks, mannerisms and behaviour accordingly and `become' one 
with them, adopting an appropriate persona. As she also studied fashion as a student, she says that she is influenced by picture spreads 
such as Vogue, which use mannered and quasi-narrative poses. Her projects include Punk 1997, Yuppie, 1998, Hispanic 1998, Seniors 
1999, Erotic Dancers 2000, Schoolgirls, 2000, Hip Hop, 2002. 
4°Tina Barney. Born in 1945, New York. She is known for large-scale portraits of her well-to-do family and friends. They appear to be 
snapshots but they are actually staged and formally prepared using a large format camera. Her work is in MMA, NYC, MFA Houston 
and George Eastman House collections. The series to which I refer is Theatre of Manners series, 1981-1997. Her more recent project 
The Europeans, picturing wealthy families across Europe was shown at the Barbican, 2005. 
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portrait that represents an individual, in a certain defined and isolated mode, is a common strategy 
of subversion, avoiding the possibility of humanism and sentimentality, as for example, Ulf 
17 
Fig. 4 Nikki S. Lee, The Hispanic Project, 1998 
Fig. 5 Tina Barney, The Christening, 1992 
Fig. 6 Ull Lundin, Picture of a Ewnilv. srrics, 1996 
Lundin's pictures of the man `as a family man', `as ordinary man'. 43 [fig. 6J Any form of 
description functions by focusing on some aspect and leaving out others. In writing, `the man' 
would be classified with the use of words to label him and verbs to describe his behaviour, and 
photographs of men are similarly classified with `pictorial labels'. `Representation as' 
incorporates the tendency toward transparency in seeing the man, as we look through the 
individual toward a category that is familiar and convenient for our ordering of the world. 
Goodman is pointing out the importance of the nature of the representation that defines him as a 
category, a type of representation. Thus a photograph of a man can be defined as a `portrait 
of.... ', framing response to the photograph already in terms of the preconceptions of `portrait'. If 
we can dispense with this preface `portrait of' then it may be possible to achieve a different sort 
of representation. Goodman's categorization is useful in indicating some assumptions but the 
more convoluted structures come unstuck when applied to some contemporary works, where 
Barthes's terminology that distinguishes between denotation and connotation is more useful. 
The photograph, over sixty years old... . 
depicts her as a young girl of twenty-four. Since 
photographs are likenesses, this one must have been a likeness as well... But were it not for the 
oral tradition, the image alone would not have sufficed to reconstruct the grandmother... All 
right, so it is the Grandmother, but in reality it is any girl in 1864. The girl smiles continuously, 
always the same smile, the smile is arrested yet no longer refers to the life from which it has 
been taken. ' (1927) 
Fig. 7 Robert Adamson and Octavius Hill, Mrs Elizabeth 
(Johnstone) Hall, Newhaven fishwife, 1843 
n Ulf Lundin, born 1965 Sweden, lives and works in Stockholm. The Pictures of a Family series, 1996 records a family over the period 
of a year. Lundin makes a contract with an old school friend that allows him to photograph them at any time as long as they do not know 
he is there: 'He still lives in the town where we grew up and now he has a wife, two sons, a home and a steady job. The security of his 
life appals me and attracts me at the same time. It is difficult to point a finger at the choices (if we made any) which have determined our 
present lives. ' http: //www. photonet. org. uk 
4' Kracauer, Siegfried, 'Photography' (1927) cited in Mehring, Christine, 'Kracauer, Siegfreid's Theories of Photography from Weimar 
to New York'. History of Photography, Vol-21, No. 2, Summer 1997, p. 129. Mehring cites the translation by Thomas Y. Levin, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995 
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Another terminology describes the effect of `representation as' as 'motif. Speaking of Walter 
Benjamin and Siegfried Kracauer with respect to Octavius Hill's fishwife [fig. 71, Christine 
Mehring points out Benjamin's assumption that the photographic image will make the woman into 
something that she is not -a representation of something more, `something that cannot be 
silenced'45 and that Kracauer does this also, but with a difference; suggesting that the girl becomes 
all girls - something more than the one individual. A photograph fabricates symbols particularly as 
time passes - the girl becomes a `representation as' a girl of such and such era. She becomes a 
motif and immortalised, divorced from the particular, but an idea of a girl rather than that girl. She 
moves into another dimension as the image doesn't describe the individual anymore, but the idea of 
an idea, objectified. This is how mythology is created and formed, by a `condensed' form of 
information. Subsequently she can perhaps only be reconstructed as a subject in the sense of an 
individual, with the addition of words. Max Kozloff describes this as a neutral state that is 
recognizable as an ideality: `Motifs are perceived in a kind of neutral zone that is set up between 
the "there" where the figures hold forth and the "here" where the viewing is done', where the 
individual becomes a sign for something else; glamour, stardom, intelligence, integrity, bravery 
etc.; where they have shifted beyond themselves or have been perceived as such and not as their 
individual self. When the function or condition or attribute overrides the individual, we see the role, 
the desire, the age, the representation over and above the detail. ' 
Goodman's distinction between `representation' (of objects) and `expression' (of feelings) as both 
being species of denotation, 47 but where representation is of the concrete and expression of the 
abstract, clarifies common confusion where we might say that a picture `expresses' a feeling when 
strictly speaking the photograph presents a metaphor that alludes to a feeling. ' Goodman's 
statement: `Actors can represent sadness but may not express it' (my emphasis) is an interesting 
notion when translated in the context of portrait, where the gestures and expression that are 
recognized to signify `sadness', fail to convey `sadness' in a powerful enough way or seem 
contrived. Where the `subject' may indicate what is understood to mean something, but does not in 
effect meet the expectations of that meaning - so it is neither `effective' and does not match 
intention or expectation nor is it powerful in any way and is mechanical only. Ruff's portraits 
provide an example of this distinction in operation, of the `portrait' that confounds attempts to 
categorise and structure. These are examples that appear to be simple `portraits' (they are 
photographs `as portraits'), but they are confusing in the face of expectations, where the subject is 
expressionless, where the `portrait' is clearly stated but the relation and `setting' is removed. They 
°-' Walter Benjamin `a something that cannot be silenced, which demands of the person who lived there, who is still real' cited in 
Mehring, 1997 
'6 Kozloff, Max, 'Variations on a Theme of Portraiture' Aperture 114, Spring 1989 and reproduced in Lone Visions, Crowded Frames, 
Albuquerque: University of Mexico Press, 1984, p. 23 
47 Goodman, The Languages of Art. p. 50 
4' Ibid., p. 46 
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neither represent expression nor do they denote or refer to expressive qualities in the person 
portrayed. The qualities that are possessed by the photograph (and here photograph refers to the 
more generic term than specifically portrait) express more abstract qualities that are not expressed 
by the face. Ruff's pictures deny the expectation of expression in the face depicted, but express 
through the motif of the face, a face that is not real. Facial expression is thus abstracted from reality 
to express - something abstract in property. One would say that Ruff's portraits are articulate and 
descriptive and yet they are problematised by their attenuation (the opposite to Goodman's 
`repleteness'). Ruff's portraits are contradictory in their attenuated density. What is clever about 
Ruff's use of the category `portrait' is the use of simplicity that is descriptive and denotative and 
devoid of expression, but is replete in meaning. 
This may be an appropriate point to acknowledge the question of the photograph as being 
`transparent' to the world. This notion touches Goodman's `representation as' and, as we will see, 
Sartre's position of `seeing'. Kendall Walton's premise, 49 that `when I look at a photograph of my 
mother, I see my mother', takes little account of `seeing' via a photograph, beyond its indexical 
reference. Jonathan Friday discusses the implications for aesthetics50 in accepting photographs as 
`putting us in perceptual contact with what they depict'. His premise refers to the photograph's 
`representational qualities', which cannot include `expressive qualities' as being a property of the 
photograph, as they `cannot be pinned down to a specific location'. 5' Thereby `expressive quality' 
cannot be part of any transparent access to the `real' world. What Friday sees as a problem is not 
the fact of representing transparently, but that it might interfere with perception of the 
photographer's `artistic creation' and the photograph's consequent aesthetic significance as a 
representational medium. He is intent on defending the photographic medium as being aesthetic 
against what he calls the `sceptic reasoning' of those (for example, Roger Scruton), who contend 
that it `is the world transparently represented that captures and sustains interest and not the 
representation of that world. ' S2 Friday does clarify the confusion somewhat ' by explaining that 
`photography is an expressive art that merely happens to be representational' and that the 
`contingent possibility of representation is wholly irrelevant to the aesthetic significance' 54 and if 
we accept that direct perception is mediated through our internal mental reference system in order 
to understand what is in front of us, then it makes no difference when looking at a photograph, 
which is mediated similarly. But the argument omits the selective frame of the photograph, the 
possibility of its own fiction and the ungraspable qualities that are termed as `expressive', and 
neither does he encompass changes in the photographic aesthetic since 1970. It might be the case 
49 Walton, Kendall, 'Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism'. Critical Inquiry, 11, December 1984 
50 Friday, Jonathan, `Transparency, representation and expression', Ph. D. thesis 1995 and Aesthetics and Photography , Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2002, pp-67-69 and discusses Walton's theory, pp. 49-57 
sº Friday, 2002, p. 82 
52 Ibid., p. 68 
53 Ibid., p. 54 
54 Ibid., p. 82 
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that, when looking at pictures for information, `the viewers primary encounter is with the world 
and not the photograph for its own sake', but when looking at art practice, we come from a 
different place and look for our expectations to be met in different ways, with the knowledge that 
we are not looking at the world. It is the additional supplementary element to that `real' world that 
is without `specific location' that is all important to this thesis. In my view, the shaky condition of 
`transparency' is exposed as problematic by the inconsistencies encompassed in the work, for 
example of Ruff, described above. And if one accepts the premise of `seeing as', it is not possible 
to entertain `transparency', as we will always mediate the simplest depiction. " 
The supposed `norms' of reality' account for many underlying assumptions derived from the 
signifying process, from photographic properties and from the state of simulation. Our mediation of 
photographs depends on what is the dominant ideological `norm' and assumes a specific condition 
or property as `norm'. In Western culture, it might be the dominating and defining `subject'. More 
specifically in art history, it might be an aesthetic that dictates criteria, as for example, beauty, 
resemblance, spectacle or concept, and photographically it might be the modernist conception of 
truth behind appearance or a `postmodernist' expectancy of fiction. It is, as Barthes states, 57 that the 
current genre dictates emphasis and assumption and each genre carries implicit purpose and 
expectation, which will be defined in turn by that genre. The process very quickly becomes self- 
perpetuating and even tautological. So that what is `real' is `normal': what is `normal' is `real'. 
The peculiar condition of photographic indexicality compounds expectations, which equate what is 
`real' with `truth' or what can be verified, and where verification may be assumed to be visual 
evidence. As is the way with assumptions, they can be stated as fact and lead to further string of 
assumptions. So that resemblance is equivalent to verisimilitude. `Reality' is associated with `what 
really happens', which is what photographs are supposed to record. The truth of the thing resides in 
its `thingness', its substance, as opposed to what it lacks or is absent. Photographs do not `need any 
independent justification' and the having-been-there of things is a sufficient reason for speaking of 
them'. ' Descriptions are therefore sufficient in themselves and do not need any further function. A 
photograph simply relates what is there and is transparent to the world. The `real' appears as 
`obvious' and organized and self-evident. It does not reflect for example the simultaneity and chaos 
of thought. Photographic descriptions verify the appearance of the empirical world, are simple and 
truthful and can be universally recognised as confirming what is `known', what is understood and 
what is familiar. Resemblance is equivalent to the `real' (despite theories that clarify resemblance 
"There are a number of essays that expose the `fallacy of transparency' e. g. Simon Watney , 'Making Strange: the Shattered Mirror' in 
Burgin, Victor, (ed. ), Thinking Photography, London: Macmillan, 1982 
' The term `real' in this chapter is used in the sense of general notions of `reality' rather than in the sense of the pre-discursive `real' of 
Lacan and Kristeva. 
57 Barthes, Roland, 'The Reality Effect'. In Todorov, Tzvetan (ed. ) French Literary Theory Today, trans. RCarter, Cambridge 
University Press, 1982, pp. l 1-17 
Barthes, 'The Reality Effect', p. 15 
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as not being necessary to representation), so that whatever is depicted photographically is 
understood to be `real'. What is `real' is understood to be the equivalent to what is depicted - the 
`subject matter'. Whatever is signified is recognised as signifying what is `real'. `Realism' is a 
system of representation that depends on what and how I have seen them depicted in the past, is the 
equivalent of what things look like, which is equivalent to what is `real'. Thereby there is an 
habitual expectation of `realism'. 
In such a manner the photograph follows contiguous assumptions of the depiction of `reality', of 
authenticity, of the transparency of meaning and of the universality of meaning and reinforces our 
conception of the photograph, which underlines our conception of 'reality'. This last condition of 
`realism' is doubly pertinent and ironic, as we have come recently full circle to the point where 
commentators suggest that we are now returning to a `postmodern realism', 59 following a period of 
being concerned with something else (e. g. appropriation) and having left realism behind. In this 
respect I suggest that not only is it doubtful that we have moved far from the slow process of 
finding alternatives to `realism' but that `appropriation' is assumed to be not 'real'. As will be 
discussed in later sections, what has been termed `postmodern photography' tends to be restricted 
to but a few properties. This palindromic condition of the photographic real is further complicated 
by the need to constantly translate into language - we are intent on translating what is happening, 
what is felt, what is seen into words, which in turn becomes evidence of what we understand as 
reality. Traditional attitudes to what is understood as `real' assert the dominance of the literal over 
the figural. Content is translated as literal `thing' or `subject', rather than more obscure 
reverberation or more `figural' possibilities. This is a `real' that is comfortingly familiar, tangible 
and understandable. Expressing the `real' in this way is celebratory and in terms of photography's 
history, equivalent to `straight' photography, which is seen as `authentic', and only what is 
`authentic' is judged to be worthy. 
Ultimately a photograph looks like anyone except the person it represents. For resemblance 
refers to the subjects identity, an absurd, purely legal, even penal affair. 60 
`Likeness' in portraiture is a complex mixture of expectation and desire for significance. Andre 
Bazin acknowledged that we may be drawn by a desire to replicate the wholeness of a person, to 
find a complete definition, to preserve bodily appearance, `to snatch it from the flow of time', 
which helps us to simply remember the subject, helps us create `an ideal world in the likeness of 
the real'. 61 Allan Sekula identifies this desire `for completeness', as being particularly evident in 
5' Bate, David, 'After Thought'. Source 40, Autumn 2004 asks 'Is an end to the discussion of postmodernism the end of ideology? ' and 
suggests the current era of 'neo-realism'. Jurgen Habermas prefers to label reaction as 'anti-modernism' in 'Modernity - An Incomplete 
Project' in Foster, Hal, (ed. ), Postmodern Culture. London Pluto Press, 1985, (originally published as The Anti-Aesthetic, 1983). 
60 Barthes, Camera Lucida, p. 100-109 
61 Bazin, Andre, 'The Ontology of the Photographic Image'. In Trachtenberg, Classic Essays 
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Fig. 8 August Sander, The Hodcarrier, 1928 
archive, in the compulsive need to categorise and is one of another set of interesting assumptions 
that include the notions of universal language, empirical truth, inventory of appearance. 62 August 
Sander's archive, which Sander himself termed `exact photography', provides a particular example 
of the contradictions of objectivity and meaning, contained in likeness and which continues to 
provoke debate concerning the degree of resonance held in the work. [fig. 8] Sander's work is 
identified as being an interesting phenomenon because of its awkward position `between narrative 
and categorisation', ` between an open ended mode and one that defines. It points to the 
contradiction of the then prevalence of placing photography alongside `truth and reality' and 
consequently aligning the physical distancing of this process with 'objectivity'. Barthes suggests 
resemblance may be more imaginary than factual, something that we expect or imagine, ' as with 
Nan Goldin who states that it is not the likeness that she is looking for in her images, but what the 
subject means to her. " [fig. 12] Barthes describes this something beyond `banal appearance' as air, 
a singular quality and without mask; what Susan Sontag calls `thereness' or `rightness of look' or 
Kozloff calls `psychological resonance' or Goodman might classify as `repleteness'. `The air of a 
face is unanalyzable ... 
The air is not a schematic, intellectual datum, the way a silhouette is. Nor is 
the air simple analogy - however extended- as is "likeness". No, the air is that exorbitant thing 
which induces from body and soul, good in one person, bad in another. ' 67 
Photographic `likeness', in describing the physicality of a person, is only part way to the possibility 
of a comprehensive description of that person. Sontag points out that while a photograph may be 
62 Allan Sekula cited in Baker, George, `Photography between Narrativity and Stasis: August Sander, Degeneration, and the Decay of the 
Portrait'. October 76, Spring 1996 from Buchloh and Willie, Halifax Press of the Nova Scotia College of Art & Design, 1983 
63 Baker, October 76, Spring 1996 
Barthes, Camera Lucida, pp 100-109. There is some similarity to Sartre's reference to resemblance in Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and 
Nothingness (1943), trans. Hazel E. Barnes, London: Routledge, 2001, p19 
65 Nan Goldin, born 1953, Washington. Her work includes the series The Cookie Portfolio 1976-89, and The Ballad of Sexual 
Dependency 1981. I'll Be Your Mirror 1995. Devil's Playground and Heart Beat 2001 and Goldin, Nan, The Ballad of Sexual 
Dependencºv, New York Aperture Foundation, 1986 
6" Sontag, Susan, On Photography, Penguin, 1979, p. 77 
67 Barthes, Camera Lucida, pp 100-109 
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said to show or present, it does not ever, properly speaking, `describe' and proposes that passages, 
say in Dickens or Nabokov, describe the implications of a face better than any photograph. By this 
she means an inventory of implications and feeling `expressed' by that face at different times. 
Physical likeness is an unsatisfactory definition then and not what we're looking for and it is more 
in the region of expression or indefinable quality that captivates what that person means, that is `the 
right look' or Barthes's `air'. However, as Kozloff ponts out, there is the difficulty in determining 
who the `right look' might be for - for me as viewer or the desire of the photographer or in terms 
of a more general, more culturally recognisable meaning. Can I, as a viewer for example, 
appreciate an image of someone that I don't know? - what can someone else's personal meaning 
provide for me? - how can I relate it to my own life? - what sort of meaning is it? - what sort of 
resonance? - what will I look for? - what does it represent as motif? - memories? - similarities? - 
my story? - what I cannot know? - what sort of `rightness of a look'? Perhaps separating these two 
regions; separating the singular from the universal will facilitate exploration of `the right look' and 
how images may define psychological aspects of the individual. Kozloff points to the fact that 
despite our understanding of traditional canons, compositional references, codes of the image etc., 
`beyond this lies something that defeats understanding... here is exactly where critical interpretation 
begins - in bewilderment'. Which leaves us with the fact that many images of people classed as 
portraits, do not possess that non-definitive quality and that when they do, the term `portrait' might 
not be adequate. Benjamin confirms this view in his affirmation of what Sander's archive' was 
attempting to do in the face of what he considered to be kitsch elements in conventional 
photography, at that time: `And suddenly the human face entered the image with a new, 
immeasurable significance. But it was no longer a portrait. What was it?... The observation is 
certainly an unprejudiced one, but clever, also, and tender and sensitive. '69 
The genre of the photographic portrait, in demanding more than simple physical likeness, expects 
an `idea' assigned by the photographer. Kozloff's series of essays7° defining the portrait, provide a 
survey of assumptions about the function of portraiture: for example that the subject must be 
central to the image and that it is the business of photographers to reveal, by means of their special 
vision, the hidden, indefinable quality that captivates who that subject is. A portrait then, must 
reveal the person beneath the mask and include qualities beyond appearance, another dimension of 
`psychological resonance'. " Kozloff states that portraits `make statements about people', 
suggesting that an author's comment is imperative and implying that a portrait must be definitive or 
should at least strive to be. An assumption that a remarkable portrait has to show character via 
August Sander's project People of the Twentieth Century, 1927, `set out to create a typologically oriented documentation of the social 
structure of his time in the form of portraits'. His first book Face of our Time was published in 1929 and the plates for which were siezed 
and destroyed by National Socialists in 1936. 
p9 Benjamin, Walter, .4 Short History of Photography (1931). 
In Trachtenberg, Classic Essays, pp. 210-211 
70 Kozloff, Max, `Variations on a Theme of Portraiture' (1989) and `Real Faces' (1988). In Lone Visions, Crowded Frames: essays on 
photography. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1994, pp. 76-89 
71 The term `resonance' is used by both Max Kozloff and Max Black also and its significance is amplified in Section Two 
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expression, position and pose has led to very deliberate portrait strategies: Portraits that elaborate, 
`perform', `capture' the character or create a mythic representation (e. g. Karsh's Einstein `as 
genius') or an isolated ironic moment (Eve Arnold's Marlene Dietrich 1952, candid and `cute' with 
one shoe off 2). This desire for character has motivated the prevalence of construction through 
performance, typified in its extreme form by such portraits of celebrities as signs of themselves. In 
order to effect this further dimension, it is required that the photographer, in seeking to reveal the 
subject's character, has some `idea' about the subject, affirming a particular value to meaning, 
whether it be glamorising, mythologizing, authenticating, summarising, as motif or permanent 
icon73 and in so doing determine a meaning already translated by the photographer as author. The 
event of portraiture being suitably acknowledged by the participants, establishes boundaries in the 
relationship between the photographer and the one photographed. Kozloff discusses the `discreet 
social and psychological relationship between the subject and the viewer' and the proper distance 
considered necessary in maintaining the clear, distinct positions between the photographer as 
`director' and the subject as `directed' and subsequently `performer', where they may become a 
sign for the viewer, a motif. Kozloff repeatedly describes the nature of the confrontation, between 
the photographer and the subject, as `a battlefield'74 of criteria and concepts and idea, which is the 
dynamic of the `great portrait' so that the definition of portraiture has been, in a sense, the 
confirmation of a game, the purpose of which is for the sitter to reveal herself to us. 75 He defines 
portraits in terms of their intended function that confirm the category called `portrait', which 
excludes those that are not made with `intention'. Thus it is intention that is central to the condition 
of portrait. Resemblance is not the issue but the `representational value', the `recognition of 
authenticity', determined by the spectator. When we know the subject, we can accept or reject `that 
the person in the photograph is `really him or her', but when they are unknown to us, `we become 
`voyeurs' of a dialogue'. But it will be the spectator's response that determines whether the 
`conflict' is a meeting, a hunt, predatory, aggressive or a dialogue. 
Photography's facilitation of representation as motif lends itself to the fabrication of stereotypes in 
the reproduction of fragments, which are in fact only moments in time, but which come to be seen 
as typical and can soon become cliche. Kracauer emphasises the reduction to appearance, where `a 
person's history is buried under a photograph as if under a layer of snow'76 and `meaningful' 
imagery eventually becomes overworn and sentimental and the `past is reduced to a style'. As a 
result of their focus on appearance, photographs eliminate the context of their reference and reduce 
reality to a spatially and temporally isolated fragment. For example the photographic portrait 
eliminates the social embeddedness of the private sphere - the portrayed figure appears in front of 
'For example Eve Arnold's Marlene Dietrich 1952, candid and 'cute' with one shoe off or Peter O'Toole 1963, caught in the process 
of fooling around and 'reckless', viewed at Zelda Cheatle Gallery, London, November 2002 
-' Kozloff, 'Variations on a Theme' 
" Pere Formiguera, 'Confrontation - Portraiture', http: //www. source. ie/is)(artconpor. html, accessed 22/9/02. 
75 Kozloff, 'Opaque Disclosures'. Art in America, October 1987, pp. 1-1 -153,197 
'° Kracauer, 'Photography' cited in Mehring, p. 130 
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an increasingly `blurred background'. Seeing the condition of the photograph as such, moving 
easily, and in contradiction, between the extremes of realism and fabrication interprets it as 
picking, choosing, fragmenting and fictionalising. Mehring suggests that Kracauer's earlier 
concern, that of reality becoming an image, that `the world itself has taken on a `photographic 
face', " anticipates a postmodern view of photographs as constructed representations, emphasising a 
view of reality as simulacrum, 78 where `all visual information becomes arbitrary, one image 
replaces another, none sticks with us'. Whereas, Kracauer's later ideas contribute to the notion of 
the photograph as having to be respectful, pure and real, an attitude which has dominated C20 
photographic modernism. He states that `the essence of the photographic medium its basic 
aesthetic principle, is its realism: the representation, revelation and penetration of physical reality. ' 
Here he sees the photograph as a means `to think through things', of lessening differences, to 
familiarise ourselves with the world and facilitating `the way to a common life of mankind. ' Sontag 
provides extensive discussion of the attempts of successive generations of photographers to show 
us `reality' through new, `photographic' eyes and writing in 1973, seems to have anticipated most 
assumptions presented to us by photography. Hers is a very common sense view that demonstrates 
humanism as being the leading ideology because it hides the confusions of `about truth and beauty 
underlying the photographic enterprise'. Photographers can be seen to be recyclers of visions, 
analogies and meaning, contributing to obsolescence, cliche, anaesthetizing and defining reality for 
the purposes of power: `as a spectacle (for masses) and as an object of surveillance (for rulers) it 
substantiates a ruling ideology, `fix(ing) the fleeting moment... appropriating reality and... making 
it obsolete'. 79 
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Fig. 9 Walker Evans, Allie Mae Burroughs, 
1936 
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Photographic images of people are powerful in their very ubiquity; leaving us bereft of 
discrimination; readily responding to, or ignoring, the beautiful, the pitiable and the horrific. We 
have seen the ease with which `an ugly or grotesque subject may be moving because it has been 
dignified by the attention of the photographer. ' It has become the purposeful photographer's 
obligation to cut through blandness80 and, in so doing, run the risk of elevating the subject, as the 
photograph can so easily transform a subject into an object of display, as with `the beauty of the 
poor'. `Not withstanding the declared aims of indiscreet, unposed, often harsh photography to 
reveal truth, not beauty, photography still beautifies. '8' Both she and later Baudrillard are 
demonstrative in their acknowledgement of photography's ability to misrepresent and be used as a 
substitute for a real connection to the world. 
I move now to the disturbance of the genre `portrait'. Walker Evans was amongst those 
championed as a pioneer of modernist photography and fitted comfortably within the canon that 
verified the photographer as defining the subject with meaning and certainty in such a way that is 
`unchallengeable', elegant and metaphoric' and whose only responsibility was to the `good 
picture', endorsing particular genres as requiring this or that to be great. Descriptions of Evans as 
author have set a tone, an attitude that Evans himself vocally reasserts in his own writing, for 
example in his catalogue of requirements for photographic `quality'. ' In a sense Evans was the 
complete `author' forging `new direction', self-assured, opinionated, inspirational, very much the 
(anti) hero of US photography, slightly at odds with the mainstream approach and stubbornly 
reiterating his own manifesto. `Walker Evans' becomes a sign for his own construction as `author' 
and his certainty, instinct and authorship contribute in turn to the construction of genres, of both 
portraiture and documentary. [fig. 9] With the acknowledgement of Evans's stature in legitimising 
genre, I deliberately use his work as a pivotal example of changes in genre and aesthetic emerging 
in the 1970s. What is additionally significant about Evans is that he comes from the tradition of 
photography as opposed to others who were using photography in more conceptual ways such as 
Ruscha. Kozloff's element of `bewilderment' indicates an area of portrayal that is more ambiguous, 
more dangerous and Evans introduces a bewildering alternative direction that is soon to become 
commonplace. In 1973-5, Walker Evans took around a 1000 portrait photographs of friends and 
students, using an SX-70 Polaroid camera in a peculiarly impulsive and uncontrolled way. [fig. 101 
This body of work is both distinct in terms of its extraordinary quality and effect, and from the 
80 Ibid. p. 15 
81 Ibid., p. 102 
ffi Szarkowski, John, 'Introduction' in Walker Evans, catalogue for exhibition at Museum of Modern Art, New York, 1971, pp. 10-17 
8 This is the first of a number of references made to primary research of Walker Evans Archive, acquired by the Metropolitan Museum 
of Art (WEA. MMA, ), New York in 1994 from the artist's estate and catalogued and kept by the Department of Photographs. WEA, 
M%4A, 1994.250.54 notes on 'quality' for his chapter on photography where he makes lists of what is important to good photography and 
describes the work of Sander, Nadar and Hine among others in Kronenberger, Louis (ed. ) Quality: Its Image in the Arts. New York 
Atheneum, 1969. 
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work for which he is best known and respected. This thesis presents `Walker Evans' as a key figure 
in discussing both the peculiarities of the encounter and the developments in the uses of 
photography, which move away from a confident modernism. 
Fig. 10 Walker Evans, Nancy Shaver, 1973 
Scrutiny of this series repeatedly questions what is assumed to characterise the genre of `portrait' 
and what is assumed to be `good'. As we have seen, an expectation of the photographer's role is to 
construct a meaningful portrait that `captures' some quality in the subject that may be recognisable 
or universal. Given these constraints, Evans's Polaroid images present themselves as something 
other than portraits and are therefore problematic. They are accidentally produced, positionally 
confused and do not appear to be motivated by any clear vision. More traditional `portraiture' at 
least requires the photographer to interpret the individual via expression, position and pose, to 
affirm a particular value in the portrayal, which comments or defines. In its extreme form it 
motivates deliberate fabrications of iconic representation. Supporting information for the 2002 
exhibition Richard Avedon: Portraits, reconfirms the assumed value of portraiture as being the 
construction of character above all else as a sign for `the ineluctable poignancy of the human 
condition'. Avedon's distinctive series of individuals in the American West, ` are made special by 
gesture, prop, expression, perfect isolation, complete focus and become indeed `perhaps the 
grandest portraits ever staged'. [fig. 11] Evans's misalignment with the assumed values of `distilled 
photographic portraiture'85 suggests instead parallels with Andy Warhol's obsessive scrutiny and 
disregard for photographic tradition, with whom he shares a significant deviation from the special 
event of portrayal, towards a more ambiguous placement of the photographed subject somewhere 
between intimacy and formality. `Judged on the basis of traditional genre, such photographs would 
be dismissed as inferior or even as botched attempts. The images have the look of bad amateur 
photographs.. . 
deliberately celebrated his apparently indifferent application of technique. He 
' Richard Avedon in the American West 1979-1984, exhibition catalogue, University of Arizona Centre for Photography and published 
by Fundacion "Ia Caixä", Granada, 2001 
115 Publicity material for the retrospective exhibition Richard Avedon: Portraits in Maria Morris Hambourg and Mia Fineman, `Avedon's 
Endgame', Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York 2002, httpl/www. metrnuseum. org/special[Richard Avedon, accessed 19/1/2003. 
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denied the importance of manual craftsmanship and technical expertise in order to eradicate the 
impression of a specific artistic vision.. . (these) snaps 
do not provide thoughtful interpretations of 
what is seen, nor do they capture `decisive moments'. ' If one applies this description of 
Exposures8' to that of Evans' portraits one can see the same disturbance in process. Together these 
works are indicative of a radical conceptual change, validating a more oblique method, 
significantly moving away from a search for personality or anything at all, making no attempt to 
mythologi se. 
. .; ý 
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Fig. 11 Richard Avedon, Ronald Fischer, 1981 
If we accept that our knowledge of a genre will affect our response to the work, then what appears 
to reside in that particular genre, however aslant the work might appear, will be viewed with 
reference to that particular `symbol system'. ' It is very difficult to step outside the genre of 
portraiture, once it is identified. The language of portraiture has become obvious and natural. ' 
Thus, what we might presume to be of importance can be very noticeably distorted. The use and 
application of a photographic genre rests on what is believed to be centrally important in defining 
that genre, for example, the framing, the care and the decisive vision `catching' the character. In 
Evans's late portraits the pursuit of character is underplayed or not played at all and in this sense 
they are remarkably passive. The difficulty in situating these images resides in the expectation that 
normally a portrait should encompass a comment, should endeavour to shape `an extended 
meditation on life' and that failure to do this may leave us with an image that serves as a fetishistic 
representation and which is merely therapeutic. Here the frame is between the centre and the 
margins of portraiture, residing in an accident or in a kind of happy snap. In this case the genre of 
' Butin, Hubertus, "Oh When Will I be Famous, When Will It Happen? " Andy Warhol's Society Photos'. In Andy Warhol 
Photography, Zurich and New York: Stemmle Publishers, 1999, pp. 249-250 
9' See the series Exposures 1976-87 in Andy Warhol Photography. 
88 Goodman, Languages of Art 
I Rhonda Lieberman, 'Jacques Le Narcissiste', Artforum, (October 2002) 35-36. In this article about the film Derrida, Derrida is quoted 
as saying, in what is almost a paraphrase of Barthes in 1957, 'deconstruction sets out not to naturalize what is not natural. To not assume 
that what is conditioned by history, institutions or society is natural'. Reference then is made to Heidegger's inference that anecdote is 
inferior to thought. Thought in this case perhaps being the equivalent to 'original' seeing' or photographic thought, rather than historical 
or biographical understanding. For Derrida, what is important is the question of narration, or the manner of telling. Derrida extends 
notions about seeing, by permitting us to actively question what appears at first natural. 
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portraiture is very obliquely alluded to in that these images are, only in a literal sense, portraits and 
do not conform to what is expected. 
Evans's earlier `documentary style'90 is readable and gives information. Not only that, it is 
documentary sanctified and touched with expression. This late series of portraits is not in the 
familiar `documentary style', is not easily readable (or identifiable) and sits uncomfortably. If they 
appropriate any mode, it is that of the vernacular, adopting the extreme spontaneity and 
thoughtlessness that the Polaroid camera provokes. Geoffrey Batchen, in the course of editing 
Vernacular Photographies, 91 asked a range of people to respond to questions about the nature of 
the `vernacular photograph'. Definitions by different respondents describe many of the qualities of 
Evans's late portraits, placing them as touching the vernacular: `visceral', `immediate', `without 
consequent ambition', `naivety', `lacking self conscious expression', a `non-category', `confusing', 
inarticulate'. In the same article, Elizabeth Hutchinson suggests that definitions of the vernacular 
depend on `subjectively determined formal qualities in the images' that are in turn thought to be 
`more "authentic" and "direct" than those.. . of art photographs'. Evans' are exactingly 
`direct' and 
apparently `authentic' in that they do seem alarmingly naive. If one accepts that the term vernacular 
cannot be ascribed to the work of a professional photographer, then one can describe it as 
`vernacular style', as Daile Kaplan suggests, much in the way that Evans adopted `documentary' as 
indicative of most of his work. 
In 2005, portraiture is no longer constrained by definitions which state that `any dilution into 
unselfconscious activity, any immersion within the subject's own time' weakens the `idea' of 
portraiture. Instead, the contemporary portrait actively endeavours to use strategies that encourage 
such `immersion'. Kozloff again, speaking of Goldin's work, hints at a development in portraiture 
that `demonstrates a fluidity of raw contact before any hint of performance rises up to intervene in 
and conclude the portrait' and indicates a move away from prescriptive, performative portraiture 
and towards a method where the subject is photographed whilst preoccupied and their attention and 
involvement is elsewhere. Goldin's work [fig. 12] holds a significant place in the story of `realism' 
and with regard to descriptions of photographic aesthetic as vernacular. Her diaristic approach 
started in the early 1970s with The Cookie Portfolio and The Ballad of Sexual Dependency and 
were shown as slideshows with music in the 1980s. Her work is known for an uncensored 
90 Evans, Walker, `Lyric Documentary', transcript of a lecture delivered at Yale University Art Gallery, New Haven, March 11 's 1964, 
p. 38 in WEA, MMA. 
91 Batchen, Geoffrey, 'Vernacular Photographies'. History of Photography, 24: 3 (Autumn 2000) 262-271. Batchen interestingly and 
coincidentally touches on a number of aspects relevant to this argument. His respondents include Daile Kaplan, Douglas Nickel and 
Elizabeth Hutchinson. 
92 Kozloff, `Opaque Disclosures', p. 146 
93 Kozloff, 'Real Faces' (1988) in Lone Visions, Crowded Frames, pp. 76-89 
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Fig. 12 Nan Goldin, Siobhan on our bed, 
NY 1990 
documentation of friends and lifestyle, inseparable from her own experience and suggest a 
sensitivity derived from the relationship itself rather than appearance. ' This approach, and more 
specifically the use of series demonstrates a position where the portrait does not remain static but 
encourages this `raw contact' and continuing relationships that emerge within and between images. 
It moves away from an isolating procedure and provides an example of portraiture, which subverts 
our expectations of the genre by a number of means: highlighting a literal ordinariness of subject 
and context, disrupting narrative and special event, rupturing the relationship between author and 
subject with intimacy, removing the author's `idea' or vision. One could say that a search for 
`realism'- and elusive `quality' is the ultimate quest - motivating the most banal and bizarre 
constructions that perpetuate and celebrate evermore crude versions of the `everyday' - Henry 
Peach Robinson's `the glorification of the Unessential' - `bare, bald, and ugly'. 95 Raw and 
unbeautiful realism has become a kind of trope for `truth'. 
The `compulsive desire for completeness' is one aspect evidently missing from the purpose of 
many contemporary photographers. Boris Mikhailov, ' [figs. 24,47-51] for example presents work 
that is open ended, clumsy, unresolved. Just as Szarkowski, in 1963, suggests that Sander was to be 
seen again as a refreshing contrast to much photography at that time with its focus on the 
I Goldin, 'I'm usually engaged in activities that I'm photographing', video of interview In My Life, Whitney Museum exhibition 
1996-7, shown at Whitechapel exhibition The Devil's Pla_ygrouund 
95 Peach-Robinson, Henry, 'Idealism, realism, Expressionism'. In Trachtenberg, p. 93 
96 Boris Mikhailov. Born 1938, Charkov, Ukraine, lives and works in Kharkov and Berlin. 
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Fig. 13 Thomas Struth, 
The Horsfield Family, 
1989 
`ephemeral' and the `moment', 9' so too photographers now, such as Mikhailov, stand in contrast to 
much photography since Sander. And in a very different way, Beat Streuli's depiction of people' 
[fig. 55] would echo both Sander and Szarkowski in approaching 'expressive meaning of the 
prototype, of a sense of permanence, of stability. In learning how to photograph that which 
happens, we have forgotten how to photograph that which exists and prevails. ' 99 Thomas Struth, " 
[fig. 13] Rineke Dijkstra [fig. 14] and Ruff have all used the genre of portrait; photographed series 
of individuals taken with their knowledge and with, in different degrees, their complicity. They all 
rely on the baldness of pose and provide extreme examples of the photographed subject being very 
aware of the event. But these are examples where the formality of the portrait genre has been 
appropriated as a `style', where the genre of portrait itself and aesthetic value has assimilated an 
extreme form of self-awareness. 
The condition of `portrait' amplifies a particular corner of structuring representation of the 
individual, versions of which will be described in the work of a restricted selection of 
photographers throughout this thesis and establishing a number of recurring themes. The 
photograph is constrained by the constraints of ideology, just as we are determined by the 
constraints of others, which the portrait amplifies. To engage in analysis of the `portrait', requires 
acknowledgement of the legacy and influence of phenomenology as explaining the immediacy of 
experience and requires that this is positioned with respect to structures `bigger than' and 
containing the individual, which the individual does not experience directly but which influences 
97 Alfred Steiglitz's `moment of equilibrium', Cartier-Bresson's `decisive moment', Robert Frank's "'n-between moments' catching 
reality off guard and revealing disequilibrium. 
' Beat Streuli 1957 Switzerland. Lives in Dusseldorf and New York. Streuli's studies of people in large cites around the world, New 
York, London, Sydney, Tokyo. They are presented as installations, large-scale colour or black and white photographs, slide projects and 
films. 
90 John Szarkowski cited in George Baker, `August Sander: the Portrait as Prototype'. Infinity 12, no 6, June 1963 
10° Thomas Struth. Born Geldern, Germany, 1954. Struth is known for a number of photographic series one of which is that of portraits 
of friends and acquaintances in their own environment. 
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and shapes any form of text, in this case the photographic. To represent the former, I refer in 
particular to Sartre's existentialism and the latter, Derrida's deconstruction. The process of 
psychoanalysis demonstrates the difficulty of authenticity subject to the opacity of our 
unconscious. Post-structuralism confirms that we can be authentic only within the bounds of a 
constructed ideology. 
,. 
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Fig. 14 Rineke Dijkstra, Tia, 1994 
What follows is an investigation of the direction of change, of what constitutes the `horizon of 
thought' that contains the `portrait', no longer simply a vehicle of `man as agent of humanism' but 
a complex compilation of subtle variants on projects using the convention of the portrait, from 
formality to banality to super-banality. Before returning to the constructions of meaning in Part 
Two, Part One scrutinizes the ambivalence of the `pose', the implications of the encounter between 
the photographer and the one photographed, the issue of objectification and alternative possibilities 
of `telling' portrayal. 
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PART ONE: THE EVENT AND THE ENCOUNTER 
Introduction: PHENOMENOLOGY 
As the relationship between the photographer and `subject' is fundamental to the photographic 
portrait, and as an instance of one-to-one encounter, it is necessary to look at its phenomenology, 
its conditions and its consequences for the `pose' and the central issue of subject: object 
relationship. Part One identifies elements that derive from the particular nature of the encounter 
itself, in order to examine factors governing the degree of subjectivity / objectivity and the nature 
of a supposed objectification in any particular relationship. The photograph affords the opportunity 
to explore the meeting of subjectivities in the formation of an image, which is governed by them. 
This section discusses the portrait session, founded in existential experience, as demonstrating the 
difficulties concomitant with the `pose' of presenting anything that `resembles' the individual, 
untouched by others. I use the term `event' to describe the occasion of a photographic portrait 
session as an alternative to `moment', `shot', `instance' (amplified by Cartier-Bresson's `decisive 
moment', ' which presumes the privileging of that moment) and which does not allow for a more 
protracted encounter that extends before and beyond the shutter release. I want to suggest that the 
encounter implies the possibility of, at the very least, an exchange between the photographer and 
depicted-subject and to emphasise that the portrait, as its manifestation, can be seen as a profound 
event on two levels - in the original encounter of two people, face-to-face, and in the reverberation 
of meaning in the subsequent encounter of viewer and photograph. Thus the resulting image 
presents positions of two phenomena simultaneously - the exchange between two individuals and 
the enigma of the image that depicts that exchange. `Event' is a term derived from Derrida's 
reference to `photographic event' in Droit de Regards, and echoes Levinas's reference to the face 
as a `fundamental event'. It serves to underline a conception of photographic portrait as paralleling 
Levinas's ambivalent use of the term `face', which is both literal reference to an actual face that we 
might know, 2 and metaphoric. 
Phenomenology, in as far as it attempts to make `sense' of the world as it is encountered, and to 
describe our experience of the world and our experience of `others' in the world, indicates a 
number of points at issue for the photographic portrait. In this section, I position the portrait with 
I Cartier-Bresson, Henri, 'The Decisive Moment' (1952). In Goldberg, Vickie, (ed. ) Photography in Print, Writings from 1876 to the 
Present. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1981 
2 Wright, Tamra, Peter Hughes, Alison Ainley, 'The Paradox of Morality: an Interview with Emmanuel Levinas'. In Bernasconi, Robert, and 
David Wood, (eds. ), The Provocation of Levinas, Rethinking the Other. London and New York, 1988, p. 168 
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regard to the conditions suggested by phenomenology, firstly in the way we understand thinking 
and perceiving and secondly in the way that we experience and understand our constitution in 
relation to others, which informs the essential relationship between photographer and the subject- 
photographed in the process of the portrait. The first is pertinent to the way we look at a 
photograph of another person and the second to the way we position ourselves when being 
photographed. 
A phenomenological conception of the subject refers back to the work of Husserl, who has been 
critiqued by Sartre, Kristeva, Levinas, Derrida and Lyotard and aspects of this analysis are 
pertinent here as they identify conditions that determine the nature of the `pose'. For example, 
Kristeva speaking of process, Levinas flattening out subject / object and Derrida of division and 
dissemination. Levinas's description of Husserl's phenomenology is one of the most succinct: 
A methodical disclosure of how meaning comes to be, how it emerges in our consciousness of 
the world, or more precisely, in our becoming conscious of our intentional rapport with the 
world. The phenomenological method enables us to discover meaning within our lived 
experience; it reveals consciousness to be and intentionality always in contact with objects 
outside of itself, other than itself. Human experience is not some self-transparent substance or 
pure cogito; it is always intending or tending towards something in the world that preoccupies 
it. The phenomenological method permits consciousness to understand its own preoccupations 
to reflect upon itself and thus discover all the hidden or neglected horizons of its 
intentionality... phenomenology enables us to explicate or unfold the full intentional meaning of 
an object. ' 
Levinas describes phenomenology's evolution from Husserl's `abstract and ponderous" approach 
to Heidegger's reference to `real' feelings that we can recognise, and to his analysis of `anguish' as 
being the fundamental mood of our existence. So that human moods such as guilt, fear, anxiety, joy 
or dread are no longer considered as separate physiological sensations or psychological emotions, 
but are recognised as the ontological way in which we feel and find our being-in-the-world, 
grounded in daily experience. 
Above all, it is the self-consciousness of phenomenology that is most pertinent to the portrait 
encounter, as the photographer's attention and intention magnifies a reciprocal awareness of the 
other. Part One presents a series of different perspectives that formulate attitudes to self and other 
from which to interpret the photographic encounter. The following chapters present variants on the 
theme of `being', `becoming' and `disappearing' demonstrated in self-reflection and in the direct 
experience with an other person. I start with Derrida's description of an encounter that serves as an 
3 `Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas and Richard Kearney' in Cohen, Richard A., (ed. ), Face to Face with Levinas. State University of 
New York Press, 1986, p14 
4 Cohen, Face to Face with Levinas, 15 
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illustration for the fluid nature of thought. Following Sartre's oppositional stance, which could be 
described as the norm for modernist photography, they present increasingly radical departures. 
Their significance indicates the break with the humanist tradition and introduces the instability and 
ambiguity of the poststructural condition. Each attitude introduces a version of uncertainty that 
suggests equivalent responses in the photographic encounter, to questions such as how do these 
conceptions of being inform our response to images of others and how are they made manifest in 
the photograph? How do contemporary strategies contend with the awareness of subjectivity or 
objectification? 
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Chapter One: BEING 
BEING-DIFFERENT 
Fig. 15 Shizuka Yokomizo, Stranger series 
no. 10,1999 
A current trend of very deliberate methodology provides a background that betrays self-conscious 
attitudes; I cite three such instances and ask what are they saying implicitly about assumptions, 
knowledge or desire? Shizuka Yokomizo fabricates a situation whereby, having sent her subjects a 
letter inviting them to be photographed at a prearranged time, she photographs them looking out 
from an illuminated window, anonymously (Stranger series 1998-2002) [fig. 15]. 5 Marjaana Kella6 
has photographed people from the back (Reversed Portraits 1996-7) [fig. 16] and under hypnosis. 
Both manufacture the avoidance of interaction with their subjects entirely. Bettina von Zwehl' 
adopts elaborate methods to control the appearance of her subjects and to limit the variability of 
expression or mannerism; in one series they are told to hold their breath and in others are presented 
in a highly prescribed and artificial manner. [fig. 17] Each artist adopts a bald portrait methodology 
as a frame, which entirely contradicts their appearance as `portraits'. They betray an awareness of 
the latent opposition implicit in the portrait encounter. Yokomizo and Kella display an anxiety to 
demonstrate subjectivity untouched by directorial control and tackle the encounter in a way that 
circumvents confrontation; they avoid being accused of objectification. They are implicitly intent 
on demonstrating the difference in subjects not reduced to a reflection of themselves and thereby 
5 Shizuka Yokomizo, born in Tokyo 1966, studied in London from 1989-1995. Lives and works in London. Her subjects receive a 
letter: ' I would like to take a photograph of you standing in your front room. A camera will be set up outside the window in the street. If 
you do not mind being photographed please stand in your room and look at the camera through the window for 10 minutes. I will take 
your picture then leave'. All Davies, BBC South Yorkshire, on the occasion of an exhibition at Site Gallery, Sheffield. 2004, describes 
her as 'working in the gap between self and other'. 
' Marjaana bella, born 1961, Orimattila, Finland. Lives and works in Helsinki. Her series of works include Interiors 1997-97, Reversed 
Portraits 1996-7, Hypnosis 1997-2001 
'Bettina von Zwehl, born 1971, Germany and studied photography at London College of Communication and Royal College of Art. 
Now Iives and works in London. Other series include Anatomy of Control 2000, Rain 2003, Alina 2004 
37 
the same. One can see a determination to challenge the oppositional dilemma in accepting it as 
inevitable. Each instance is indicative of strategies that swing between control and lack of control, 
and explain the event as being of necessity fundamentally an invention - fictive. Ultimately they 
reiterate the theme of distance versus intimacy (perpetuated in Cruel and Tender) and of 
photography's oscillation between extremes; one that confuses photographer and photographed 
subject and here of distanced stand-off. 
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Fig. 16 Marjaana Kella, Reversed Portraits, 
1996 
Derrida's oblique account' of the encounter introduces the predicament of coming to terms with 
being-different from others with a playful demonstration of self-division, which can be equally 
`read' in visual texts as above, in images that confront uncertainty and which begin to explain the 
`impossibility of representation'. His thinking articulates a number of themes that emerge from his 
conception of being and thinking in the presence of another, with regard to the photographic 
encounter and to the inter-changeability of narrator, character, reader when looking at photographs. 
His articulation of the initial disarray and mobility in the internal experience of thought introduces 
the phenomenological pre-condition of our face-to-face encounter with others and the fundamental 
condition for the photographic portrait. The process of differentiation from others requires firstly 
recognition that we are of the same (human) and secondly comparison and reflection to understand 
that we are not the same, and that its articulation is complex. With regard to describing our 
encounter with others, Derrida, finding inconsistencies in Husserl's text for example, exposes 
perception and representation as being more complex than straightforward, and inseparable from 
subjectivity, culture and history: `They, (the other egos) ... are not simple representations or objects 
8 Lecture given by Derrida What is called not thinking, Loughborough University, November 10"' 2001. A reference to Martin 
Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking? Lectures delivered at the University of Freiburg during the winter and summer semesters of 1951-2 
and translated by J. Glenn Gray, New York, Harper & Row, 1968 
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represented within me, synthetic unities of a process of verification taking place `within me, ' but 
precisely `others'... subjects for this same world... subjects who perceive the world... and who 
thereby experience me, just as I experience the world and in it `others'. ' Further to this he points to 
a certain absurdity in Levinas's critique of Husserl, which articulates the complexity of interaction 
in our engagement with others: `there is the same and the other, and then the other cannot be the 
other - of the same - except by being the same (as itself: ego), and the same cannot be the same (as 
itself: ego) except by being the other's other: alter ego. That I am also essentially the other's other, 
and that I know who I am, is the evidence of a strange symmetry whose trace appears nowhere in 
Levinas's descriptions. ' 1° Derrida rejects Husserl's descriptions of an ideal `objectivity' of the 
object and insists that the `presence' of the present is unsustainable, that consciousness is not self- 
contained, not an `undivided unity of the present moment'" and just as perception requires memory 
and anticipation, consciousness requires representation, discourse and alterity to recognise itself. 
Derrida's attitude introduces a state of being that reflects a subject who is reflexive and divided, 
`irremediable self division and difference itself', and which is worked upon day-by-day, for 
example, by speaking with others. 
Fig. 17 Bettina von Zwehl, from Untitled II, 
1998 
Derrida's lecture What is called not thinking, demonstrates self-division in operation and the self as 
`radically discontinuous', as profoundly influenced by others, both for-himself and for-others. As a 
display of reflexive dialogue, it takes the form of commentary on his thinking that takes place 
whilst in verbal exchange with an other. The resulting questioning follows the interaction with his 
experience, with the other, and with the implications of the process. Derrida describes this process 
v Husserl quoted in Derrida, Jacques, ' Violence and Metaphysics' (1964). In Writing and Difference. London and New York: 
Roud edge, 1978, p. 15-ß 
10 Dernda, Writing and Difference, p. 160 
" Howells, Christina, Derrida. Deconstruction from Phenomenology to Ethics. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998, p. 22 
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of not becoming, but of being moment-to-moment something different, in following his own 
speech, as a sort of `psycho-phenomenology', a meta-narrative that has `intrinsic multiplicity' and 
mobility of thought and intention. He is at once narrator/ character/ author/ reader / writer/ written 
about - all interchangeable - following each other - all acolytes. He asks: "what truth is there 
here? " And assuming the possibility of a substitution of one for the other, the supposed truth of the 
6 we', he demands that the other understand him: "put yourself in my place". 
What I did, what I said, what I did not do, what I would have done, what I could have done. 
Saying other than what one thinks, misleading the other deliberately, I display the simultaneity 
and disarray of thought - the discontinuity. I distinguish between moment A and moment B- 
what happens is that I can be different in each moment. In another moment. I have changed - 
everything has changed and I am unable to account for how it has changed. Changing every 
instant, infinitely and at every instant forgetting what I was and what I have thought of. 
"Everything is clear from that moment on". I blurt out something without thought - the words 
leap out. I am the person for me and the person for you - what am I doing here? -I am 
dislodged from identity. Each time there is an interruption, my relation to you changes - there 
is no relation without this break - it is necessary. I let myself be surprised by the pull of another 
- the necessity coming from another. Meaning what we say - what we do when we don't think: 
"I didn't mean it". I meant something else. Not meaning it intentionally. There are many voices 
in me. Sometimes another voice speaks through me. There are a number of inhabitants in me. If 
I can't write a text with one voice, then I use a number. For someone to mean what they say - 
the possibility of saying something else must remain open. If you close this possibility then there 
is no language. For the truth to be true meaning, to be meaningful, the possibility of a lie must 
remain open. My identity with myself - as subject - is how I see or understand myself or what I 
do with myself. The tete-a-tete between two friends -I ask the other to understand, yet I can 
never know her. Can she ever understand me as I can never know the furthest extent of myself. 
And if she did know me it is one aspect only - not my aspect. "Put yourself in my place" - can I 
do that? "Disappearing at work in the phenomenality of appearing" - as we appear, we 
disappear. "The person for me and the same person for others". How they are different, 
different `I's, different subjects. 12 
Others speak of thought as if it is continuous, perhaps not logical, but understandable and clear - as 
with one thought at a time. Husserl's view is that interior monologue presents the ideal of 
unmediated self-presence because "I understand what I say as I am saying it, or even before I say 
it". Whereas Derrida demonstrates that "I don't know what I think until I hear what I say, or only 
one aspect of myself at the moment that I hear the words come out of my mouth. " He demonstrates 
12 This is the first example my appropriation of a text. In this instance spoken. I have paraphrased and reconfigured fragments and 
thereby liberally interpreted the lecture given by Derrida What is called not thinking, Loughborough University, November 10`h 2001 
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that we cannot entirely control what we think or what we say or how we say it. It is as multi- 
faceted as it is simultaneous, disrupted and lateral. "Everything is clear from that moment" when 
we speak, but we can be different at each moment as we continue to speak. The words in the 
company of others lead the way, without pre-thought. There is an "essential discontinuity", an 
"eternal interruption" in being different, which cannot be accounted for. Essentially the other 
makes a difference to what one thinks and says, letting oneself be surprised or swayed, watching 
what follows and what does not follow in interruptions, allusions, in metonymic snapshots. Derrida 
displays the necessary state of being-different, to both oneself and to others at each moment, as an 
event of thinking that is not so very different from fiction. He demonstrates the multi-subjectivity, 
the absence of univocity as an opportunity that is the simultaneity of idea and possibility. This 
condition of fiction and possibility, which is nascent in thought, is necessarily present in aesthetic 
statements, both singular and collective. What is implied for the photographic portrait in Derrida's 
self-division and multi-subjectivity is that the `pose' must always be ambivalent, that any moment 
can only be incidental, as it is but one of many alternatives available to the subject. That the subject 
follows herself, watches what she says and what she does, constructs what she appears to be to 
others, creates a fiction of herself on the basis of arbitrary decision. The process is discursive. 
Verbal or visual statements, of which one is the portrait, establish what someone becomes. What is 
suggested also in the arbitrariness of either-this-or-that is an adventure not to be feared, is positive. 
This mesh of uncontrolled, unpredictable factors parallel what must be involved in the making of a 
photographic portrait and it is the very haphazardness that suggests its fictional property over any 
pretensions to `truth'. 
Fig. 18 Annelies Strba, 
Iii 1/tc Kil, ltcn. 1'aýýý 
Because we can relate to what we imagine is our direct experience of the world, irrespective of the 
complex sociological and ideological frameworks that encompass it and the psychological interior 
that colours it, direct experience appears to be undeniable and simple; what we feel we experience 
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is what we feel we experience. In such a way we construct a convincing conception of reality. 
Phenomenology attempts to put aside the personal and subjective in order to examine what is 
Fig. 19 Richard Billingham, Ray's a Laugh series, 1996 
universal. The legacy of phenomenology and its search for a purity in direct experience underlies 
much of the ideal of `pure photography' (Paul Strand's `absolute unqualified objectivity'). " The 
modernist photograph, reliant on the properties of the medium itself, and its peculiar access to the 
`real world', and the `straight' and direct objectivity that is available to it, holds a certain reverence 
for the photographer who can bracket off subjectivity. 15 Similarly the privileging of the present and 
absolute moment idealised by Husserl's phenomenology, is echoed in photographic ideals such as 
`decisive moment'. However, Strand's assumptions of honest objectivity acknowledge the 
photograph's limitation and anticipate the contradiction that inhabits its potential for `both 
objectivity' and fiction that I discuss in Part Three. Photography has inherited the legacy of `real 
feelings' and day-to-day experience, which can be seen as a `sign' for a contemporary reality found 
in the depiction of extreme ordinariness for example. [fig. 18] We may have rationally absorbed the 
post-structural adjustment that there is no `truth' outside representation, that we do not experience 
the world and others in a simple osmotic process of the senses, unpolluted by the structure of the 
world in which we exist. And if we acknowledge `the theoretical, cultural, social and emotional 
content of the photograph', 16 we must accept that one logical reaction might be the abandonment of 
responsibility and control, not only from interaction with the world but at least from notions of 
authorial control [fig. 19]. In the context of my own photographic project, such a consequence 
disrupts any search for an original essence or quality. But the photographic portrait struggles still 
with two notions: the existence of an essential individual and the possibility of objective 
13 Burgin, Victor, The End of Art Theory. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave, 1986, p. 16. `In the same movement in which the 
phenomenological world is transformed into the 'real', so the real is transformed into reality-in-ideology. ' 
14 Strand, Paul, 'Photography and Photography and the New God' (1917). In Alan Trachtenberg, (ed. ) Classic Essays on Photography. 
New Haven: Leete's Island Books, 1980, pp. 141-142. 'This is an absolute unqualified objectivity. Unlike other arts which are really 
anti -photographic. This objectivity 
is of the very essence of photography, its contribution at the same time its limitation. ' 
15 Walker Evans talking about detachment, in interview with Jonathan Goell in his studio Brookline, Massachusetts, August 4,1971, 
p. 19: `Well, its like a surgeon. It's psychologically determined. A surgeon has to be detached from the human pain when he's going to 
cut into somebody or detached from gore and its effect on him. ' 
16 Burgin, Victor, (ed. ) 77tinking Photography, p. 9 
42 
representation. So that the search for `truth' persists, albeit the only one possible must be 
constituted by me, as Derrida relates, in the process of my relating to my own experience - as it 
was then, is now and will be in the next moment. 
Derrida's monologue serves as a representation of the complex exchange between two people and 
an introduction to the state of uncertainty that I want to pursue in this thesis. Derrida's multi- 
faceted and discontinuous attitude demonstrates the susceptibility of self to the whims of chance, 
circumstance and the idiosyncrasies of encounter, which demand either Subsumption or resolute 
assertions. This condition underlines two things; firstly the nearness of any presentation, however 
self present, to fiction. And secondly one could say that our `radically discontinuous self division' 
is the first place of the ineffable, which we both seek to escape and to retrieve, and that all 
representation seeks reconciliation, clarity or compensation from that initial disarray - in some form 
of pictorial resolution. The question for this thesis is how this might be achieved, retaining a 
position alongside and not in absence as with Yokomizo or Kella. 
Derrida's procedure of multi-positional dialogue is one that I adopt intermittently in Part One as a 
reflection of that initial state of reality and of our `intrinsic multiplicity', before linguistic ordering 
takes over. In contrast I move now to Jean-Paul Sartre's stance, which epitomises the extreme 
consequence of division and difference that is enlarged and validated in the context of photography 
by Barthes's adoption of it in Camera Lucida. 
THE EXISTENTIAL ENCOUNTER 
I decide to "let drift" over my lips and in my eyes a faint smile which I mean to be 
"indefinable", in which I might suggest along with the qualities of my nature, my amused 
consciousness of the whole photographic ritual: I lend myself to the social game, I pose, I know 
I am posing, I want you to know that I am posing, but... this additional message must in no way 
alter the precious essence of my individuality. " 
The `pose' is exemplified here by Barthes's description of his derivation of `existence from the 
photographer'. As an exploration of `pose' requires a preliminary survey of notions of `subject' and 
`object', concomitant with the event of looking, I briefly review here the experience of looking and 
being looked at, as described by Sartre and Barthes and its implications for the photographic event 
more generally before returning to more specific instances of photographic practice. Since Camera 
Lucida has initiated so much review already", reference to it is confined to specifically significant 
17 Barthes, Roland, Camera Lucida [1980], trans. Richard Howard, London: Vintage, 1993, p. 11 
'R For example Shaweross, Nancy M., Roland Barthes on Photography: The Critical Tradition in Perspective. Gainsville: University 
Press of Florida, 1997 
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passages for this thesis. I am concerned to describe the nature of the encounter between the two 
protagonists and the kind of displacement of the subject that occurs in the event of the photograph. 
I will first clarify uses of the term `subject' in this context. Applied metaphorically, the 
grammatical subject lends it its most easily understood meaning, that of the nominative part of the 
sentence, which names something else, that assimilates the `object' in the sentence. We then have 
the distinction between `subject' as subject-matter (Goffman's model19) as a study that is `treated' 
or `handled', 20 and `subject' as an individual, psychological subject. Subject-matter, identified as a 
state or role in text, is defined by preceding texts and ideology, akin to motif and as there are many 
subject positions according to context, it follows that `subject' as subject-matter is not static, but in 
process or simultaneously multi-faceted as suggested by Derrida. When specifically applied in the 
context of photography, the subject-depicted is that which is the object (intended) and object 
(purpose) of the artist to `treat' or `handle' with the aim of `expressing' an intention that is 
projected (intended) on to the subject so treated and which is `contained' by the subject-depicted as 
subject-matter. Derrida consistently uses the term `subject' in the sense of specific subject-matter, 
Kristeva makes a distinction between `unary subject' as a complete and defined whole, as opposed 
to a `subject in process' and Baudrillard uses both these senses and moves between the two 
throughout his writing on photography. His premise `disappearing as a subject' is meant in the 
sense of relinquishing the position of being `the mind which thinks', thus becoming object. Barthes 
more precisely distinguishes between three subject positions: operator (the photographer), 
spectrum, (the one photographed), spectator (the viewer) and provides a convenient shorthand for 
clarifying the uses of the term subject. He himself defines his position as spectator or spectrum, 
whereas Baudrillard tends to talk from the position of operator. 
All of sudden I hear footsteps in the hall. Someone is looking at me! What does this mean? It 
means that I am suddenly affected in my being and that essential modifications appear in my 
structure. 21 
Barthes essentially locates Sartre's existentialist view in the specific instance of personal encounter 
with the photographer22 and extends the analogy of encounter to that of photography itself; thus the 
'v Goffman, Erving, Gender Advertisements, London: The Macmillan Press, 1976, p. 11 
20 The Chambers English Dictionary defines `subject' thus: `opposite to the object about which it thinks, a thing existing independently, 
that part of a sentence denoting that of which something is said, the mind regarded as a thinking power' and the word `object' as `a thing 
presented to the senses, that which is thought of as being outside, different from the mind (opposed to the subject), that upon which 
attention, interest or some emotion is fixed... the part... upon which the action of a transitive verb is directed'. In contrast it is also used 
in the sense of purpose or goal, or as the object of discussion (subject-matter). 
2' Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness (1943), trans. Hazel E. Barnes, London: Routledge, 2001, p. 259-261. `I have just glued my 
ear to the door and looked through a keyhole. I am alone and on the level of non-thetic self-consciousness. This means first of all that 
there is no self to inhabit my consciousness, nothing therefore to which I can refer my acts in order to qualify them. They are in no way 
known; I am my acts and hence they carry in themselves their whole justification, I am pure consciousness of things and things, caught 
up in the circuit if selfness, offer to me their potentialities... a pure mode of losing myself in the world, of causing myself to be drunk in 
by things as ink is by a blotter... But all of sudden I hear footsteps in the hall. Someone is looking at me! What does this mean? It 
means that I am suddenly affected in my being and that essential modifications appear in my structure... First of all, I now exist as 
myself for my unreflective consciousness... I see myself because somebody sees me... it is recognition of the fact that I am indeed that 
object which the Other is looking at and judging'. 
22 Camera Lucida is prefaced 'In Homage to L'Imaginaire' His debt to Sartre is evident throughout. 
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photographic pose becomes metaphor for the encounter with others and the choices that are 
presented to him. Sartre's description of looking through the `keyhole' demonstrates a pure act of 
self-absorption in the process of looking, without reflection or awareness, as if consciousness is the 
act of looking itself, until that is, there is awareness of being seen by another. ' The major factor in 
the constitution of self awareness that defines our relation to the world and others is the co- 
dependent position of `being-as-subject' or `Other-as-object'. Barthes describes the experience of 
being photographed as so influenced by the photographer's intention, so immersed is he in the 
inevitable performance, that the `disassociation of consciousness from identity" necessarily results 
in him becoming `object' and ex-posed. 25 Because to maintain oneself as subject, consciousness 
and identity have to remain together and once being is contained in the `landscape', of the 
photograph, it is possessed, appropriated and no longer itself: `once I feel myself observed by the 
lens, everything changes: I constitute myself in the process of "posing". I instantaneously make 
another body for myself. I transform myself in advance of the image. 21 
My series of `A', 2003 
Sartre's position of self-absorption is important in distinguishing between being photographed 
without knowledge or consent and being photographed knowingly and consciously. If I am not 
aware of the event, I am free to simply and purely act. If I am aware, I am forced into assuming a 
23 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 359 
' Barthes, Camera Lucida, p. 11 
25 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 259 
26 Barthes, Camera Lucida, p. 11. 'Once I feel myself observed by the lens, everything changes... The transformation is an active one'. 
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position, and `so I discover myself in the process of becoming a probable object'. Barthes's 
`performance' presents the balance that exists between two contradictory positions and the inherent 
conflict between operator and spectrum. On the one hand, he describes being `prone to the other's 
possibilities'27 and deriving `his existence from the Photographer', ' being forced to assume some 
arbitrary countenance that will define him in some way. In this extreme state of awareness, Barthes 
insinuates that he is constructed by the photographer who does not allow him the neutral `body that 
signifies nothing', his `profound self' nd is forced to present a someone who signifies something. 
On the other hand, Barthes engages in a mischievous game with the photographer, taking the 
opportunity to reconstruct himself in an `active transformation' and as performer, he becomes 
absorbed in the construction of self as he wants to be, counteracting the objectifying look with a 
self-subjectifying performance that is active and not passive. 
I am fixing the people whom I see into objects; I am in relation to them as the Other is in 
relation to me. In looking at them I measure my power. But if the Other sees them and sees 
me, then my look loses its power. 29 
Sartre's complicated set of interactions30 of reciprocal constitution is neatly applied to the 
context of self-conscious photographic portraiture, where a balance of power creates a state of 
interesting conflict, looks, concessions and assertions. Sartre's notion of consciousness is that of 
either total subjectivity, separate from the world in unreflective, absorbed looking or aware of `a 
look fastened upon us' and thus unable to imagine or project elsewhere. 31 In this state, as object, 
self-containment is disturbed and fractured, identity is placed `out there' and he disassociates 
himself from himself, watches himself. Barthes's description of dissociated consciousness 
illustrates one of the inherent contradictions of possibility in the photographic encounter. He is both 
posed and ex-posed, on display and exploring himself, re-stating himself, taking control in his self- 
awareness. Barthes (trans)poses Sartre's description and amplifies the dimension of opportunity as 
playing with position and (dis)position. Here is a fissure in the certitude of objectification - at the 
point where the subject-depicted controls the photograph. Barthes emphasises the ambivalence of 
`becoming', indicates a process of transformation, rather than a clear division between one state 
and another. He describes the photograph as representing `that very subtle moment when, to tell the 
truth, I am neither subject nor object but a subject who feels he is becoming object. This 
metaphor very simply describes the balance of control involved, being neither in control of the 
-1 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 265 `This is the shock which seizes me when I apprehend the Other's look... I experience a subtle 
aleienation of all my possibilities' and Barthes echoing this concerning the photographer as the other's look: `the essential gesture of the 
operator is to surprise something or someone... and that htis gesture is therefore perfect when it is performed unbeknownst to the subject 
being photographed. ' p. 32 
11 Barthes, Camera Lucida, pp. 11-12, 'If only photography could give me a neutral, anatomic body, a body which signifies nothing!... I 
am doomed by Photography always to have an expression: my body never finds its degree zero, no-one can give it to me'. 
y Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 266 
30Ibid., p. 223 'as the subject of knowledge I strive to determine as object the subject who denies my character as subject and who 
himself determines me as subject'. 
31 Ibid., p. 235 
32 Barthel, Camera Lucida, p. 14 
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resulting image, nor out of control of its presentation of self. He is neither one thing nor the other; 
he is `of parenthesis', somewhere in-between self possession and the photographer's appropriation 
of him as fodder for meaning, used to represent something more universal beyond the individual. It 
engenders a neither-nor, in-between state that leads to a wobbly, unstable potency in the image that 
serves as a displacement of meaning for others, as spectators. 
Applying Sartre's thesis to my own experience in photographing A exemplifies the interplay of 
control, assumptions and possibilities in the course of this process. Kozioff's `battlefield' suggests 
that the condition of `director' and `subject' effectively produces two events in conflict, the 
resulting manoeuvring creating a dynamic -a space of uncertainty. In my own example, my 
agenda is counterproductive. I want to remain impartial, I want to produce interesting images. I 
want to find the essential character of A but as much as I might try, my work is reflective and 
analytical rather than spontaneous. My relationship wrestles with my desire to `picture' - not so 
much a battle between I-photographer and my-subject, as between my conflicting intentions. The 
image expresses my response to A, my idea of A. So that A's position, as both herself and my- 
subject is unclear. A-as-subject, confronted and looked at is obliged to make decisions, to look back 
at me-as-photographer in some particular way and it is in this place that her position can change - 
be that of compliance or defiance, challenge or duel, of submission or assertion, vulnerability or 
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power. And if one switches focus; in my own self-consciousness I am watched and in a sense 
object of the encounter also. 
Adim p uýý 
. _,. 
Throughout the photographic session, A is extremely uncomfortable. My insistence on a close 
and direct focus does not allow her to escape my look. The occasion forces the focus on the 
event itself and forces her to be centre stage and the object of my attention. I am looking at what 
she looks like. I am searching for something undefined and she knows that I am searching for 
something and not being sure what that something is, she is not sure if she wants me to see it. I 
might find something that she doesn't want me to find, something hidden, even from herself. 
Even prepared, she cannot hide everything and she recognises that perhaps something 
unexpected will be revealed. She is between certainty and uncertainty; uncomfortable. The all- 
important fact is that she is being looked at with intention, both as an object simply being 
looked at, and more subjectively with an unspoken idea in mind. She is the object of my 
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concentration; my attention being determined by my intention. Because I am the one doing the 
doing, I am the subject and she becomes object; she knows that she is being interpreted, being 
represented. In the course of this event of being looked at, her awareness of her own existence 
alters. She is both subject and object (in control and out of control), in herself and for the other 
(me). In recognising that I am there as well as herself, her perception is, not only of her own 
relation to the world, but that my relation to the world is affected in turn by her and 
subsequently her relation to the world and so on. We are in a shared world and she is no longer 
central to it, despite being the centre of attention. She is a particular sort of centre of attention 
for me the photographer. She is possibly, at this point, more important to me than she is to 
herself. As she is under my direction, she is in my control. As she knows me so well, trust may 
not be an issue, but it is still unknown territory and ever so slightly dangerous. 
The legacy of the existential encounter perpetuates the hierarchy of subject, notions of conflict and 
violation and confirms prejudices and constraint associated with the `pose'. Three implicit 
conditions of existentialism (the inherent suspicion of others, the contradiction that, despite being 
free subjects we are determined by others and the centrality of the `I' as an individual) contribute to 
notions of power and possession commonly associated with photographing people, advanced by 
Barthes and Sontag, and appearing persistently throughout photographic theory and critique. 33 If 
we accept the positional norm of subject-to-object relation as deriving from the metaphoric 
equivalent of the nominative and accusative in grammatical structure, the photographic portrait 
visualises the position of power as residing in the transitive role of the one who `takes the picture'. 
In consequence, because we are vulnerable to the penetrating look and in the fear of revealing 
ourselves, we erect a barrier (a mask). The state of the `pose' is one of extreme ambivalence, 
complexity and possibility embedded in statements of `obvious' fact that perpetuate the idea of the 
`mask', as its pre-condition. The many contradictions that Sartre describes, such as the desire of the 
lover to possess the other (whom once possessed, is found to be a mask only), ` have obvious 
parallels in photography. Sontag points out that violation is implicit in the language of 
photography35 (being `taken' or `shot') and asserts its predatory nature. Conversely, Barthes 
attitude to the situation is more opportunistic, one that `allows (me) to see "myself as other"36 and 
which confirms `my ambivalent position in the world'. This more equivocal view asks `to whom 
does the photograph belong? '37 The level of power and possession, if it exists, stems from the 
relationship at the point of taking the photograph and the roles assumed by each position. It is not 
adequate to state the operator's or the spectator's or the spectrum's position as certain; they each 
;; See for example Pace, Allessandra, Interview with Beat Streuli, `The total possession of the other takes place when the latter is 
unaware of being seen, is caught in the most complete solitude, not wearing a mask to respond to someone's presence or gaze', Portraits 
98-00, La belle estate. Torino: Galleria Civica d'Arte Modema e Contemporanea, 2000 
34 Sarre, Being and Nothingness, p. 393 
AS Sontag, On Photography, p. 14 
36 Barthes, Camera Lueida, p. 12 
37 Ibid., p. 13 
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fluctuate between positions. The question of vulnerability and power, in terms of being 
photographed, depends on the expectations and boundaries assigned to the `I', the relationships of 
the operator and of the spectrum to the world, the state of the relationship between them and 
whether there is conflict or exchange, the photographer's attitude - of sympathy, curiosity, 
amusement..., the spectrum's attitude - of acceptance or participation, and whether those 
photographed are taken with or without the subject's knowledge. 
_W, aam 
If we are compelled to re-constitute ourselves in every encounter, then each time we unravel 
ourselves differently and try another version in response to the other. And if this re-constitution is 
interpreted as violation, then it is a normal, necessary consequence of interacting with others. As 
reciprocal `seeing' establishes this procedure as a sort of exchange, the issue rests with the degree 
of exchange, or the extent of difference between the positions, attitudes or expectation, in each 
instance. Sartre refers to the situation of interaction as a `disintegration of the universe, ' `a little 
particular crack in my universe', 38 a crack that creates uncertainty and thereby vulnerability, the 
place where one person's world collides with another's. My focus here resides in this `crack' of 
uncertainty and the possibility for disturbance of the positional norm via its visualisation. As 
indicated by contradictions suggested by Barthes's parenthetical `becoming', possible subversions 
of subject-to-object work through self-absorption, recipricocity, protection, re-construction and 
disturbances of control, intention and desire. Photographs can record that `crack' in which the 
relationship intervenes and turns predictability around. Avoiding reiteration of the `moment', I 
prefer to describe this point as the one that allows the positioning process to display and 
' Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 256 'a little particular crack in my universe... ' 
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Fig. 20 Walker Evans, Caroline Blackwood, 
1973 
reverberate. One can see this occurring in Evans's Polaroid portraits39 for example, where 
interdependence and counter- positioning determine the image. Here deliberate `posing' sessions 
follow a distinct pattern, which appear to have been directed in a conventional manner. But this 
`posing' deviates from convention in a number of ways. It is opportunistic and careless, the level of 
closeness to the subject is alarming and the degree of intrusive scrutiny is obsessive. The images 
give the appearance of a luminously focal isolation as the subjects stare up at him, startled, 40 
sometimes distorted as he pushes the focal length to its limit. [fig. 20] The pattern of interaction 
with the camera is visible as one can see the sessions starting fortuitously, denying formal 
preparation, and proceeding with the subject's insouciant participation, when the images are more 
telling. It is the singular nature of each exchange and the order of reciprocation beyond the 
photographic event that distinguishes one series from another and which directly relates to their 
raw quality and energy. 
Fig. 21 Rineke Dijkstra, Kolobrzeg, Poland, July 26 1992 
39 During the last two years of his life, in 1973-1974, Walker Evans took around a 1000 portrait photographs of friends and students, 
using an SX-70 Polaroid camera. The photographs discussed are kept in the Walker Evans Archive, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New 
York. 
401VEA. MMA, D. 1994.262.124, Joyce Baronio, October 11te 1974, startled or D. 1994.262.191 Gay Burke, May 4th 1974 
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The crucial factor determining `possession' or `objectification' requires the photographer's insular 
detachment, 41 and a look of authorial intention with the purpose of construction; nominating, 
classifying, fabricating. The portrait work of Struth, Ruff and Dijkstra belies the appearance of 
simplicity with complex self-consciousness. These portraits confirm and question the existential 
position of `objectivity' by adopting formal procedures that accentuate the event, isolate the subject 
and utilise the elaborate preparation and paraphernalia of studio photography as a strategy. This 
level of process transfixes the encounter, which serves as a frozen metaphor for fear and 
uncertainty, inherited from theories of `being'. But they each disturb the binary logic of the process 
in some way. Dijkstra's metaphoric `formality' fabricates an opportunity to see `photography 
transform(ing) subject into object"' so that we see in its operation their becoming `a certain icon'. 43 
[fig. 21] Dijkstra uses the subjects' state of self-consciousness (for example the bathers, nearly 
unclothed and awkward in the extreme awareness of their bodies) as the event around which to 
focus her subjects. She deliberately chooses occasions of vulnerability in an attempt to reveal 
something else. In terms of Sartre's equation of consciousness with self-awareness, her method 
uses self-consciousness to reveal what the subject themselves are not aware of, what is 
`unconscious'. " Dijkstra is looking for a place where emotion is more `tangible'. 45 Like many 
before her, she is `looking for a kind of purity, something essential from human beings.. . 
how 
people distinguish themselves from each other'' However in Dijkstra's portraits, the notion of a 
photograph as containing the subject, constructed by another as an `idea', is one that is confused by 
a double-take of self-consciousness that offers an interesting combination of traditional constraints 
with contemporary psychological strategies with respect to the degree of com-posure or ex-posure 
of her subjects. Formality is no longer innocent of the play of subject-object positions. Ruff and 
Struth subvert apperception of meaning by reduction, whereby strategies of objectivity produce the 
signs of objectivity. Strategies that relinquish directorial involvement in the determination of the 
image seemingly relinquish the photographer's subjectivity, simplistically understood as being 
quirky, inspirational or emotional. Struth's images appear, in all respects, to adopt the traditional 
studio portrait [fig. 22], but beyond determining the frame, he allows his sitters to position 
themselves in whatever way they choose within it, in contrast to a situation that frames (conceives) 
`a certain idea of the sitter'. Struth uses the tension created in the theatre of isolation and 
artificiality, in an attempt to make the encounter more 'charged and intense'47 to `reveal a slice of 
nature' and the results sit somewhere in the `crack' between individuality and motif. Struth and 
41 Walker Evans talking about detachment, Jonathan Goell interview in his studio Brookline, Massachusetts, August 4,1971, p. 19 
'Z Barthes, Camera Lucida, p. I1 
43 Rineke Dijkstra in the interview with David Brittain, in Creative Camera April/May 1999, 'I isolate them, so they become a certain 
icon or symbol'. Dijkstra, bom 1959, Sittard, The Netherlands. Her portrait subjects have included Almerisa, a Bosnian refugee 1994- 
2003, Portuguese bullfighters 1994, mothers, 1994, Israeli soldiers 2002-3 and beach portraits taken across Europe and America 1992-6. 
She uses large format cameras that require a formal preparation. 
44 Di j kstra, Creative Camera , 1999 
'ü Di jkstra cited by Julian Rodriguez in 'The Art of Business'. British Journal of Photography, March 17'x, 1999 
46 Dijkstra, Creative Camera, 1999 
1 Gisbourne, Iii. Interview with Struth, Artist's Monthly, May, 1994 
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Ruff's emotional minimalism and obtuse analogy takes us somewhere toward the metaphoric use 
of portrait. 
Fig. 22 Thomas Struth, 
Anci and Harrt/ Guv, 1989 
In considering how we might configure conceptions of the `essential individual', I move now to 
Sartre's earlier work Psychology of the Imagination, which usefully describes how we might 
imagine a known individual, or conceive of and respond to that person's image. As with the 
`keyhole' experience, he typically grounds his thesis in anecdote, in an experience that we can 
relate to. This time he describes various encounters with Peter and utilises the metaphor of 
photograph to effect an understanding of imagination. He suggests that in terms of feelings 
provoked by a person in reality, we respond similarly when looking at an image of that person in as 
much as that the sensation that is evoked in direct apprehension, is evoked again when looking at 
their photograph. Thus in terms of registering my relation to the person or of how I understand 
them, I do not distinguish between the image and the person herself. Sartre's affective sense is 
useful, because it identifies the possibility that Friday's `expressive qualities' are inserted into the 
photograph by us in response, rather than by the photographer. Sartre talks about the `essence of 
the image" by which he means the `idea' of that person beyond the physicality of appearance. The 
fact that Sartre uses `image' in the sense of both imagined and photographic, is significant in that it 
legitimates focus on an internal (imaginative) conception of that person sufficient to determine 
feeling, quality or response. It is in effect in direct opposition to Walton's condition of transparency 
as a result of `looking through' to the person, because here the recognition focuses on my feelings, 
rather than the requirement of physical presence. So that when describing my response to an image 
of someone, I am in effect talking of myself - of my idea of that person held in the image. The idea 
of a reciprocal `seeing' proceeds from a constitution in being looked at, toward confirmation of my 
48 Sartre, Psychology of the Imagination, p. 2 
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'feelings, ideas, volitions, character"' as reflected in others. The photograph could be said to 
recount and summarise my response, rather than being a summary of them. And so I approach the 
possibility that my conception of A is more abstract, more fictional than having any basis in reality. 
v t' p ms s. 
`Affective' Projection 
It is my friend, A. It is A tempered by me. The picture delivers A although A is not there. A is like 
that; she has such brows, such a smile. Everything I perceive enters into a projective synthesis, 
which aims at the same true A, a living being who is not present. Every feeling I have about A, 
every certain quality of A is involved and projects upon her image a certain indefinable quality 
of what A means for me, which gives her that affective meaning for me; that certain density; 
that intrinsic individuality. I construct her by means of my feelings towards her. My image of 
her depends on my construction and I could construct different ones according to my feelings at 
the time - as playful, as irritating, as affectionate. My feeling of irritation is not the 
consciousness of irritation; it is of A being irritating. In that way, my feelings are intentional 
and project onto my object A. They are qualities in myself rather than in her. They constitute the 
sense for me Eher. My feeling towards her constitutes my understanding of her as that person. 
This is the same sensation as in my dream; whilst I may not `see' her, I `sense' it is her by 
means of her `qualities' or the feeling I have toward her. I recognise the feeling in me rather 
than what she looks like. My feelings `represent one way of self-transcendence'. so 
Our understanding of a thing is given to us `through the order of its qualities', " which determines 
its essential character. I pick up different perceptions, some visual, some not, in succession as 
conceptual attributes, so A for example, appears uniquely to me as someone in relation to me in 
size and quality, as disordered and sharp, small and contrary, her head to one side. This `affective' 
49 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 223 
50 Sartre, Jean-Paul. Psychology of the Imagination (1940). London: Methuen, 1972, pp. 13 - 77. This is my 'translation' using Sartre's 
model of describing Peter, to the context of my relationship with A. 
51 Sartre, Psychology of the Imagination, p. 77 'These qualities are in a sense not properties of the object, so that basically the very term 
'quality' is inappropriate. It would be better to say that the qualities constitute the sense of the object, that they are its affective structure: 
they permeate the entire object. ' 
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sense comes close to the term `projection' used in psychoanalysis to indicate that feelings or 
qualities that we `see' in others, are often more a reflection of what we ourselves feel but do not 
recognise. It comes down to recognition of a feeling that the object arouses in me, so that looking at 
an image will arouse recognition of certain qualities, which are indefinable but evoke a particular 
feeling in me, for example the gesture of her hands: `white hands... at the same time the feeling 
reproduces most poignantly what there is of the ineffable in the sensations of whiteness, of fineness 
etc'S2 
Sartre explains that in passing from perception to the image, the individual conceived, `acquires a 
certain generality'S3 in the sense of the most typical characteristics. In apprehending the various 
qualities of the representation, each exemplar characteristic stands for a mass of qualities. The 
further removed from my original perception, the more A becomes an object of imagination and 
coloured by my accumulated knowledge of her, moving further toward her `equivalence' for me. ' 
Sartre's 'prototype 55 is particularity, rather than a generality, an idea of A that holds all my 
experience of her to date, which is different from a conception as motif that aspires to a more 
universal application. Sartre's affectivity goes some way to explain the aspect beyond `likeness', 
which adds the dimension as air (Barthes) or `psychological resonance' (Kozloff) and which 
identifies what is ineffable in that person as residing in myself rather than in the photograph. The 
desire' to re-create a sensation of feeling, rather than image, suggests that the origination of my 
52 Ibid., p. 8I 
I Ibid., p. 58 
5' Ibid., p. 59 
Ibid., p. 58, 'What we are looking for by means of the photograph is not Peter as he might have looked for us the day before yesterday 
or on such a day... it is Peter in general, a prototype which serves as a thematic unity of all Peter's individual traits' 
56 Ibid., p. 80 , 
'Desire is a blind effort to possess on the level of representation what I already possess on the affective level; through the 
affective synthesis it aims at a "beyond" which it pursues without being able to know it, it directs itself upon the affective `something' 
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motivation to photograph the `essential' character of someone (and that the reality of photography) 
is the search for that elusive, indescribable quality that provokes an equivalent sensation. To 
present `diverse appearances" of the subject is ultimately `intentional synthesis' of my own desire. 
Looking for the `essential nature', for signs of perpetuity, constancy and truth' in what is in fact 
momentary and incidental in evidence of a certain mood in A, is an approach that requires intimate 
knowledge of someone. With subjects less familiar, something incidental and infrequent can 
become a convenient attribute that suffices to convey `evidence of internal states'. It is in this way 
that the `candid' image of an individual can display the contradiction that one feature, which is 
uncharacteristic in the subject, can become emblematic of the photographer rather than of that 
subject. 
Sartre's view of consciousness makes sense - we can relate to it. He affirms long established 
conceptions of power in relation to the Other, the Same and grounds them in situations we can 
recognise, confirming them as common sense. The relationship between photography and 
existentialism is mutually confirming. Sartre's affective sense is useful in that it indicates the ease 
with which constructions move from an `honest' desire to find something `essential' to a fiction 
that thinks it is essential. What Sartre importantly signifies is the possibility of a conception that is 
independent of the person, which holds a collection of qualities as a kind of fictional construction 
and suggests that an image may depict the photographer's subjectivity rather than that of the 
subject's. It is a conception that anticipates my discussion of metaphor in Part Two. I move now 
toward less predictable premises that determine attitude and position, in recipricocity and 
participation, in opportunity and reconstruction, in non-oppositional encounter. 
THE NON- OPPOSITIONAL ENCOUNTER 
Alterity is not at all the fact that there is a difference, that facing me there is someone who has a 
different nose than mine, different colour eyes, another character. It is not difference, but 
alterity. It is alterity, the uncompassable, the transcendent. It is the beginning of transcendence. 59 
Levinas offers alternative possibilities for the relationship of photographer-to-depicted-subject and 
presents this possibility by means of the ambivalent term `face', which establishes a recognition of 
the other's equivalent difference that neither reverses, nor submits, to power. In discussing how we 
are affected or disturbed by `the face of the Other', like Sartre, he places his thinking in the 
material situation of the encounter, where it is impossible to divorce the notion of alterity from the 
which is now given to it and apprehends it as the representative of the desired things. So the structure of an affective consciousness of 
desire is already that of an imaginative consciousness, since here, as in the image, a present synthesis functions as a substitute for an 
absent representative synthesis'. 
S' Ibid., p. 13 
18 Goffman, Gender Advertisements, p. 7 
Levinas, Emmanuel, `The Paradox of Morality an Interview with Emmanuel Levinas' with Tamra Wright, Peter Hughes, Alison 
Ainley, trans. Andrew Benjamin and Tamra Wright in Bemasconi, Robert and David Wood, (eds. ) The Provocation of Levinas. London 
and New York: Routledge, 1988, p. 170 
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more personal and subjective. But it is a very different view to Sartre's oppositional position. 
Levinas's fundamental addition to the condition and possibility of the encounter is that of a non- 
oppositional difference and a de-centring and repositioning of subject. In Levinas's version the 
position and possession of power reverberates. 
Coming from the tradition of phenomenology, Levinas questions, provokes and subverts the 
fundamental givens of philosophical thought - the centrality of the subject and `truth', pivotal also 
to conceptions of the photograph. His use of language plays with its inherited assumptions `to 
deconstruct what it has constructed and unsay what it has said... interrogate or challenge its own 
concepts, its own terms or foundations. '60 Acknowledging Derrida's work of deconstruction, he 
establishes the root of perpetuation lying in language that equates `truth with an intelligibility of 
presence' and attempts to avoid the habitual processes of thinking, which is ingrained in us, such as 
comparison and judgement, the insistence on goal and the focus on the `I'. 61 This then challenges 
the habitual stand-off position in the confrontation between two people. Most significantly for the 
state of the encounter, Western philosophy has forced the `Other' to be assimilated or subsumed by 
the Same (what is understood to be `Me') by assimilating into my-self that which lies outside 
myself, and reducing the Other to my understanding thus avoiding the `shock of alterity'. 62 It is 
habitual to make the unfamiliar, familiar. But Levinas sees the other as utterly alien and `unable to 
be assimilated'; ` his aim is to assert `a non-allergic reaction to alterity'" and to allow a questioning 
of the Same provoked by the very strangeness of the Other. He seeks an encounter, which 
maintains this strangeness and which does not involve dominance or control, 65 and locates his 
critique of these issues in what he calls `face', both a material and metaphoric place, somewhere 
above, alongside or between confrontation. ` In Goodman's terms `face' is `representation as 
alterity' - what is not me. The implications of this resound in the photographic encounter as an 
encouragement to confound, to allow peculiarity and abjection, rather than reducing the subject to 
my framework, transforming the other as `vehicle' for `my idea'. Levinas's insistence on 
maintaining the strangeness of alterity, requires that in some way, we must distance ourselves from 
ourselves sufficiently to `receive' the other. 
With the use of the word `face', because it is so particular, Levinas introduces physicality into a 
discussion that usually speaks more abstractly and ambiguously (as with Heidegger's Dasein). The 
60 Levinas in dialogue with Richard Kearney in Cohen, Richard A. (ed. ), Face to Face with Levinas. Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1986, p. 22 
61 ibid., p. 19, `Perhaps the most essential distinguishing feature of the language of Greek philosophy was its equation of truth with an 
intelligibility of presence. By this I mean an intelligibility that considers truth to be that which is present or copresent, that which can be 
gathered or synchronized into a totality that we would call the world'. 
' Davies, Colin, Levinas, An Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996, p. 40 
° Ibid., p. 24 
64 Levinas, Emmanuel. Totality and Infinity, An Essay in Exteriority (1961), trans. Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press, 1969, p. 47 
Levinas, Totality and Infinity. p. 43 
Ibid., p. 203 
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concept `face' is not `fixed and given'67 but is instead a dawning of meaning, `an epiphany', `a 
breach within what is known and knowable', (Sartre's `crack'). Levinas's `face' is a fundamental 
conceptual shift that is sensible and unintelligible, both abstract and material, ` a metaphor for what 
we cannot know, for what is ineffable. `Face' is not specific in the sense of individual 
psychology, 69 not objective but a phenomenal potential between individual psychology and object. 
Levinas uses several frameworks for his `face', which evoke contradictory parallels. As a 
`fundamental event', `the action of the face' makes it active rather than passive object. He 
describes it as demanding rather than questioning, `irreducible' and not known and yet compelling, 
both vulnerable and authoritative. It has the propensity to be both unpredictable and potent. 7° This 
sort of attitude is less resigned to objectification than Sartre's conception and if we apply these 
conditions to the portrait, it suggests a `subject' that is defiant, elusive and ambivalent, certainly not 
submissive, and not necessarily revealing their psychology. Levinas's manner of thinking is 
fundamental to this thesis in problematising our basis for perceiving things and conceiving ideas. It 
signifies that for contemporary photography, the portrait can lie somewhere between psychology 
and object, between sensation and concept and be both abstract idea and material reference. 
The eyes break through the mask - the language of the eyes, impossible to dissemble. The eye 
does not shine; it speaks. " 
Importantly for the development of photographic aesthetic and alternative conceptions of portrait, 
Levinas disturbs the dominant position of vision in our understanding the world and in interacting 
with others with metaphoric reference such as `the visible CARESS of the eye' and `one sees and 
hears like one touches'. He disassembles vision in a way that creates a kind of intransitive action of 
the eye that is commensurate with hearing. He associates seeing the face with touch - and in seeing 
your face, I am touching you and am touched by you. In such a way, he fragments the subject so 
that I am both subject and object. The eye sees - looks out and is `intentional'. In looking at a face 
there is an intentional exchange, but in touching, it is more material, more visceral, less detached. I 
touch and am touched and in hearing, am receiving as well as putting out. The encounter becomes a 
metaphorical seeing; seeing literally, seeing-as-understanding and now seeing-as-exchange, as is 
inevitable with touch. In challenging the supremacy of vision, he subverts the supremacy of Eye/I 
and the seeing of the `I' as central. Levinas's is a more positive apprehension of the other - in the 
sense of `understanding'. In establishing the encounter as an exchange, Levinas realigns the power 
base of response with responsibility. As we are compelled to respond so we are compelled to be 
responsible. `The approach to the face is the most basic mode of responsibility ... the face is not in 
front of me but above me. Our presumption that we have the right to exist is challenged by the 
6-" Davies, Colin, Levinas. An Introduction, Polity Press, 1996, p. 47 
I Levinas, The Provocation of Levinas, p. 174. 
69 Ibid., p. 171. 
11 bid., pp. 168-9 
" Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 66. This attitude is referred to as 'embodiment' in current terminology and is cited more commonly as 
deriving from Merlau-Ponty. 
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existence of the other. I cannot find meaning on my own... the other's right to exist has primacy 
over my own... The ethical rapport with the face is asymmetrical in that it subordinates my 
existence to the other'. 72 The intransitive eye suggests a passive approach to `taking' images, an 
abdication of direction that depends on looking. The suggestion of exchange shifts the balance 
between the two protagonists and promotes a sort of sensitivity other than looking, perhaps 
deriving from the relationship itself, such as has become familiar in the work of Goldin. 
Alternatively it suggests the possibility of a photographic exchange that shifts focus from the 
subject-as-matter toward re-situating the experience as oblique. 
It is not a particular quality or collection of qualities that describes the alterity of A. She 
does not simply have different qualities from me, but has all that is not me as a quality itself. 
It is not clear whether I am looking for dissimilarity or I am looking ideally for some sort of 
fusion. My relationship with her identifies a collective representation, a common ideal or 
common action. In recognising similarity with myself in many ways, "we" become a sort of 
collectivity. It is a collectivity formed around what is common to us both, a `third term' 
which serves as an intermediary. We become "we " rather than you and I. It is this 
collectivity of "we" that makes her appear alongside me rather than opposite, facing me and 
is in contrast to the "I-you". The "I-you" is the fearful face-to-face situation of a 
relationship without an intermediary. Here the interpersonal situation is not the reciprocal 
relationship of equivalents, two interchangeable terms. A and I. We are not interchangeable, 
but our positions to each other are. A is not only an alter ego; she is what I am not; she is 
' Levinas, Face to Face with Levinas. pp. 23-4 
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Facing Another 
the weak one, whereas I am the strong one. She is not where I want to be. If I want to be 
strong then she must be weak and she is the stranger, the enemy and the powerful one. What 
is essential is that she has the qualities by virtue of her alterity - she is not me. 73 
It seems that we may be in some way a collective "we. " We are different and difference implies 
that self and other can only be in opposition, but Levinas disrupts this; his avoidance of opposition 
is key and similar to Derrida's, as not opposed, not even different, but separate. 74 In contradiction 
to a straight either or subject-to-object position Levinas describes the other in comparison as the 
paradoxical condition of possessing opposing attitudes to the other; she is the weak one and she is 
the powerful one - the same and not the same. His thinking starts from the same premise as Sartre 
in that I continually reconstitute myself in response to the world and others, but inserts a more 
positive interpretation that is a constant process. The realignment of the `I' that is oppositional, 
controlling and reducing, indicates the condition of postmodern dislocation, assumed later by 
Baudrillard with regard to `disappearance of the subject'. 
Levinas's insistence on non-oppositional difference results in a flattening out of subject and object 
positions. He deviates from Sartre's encounter that expects conflict and violence, whereby I give 
meaning to the face of the other, I project myself onto the other and the meaning is fundamentally 
about me. Like Derrida, Levinas doesn't see the loss of some final presence, or of centrality of the 
subject, as problem or threat's and instead represents encounter and alterity as a positive affirmation 
of strangeness and uncertainty that is opportunity. Levinas accepts as inevitable the dilemma in 
encounter that cannot find resolution and sees `the impossibility of reducing the other to myself as 
an advantageous responsibility to the other. He seeks to restore subjectivity, not in terms of an 
idealism that centres on the Ego, 76 but by avoiding the reduction of the Other to the limitations of 
the subject's own experience and knowledge. Neither does he seek to replace one hegemony with 
another, but aims to dissipate the opposition as a non-confrontational acceptance of what is outside 
the self. He suggests instead a position of difference whereby relation to alterity does not exclude, 
familiarise or alienate - an assertion of subjectivity and of alterity, which is mutually affirming. 
What Levinas contributes is a way of looking at the photographic encounter metaphorically, as his 
use of the term `face' is ultimately one that challenges the more obvious connotations of actual 
face-to-face encounter. He stretches this to what cannot be materially evidenced in encountering 
alterity. Levinas's discussion of the `Other' presents the antithesis of phenomenology, which relies 
'My 'transcription' of Levinas, 'With Another and Facing Another' in Existence and Existents (1947) trans. A. Lingis, Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995, pp. 94-5 
74 Davies, Levinas, An Introduction, p. 42 
Lcvinas, Face to Face with Levinas. p. 22 
Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 26 
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Fig. 23 Thomas Ruff, Portrait, 
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on, and describes what appears, what is normally associated with perception and knowledge and 
intentionality that positions the other as becoming an object. The `face' (as Levinas uses it) is more 
than appearance. " Significantly for the photograph, what may at first appear to be a 
phenomenological encounter presents us with an anti-thetical situation that is something else 
beyond appearance, between individual psychology and object, between `real' person and abstract 
concept, between familiar and strange. Levinas's `face' confirms the conclusion, derived from 
Sartre's affectivity, that any meaning must be mine only (and has little to do with A and remains 
separate from her). Struth states that he wants his portraits to reconcile with his own projection, 
based on his own knowledge and experience of the subject. 78 Ruff s images are baldly clear but 
overtly inauthentic. His authenticity lies with the primacy of the image. He constructs his vision, 
his ideal, his own version of purity in total artifice and replaces representation with production and 
fiction [fig. 23]. The control and consistency in Ruff's presentations, the pose, the size, the regular 
background, the proportion within the frame reduce individuality to abstraction. So that every thing 
in the image assumes enormous significance; she is wearing a choker and red T-shirt or she would 
be bare-necked or she would be naked. In this absence of psychological narrative, we are bound to 
read meaning into the least clue, the least sign, where the smallest detail becomes significant in our 
search to understand the girl's individuality. We seek prescriptions for response; expression, 
" Lev i nas, The Provocation of Levinas, p. 171 
'g Thomas Struth interviewed by Mark Gisboume, 'Struth'. Art Monthly, May 1194, pp. 3-9 
61 
character, individuality, narrative and Ruff denies us them all. Ruff presents a face with as little 
indication of the other's individuality or ego as possible and gives us image and surface only. Very 
like Levinas's insistence on discussion of `the face' not referring to the physical face but to 
something that is not describable and not knowable - the ultimate Other. 
Fig. 24 Bons Mikhailov, Case 
History, 1999 
The existential stand-off (either face-to-face or in a photograph) is challenged by Levinas's 
simultaneous possibility of the same and strange. Because we think of alterity as difference, we 
cannot easily comprehend something that is both the same and strange, without looking toward 
resolution, without `totalising meaning'. Looking at someone's face presents essentially 
contradictory positions; the compulsive search for what is recognisable and familiar in something 
that is strangely different and unknowable; the possibility of possessing both power and 
vulnerability. Such dissymmetry balances out the `I' and the `you' to something more ambivalent, 
less arrogant, less certain - suggests an attitude more of exchange. In the context of the photograph, 
the possibility of non-oppositional encounter problematises and realigns the `natural' assumption of 
power of subject-photographer over the other as subject-depicted. An encounter that is non- 
oppositional impacts on the photographer's approach to subject and can be seen in fundamentally 
different authorial attitudes for example in Goldin's work or Evans's Polaroid portraits where the 
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reverberation of subject-to-object power is visible. Struth and Boris Mikhailov'9 provide perhaps 
surprising alternative examples of what I might call a challenge to opposition. Mikhailov's Case 
History [fig-24] documents aspects of poverty and social disintegration, specifically the life of the 
homeless (BOMJI), following the collapse of the Soviet Union; his work has consistently 
challenged ideologies using controversial subject matter and irony. Case History being particularly 
confrontational and precipitous, reverses the generalised humanist position of compassionate 
presentation and confronts the assumptions of power position in patronage, as it affronts our 
condition of comfortable privilege recognising those less comfortable and more vulnerable than 
ourselves. Instead of bringing others nearer to us (the Same), Mikhailov keeps them and the 
experience separate - strange. This `strangeness' holds specific histories of Stalinist Russia; the 
politically manufactured stigma attached to unemployment, the subsequent lack of sympathy for 
the unemployed and homeless. Mikhailov's theatricality amplifies the strangeness: `I took the 
pictures displaying naked people with their things in hands like people going to gas chambers. ' 
Levinas's approach marks a fundamental shift from striving for unity toward acceptance of alterity. 
He suggests that it is better that we fail to `totalize meaning', because thereby we remain open to 
the possibility of `irreducible otherness of transcendence'. He offers radical alternatives in two 
respects. With regard to the encounter, the possibility of accepting differences rather than 
assimilating them and with regard to meaning, the possibility of the awkward and unfamiliar, rather 
than the bringing together of uncoordinated fragments in comfortable aesthetic forms. In terms of 
the resulting image it suggests an excess of content or meaning that cannot be contained in the 
indexicality of the image and one that negates or denies any predictable intended 'idea'. The arena 
that makes possible an excess of meaning and content is essentially what I am pursuing here. 
The key points here that impact on portrayal are the lack of control as a result of the irreducible 
`face' that exceeds my possession and the inevitability of fictional construction. Fundamentally 
poststructuralism establishes phenomenology's concern to describe a consciousness independent 
from a `straightforward' perception, as a problematic central to the experience of the portrait, both 
in its making and in its reading; it can be seen in photographic strategies that exploit awareness of 
authorship and objectification. Levinas's attitude is a radical departure from the habitual discussion 
of power and possession and his promotion of strangeness opens the door to what is not under 
control. Derrida's articulation of a primary state of uncertainty in the event of thinking, signals 
representation of others as subsequently reflecting that self-division, purposeless-ness, disarray as 
if by chance, and not being very different from fiction. Similarly Sartre's affectivity suggests 
portrayal as something constructed independently from the subject, confirming Ruff's assertion. 
The inherent mobility, multiplicity and discontinuity in the engagement imposes an interesting 
79 Boris Mikhailov, born 1938, Charkov, Ukraine, lives and works in Kharkov and Berlin. Winner of the Hasselblad award, 2000 and 
Citybank prize, 2001 
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prospect for photographing others and suggests that the notion of `definitive' portrait can only be 
`fictive' and any `truth' likely to be singular. 
-1 A KY* 
Chapter Two: IN PROCESS 
`SUBJECT IN PROCESS' 
Kristeva's writing provides a background of psychological origin to motivation, and to the 
pervasive influence of psychoanalytic theory on attitudes adopted by both interpretation and 
practice. Her approach is relevant to portraiture with regard to the subject `becoming' as process, 
and to the dynamics of meaning. In contrast to Sartre's cerebral existential encounter and Levinas's 
metaphoric face-to-face, Kristeva offers a position that identifies the derivation of `subject' as 
being grounded in the materiality of the body and its ultimate autonomy. 
When the eyes see or the lips touch that skin on the surface of the milk - harmless, thin as a 
sheet of cigarette paper, pitiful as a nail paring -I experience a gagging sensation and, still 
farther down, spasms in the stomach, the belly; and all the organs shrivel up the body, provoke 
tears and bile, increase heartbeat, cause forehead and hands to perspire. Along with sight- 
clouding dizziness, nausea makes me balk at that milk cream, separates me from the mother and 
father who proffer it. `I' want none of that element, sign of their desire; `I' do not want to listen, 
`I' do not assimilate it, `I' expel it... that trifle turns me inside out, guts sprawling; it is thus that 
they see that `I' am in the process of becoming an other at the expense of my own death. During 
that course in which `I' become, I give birth to myself amid the violence of sobs, of vomit. Mute 
protest of the symptom, shattering violence of a convulsion that to be sure, is inscribed in a 
symbolic system, but in which, without ever wanting or being able to become integrated in 
order to answer it, it reacts, it abreacts, it abjects. ' 
This description demonstrates the drive that is repressed psychologically but is bodily irrepressible, 
as it surfaces involuntarily in encountering the substances of the world. Such experiences are what 
establish and define us as individuals as being distinct and separate from both other substances and 
other persons. Kristeva's thesis combines psychoanalytic theory and structural analysis in her 
account of the process of meaning. Importantly for this project, her writing concerns the 
constitution of the subject and the constitution of meaning and demonstrates the difficulty in 
disentangling the processes of meaning from our own bodies and desires and from the processes of 
becoming, as they are simultaneous. ' Through her readings of Freud and Lacan, Kristeva 
repositions the `energies that operate between biology and culture'3, and which precede language as 
being fundamental to its emergence and dynamic in practice. Her insistence on the presence of the 
'Kristeva, Julia, 'Powers of Horror. An Essay on Abjection' (1980), trans. Leon S. Roudiez, New York, Columbia University Press, 1982. 
Reproduced in Clive Cazeaux, (ed. ) The Continental Aesthetics Reader. London: Routledge, 2000, p. 543 
2 Kristeva, Julia, Revolution in Poetic Language (1974). New York: Columbia University Press, 1984, p. 30 
Oliver, Kelly, 'The Crisis of Meaning' (1998). In Lechte, John and Mary Zoumazi, (eds. ) The Kristeva Critical Reader. Edinburgh 
University Press. 2003, p. 39 
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`body' and its manifestation in utterance, of rhythm, tone, sound and touch is useful in approaching 
an explanation for the qualities of meaning that cannot be quantified, for aspects of meaning 
besides the linguistic, that are ineffable. 
Kristeva uses a number of terms to explain her approach. Semiotic refers to the organisation within 
the body of instinctual drives and its function has the dimension of being an affective motivating 
force in language and practice, in process and interaction. Semiotic conjoins the pre-symbolic` and 
the social in language and meaning (visual and verbal), and is useful in the explanation of the 
dynamic, which maintains meaning as beyond knowledge and thereby alive and challenging. The 
kinetic function `chora' defines that which is prior to reason and logic. It is the modality of 
significance, which is not yet articulated, and designates the pre-linguistic origins of subject and 
signification. As explicated in Kristeva's account above, the subject must separate from its 
surrounding objects in order to identify itself `from and through its objects'. ' The `thetic' phase of 
the signifying process is the stage where the subject distinguishes itself from objects and the 
inception of developing language through predication as the subject identifies and names. Thus all 
enunciation requires an identification and is thetic. At the `threshold of language', ' the thetic is 
evident in the child's use of holophrastic enunciations such as "woof -woof', which incorporates 
both in its sound and signification the `concept' of `dog' and all that that might mean in the child's 
experience. It signals the metonymic force that emerges from the primal stages of signification. 
Kristeva emphasises that the `identifiable subject', which is located in systems of signification, 
originates in an heterogeneous unpositioned subject that is unpredictable and contradictory, and 
determined by repressed bodily experiences. Thus the mind/body dualism that underlies modern 
thought is rooted in processes of the abject body. The subject, divided by such repression, is not a 
unified whole, is consequently unstable and inevitably is continually in process. She challenges the 
principle of a static subject. Like signification, the subject is in a constant process of oscillation 
between instability and stability, or negativity and stasis. She refines the notion of being, 
constituted by another and makes it mobile -a process - more natural, and situates other ideologies 
(e. g. structural analysis, phenomenology) as being relevant but not exclusive - part of the process. 
With her notion of the `subject in process', she articulates an ethical relationship between 
conscious and unconscious, self and other, citizen and foreigner, identity and difference. 
I see a face. A first differentiation takes place, and thus a first self-identity. This identity is still 
unstable because sometimes I take myself to be me, sometimes I confuse myself with my 
4Kristeva's use of the term symbolic relates to syntax and structure. Lacan's use is a much broader term. Kristeva's 'real' is derived from 
Lacan's psychoanalytic use, as distinct from the 'symbolic' and the 'imaginary ', is pre-discursive and distinct from more general notions of 
'reality'. The "real' is very much drive-based and can incorporate shock and violence both of which bypasses signification. Lechte, Critical 
Reader, p. 210 
5 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 26 
6 Ibid., p. 4; 1 
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mother. This narcissistic instability, this doubt persists and makes me ask `who am IT, `Is it me 
or is it the other? ' The confusion with the maternal image as first other remains... the 
interpretation of people's speech presupposes that you apply yourself to the meaning of what 
they say. I saw that there was no neutral objectivity possible in descriptions of language at its 
limits and that we are constantly in what psychoanalysis calls a `transfer'. ' 
Kristeva is drawn to states of instability because they are normally repressed. What she calls 
semiotic is a `state of disintegration in which patterns appear but which do not have any stable 
identity: they are blurred and fluctuating. " The notion of a fixed identity is an illusion, and in the 
context of a photographic portrait is a kind of fiction or a metaphor for a revelatory event, such as 
Lacan's mirror phase. Her use of the term process incorporates `the sense of a legal proceeding 
where the subject is committed to trial, because our identities in life are constantly called into 
question'. ' The photographic event manifests both subjects on trial in an instant and provides a 
revelatory confrontation as if it were a mirror, except here an `other' is `reflected' for us in place of 
ourselves. It calls into question what we stand for and can provoke feelings to surface that are 
normally repressed. These `others', usually taken for granted, are here paused and highlighted. So 
that the event, rather than focusing on the `subject' of the photograph on a personal level, or 
`artistic' or `ideological' level, can become a trial for the operator. 
Already there are a number of concerns that parallel mechanisms in this thesis: the constitution of 
the subject as being existentially and visually played out in the photographic pose, the constitution 
of meaning and `subject' experience in reading a photograph, the notion of the subject as a mobile 
oscillating process, lending a different perspective to the tradition of the definitive portrait and the 
dynamics of illogic and the unspeakable. Kristeva's emphasis heralds a portrait depiction that is 
less dramatic, more incidental and participatory and which becomes crucial to the critical dynamic 
of dialogic process in the making and reading of photographs. 
In outlining the legacy of Husserl's phenomenology, its importance for signification / meaning and 
in judging what is `real', Kristeva (as with Levinas and Derrida) points to what she sees as its 
limitations, in its reliance on the transcendental ego, the unity of the subject, which, while a valid 
element of subjectivity, is not total or contained and only a part of the process of becoming and 
meaning. Phenomenology explains the `object' as given identity by a judging subject, but does not 
allow for the contradictory force of heterogeneity, which is a central dynamic to a concern that 
encompasses a relation to an `other' or the formation of meaning, beyond individual subjectivity. 
Simply put, we need others to both make and to `grasp' meaning. She shares with Levinas an ethics 
of communication and sociability explained as the compulsion of the face-to-face and in his terms 
7 Kristeva, `A Question of Subjectivity - an interview' (1986) in Rice, Philip & Patricia Waugh (eds. ) Modern Literary Theory Today, A 
Reader. Third edition, London: Arnold, 1986, pp. 132-3 
g Kristeva, `A Question of Subjectivity', p. 133 
9 Ibid. p. 133 
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- responsibility. In consequence the `psyche' represents the bond between the speaking being and 
the `other'. But a process that is dependent on interaction with others, or the interference by others, 
results ultimately in a frustration that fundamentally motivates. 
In discussions of the constituting process of individual and signification, Kristeva speaks more of 
the psyche, Derrida of the intellect and Levinas of the absolute. Kristeva is more practical, more 
matter-realistic and uses the term `transubstantiation' of the living body' as a visceral version of 
transcendence, a trancendence evident in the body of the subject. With an acknowledgement of the 
reality and significance of the body, comes the reality of a divided consciousness and disordered 
meaning that mirrors the confusing coming-and-going of thought, identified by Derrida. Her 
emphasis is on the unlimited generative process - the backwards-and-forwards exchange of subject 
and productive process, as opposed to a system that prefers definition and that represses the 
process of signification. Kristeva speaks instead of a subject in process as a positive explanation of 
separation and rejection, as an acceptance of the pre-symbolic function as necessary and 
pleasurable, which explains the `child's move to signification'. 1° Thus the transition to language is 
less traumatic and less of a threat than Freud and Lacan indicate, or than is evident in Western 
philosophical tradition exemplified by Sartre's fear of the `other'. Kristeva sidesteps this threat and 
offers something more positive. Instead of lamenting what is lost or absent or impossible, Kristeva, 
like Levinas, affirms what is contradictory and superficially negative, as useful and essential. 
Kristeva's themes signal what will be seen as a recurring dynamic throughout contemporary 
photographic texts, of possibility, of neither/nor, of in-between, paralled by the oscillation between 
individuation and identification, in `posing' and becoming, Barthes's being-himself-for-himself, 
and being-himself-for-others, Derrida's non-oppositional stance of `both/and' and the elusive edge 
between effective and full meaning. With regard to the photographic portrait itself, a particular 
dynamic is to be found in the photographic exchange, in an interactive process that refuses 
objectification, and which heralds a move towards participatory exchange, in a dialogic process. 
DIALOGIC PROCESS 
I move now to the implications of this divided subject and of the destabilisation of norms for the 
construction and interpretation of meaning, and indicate the mechanisms that challenge established 
forms of art practice and signal the possible impact on a photographic aesthetic. As indicated, any 
psychoanalytic dimension to the reading of texts is bound to introduce a breakdown of the strict 
roles of exchange by way of transference and identification. Here I explore possibilities of `telling' 
psychological focus by other than linear or fixed means in relation to two texts; Evans's Polaroid 
10 Oliver, 'The Crisis of Meaning', p. 41 
fÖ 
Portraits and Annelies Strba's depiction of her daughter Sonja as two instances of narration, 
placing the divided subject in the context of artistic practice. Both use a diaristic approach that 
depends on its presentation in series, an accumulation, which invites multiple meanings suggested 
by process. The method of series questions the nature of expression as it depends on a discourse 
between images. The now common strategy of seriality rather than sequentiality allows the 
presentation of experiences simultaneously, traversing chronology, perception and psychological 
dimensions. Both series mix the genres of snapshot and portrait and display an indirect, de-centred 
approach. Both use careless methods; Evans's is particularly intrusive and regard-less of the 
`subject' and Strba's, now later assumed as a conventional sign of reality, is also regard-less and 
hardly distinguishable from daily domestic trivia. 
Fig. 25 Walker Evans, Joyce Baronio, 1974 
Evans's Polaroid Portraits [figs. 10,20,25-28] present an intrusive, obsessive scrutiny, which 
display a participative collusion with his subjects. Lying somewhere between a conversation and a 
formal `portrait' session, they question expectations of the photographer as director, and 
photographed subject as performer. The singular nature of each exchange and the order of 
reciprocation beyond the photographic event distinguishes these images for their particularly raw 
quality and energy. They describe the continuous and subtle interaction in what is going on besides 
the posing, in the complexity and interdependence of relationship, of oppositional parallels. The 
subjects are neither preoccupied with the event of presentation nor fully self-absorbed; they appear 
to waver between presenting what they imagine is wanted and staying with themselves, thus 
maintain an individual, yet aware, autonomy. 11 The images appear to be intimate portraits, yet point 
to the movement between the extremes of intimacy and distance and it is this instability of role that 
determines their peculiar quality of displacement. 
" WEA. MMA, D. 1994.262.50 Virginia Hubbard, August 6th 1974 
69 
Fig. 26 Walker Evans, Virginia Hubbard, 
1974 
The collection presents a series of contradictions. Firstly they indicate a seismic shift away from 
work for which he is known; where before he advocated distance, 12 now his intrusion is palpable. 
In contradiction to detached manner, the respective positions of photographer and `subject' are so 
confused that Evans's own integral subjectivity becomes evident and dictates the method. 13 The 
photographer's selection is that of a collector's objectivity, a distanced appraisal, in its motivation, 
but is subjective, psychologically determined, in its fixation and involvement. He appears to have 
been attracted to his subjects in a very literal and uncluttered way, in an obsessive compulsion to 
possess. There is an urgent searching for something, an expression of need. Complexity of feeling 
is contradicted by the direct baldness in the method, creating tension between possession 
(objectivity) and emotional need (subjectivity). An evident delight in observation of detail and 
insignificance disrupts and feeds a rapid, reckless process, facilitated by the easy phenomenon of 
Polaroid technology. The close shooting demands an element of abandon that denies the possibility 
of intention or definitive statement about the subject depicted. The resulting images confront the 
viewer, making no concessions, and eschew the notion of shared universality. They are without 
sentimentality, are uncompromising in their plain statement and have no pretensions via narrative, 
comment or metaphoric reference. They are without the wistfulness so common in `meaningful' 
portraits as they do not show individuals, presenting some visible transcendence. There is no 
attempt to make them relevant to the viewer, making no obvious concessions to the viewer at all. 
They are confronting; so close are we that the intrusion put upon his subjects results in an intrusion 
on us as viewers. If one recognises the `subject' as being both a model (representing the 
12 Evans, Walker, 'Walker Evans on Himself', transcript of talk given at Harvard, 8' April 1975, in Caplan, Lincoln, Exposure, Society for 
Photographic Education, 15.1 (February 1977), p. 6 'I believe in staying out... I don't think you should intrude. It's rude in a way to say 'This 
is the way I see things'. It infers that you ought to see it that way too. ' and Evans, Walker, in 'Interview with Walker Evans' 1971 Katz, 
Leslie in Goldberg op. cit., p. 360: 'the non-appearance of the author, the non-subjectivity. That is literally applicable to the way I want to use 
a camera and do. ' 
13 Ferris, Bill, Images of the South: Visits with Eudora Welty and Walker Evans, Southern Folklore Reports, No 1, Memphis, Tennessee: 
Centre for Southern Folklore, 1977, p34. Evans talking to students about going into a community and photographing 'I would say just get in 
there, and really get into it and do it, up to the hilt. Thoroughly. Everything. Even people going to the bathroom. The whole damn business... 
After all what we are interested in is people and how they really live. I'm a realist and I'm interested in the deepest reality of life and social 
life. ' 
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photographer's brief or vision) and an individual, then these images are positioned between the 
two. 
Fig. 27 Walker Evans, Jane Corrigan, 1974 
Relinquishing the photographer's vision, Evans does not impose his `idea' of the subject as the 
concern is for something besides style or meaningful `good portraiture', is more literal and simple, 
without a calculated agenda. Somehow this frenzy of personal compulsion and un-thoughtful 
method, allows the subject-depicted to dominate. In allowing chance to dictate the making of the 
image and being totally dependent on instinct, this process becomes interestingly unique. 14 It is this 
in between place of carelessness and thoughtlessness that disturbs. They are clear statements as 
`portraits' without `artistic pretension', " clumsy but with some quality beyond a `snapshot', 
somewhere between the two. Their quality verifies the ambivalent positioning between the subject 
as photographer and the subject depicted, the quality evident in the tension between them and the 
resonance that appears. They do not explain themselves, they do not narrate clearly, but are 
discursive in a more surreptitious way. On first sight, this work might appear as simple, slight, not 
serious, but it raises many issues: from emotional distance to confrontation, from the nature of the 
casual shot to the construction of resonant images. Evans can be seen to contradict the `objective' 
portrait, confuse intimate and professional roles and present instead an ambivalent exchange 
between photographer and subject, the surrender of objectivity to the appropriation of subjective 
desire, where the photographer is lost within the self-obsession of a totally egoistic engagement, of 
the self conscious task of `taking' an image of the `other'. It is an example of an `interwoven' 
encounter where the subject and other and history and speaking come together. 
"Instinct' is a recurring theme for Evans, something of which he is very certain. He describes the 'act of photographing' as 
instinctive and not conscious; asked how he came upon images, he replies 'By instinct, like a bird, entirely by instinct. Like a squirrel 
too, burying and hiding... But I find it inhibiting to discuss this. It suggests speculation'. He talks about it this and the notion of 
objectivity frequently and seems to align 'objectivity of treatment' with instinct, which is the opposite to a predetermined 'phoniness'. 
And yet he describes himself as a 'collector' who 'falls in love' with something and pursues it compulsively; an attitude which does 
not seem at all 'objective'. 'An Interview with Leslie Katz' (1971), in Goldberg, Vickie (ed. ) Photography in Print, Writings from 
1876 to the Present, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981, pp. 358-369. 
15 Evans, Walker, Notes for'Lyric Documentary' on cards, WEA, MMA , 1994.250.6 (11) 'Clarity is without artistic pretension'. 
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Psychoanalysis explains our experience of the world as dependent on the relationship of the psyche 
to the body and in turn to others, where the emphasis is more visceral than phenomenological 
explanations of an abstract `existence'. For example, even when citing real encounters, Sartre (via 
Peter), takes no account of psychic drives or emotional clutter. Psychoanalysis encourages a 
concern to locate displaced meaning that lurks behind any articulation of experience. It accounts 
for the emphasis on individual expression that has shaped `art' practice in C20 and contributes to 
Fig. 28 Walker Evans, Nancy Shaver, 1973 
the notion that language (visual and verbal) reveals unbidden clues, which point to, rather than 
represent, our unconscious motivations. Thus, in an image, meaning is revealed in the detail and 
what is not said - what is absent. This is a different conception of meaning from `finding' what is 
`truth' and suggests an alternative model of reading and experiencing can be borrowed from 
psychoanalysis, which does not seek to find any one `hidden meaning"6 and that `interpreting art' 
can adopt a similar approach, in a way that sets out to discover (not anything in particular), that sets 
out to `trouble' the text, but not teleologically. In this process all that is presented is useful, there is 
no privileged meaning, all details and gestures being equally fruitful and meaningful, or 
meaningless. Because, if `meaning' indicates that there is an answer in some sense, then in 
psychoanalysis there is no-thing that is unanswered, there is no `meaningless'. One can identify 
significance in any number of ways that are equally and simultaneously valid. One `answer' can 
implicate as much as another. The notion and the naming of `uncovering' meaning that is `hidden' 
is mistaken, as psycholanalysis knows that there is nothing to be `found', certainly no essential 
`truth'. In this sense, psychoanalysis in practice demonstrates what Derrida seeks to expose in and 
through texts. 
In psychoanalysis the analysand transfers desires onto the analyst, whilst the analyst is, in turn, 
keeping track of her own desires in response; tracking, tracing, trailing. This counter-transference 
of analytical discourse parallels a different kind of reading texts from the norm of interpreting 
16 Lechte, John, Julia Kristeva. London: Roudedge, 1990, p. 212 
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stable meanings. " In this scenario, both the text and the subject reading the text, are in process. The 
`artwork' is a text that is a different form of psychic space. Kristeva's concept of identification is 
one that suggests an artistic process that is `open to the other', that is willing to face the challenge 
(of confrontation), to put itself (oneself) into question, to risk the possibility of non-meaning, and to 
face one's own hell in a similar way to the process of psychoanalysis. 
ý=., 
Fig. 29 Annelies Strba, Sonja, 1996 
Annelies Strba's slide presentations and the book entitled Shades of Time (1997), continue a 
tradition which originated with Goldin's first showing of the Ballad of Sexual Dependency in 
1981. '8 Shades of Time [figs. 29-3 I ]started as a private document and represents the boundaries of 
the private broken by its later public display. It presents the detail and singularity of her family over 
a twenty-year period and Sonja, one of her daughters, features throughout. Images of Sonja explain 
the characteristics of her work, as the qualities of uncertainty, contradiction, marginality. Strba's 
method of depiction can be described as diaristic in that it records day-to-day events, and dialogic 
in the way the collection as a whole tells of relationships and the nuances of dialogue between 
herself and her subjects. Strba abandons formal posing strategies and creates an un-eventful space 
where the very familiar supersedes the specialness of portrayal. Instead, the presentation of the 
individual is simpler, more incidental, functioning as dialogue between intimate exchange with her 
mother, formal requirements of photography and the happy accident that is recognised as a family 
`snap'. In a process borrowed from psychoanalysis, each participant speaks, so that stories emerge 
from the position of the photographer (Strba), from the position of the one looking at the image 
(myself), and from the position of the subject photographed (Sonja). " 
"Ibid., p. 212 
18 Goldin, Nan, The Ballad of Sexual Dependency. New York: Aperture Foundation, 1986 
19 This section contains three imagined scripts, speaking from three perspectives. The images described are all from the series Shades of Time 
reproduced in Annelies Strba `Shades of Time', text by lima Rakusa, Lars Muller Publishers 1997. Sonja with a Glass 1991, Sonja 1996, 
Sonja 1984, Sonja in the Bath 1985, Sonja 1983, Sonja with Ashi 1988, Linda and Sonja 1991, Linda with Sonja and Samuel-Maria 1996, 
Sonja 1977, Sonja's birthday 1990, Sonja at the stove 1987, Sonja with Samuel-Maria 1994, Combing hair 1995. 
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Fig. 30 Annelies Strba, Sonja with Asha, 1988 
`There are many pictures of my daughter, in which I recognise my mother or myself. I 
experience this dissolution of boundaries'20... She is an extension of myself, she is not a 
stranger and yet she becomes someone else in the image, no longer a daughter, but Sonja 
as she prepares herself. Even prepared, she cannot hide everything and she knows that 
perhaps something unexpected will be revealed. She is between certainty and uncertainty, 
uncomfortable. As she knows me so well, she trusts me, it is familiar territory but it is still 
ever so slightly dangerous. She knows that she is being interpreted, being re-presented. In 
the course of being looked at, her awareness of her own existence alters. At that time she is 
both in control and out of control, in herself and in suspension for me, in recognising that I 
am looking at her. She changes herself as I look at her, because I look at her. I construct 
her `image' as confirming my sense of her, my feelings towards her, my imagining, for me 
not for herself, which is not Sonja. Neither image is Sonja. I could construct different ones. 
My feelings project onto her. They are qualities in myself rather than in her. My feeling 
towards her constitutes my understanding of her as my daughter. 
The series depicts Sonja repetitively, but does not indicate that varied positions or contexts might 
eventually manufacture the ultimate image or characteristic. Just as the tone in a voice can weight a 
statement, so can the direction of these images; she is questioning, presenting, dejected, 
preoccupied or concerned. Each version of Sonja explores different sides to her visage and 
character. And as there is no search for Sonja's essential depiction and as they are repetitive in 
context, Strba's images speak in different ways, with each encounter, with each spectator. The 
collection as a whole is dialogic in its method of describing the complex exchange that occurs in 
Strba's relationship with each of her daughters and their relationship with each other. This is a 
dialogue that operates internally, wordlessly. It tells no-one's complete story and ultimately 
20 Strba, A., This passage starts off with an extract from a conversation between Strba and Crista Ziegler, Photographer's Gallery, April 1998, 
w%-Nwwww photonet carp uk programme past comvcrsation. htmi, 13 '6 January 2001 
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because the effect is accumulative, if there is one story then there are many, which are concurrent 
and divergent, even contradictory. My interpretations, my story can be seen to be implicit in my use 
of language. Mieke Ba121 describes interpretation as being interrelated, as being embedded first in 
the image and then in the language describing the image. Strba's images and my interpretations can 
describe Sonja in countless ways: looking penetratingly at me, sitting dejectedly at the tea table on 
her birthday, unreservedly naked to the waist in front of the stove in the corner of the room, sitting 
alone on a chair displaying the child, combing her sister's hair, preoccupied. I see her as looking at 
me, just as she was looking at her mother. My feelings project onto her and are qualities in myself 
rather than in her. They constitute the sense for me of her. My feeling towards her constitutes my 
understanding of her. 
She knows that I look at her; her mouth is held together and reminds me of that 
concentration when looking at oneself in the mirror; when something happens to the mouth 
and lips; they `purse'; they pout. Sonja performs. She adopts a beautiful pose. Sonja 
presents herself, content that she looks like she does. Her mouth performs again - or so I 
imagine. I am dismissive of this pretty, wistful position. Sonja likes to be wistful. She's 
interrupted, standing in the kitchen, arms loosely down by her sides, looking at me. She 
seems to be very separate from the kitchen paraphernalia that is behind her, as she looks 
intently out and away from it. Her eyebrows are tidy. Her face is almost accusing and 
confrontational and calm and accepting. She's naked in the bath. She sits on the bed, 
cradling the cat in her lap. She looks coyly at me in her best dress. She is totally distracted 
and moving out of the frame. 
Sonja appears to wait to be photographed; she is always ready. She visibly moves between 
acceptance and resentment, ignorance and confrontation. She can be seen to be purposeful, 
resigned, determined. As she looks at her mother defiantly or submissively, her face changes 
slightly, imperceptibly for the pose. She steadies herself, changes herself. In taking the 
photographs, Strba allows little time for preparation or for the subject to perform a directed 
character, but creates a small space where the `subject' can just about determine a position. In 
giving her this space, she tests the self-conscious and unconscious masks, played out in Sonja's 
demeanour. Sonja is very conscious of herself, her appearance, her image and is rarely caught not 
aware and nearly always looks at the camera. But because Strba interrupts her and disallows the 
formal pose, Sonja is not quite able to present a `theatre', a special version of herself, is not allowed 
to become what she wants entirely. Sonja is held in a place between pose and non-pose. It is as if 
she stops momentarily, suspends herself, pausing and allowing the photograph, as if compelled to 
do so. Sonja illustrates two sorts of relationship reflected in two sorts of presentation: the prepared 
and the unprepared pose, in relation to herself and the changing relationship with her mother 
Z' Bal, Mieke, 'Seeing Signs'. In Moxey, K. (ed. ) The Subjects of Art History: Historical Objects in Contemporary Perspectives, Cambridge: 
Cambridge t university Press. 1998, p. 79. There is correlation between Bal's readings and those of Kristeva, both of whom refer to Bahktin. 
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respectively. She demonstrates an oscillation between the two stances of preparedness and 
unpreparedness (reminiscent of Barthes in parenthesis) and how, in each, they describe something 
different in her. She precariously hovers between these two positions as each photograph could so 
easily be one or the other. She is both at the same time. 
Here I am; this is what I am doing. Look at me. I am in the bath. I am naked. I am 
interrupted. This is private. I feel vulnerable. I want to hide myself. My left leg is lifted a 
little and rests over my right knee. I am nearly covered, but you can see me. I am trying to 
cover myself, but it is too much effort and I want to please you and I want to display 
myself. Look at me. I am young. I am perfect. I want to appear as my perfect self. My adult 
self. My strong self. I do not feel strong. I am interrupted. I am waiting. My hands are 
open and waiting to hold something. My head is forced uncomfortably forward by the cold 
back of the bath. I have to look up at you as my head faces down. What do you think you 
are doing? I am not your child anymore. I am as powerful as you. How can I refuse? I 
want to display myself. I want to hide myself. I am frail. I am vulnerable. Look back at me. 
I am looking back at you. I will hold your look for as long as you look at me. Take this 
moment if you can. What can you take from me? It is my moment. I hold it here with me as 
long as I am looking at you. 
Fig. 31 Anneleis Strba, 
Sonja in the Tub, 1985 
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Strba's avoidance of interpretive staging, of pictorial framing or affirmation of her own `idea' of 
the subject, removes her as controlling subject and results in Sonja asserting her own idea of 
herself, her own voice. Strba avoids the precept of the photographer as author, creating a situation 
where the photographed subject can become author. It is a method that relinquishes power and a 
substantial part of the traditional position as photographer, by not preparing images for the viewer 
and placing more emphasis on the role of the photographed subject. This is a significant turnabout 
of emphasis, allowing the subject to reassert herself and inverting the responsibility for determining 
meaning by allocating power to the viewer. 
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DIALOGICAL MATRIX 
The following convoluted passage is important because it explains a breakdown of the fixed 
oppositions of author/reader and signifier/signified. This text, which articulates Kristeva's 
exploration of Mikhail Bakhtin's dialogism and carnivalesque22 describes literary signification, 
offers a version of the positional relation between the three protagonists in fiction and explains my 
readings of Strba, Sonja, and myself given above. When translated into photographic portrait 
fiction, it inserts a fascinating perspective that brings some clarification. It serves to unify 
discussion of text, authorship and relationship between all protagonists in the photographic event 
and to reiterate a `becoming' presented in conjunction with a description of reading as 'dialogue'. 
We may consider narration, beyond the signifier/signified relationship, as a dialogue between 
the subject of narration (photographer) and the addressee (reader23) - the other. This 
addressee, quite simply the reading subject, represents a doubly oriented entity: signifier in 
relation to the text (photograph), and signified in the relation between the subject of narration 
(photographer) and herself. The addressee is a dyad, whose two terms, communicating with 
each other, constitute a code system. The subject of narration (photographer) is drawn in and 
therefore reduced to a code, a non person, to an anonymity as author and subject of 
enunciation, mediated by a third person, the subject of utterance (the subject depicted, 
spectrum). The (photographer) is thus the subject of narration, transformed by having included 
herself within the narrative system; she is neither nothingness nor anybody, but the possibility 
of permutation from (photographer) to (reader), from story to discourse, and from discourse to 
story. She becomes an anonymity, an absence, a blank space. At the very origin of narration, at 
the very moment when the author (photographer) appears, we experience emptiness... On the 
basis of this anonymity, this zero where the author is situated, the character (spectrum - 
subject-depicted) is born. . . Emptiness is quickly replaced 
by a "one", a named (subject matter) 
that is really twofold, since it is subject and addressee. It is the addressee, the other, exteriority, 
whose object is the (photographer) and who is at the same time represented and representing, 
who transforms the subject (photographer) into an author. That is, who has the subject 
(photographer) pass through this zero stage of negation, of exclusion, constituted by the author. 
In this coming-and-going movement between the subject and other, between photographer and 
reader, the author is structured as a signifier and the text as a dialogue of two discourses.... The 
22 Kristeva describes and analyses the work of Bakhtin in `Word, Dialogue and Novel' in Desire in Language. Bakhtin's work proposes 
an 'intersection of textual surfaces rather than a point (a fixed meaning)' as a dialogue between the writer, the addressee and the 
`character', context and history; an attitude that has had an enormous impact on art history. Thus using Bakhtin's terms, the 'status' of 
the image would be defined horizontally by the photographer and reader and vertically relating to other photographs - historically and 
contemporarily. And a text described as a 'mosaic of quotations' and an'absorption and transformation of another', in the context of 
photography, can be detected as emerging in early uses of `post-modern' art practice as 'appropriation'. Much of Bakhtin's thinking has 
been since translated into the mechanics of the visual by Mieke Bal and is recognisable in Narratology and Looking In. 
11 Barthes's term spectator is now redundant as it disallows participation. 
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constitution of the (subject-depicted) manifests a disjunction between the (photographer) as 
active subject and (photographer) as subject of utterance (contained in the photograph). At the 
level of the text, in the dialogue between the (photographer) and the (spectrum), we find also 
this dialogue of the subject with the addressee around which every narration is structured. The 
(subject-depicted), in relation to the (photographer), plays the role of the addressee with respect 
to the subject; it inserts the (photographer) within the (fabrication) by making the 
(photographer) pass through emptiness or `elocutionary disappearance' (Mallarme). The 
(subject-depicted) is both representative of the (photographer) and represented as object of the 
(photographer).... The (subject-depicted) is `dialogical', both author and reader are disguised 
within it... a dialogical matrix. 24 
My interpretation of the term `narration' in photographic text is in the sense of `relating' and 
`telling' a person and is not, as might be implied, that of linear diachronic narrative (where the 
power remains with the author). This understanding derives from alternative conceptions to those 
of `univocity or objectivity' . 
25 Psychoanalytic readings force alternatives to the linearity and stasis 
of `epic monologism', which as causal, follows the familiar `vertical, hierarchical linear structure' 
and `retains the transcendental signified as `self presence', that which is questioned by Derrida. In 
contrast, `dialogism' `presupposes an intervention by the speaker within the narrative as well as an 
orientation toward the other'. It inserts the psychological aspect implicit in even the most literal 
depiction, as the internal dialogue with oneself and in the author's `distance from himself, as a 
splitting of the (author) into subject of enunciation and subject of utterance. ' The essential point 
here is that of the dual roles assumed by each of the protagonists in the event of the photographic 
portrait. The author (in this case the photographer) becomes both subject-as-author, and object, 
manifested in her own photographic expression (the photograph) and as `author' named by the 
reader. The photographer is contained within the photograph and becomes object. She is drawn into 
the matrix as she is mediated and constituted by the subject-depicted, is transformed, a split subject 
as author-subject and mediated-object. In appearing as author, she disappears as being-other-than- 
herself and at this point the subject-depicted becomes someone else as defined and constructed by 
the image; becomes another active persona derived from both the photographer and the reader. The 
subject-depicted becomes object for the reader and the photographer and active subject in 
contributing to the disappearance of the photographer, and in the making of an `other` version of 
herself in the photograph. The reader is active subject as interpreter of the text and passive object 
as defined by the photographer in fabricating the text for her. The constitution of the subject- 
depicted as an `other' manifests a change in the relationship between subject-depicted and the 
photographer. The subject-depicted becomes `dialogical, both author and reader, disguised within' 
'Kristeva, 'Word, Dialogue and Novel' (1969). In Desire in Language, p. 74- my 'translation' in the context of photography of Kristeva's 
text, my inserts in brackets. 
25 Kristev a, 'Word, Dialogue and Novel', p. 74 
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her own photograph. Thus dialogic structure invites a more complex and confusing 
interrelationship than that of simply subject and object. 
Dialogism presents us with an alternative process of meaning to many of the assumptions I 
itemised as `real' in the Introduction and incorporates many properties that counter the existential; 
non-oppositional, non-causal, non-diachronic. Aspects, reminiscent of alternative conceptions of 
the `real', deny comfortable versions of narration and provide a structure that ignores `substance, 
causality or identity... [and] which exists only in and through relationship. '26 In parallel, much 
photographic work appears to strongly move against `monologism' to adopt a more dialogic 
involvement of character, despite `storytelling' being hard to resist. 
PERQ UISITION 
Kristeva clearly identifies the photographer as inserting a kind of fiction into the image by way of 
enunciation. Word, Dialogue and Novel confirms a contra-narrative move and importantly 
demonstrates the link between Derrida and Kristeva with respect to reading, responding and the 
generation of meaning. It invites a discursive manner of telling, which demonstrates `interminable 
narration' as a contradiction in terms and a psychological perspective. Derrida's Droit de Regards 
is essentially the same approach that describes, above all, the reading of photographs as an active 
procedure, as a dialogue between the photograph and the reader and demonstrates the text as 
changing and contradictory. I shall restrict commentary here to Derrida's procedures of reading 
rather than his response to the specific content of the images. Droit de Regards is exemplary in its 
argument with `presence' and as a post-structural move against the urge to make sense. Derrida 
likens photographs to a `back to front construction', as provoking, diverting, confusing, and to 
`constructions in psychoanalysis', where once spoken or stated, the original is distorted or changed. 
Camera Lucida, introduces the conflation of the theoretical and the emotional in the reading of 
images. Derrida extends this possibility in Droit de Regards where, via extreme speculation in his 
examination of Marie-Francois Plissart's photographic sequence, he demonstrates a non-definitive 
logic as `interminable' narrative that contradicts, challenges and interrogates what appears at first 
`natural' and our `desire for stories'. His analysis takes the form of a contradictory reflection, 
which allows every detail to have significance and each participant to have a voice. He steers us 
away from a definitive account, denying us the certainty of closure and demonstrates methods of 
looking and understanding through his questioning of implicit interpretation. Perquisition27 
(pursuit, inquisition, search, inquiry) is the term Derrida uses for the sort of scrutiny he gives to this 
search and represents a shift in the purpose of looking at photographs, an alternative discursive 
26 Ibid., p. 78 
27 Derrida, Jacques, Right of Inspection [Droit de Regards] (1985) with Marie-Francois Plissart, trans. David Wills, Art &Text 32,1989, p.; S 
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manner of telling as opposed to one of causal narrative. Droit de Regards is a translation of 
photographic text in which the discontinuity of thought is applied to the looking at photographs in a 
way that allows response to images to follow the sequence of thought. It is a performative manner 
of `thinking' about meaning that echoes the uncertainty and messiness of thought as a process and 
provides a focus for his thesis of `implicit multiplicity' in metaphoric significance in texts. ' His 
procedures for looking and analysis demonstrate the mediation of perception, thinking and 
association and describe what one sees as entirely imaginary, symbolic and inseparable from 
perception. Hence `there never was any perception'. 29 It is typical of the rhetorical performance that 
demonstrates his critique through the manner of his writing and, as will be seen in Part Two, 
exemplary of elements that explain differance. Whilst they are not systematic methods as such, 
there are two active procedures, which characterise the approach. The first is the use of words 
(photogrammar) that split and contradict themselves throughout the text and make use of 
photographic terminology as meta-metaphor for meaning and understanding. For example, the use 
of the word `develop' - the physical process of making a photograph works as metaphor for the 
process of understanding and finding meaning. Photogrammar functions as a dynamic destabiliser 
in the text, keeps the meaning mobile and ambivalent, promises implication beyond the literal text. 
The second procedure is his dialogic structure, which extends his discussion of parergon that 
subverts the opposition of outside and inside, by speaking about the photograph from a number of 
different points of view, (looking at the photograph) from outside, and from a number of imagined 
points of view (as protagonists) inside the frame of the photograph. The play with words 
incorporates both noun and verb functions, so that qualities can exist and be static (as a noun) or 
can actively disturb and influence (as a verb). Words such as pose, pause, compose, propose, 
position, relate what the subject depicted does (the one assuming a position) with what the 
photograph does (the place of meaning) and what the photographer does (in presenting a position). 
Like Kristeva's dialogical matrix, this play-function allows him to speak from either the position of 
reader or from one of those depicted in the photograph, to move between them and to tell the story 
from every point of view, each taking their turn as nominating subject. The one who is subject may 
be 
.... 
I, you, he, she, we, you, they, in turn. In such a way he uses the displacement of words to 
contradict himself and to change his view (opinion/viewing position). 
Derrida's rhetoric holds the meaning in the very structure and expression of the writing and effects 
a demonstration of non-naming and non-presence by `holding' meaning in words as a place of 
ambivalence rather than definition. Confronting our desire to find ultimate meaning, he tries 
instead to describe, as with an inventory, to make `a true description', naming and not naming 
things that are left out, things that are not there (parallels depictions such as Martha Rosler's 
Derrida, What is called not thinking, Loughborough University, 2001 
Derrida, Jacques. Speech and Phenomena (1967), trans. David B. Allison, Evanston: North Western University Press, 1973, p. 103 
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Bowery where the subject is absent). He does not relate what he imagines to be the experience of 
characters, but restricts himself to designating `objective' situations, indulging in lengthy 
description, which, in its avoidance of intentional interpretation, cannot fail to interpret. He argues 
with himself about qualitative description, about speculation, invention, about the implications of 
possible motivations and his compulsion to interpret. This manner of speaking to photographs 
assigns a series of interconnected qualities and conditions, active properties that repeat and reoccur 
within evocations suggested throughout the text. The series of associations hypothesise and extend 
meaning, generating a process of understanding between text and reader. The practice suggests a 
similarity with art practice in which visual meaning can reverberate and avoid both verbal 
explanation of the visual and visual illustration of the text. It amounts to a performance of qualities 
providing a conceptual framework: suspending, holding, generating, telling, speaking subject to 
subject, positioning, performing. 
The photograph is a machine for making talk... inexhaustibly... that has an altogether different 
relation to any spoken word.. . The photographic event has another structure. ' 30 
Photographic speculation cannot distinguish between what you see and what you imagine and thus 
power resides in the photograph, not as possession, but in the meaning invoked by utterance and 
dialogue, of what is absent, of imagination and interpretation. The photograph is like a palindrome 
that can be read in many directions, `concurrently and cursorily'; `there is reversibility, 
irreversibility, diachrony, and simultaneity'3' and diversion, deflection, deferral. In this process, a 
photograph is a matter of reflection, negating time, denying history, an event that happens when I 
look at it, rather than a retelling about another time. In this kind of description, a photograph is 
active in generating thoughts, in studying and describing at the same time as being described in a 
way that supports alternative subject positions, often contradictory. The goal of speaking to a 
`unified subject' is perhaps then a pointless one. The goal too of establishing what subject matter is, 
is also pointless. Pointless in terms of believing that there is a point (endpoint), a conclusion to 
find. Not pointless in exploring the meaning in the text, and not pointless in terms of exploring 
where the `point' (punctum) might be found or where it may be from the `point of view' of 
different protagonists - reader, photographer and depicted `subject'; not pointless in terms of 
satisfying desire. And Derrida would in no way advocate that we should not look. If we can remove 
ourselves from reading photo-texts as from within an already determined system, as for example as 
`portrait or `picture', but instead as a text that allows simultaneity, our reading may catch up with 
some examples of practice, such as Ruff's tautological absence and as we shall see Rosler's 
absence of subject. If one performs a more rhetorical viewing (perquisition) that incorporates views 
(of perspective and opinion) simultaneously and anticipates via its play function, then we operate in 
advance of the verbal articulation that follows and which reduces possibilities in its formation. I 
30 Derrida, Right of Inspection, p. 25 
11 Ibid., p. 42 
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suggest that photographs are able to present ideas in a way that exceeds those expressed by words 
and in this sense they may anticipate debate in much the same way as Derrida's multiplicity of 
thought ranges round possibilities of verbal articulation. 
Both Kristeva and Derrida demonstrate meaning as inseparable from the inter-relationship of 
thought, imagination and perception, the consequence of which refutes the possibility of 
`disinterestedness' in determining quality. Instead both assert a position of discursive process as a 
positive adventure instead derived from our internal construction, which when translated in the 
reading of photographs begins to articulate a conceptual procedure. I move now to Baudrillard's 
discussion on the construction of the image dependent on the author's position. 
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Chapter Three: DISAPPEARING 
In order for the object to be grasped, the subject has to relinquish his hold. But this turns out to 
be the subject's last adventure, his last chance - the chance of a dispossession of self in the 
reverberation of the world in which he henceforth occupies the unseen site of representation. ' 
Baudrillard's writing on photography becomes a figurative explication of his general project that 
seeks to upturn the basic premise of causality and reason and of the supremacy of the subject and 
`objectivity'. As such it echoes Derrida's, Levinas's and Kristeva's concerns and locates it 
conveniently in the context of the photograph. Relevant to the `portrait' photograph specifically, he 
presents a provocative and extreme alternative to the power of the photographer on the one hand 
and the objectified depicted subject on the other, in what he calls `disappearance'. He is adamant 
that `it is impossible to bring someone into focus photographically when you are so little able to 
get them into focus psychologically', ' and challenges the tradition of photographer-to-subject and 
provokes an exploration of alternative methods. His advocation of `mutual disappearance' becomes 
an epic of photographic exchange and indicates a reciprocal process, which anticipates a kind of 
equality in the photographic encounter. Baudrillard's project serves to introduce some of the central 
contributors to this thesis as it encompasses themes paralleled by many photographers over the last 
twenty years. Qualities such as absence, rawness, blankness and banality are in the main 
characterised by negation of meaning, interpretation, intentionality and control. 
Recognising the non-literal within Baudrillard's provocatively literal manner of writing and 
responding to his invitation to play with his ideas3, I adopt here a similarly `literal' approach in 
order to amplify his didactic expression and to explain without describing. I identify Baudrillard's 
photographic project as a moral tale in the form of a set of `instructions', which serve to itemize 
and confront many of the issues concerning the `portrait' and which I assume as a manual for 
achieving a `true photograph" and as a measure with which to test the possibilities of portrait 
depiction. It is a contradictory checklist in many ways, as the terms `subject' and `object' are often 
characteristically and pertinently interchangeable. His writing on the subject is made more 
significant by the fact that he takes photographs himself, that betray a certain naivety with regard to 
photographic aesthetic. 
Baudrillard, Jean, 'For Illusion isn't the Opposite of Reality... ' In Wiebel, Peter, (ed. ) Photographies 1985-1998, Within the Horizon of the 
Object, Objects in this Mirror are Closer than they Appear. Hatje-Cantz Publishers, 1999, p. 133 
2 Baudril lard, 'For Illusion isn't the Opposite of Reality... ' In Photographies, pp. 136-137 
3 Baudrillard, Jean, 'When Reality Merges with the Idea', interview with Mike Gane and Monique Arnaud, November 1991 in Mike Crane, 
ed., Baudrillard Live: Selected Interviews , 
London and New York: Routledge, 1993, p. 205 
4Baudrillard, Jean. 'It is the Object that Thinks Us'. In Photographies, p. 146 
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THE SUBJECT'S LAST ADVENTURE: HOW TO TAKE THE TRUE PHOTOGRAPH, (after 
Baudrillard) 
Empty my mind, hold my breath, immerse myself 
I must distinguish between the point of taking the photograph, without any calculation, and the 
retrospective process of making representation. Thus I can avoid interpretation by immersing 
myself in the process of taking the photograph and allowing the `object' to dictate me. It is the 
activity itself, rather than the prospect of the image, which must interest me and which I must 
seek `to practise harshly', keeping the activity crude and uncontrolled, as an `objective 
meditation', `a mental process', ' so that, in the act of taking a photograph, I allow the 
possibility of `disappearing' as a subject. 
Disappear as a subject and enjoy my own absence 
As I press the shutter and as the picture is taken, both the `object', and myself as `subject', 
disappears. `It's in this reciprocal disappearance that a transfusion between the two occurs'. ' 
This occurrence invites the `object' to emerge from its disappearance in a different form; 
transformed; in a `poetic situation of transference or a poetic transference of a situation'! Here 
then is the possibility to retrieve a response in my interaction with the world, neither of 
alienation nor of indifference, and contrary to the manner expected and explained by Sartre. In 
my fear of the `fact that people and things tend no longer to signify anything for each otheri8 
and in my concern to avoid indifference, I usually force myself into creating some sort of 
meaning, indiscriminately and sometimes in desperation. In removing myself as directing 
subject, the photograph can achieve a dimension of the real that escapes the complication of 
`representation' and thus I can get nearer to producing no meaning at all. By `representation', I 
mean my involvement in discourse and interpretation, which can complicate the object with 
moral packaging or my personal fabrication. If I allow `an insignificant objecti9 to intervene 
and change me as I photograph it, ultimately, I can disappear as an interpreting subject. 
Do not attempt to represent reality 
What I am trying to achieve is `the primitive dimension of the object as opposed to the 
secondary dimension of the subject (me) and the whole domain of representation. It's the 
immanent presence of the object, rather than the representation of (me) the subject. i1' It is a 
letting be; allowing a thing to present itself; escaping any vision that I might have. It is a 
S'Baudrillard, The Ecstasy of Photography' 1993, an interview with Nicholas Zurbrugg in Zurbrugg (ed. ) Jean Baudrillard: Art & Artefact. 
London: Sage Publications, 1997, p. 34 
6 Baudril lard, 'It is the Object... ' p. 147 
7Ibid., p. 148 
8Ibid., p. 148 
9Baudrillard, The Ecstasy of Photography', p. 33 
'o Ibid., p. 33 
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process of capturing in the sense of `some kind of non-occurrence', which presents intimations 
of what has taken place or what is about to take place, of capturing this moment of suspension, 
rather than the object. 
Abandon the instinct to interpret 
I must actively avoid control, interpretation or vision and seek `the way objects make 
themselves visible'1' and the way that objects become active themselves. So far as is possible I 
allow myself `to be viewed by the object, rather than an attempt to capture the object'. 12 To 
describe more accurately, more pertinently, it is necessary that the image be less accurate, 
direct or overt. It needs to be more oblique. 
Suspend my judgement, my gaze, my vision 
I must let my attention slip so that the image can invent itself and become a fiction for me. To 
`render the incommensurable', I have to allow a situation to reveal the unexpected, to `hold', 
but not represent. I have to allow the object to reveal itself. I will have to exorcise my own gaze 
and revel in my own absence. `It is not the object of the photograph who must pose', but I, the 
photographer who must hold my breath in order to create a blank region both in time and my 
body. I must also refrain from breathing mentally, and empty my mind, so that the mental 
surface is as blank as the film. 
Do not seek an image 
I must not see myself as a representative being, but as an object working, `without any concern 
for mise-en-scene, in a kind of frenzied circumscribing of self and object'. 13 To arrive at a more 
meaningful and potent image; a harsh and raw image, approaching punctum, 14 requires silence, 
time and isolation, lack of insight, lack of agenda, lack of intention. And to bring out an ironic, 
spiritual dimension I need to resort to anything that removes the `object' from its realistic, 
ideological context or my interpretation; anything that surprises, anything that is not 
anticipated. 
Defy all resemblance and look elsewhere 
`It is very difficult to photograph individuals or faces... Human beings are sites of such mise-en- 
scene, such complex (de)construction, that the lens strips them of their character in spite of 
themselves. They are so laden with meaning that it is almost impossible to separate them from 
that meaning to discover the secret form of their absence... They say there is always a moment 
" Ibid., p. 37 
12 Ibid., p. 38 
13 Baudrillard, 'For Illusion isn't', p. 134 
14 Baudrillard makes several references to Barthes's punctum, `which is the poignant moment of the object ... the one that 
is the very moment 
of the photograph, of the instant in which it is taken, which is immediately past and gone and can never be found again' in `It is the Object... 
p. 151 
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when the most commonplace or the most masked - person reveals their secret identity. But what 
is interesting is their secret alterity. And rather than seeking out the identity beneath the mask, 
one should seek out the mask beneath the identity. " Considerations of resemblance or of 
expression in the image are inconsequential and won't amount to anything in the end; they will 
only register absence. So if the person will not be revealed in their resemblance, will it be in my 
knowledge of them, or in their story? Taking photographs of individuals is an impossible project 
`because there would be an excess of meaning. i1' `Instead of transfiguring and idealising the 
image as the camera usually does, the lens disfigures and decimates the character. The human 
being is masked, and the most difficult subject to capture is not so much their reality or their 
resemblance, as their mask'. " `What is needed... is to make (her) a little more enigmatic to 
(herself) and to make human beings in general a little stranger, (or more alien) to each other as 
with Levinas. It is a question not of treating them as subjects, but of turning them into objects, 
into something different - that is to say treating them as what they are. i18 
Struggle to assert myself, yet lose control 
`The dramatic quality of the photographic image comes from the struggle' between my resolve 
to impose myself and disturb `its discontinuity and immediacy. "9 There has to be at least a 
struggle in my attempt to achieve what I am looking for, my vision, even though inevitably I'll 
lose the conflict and lose myself. The photographic event has to retain this ironic confrontation. 
`The photographic act is a duel. It is a dare, launched at the object and a dare of the object in 
return. '20 It is a confrontation between this other and myself as we face each other and to some 
extent I, as photographer, am manipulated and subverted by her. It demonstrates my inability to 
communicate with her - and others - the way I fire out and miss and she fires back and misses. 
But then `I only become defined as a subject when faced with another subject. ' My `inability to 
photograph human beings is clear proof of the manipulation of the photographic subject by its 
object"' and I feel the same unease when being photographed myself: I am waiting /playingi 
acting/ removing myself from the event. In photographing a series of different subjects, will I be 
defined as a different subject each time? Will each subject define me in a different way? The 
impossibility of the photographic portrait is a metaphor for our inability to communicate with 
others. 
15 Baudrillard, `For Illusion is not', pp. 136-137 
16iBaudrillard, `The Ecstasy of Photography', p. 34 
"Baudril lard, 'The Art of Disappearance' in Zurbrugg, p. 29 
18 Baudrillard, `For Illusion is not', p. 137 
Ibid., p. 132 
20 Baudrillard, Jean, 'Photograph}, or the Writing of Light' (1999). Trans, Francois Debrix in The Impossible Exchange. Paris: Galilee pp. 
175 -184 and Ctheory, 1999 
[cited 12te April 2000] Vol. 23, No. 1-2, available from www. ctheory. com 
2' Baudrillard, 'The Art of Disappearance', p. 29 
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LOOKING FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL FOCUS: ANONYMITY AND INTIMACY 
Baudrillard uses the event of photography to confirm and illustrate his theories about signification, 
`abusive representation', `the weariness of being oneself, and his idealistic view regarding `the 
emptiness and fragility of exchange'. His approach is especially pertinent to this thesis as he 
radically disturbs conceptions of the photographic encounter, both metaphorically and literally. His 
manifesto for the `true photograph' pushes the subject/object relation to the limits, towards a 
reversal. He suggests that we must look for meaning elsewhere, not only in others, but for 
ourselves invoking the other to exist, in order to make oneself exist: `Tell me what I am, tell me 
what I desire, tell me what I think'. 22 Baudrillard's texts suggest methods other than those of the 
inspired photographer or the concerned commentator in examples of documentation, which address 
objectification in a simple way and that mark some sort of psychological `reality' in the 
presentation by one individual of another individual. Baudrillard's provocation approaches 
innocence, a relinquishing of knowing construction, toward territory that is undefined and 
unfamiliar. In advocating the object over subject, he topples the centrality of the subject, but 
reverses hegemony and fails to achieve the non-oppositional or dialogical position of Levinas and 
Kristeva. In photographic practice this reversal achieves a knowing avoidance of `knowingness', an 
artificial and fabricated lack of control. I introduce here explorations of versions of the 
photographic encounter, suggested principally by Baudrillard's metaphor of disappearance, `which 
gives the object its full intensity'. ' Studies in this chapter focus on the nature of the confrontation 
between the photographer and the photographed subject. This first section, `ANONYMITY AND 
INTIMACY' looks at the encounter, as defined by the contrasting extremes of intimacy or 
anonymity. The following section, `OBSCURE AND ASLANT', focuses on extreme positions of 
`authorship' by way of desire and intention, as opposed to distance and obscuration in the works of 
Ulf Lundin and Larry Sultan. 
Luc Delahaye's Metro24 and Walker Evans's Subway series provide extreme examples of 
photographs taken with anonymity, whilst the work of Goldin and Strba depend on an intimate 
relationship between operator and spectrum. I propose that both extremes result in a `disappearing 
of the subject', in a manner that could be seen to avoid intentional positioning and thereby 
objectifying those photographed. Both methods are a means of relinquishing power as each assert 
the dominance of particularity over generality; both methods question the mask of self 
consciousness and that of unselfconsciousness, and undermine intentionality. 
22 Baudrillard, 'Poetic Transference of Situation'. In Delahaye, Luc & Jean Baudrillard, L' Autre. London: Phaidon, 1999, unpaginated 
23 Baudrillard, Poetic Transference' 
I Delahaye, Luc, L' Autre, London: Phaidon, 1999 
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Baudrillard describes photographers as predators, plundering that which doesn't concern them and 
infecting others with 'the image virus'. 2' The method of anonymity, of 'the subject's disappearance' 
is advocated as refreshing at least; 'not the transparent, interactive thing it normally has become', 26 
and liberating at most, `presenting people in their destiny. '27 `To do this the photographer must be 
both non-existent and one with those she is photographing. ' Baudrillard despises `realist' 
photography as documentary or testimony of 'real situations', the sort that, in the `pursuit of 
naturalness', 29 presents, for example, regrettable situations, because it captures not what exists, but 
what, according to moral convictions, `should not exist'. It presents us with only one version of 
events. In addition, images, intended as testimony, merely convey information, which is `the most 
trivial, debased form of meaning'30 and photography that is ` aestheticised, calculated and 
composed"' does not approach what is interesting. Few photographs escape this `forced 
signification'. 
All the artistic preparations of the photographer and all the design in the positioning of the 
model to the contrary, the viewer feels an irresistible compulsion to seek the tiny spark of 
accident, the here and now... In such a picture, that spark, as it were, burned through the person 
in the image with reality. 32 
The notion of mask and the reality or true identity behind the mask embodies many of the 
expectations of the portrait, expressed here by Benjamin, who suggests that the `spark' will be 
perversely sought elsewhere than in the `presentation' in spite of the photographer's efforts. 
Provocatively Baudrillard takes Benjamin's intuition to its extreme conclusion and suggests that 
any photography with purposeful intention, loses its potential for potent quality (punctum); the 
untranslated integrity of the photograph, which defies verbal elaboration and is at its most 
powerful. In contradiction to what is generally held as a desirable aim in portrait photography, 
Baudrillard suggests that what is interesting is their outward appearance, their `secret alterity' and 
that `one should seek out the mask beneath the identity' . 
33 
Evans and Karsh represent two attitudinal poles. On the one hand Evans, who in many ways 
consistently sought an alternative artistic route to the establishment, denied that there was any 
`reality' to be found in portraiture. What he actually denied was the very conscious and deliberate 
posing ('all the artistic preparations of the photographer and all the design in the positioning of the 
25 Baudrillard, 'It is the Object that Thinks Us', p. 149 
' Ibid., p. 149 
27 Baudril lard, 'Poetic Transference of Situation' 
28 Ibid. 
' Baudrillard, 'It is the Object that Thinks Us', p. 149 
30 Ibid. p. 150 
31 'Baudrillard, 'The Ecstasy of Photography', p. 35 
Benjamin, Walter, 'A Short History of Photography'(1931. In Trachtenberg, Alan (ed. ) Classic Essays on Photography. New Haven: 
Leete's Island Books, 1980, pp. 199-216 
B Baudrillard, 'For Illusion is not the Opposition of Reality', p. 137 
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model') and the very mannered pretensions of, for example Karsh, ' and claims of catching the 
psychological power centre of his famous subjects; his grandiose `search for greatness'. Karsh 
claimed that `the mask we present to others... may lift for only a second to reveal the power in the 
unconscious gesture, a raised eyebrow, a surprised response, a moment of repose. This is the 
moment to record' . 
35 This is what Benjamin despises and what Evans and Baudrillard acknowledge 
as being the impossibility of the project; that we cannot lift the mask and suggest instead that what 
we must capture is the mask. The works of Karsh, now so much a caricature of `portraiture', are 
presented with accompanying texts extolling the subject's virtues, verbally explaining the power 
and with amusing anecdote. The `portraits' remain illustrations of the story and the myth, which 
they amplify and confirm. In contrast, Evans repeatedly struggled and played with the dilemma of 
wanting to `do things as they were' . 
36 In so doing his photographs pass through three phases of 
anonymity, followed by a later dimension of more ambivalent encounter. Let us Now Praise 
Famous Men (1935) displays a disparateness of the separate standpoint of the photographer and 
Subway (1938-41) attempts a total anonymity repeated by Delahaye in 1994-5. Evans wanted to 
allow the individuals to be themselves and not be manipulated, and to achieve this he had to 
remove himself from the encounter so that there would be no interaction with them. Detroit (1946), 
taken uninhibitedly, but visibly and yet uninvolved, sees the individuals as `elements in the total 
image', not individuals, not portraits, but objects, again as sought by Baudrillard, and anticipating 
Ruff's approach. His late Polaroid Portraits (1973-74) allow the opposite position of intrusion, `to 
do things as they were'. 
Annelies Strba: `When I push the shutter release. I close my eyes'37 
Luc Delahaye: `I hold my breath and let the shutter go'38 
These two statements demonstrate extreme forms of relinquishing power, reminiscent of 
Baudrillard's instructions. They both assign a degree of significance to the physicality of the event 
and allow it to dictate the nature of attention given to the photographic event, which importantly is 
very little. Delahaye, by secretly concealing the camera, controlling the shutter from his pocket and 
not looking through a viewfinder and Strba by shutting her eyes. In taking no part in constructing 
any sort of event other than the decision to press the shutter, one could say that they both 
`disappear as a subject. ' Beyond the shutter release there is nothing to mark the occasion. There are 
direct contrasts and similarities in the position of the photographer to the photographed in each 
case; Delahaye is anonymous; Strba is intimately known. Both positions result in an uneventful 
'4 Evans, Walker, interview with Paul Cummings, recorded at his home in Connecticut, October 13'' 1971: 'I really disapprove of 
photographing celebrities... the worst of it is something like Karsh'. pp. 37-. 38 
Karsh, Yousuf, Karsh Portraits, Boston: NY GS, 1976 
Evans, Cummings interview 
37 Strba, Shades of Time, p. 326 
Delahaye, Luc in 'Poetic Transference of Situation' in L' Autre. Luc Delahaye, born France, 1962, is known principally as a Magnum 
documentary photographer. Such series include Winterriese documenting contemporary Russia (published London: Phaidon, 2000) and 
History 2003 that includes photographs of Iraq, Afghanistan and Ground Zero New York. He received the Robert Capa gold medal in 1993 
and 2002 and awarded the Deutsche Borse Photography Prize organised by Photographers' Gallery 2005. 
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space for depiction, where the photographed subjects are less diminished by the photographer's 
power. 
Fig. 32 Luc Delahaye, Metro series, 1995-1997 
Delahaye has made several portrait series that experiment with photographic properties as a 
recording process (Portraits 1 1996, Memo 1997 and Metro 1999). Here his series of people seated 
in the Metro, tests Baudrillard's thesis to some extent. Because Delahaye hides himself, 'the image 
then shows itself for what it is: the exaltation of what the camera sees in its pure self-evidence, 
without intercession, concession or embellishment. Captured at their simplest and divested of that 
identity which weighs upon them like a frame, people are for a moment, - the moment of the 
photograph - absent from their lives, absent from their misfortunes, raised from their misery to the 
tragic, impersonal figuration of their destiny. '39 Like Evans, he relinquishes responsibility for any 
sort of image construction and cannot ultimately `see' what he is looking at or what the camera is 
`seeing'. Having to hide in order to take the image, he is absenting himself from the confrontation 
and raises questions about who is being objectified here. It is an extraordinary collection of images; 
they all stare away, vacantly; many are defiant, only a few seem resigned or sad; only some look 
'thoughtful'; only three have their eyes closed; none appear to be looking at anything and no one 
smiles. Following Baudrillard's `instructions', one would think that this must be the ideal situation, 
ripe for revealing `the mask beneath the identity', as there is no intention in the framing by the 
photographer and yet, Baudrillard comments still: There is no bringing these people into 
psychological `focus'. We cannot imagine what they are thinking or what their stories might be and 
we are not in the real presence of the object (the Other). r40 Catching the person unawares, whilst 
39 Baudrillard, 'Poetic Transference of Situation' 
a0 Ibid. 
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Fig. 33 Luc Delahaye, Metro series, 1995-1997 
producing an intense image of absence, will not define `psychological focus'; we will not be able to 
see them or know them or where they are. Each of these series point to the contradictory contrasts, 
similarities and confusion between subject-object positions and the event of confrontation. In 
Delahaye's Metro, there appears to be contradiction regarding the `absence' of those photographed 
who, although the camera is hidden, could be seen to know it is there, if only unconsciously and be 
complicit in a strange joint enterprise. How can they not know that he is taking a photograph of 
them? Delahaye appears to concede this element of collusion to the point where he mirrors their 
behaviour: `I am sitting in front of someone to record his image, the form of evidence, but just like 
him I too stare into the distance and feign absence' . 
41 It is the `non-aggression pact', 42 which 
explores the unspoken contract; an ironic confrontation of absence-presence between the unself- 
conscious mask of absence and the presented mask of self-consciousness. 
Strba's method of immersing herself in the physicality of taking the photograph is pertinent. The 
photographer's voice disappears as she abandons both control of the image and of interpretation. 
As she shuts her eyes, she creates `a blank region'43 and absents herself from any `special' event, 
giving what is there to be seen literally no attention, thus denying the intention of the `photographic 
eye' and allowing the intimacy of the relationships and accident to dictate the eventual image. It is 
both intimate and anonymous. Using instinct as strategy, she is clearly not driven by observation, 44 
but rather the evocation of sensation, of the relationship and what Sonja signifies for her, as 
mother, rather than appearance and what that might signify for others. Strba side steps the 
a' Ibid. My emphasis. 
°- Darr, Jen, Review of L'Autre, Philadelphia CityPaperNet, www. cpcn. com/articles 
°-; Baudrillard, 'For Illusion isn't the Opposite of Reality', pp. 128-142 
' Morrissey, S., 'Annelies Strba'. Portfolio, 29 (1998), p. 71. Morrissey suggests that she creates 'photographs out of relationships' not 
observations. 
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oppositional display of `portraiture' between the photographer and the photographed `subject', yet 
still confronts the uncertainty of communication, the elusiveness of direct dialogue, the positional 
separation between individuals. There can be no distance between the photographer and the 
subject, no objectivity, as both roles are confused and blurred by their shared intimacy. It is a 
subjective diaristic telling as it integrates the photographer's, Annelies's, self-reflection. " Just as 
Sonja reveals different aspects of herself, of waiting, playing, acting, removing herself, the 
photographer, Annelies, might also be changing in response to her subject, Sonja. 
Fig. 34 Nan Goldin, Siobhun the Shower, 
NYC, 1991 
Looking at series by both Strba and Goldin, it has been helpful to concentrate on just one 'subject'; 
`Sonja' and `Siobhan' respectively, amplifying the focus on the individual, their appearance on 
each occasion and how different they can be. Goldin's work actively addresses the nature of her 
relationships and is much more explicit than Strba's. She says that whilst the pictures are specific, 
the concerns are universal and whilst others may not look like these particular individuals, they are 
about `others': `it's about the nature of relationships' rather than what they might look like. 
Particularly sexual relationships. She talks about people being strangers to each other, of their 
desire to make relationships, however destructive they might be, of different emotional realities and 
languages, which cause disruption in relationships. Strba's work provides a tighter arena, a more 
confined context for characters and a more longstanding and obvious intimacy within the family, 
45 Strba, A., Extracts from a conversation between Annelies Strba and Crista Ziegler, April 1998, Photographer's Gallery, 1998, 
www. photonet. org. uk/programme/past/conversation. html, 13th January, 2001 
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more specifically associated with the `snapshot'. They are less eventful than Goldin's images, less 
shocking, less prone to accusations of objectification46 and ultimately more ordinary. Both Goldin 
Fig. 35 Nan Goldin, 
Siobhan at the 
Paramount Hotel 
NYC, 1993 
and Strba involve a struggle between themselves and their `subjects' and both invite reciprocal 
confrontation that produces more equality in the construction of the image. Goldin wants them to 
`stare back'; wants them to actively confront her, resulting in images that betray a shared 
vulnerability where defiance or resentfulness is barely visible. 47 Strba gets a more complicated 
response from her daughter, who has a particular investment in her behaviour towards her mother. 
Strba depicts over years, a one to one struggle of independence and separation. There is an element 
of flux between performance and non-performance throughout the series, which is not evident in 
Goldin's work. Strba's work, `without documentary pretensions', ' doesn't set out to substantiate 
anything or prove anything and Goldin strives to view from the inside looking out, as opposed to 
the outside looking in, as she says documentary does. Their images hold the contradiction of 
outward and inside views, displaying secret lives and the contradiction of the simplicity and 
directness of the image summoning meaning. Baudrillard describes the photographic act as a duel; 
a reciprocal `dare', where the subject (the photographer) might potentially be defined by the other 
subject. This is nowhere more evident than in Strba's work where each time a different aspect of 
the photographer is confronted, just as each photographed subject reveals different aspects of 
themselves despite the achievement of reducing the level of unease in being photographed; waiting, 
playing, acting, removing oneself. 
46 See Buchloh's discussion of the possibility of victimization of the subject in Buchloh, B. H. D., 'Portraits/Genre: Thomas Struth'. In 
Portraits, Thomas Struth, Mosel, Munich: Schirmer Art Books, 1998, pp. 150-162 
47 Goldin, Nan, The Ballad of Sexual Dependency. New York: Aperture Foundation, 1986, p. 6 
°R Rakusa, Ilma, Shades of Time. 'Annelies Strba's photographs have no documentary pretensions. They do not substantiate individual cases, 
they do not submit proof that "this is what it was really like". On the contrary they eschew the topos of arresting, of freeing a moment in 
time, of letting it snap shut. They eschew the historical past. ' p. 336 
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In contrast Metro shows individuals in an abandoned, separation from us; staring, eyeless, focus- 
less, somewhere else, with no apparent awareness of being looked at or of the ab-normality of the 
event. In Strba's work, invariably, the subject is looking at her, but not as a photographer, not as a 
stranger, but in terms of familial involvement, as an extension to themselves. She and, more 
especially, Goldin have introduced the camera in such a way that allows their `subjects' to just be. a9 
Evans, Delahaye, Goldin and Strba each create conditions that allow the `subjects' to present 
themselves and keep the activity crude and uncontrolled. 50 They themselves, have `disappeared' as 
interpreting subjects" as far as is possible perhaps. Baudrillard's rethinking of the primacy of the 
subject, of the possibility of objectivity in `disappearing as subject', suggests an avoidance of an 
active fabrication of meaning. The methods that these photographers adopt relinquish any room for 
interpretation or control. The Metro and Subway series entirely remove the involvement of the 
subject from those being photographed and, in contradiction, Strba and Goldin achieve the same by 
their total immersion and involvement with those photographed. All of them take these 
photographs without calculation or deliberation; they create `a blank region'. What Baudrillard 
proposes in theory and what their work performs is that, in the lack of control or search for 
intentional meaning, perversely meaning is allowed to assert itself and the insignificant comes into 
its own. 52 The subject-depicted emerges in a different form; is allowed to assume a position without 
having done anything; the `poetic transference'. 
LOOKING FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL FOCUS: Obscure and Aslant 
Just as we decompose the odour of violets or the taste of tea, each apparently so particular, so 
inimitable, so ineffable, into several elements whose subtle combination produces the entire 
identity of the substance, so he realised that the identity of each friend, which made that friend 
loveable, was based upon a delicately proportioned and henceforth absolutely original 
combination of tiny characteristics organised in fugitive scenes, from day to day. Thus each 
friend deployed in his presence the brilliant staging of his originality. ' 
This quote embodies the inability to articulate what might be understood as `the entire identity of 
our substance' and that despite this impossibility, there remains in us a compulsion to keep trying. 
Ulf Lundin' and Larry Sultan 55 provide a particular focus within my overall project that tests the 
possibility of essential photographic description and present me with texts that approach `original 
'Goldin, Ballad of Sexual Dependency, p. 6 -'People in the pictures say my cameras is as much part of being with me as any other aspect 
of knowing me. It's as if my hand were a camera. If it were possible, I'd want no mechanism between me and the moment of photographing. ' 
50 Jean Baudrillard in an interview with Nicholas Zurbrugg in Art & Artefact, 1993, p. 37 
S' Baudrillard, J., The Ecstasy of Photography', in Art & Artefact, Zurbrugg, N. London: Sage Publications, 1993, pp. 32-42 
Benjamin, `A Short History of Photography' in Trachtenberg op. cit. p. 202, `All the artistic preparations of the photographer and all the 
design in the positioning of the model to the contrary, the viewer feels an irresistible compulsion to seek the tiny spark of accident, the here 
and now... In such a picture, that spark, as it were, burned through the person in the image with reality'. 
Barthes, Roland, Roland Barthes, trans. Richard Howard, New York: HiII and Wang, 1977 
54 Ulf Lundin, born in 1965, Sweden. Lives and works in Stockholm. 
Larry Sultan, born 1946 New York. Sultan is known for a number of series including The Valley 2003 focusing on the San Fernando 
Valley where he grew up and the subject of pornographic films. In 1977 he and Mike Mandell presented Evidence, a series of photographs 
selected form the files of the Beverly Hills Police Dept. and intended to demonstrate `objective' photographic evidence as not that simple. 
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combinations of tiny characteristics organised in fugitive scenes, from day to day'. Each actively 
quarry scenes of `everyday life' to effect an overall picture of those photographed. Lundin's series 
Pictures of a Family exemplifies the deferral of meaning, apparent in the oblique view' and 
Sultan's Pictures from Homes' describe the desire and search for the ever elusive quality or 
`identity of substance'. In terms of psychological focus these are two projects, which in each case 
include participation of their subjects, but in completely different ways. They both invite collusion 
in self-description using deliberate staging. In terms of a wider debate, both projects actively 
`discuss' the issues of authorship and artistic intention. 
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Figs. 36 & 37 Ulf Lundin, 
Pictures of a Family series, 
1996 
Lundin's project seeks to observe `family life' from a distance. Given permission to photograph an 
old school friend, whenever he liked as long as they were unaware he was doing so, presents a 
Derrida in Kearney, Richard, Dialogues with Contemporary Thinkers, Manchester University Press, 1984, `to deconstruct a text is to 
disclose how it functions as desire, as a search for presence and fulfilment which is interminably deferred'. 
57 Sultan, Larry, Pictures From Home. New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1992 
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contradictory take on anonymity and an ironic form of voyeurism. In this series, there is no 
communication between the observed and the observer, and yet it seems to highlight some 
perspective of the relationship between these two. The images themselves point to the striking 
separation between the individuals depicted and quite literally the rarity of direct communication, 
the isolation and the independence of their existence, from each other and from us, which the 
photographic strategy parallels metaphorically. The man always appears to be solitary. He rarely 
appears to look at anyone else or talk to anyone else, is often walking away from others and doesn't 
interact with others. He looks downwards always, to what he is doing, is involved in whatever he 
does. The woman is generally more outwardly engaged, sitting down talking to someone else or 
occupied with the child whilst he carries on. A number of the images highlight this position of 
divergence; he is in front and facing right, turning the meat over on the barbecue while she is 
behind and walking to the left and speaking. [fig. 6] He stands still, she moves away behind him 
They present a double take on the contradiction of intimacy and anonymity. Intimate in that this 
man was Lundin's friend in childhood. Intimate in that Lundin must now be familiar with the 
personal detail and particularity of their behaviour, relationships and peculiarities. Anonymous in 
that we don't know who this man is or where he is and he doesn't know when Lundin is there 
looking at him. This is a complicit contract of voyeuristic indulgence and imploded narcissism. It is 
an example of a photographic `project', which implicitly understands the questionable position of 
subject supremacy and the norm of objectification, which Baudrillard is concerned to expose. In 
literally hiding from his subjects, Lundin embodies the `subject's last adventure'. What it tells me 
about `family life' is fascinating but predictable, as opposed to what it says about the `the 
emptiness and fragility of exchange' 58 as it illuminates the nature of the photographic encounter in 
its very absence. The strategy refuses the essential point of self-constitution - in an exchange with 
others, and literally presents `the unseen site of representation' , 
5'rendering it meaningless in 
Lundin's absence. It asserts that anonymity, `subtracts' not only the `presence' of the subjects- 
depicted, but also that of the photographer. With regard to the subjects-depicted, the nature of the 
photographic event prompts questions about not only their relationship between themselves and the 
photographer, but also between themselves and their own image. Do they forget that Lundin will be 
sometimes there, just not knowing when? Or do they behave differently or a little self consciously 
all the time? Is the man, the main `character', performing? Is he playing the lone hero? Does he 
subconsciously `frame' himself as a normal part of his life now? And Lundin, is he aware of 
himself as he photographs them, comparing himself, his life? Does he see a part of himself in this 
man, some aspect at least? 60 
Baudrillard, `Poetic Transference of Situation' 
Baudrillyd, For Illusion isn't the Opposite of Reality... ' p. 133 
60 Ulf Lundin, Photographer's Gallery - «-%Nvw photonet org uk programme past - 
'the security of his life appalls and attracts me at the 
same time. It is difficult to point a finger at the choices (if we made any) which have determined our present lives'. 
96 
In contrast, Sultan confronts his subjects (his parents) and actively involves them in the project. 
They argue about it, they do not understand what he is trying to achieve and yet they try to do their 
best for him and what ensues is a series of photographs and dialogue that relates this delightful 
conflict. The book describes a number of things: the conflict and relationship between his mother 
and father, the conflict and difference of perspective between himself and his parents, particularly 
his father, different notions of what a picture should or should not describe, the consequent 
response to the photographer and an account that describes the letting go of `trying to make 
pictures'. 61 
She was lying on her stomach with her head turned towards me. I was so apprehensive of 
waking her that I breathed in rhythm with her. Standing at the foot of the bed, I realised that I 
had never seen the underside of her foot. I had my camera, so I photographed it. I could see the 
slight grass stains from walking barefoot that morning to the lake. I wanted to photograph it 
again and again, to use up the entire roll of film. ) Then it struck me that she was not really 
asleep. That her breathing, like mine, was controlled. We were co-conspirators. Just as I was 
secretly photographing, she was secretly awake. She felt me looking. -62 
Sultan presents a parallel text to that of the photographs, in the form of a self-conscious 
commentary on his aims and desires, a diary that logs his experience in a direct way without 
qualitative comment. Most of it is, day-to-day description, quite tedious and predictable as any 
ordinary life might be. Irv and Jean, alongside each other, both trying to make a life for themselves 
in retirement. ' It gets more interesting when they start talking about each other: his perception of 
her behaviour and then, her perception of his behaviour, his irritation, her irritation. A familiar tale 
after a lifetime together, but fascinating in its detailed dialogue that relates parallel and 
contradictory versions. Sultan's original project was to look at what happens when corporations 
discard loyal employees and the resulting frustration. But it quickly becomes more simply about his 
relationship with his father and mother. Sultan desperately tries to contrive a reality for himself, 
reflected in the life of his parents and, in his attempt, highlights the misinterpretation of what the 
same activity might mean for the photographer and the depicted-subjects. It is an uncomfortable 
time for him. He is trying to find some sort of position; what his parents are like for him. But he's 
so busy constructing images that they become something else. In trying to recreate something that 
approaches, for him, `that brief moment between thoughts when you forget yourself' or the ideal 
61 Sultan, Pictures from Home. New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1992, p. 16 
Ibid., p. 29 
° Ibid., pp. 96-105 
His mother: `Those newspapers of his drive me crazy. The big investor. I don't think he ever reads them. If he kept them in his study 
that would be fine, but they're all over the dining room table and the living room table and the kitchen counter. They're stacked on the 
floor by the bed, on the living room chair, on the stool in the kitchen. Do you know that we eat on those papers? They have become our 
dining mats. I'm serious. ' 
His father: "She'll be having her juice and while she drinks it she looks out the window. She'll start talking but I'm not sure if it's me or 
to herself. She says that she has to call this person or that person and do this particular thing. Throughout the day she'll walk round the 
house saying this, and I hear it so often that I find myself getting sucked in. ' 
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Figs. 38 - 40 Larry Sultan, 
Pictures from Home series, 
1992 
vision that resides in his memory, he constructs instead what Sultan describes as images with that 
`steely eyed look', `penetrating but impenetrable', indicative of the performance space of the pose. 
A space where the subject prepares her/himself and presents it as a spectacular mask of being; out 
there and nowhere. 
In the experience of being photographed, Barthes actively revels in the event, whereas Sultan's 
father, Irv, loses animation and freezes: `All I know is that when you photograph me I feel 
everything leave me. The blood drains from my face, my eyelids droop. My thoughts disappear. I 
can feel my facial muscle go limp. All you have to do is to give me that one cue. "Don't smile. " 
and zap. Nothing. That's what you get. '64In being photographed by his son, Irv is trying to be what 
he imagines Larry wants him to be and in turn, Larry wants him to be what he imagines Irv as 
I Irv in Sultan, Pictures from Home, p. 113 
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being. They both project a vision that will never match up. 65 Similarly, his mother, in a desperate 
attempt to please, and Larry, in his attempt to capture, proceed through an intimate farce of 
pretence. He relates encounters that describe the mismatch of perception of them by him, and of 
him by them, `she appears to me differently from how she feels; I feel differently from how I look. ' 
The photographs are taken amidst this conflict and are enlivened by the argument. Ultimately the 
debate regarding understanding and communication is the point, and determines the body of 
imagery. 
`I look at the pictures I've made and I don't know whom I was photographing. It looks like my 
father but it feels like me. " Sultan here asks the question that might be asked about any 
photographer of things familial and intimate: is any quest to look at others, close to oneself, 
ultimately a study of the self? In even responding to others, does one inevitably reveal different 
aspects of oneself? Each time `subject' confronts `subject', another side of each is revealed. Each 
invents the other; they run in parallel. Sultan's parents exemplify the experience of constituting 
themselves in the manner of their son's imagination and memory. As Barthes states `I feel that the 
Photograph creates my body or mortifies it... No doubt it is metaphorically that I derive my 
existence from the photographer. '67 And following Barthes, as he invariably does, Baudrillard's 
Ibid., p. 113 
Irv: 'I don't know what you are doing. You seem to be just as confused as I am. I mean, you pussyfoot around; half of the time the tape 
recorder doesn't work and you want me to repeat conversations that occurred spontaneously, and on the other hand you take the same 
pictures over and over again and you're still not happy with the results. It doesn't make a lot of sense to me. I don't know what you're 
after. What's the big deal ?' 
Larry: 'A lot of the time it doesn't make sense to me neither. All I know is that every time I try to make a photograph, you give me that 
steely -eyed look. You know it, penetrating but impenetrable, tough and in control. Or you shove your hands in your pockets and gaze 
off into some mythical future, which for some reason is about 45 degrees to my left. It's like you're acting the role of the heroic 
executive in an annual report... Maybe you're looking for a public image of yourself and I 'm interested in something more private, in 
what happens between events - that brief moment between thoughts when you forget yourself. ' 
Irv: 'All I know is that when you photograph me I feel everything leave me. the blood drains from my face, my eyelids droop. My 
thoughts disappear. I can feel my facial muscle go limp. All you have to do is to give me that one cue. 'Don't smile. " and zap. Nothing. 
That's what you get. ' 
' Sultan, Larry, 'Reflections on a Home Movie'. Aperture 103, pp. 32-34 
6' Barthes, Camera Lucida, p. 11 
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pessimistic view comes to pass that we look for meaning for ourselves in others and by asking 
others to define meaning for us: `Tell me what I am, tell me what I desire, tell me what I think'. 
Marianne Hirsch has demonstrated the importance of a late twentieth century foregrounding of 
family photography and its cultural role. Just as family snaps normally follow conventions and 
support dominant ideologies, so Sultan's work, whilst seeking to undermine this kind of familial 
function by looking for something more private, exposes the conflict deeply embedded in his 
parent's concern to maintain their own vision of what an image of themselves should be. Hirsch 
refers to the complexity of the look in these photographs, of there being `an infinitely multiple and 
contradictory series of looks' and a `complex exchange of looks and gazes. ' If we extend this use 
of the word look to include the agenda behind the look, then we can see the enormity of 
misunderstanding and cross transaction inherent in Sultan's project. Sultan, in attempting to 
question and utilise the family picture and its established convention replaces one tradition with 
that of modernist transcendence and returns us to the use of objects to describe an inner meaning; 
`a quest for presence' or `a mythic identification of himself in others'. 69 He appears to seek an 
image, which is about something; `about memory and reflection, like looking back on your life. '70 
In an indirect way, Sultan perpetuates this `modernist privileging of inner depth over external 
appearance"' in his appropriation and use of his parents to describe something in himself. He 
acknowledges this irony to some extent: `It's only when I give up trying to make pictures and begin 
to enjoy the time spent with them that anything of value ever happens', but despite this, he persists 
in trying to achieve some definitive moment, 72 some metaphoric insight: `I am waiting around for 
an ending' and `The image I had in mind seems to be about memory and reflection, like looking 
back on your life' and Irv puts his finger on it: `Oh Jesus, not another one of those'. 73 
Aslant: Whatever pertinence there happens to be comes only in the margins, the interpolations, 
the parenthesis, aslant: it is the subject's voice off, as we say, off camera, off microphone, off 
stage. 74 
In Roland Barthes, Barthes traverses meaning in notions of interruption, shortcutting, parenthesis, 
inflection, duplicity, and looks at what is said and not said and what remains undefined. He talks in 
the third person about himself, exemplifying a subjective self-appraisal that in itself shortcuts and 
contradicts self-reflection and perception by others. Lundin's project similarly presents us with a 
' Hirsch, Marianne, 'Introduction: Familial Looking'. In The Familial Gaze, Dartmouth College: University Pres of New England, 
1999, p. xvi 
69 Phillips, David, `Photo-Logos: Photography and Deconstruction', in The Subjects of Art History, Cheetham, Holly and Moxey, 
Cambridge University press, 1998, p. 166. - gives a concise critique of Steiglitz's work as typical of the photographic philosophy of 
`presence'. 
70 Sultan, Pictures from Home, p. 119 
" Phillips, 'Photo-Logos: Photography and Deconstruction', p. 165 
' Henri Cartier-Bresson, The Decisive Moment (1952), 'I prowled the streets all day, feeling very strung up and ready to pounce, 
determined to 'trap' life - to preserve life in the act of living. Above all, I crave to seize the whole essence, 
in the confines of one single 
photograph, of some situation that was in the process of unrolling itself before my eyes. ' 
73 'Irv' in Pictures from Home, p. 119 
' Barthes, Roland, Roland Barthes [1975], trans. Richard Howard, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1977, p. 73 
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fragmentary `aslant' view; his view (perception) of this `other' is indirect and covert, whilst the 
resulting photograph is clear, `straight' and overt, which similarly shortcuts both view and vision. 
Baudrillard suggests that `poetic order requires that the event should not exactly take place'75 and 
that there should be a `fracture in this excessively well-crafted machinery of presentation' . 
76 I 
would argue that Lundin's oblique, sideways look at the appearance of an individual, rather than 
Sultan's more active search for depth, reveals more of that individual. Ultimately Sultan's careful 
management returns us to strategic attempts to achieve photographic transcendence as a `means for 
keeping social relations to an abstraction'. ' In so doing, he disallows the messiness, the 
uncertainty, the interference of contradiction and obscuration and struggles to maintain his own 
position of power by an `assertion of subjective and symbolic effect' in the face of his parents' 
struggle to assert something else. Sultan chooses to determine and construct the `entire identity' of 
his parents but effects something else entirely. In seeking intimacy or interaction, he arrives at 
himself - ultimately distance. He is an example of an author who doesn't disappear - he appears as 
the subject. 
Both series spotlight two crucial aspects of the photographic portrait: the position and relation of 
photographer to `subject' and the grand photographic project of revealing the `true identity' behind 
appearance. They question the power and specialness of the photographer as author and expose its 
fragility. They suggest alternative positions for the subject in relation to the viewer and alternative 
notions of `reality' than one that relies on resemblance. It begs the question: if we were to explore 
mere appearance, rather than seeking essence, what might we find? Kristeva describes two models 
for organising fictive signification based on two `dialogical categories'; " the first between subject 
and addressee (reader), which determines the nature of genre; and the second between subject- 
photographer and subject-depicted, which determines the manner of enunciating (constructing) the 
photographic statement. The use of respective pronouns, if translated into the context of 
photographic portrayal, better explains the particular metaphoric activity: the use of `he/she', the 
impersonal pronoun, introduces a degree of anonymity and negation in depiction (Delahaye). The 
use of `I' in narration increasingly and figuratively inserts the author alongside the subject as with 
Evans and Goldin and, at its extreme, literally embeds narration in the characters depicted. Nikki 
S. Lee's Projects [fig. 4] depict her after having infiltrated an identifiable community, adopted an 
appropriate persona and `having become' one with her subjects. She thus incorporates the cultural 
codes of each group. An author's projection can sometimes take an inverted form, where in some 
instances it is difficult to discriminate one story from another; Sultan's narration is disrupted not 
only by his father's dialogue but by the images themselves that answer back. Where the staging is 
openly displayed and impersonal, the collusion between author and addressee is shared and the 
"Jean Baudrillard, 'It is the Object that Thinks Us', p. 150 
'? 'Jean Baudrillard, ' For Illusion is not the Opposition of Reality', p. 133 
' Phillips, 'Photo-Logos: Photography and Deconstruction', p. 165 
"Word, Dialogue and Novel' in Desire in Language describes and analyses the work of Mikhail Bakhtin p. 86 
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fiction is tangible, if not visible and evident. The addressee is then privy to the quotation, irony or 
commentary, as with Jeff Wall who often makes art historical references such as to Manet or 
Hokusai. 79 In complete contrast to this is the careful and self-conscious standoff strategy whereby 
the `subject' is given strict mechanical parameters80 that strip the event of expression or removes 
contact altogether (von Zwehl, Yokomizo). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Part One establishes the portrait as an event, rather than moment and as a manifestation of 
exchange dependent on process, rather than any system that implies or desires immutability. I 
identify positions for photographer, subject and reader that facilitiate alternatives to objectification 
or the didactic and definitive and Kristeva's dialogical matrix as providing a frame that 
incorporates process, participation or forms of disappearance. The degree of complicity and 
participation in the relationship between the protagonists is established as determining, implicitly 
or explicitly, dialogic modes of exchange. The range of perspectives described in this section are 
located in relation to the material example of practice and demonstrate a developing correlation 
between verbal and visual ideas. 
In the light of Derrida's discontinuous self-division and Sartre's affective sense, one can see that 
portrayal encompasses the notion that the manner of rhetoric must necessarily describe our attitude 
to the world, which in consequence suggests that qualities in the photograph are inserted by us in 
feeling and response, rather than by the photographer. Kristeva forefronts qualities that are only 
evident in intonation and not in the literal substance or `thing', which confirms dimensions besides 
indexical reference. Baudrillard hints at the immanence inhabiting the material of the photograph, 
rather than a transcendence imposed by our pretensions. Levinas's metaphor `face' introduces the 
notion of a conceptual space reliant on senses other than vision and Derrida's performative reading 
engenders a conceptual framework of qualities, which Sartre's `order of qualities' begins to 
articulate as a form of concept-idea-feeling-quality. Thus each inserts a conceptual element that is 
both material and abstract, both graspable and ineffable and suggests the possibility of an 
alternative imperative to that of `resemblance'. 
Disruption of the portrait genre identifies a need for other modes of describing photographs of 
people. I have stated that the mode of `intention', the inclusion or removal of particularity, the 
nature of interaction and the level of commentary are determining factors in understanding 
photographs differently, but the concomitant transformation of the particular into the dimension of 
`something more' as symbol is difficult to avoid. A recurrent theme is that of the conflict between 
79 Jeff Wall, born Canada 1946. Lives and works in Vancouver. In 2001. In 1977 he began making backlit Cibachrome transparencies 
and since 1991 has used digital technology. His photographs are typically staged like a scene in a film and are therefore operate like 
fiction. 
° See for example Bettina von Zwehl's elaborate procedures where subjects wear uniform apparel and are told to hold their breath. 
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this urge to find universal meaning beyond the self (to reduce alterity by making it knowable) and 
the compulsion towards inexplicable areas that invite a more dangerous encounter, suggesting a 
practice that is not reliant on words, not ruled by logic or literal translation and which does not 
fixedly determine meaning by naming but courts territories of the unknown. Levinas acknowledges 
the value of not knowing and the possibility and opportunity of the mystery residing in the 
particular without universal meaning. Part Two aims to identify how such unknowable qualities 
might be formed and manifested and how `meaningful' images are constructed in an arena that 
entertains uncomfortable and uncertain content, determined by the mobility and multiplicity of 
those involved in the process. I pursue the possibility of generating `ideas', of presenting 
`something more' without neutralising or idealising and the possibility of exploring photographs in 
a way that retains the particular event or process, as an alternative to transcendence. 
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PART TWO: CONSTRUCTIONS OF RESONANCE 
Introduction 
In Part Two, I examine ideas that contribute to an explanation for non-definitive meaning; those 
elements that remain ineffable in an image. Common to a number of theoretical fields concerning 
visual signification, is an area, which appears to remain in parenthesis. It is referred to as being 
certain in its existence, but undefined in structure. It concerns the aspect of potency in visual 
imagery that is not transparent to meaning. Its location is (bracketed off), to the side or 
insignificantly placed, not universally understood and not consistent. It occupies an area that 
precisely makes visual meaning not a language in the manner of a linguistic system, because it is 
ungraspable, elusive and too `replete. ' Its existence provokes an array of terminology unique to 
particular ideological frames. In this discussion it is named variously as pure meaning (Barthes), 
sans (Derrida); its place is punctum (Barthes), parergon, (Derrida), interstices (Levinas); its 
function is catalyser, metonym, metaphor; its motivation is semiotic (Kristeva). Each term 
contributes a means to describe the ineffable and to indicate the whereabouts of a reverberating 
potency that is critical but evades definition. 
I examine the manner in which photographs construct a discourse by means of their visual 
dynamics. I review the respective mechanisms of meaning and the indescribable and the role of 
each in the contemporary portrait, not with the aim to define or contain in a categorical structure 
but to recognise and expose. Attempting to grasp elusive ideas about ineffability, I aim to 
examine the intrinsic dynamic in the photograph that is neither a support for narrative 
interpretation nor explained by being `transcendent' and give emphasis to immanent property 
instead. Narrative could be said to be the anti-thesis of the ineffable as it orders and sequences the 
anarchy of detail. I look at alternatives to this understanding, to procedures that are more 
discursive than decisive and ask how does the image articulate the implicit? 
`CONTEXTS' establishes a rationale for my use of the key term `resonance', which signifies 
aspects of quality that defy definitions such as beauty and suggests the possibility of the 
photograph being more akin to a rhythm than a thing. Poststructuralism has had a profound effect 
on the interpretations of meaning and in this regard, I contextualise this examination of the 
photograph (not specifically portrait) as being influenced by Derrida's procedures of 
deconstruction. I discuss the significance of differance as the dynamic that decentres both the 
reading and the making of images that encourages dispersal, process and dialogue and which 
denies narrative and definition in images. `THE FUNCTION OF DETAIL', specifically explores 
For useful distinctions between representation and language or the complexities in visual depiction see Goodman, Nelson, The 
Languages ofArt, Indianapolis: New York: Kansa City: The Bobbs-Merrill Company Inc. p. 41 and p. 230 
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the dynamics of the parergon, the subjective dimensions of punctum and the workings of 
metonym that inhabit them. I argue for the essential role of detail in contributing the element that 
defies definition, that can elevate the image to something more than narrative. In `THE 
MECHANICS OF METAPHOR', I correlate differance with theories of metaphor and proceed to 
look at how metonymic procedure opens up the possibility further to metaphor in allegorical 
systems within the image, in `conceptual schema'. 
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Chapter One: CONTEXTS 
RESONANCE SANS SENSE 
Before looking at the operations of meaning in the photograph, I consider the naming of elements 
that cannot be quantified, that problematise the relationship between sense and meaning. One such 
habitual name is `beauty', which I translate generally to indicate at least a property of potency; a 
quality that is carried in the `thing' (photograph), but cannot be named as present, because it cannot 
be separated from the whole in order to be articulated. As a quality of experience it may yet retain a 
purpose or validation for artwork, but is clearly an outmoded term in the context of contemporary 
art photography, which commonly incorporates ideas of absurdity, fiction and irony as its 
foundation. Its use in relation to the non-definitive qualities of image that I am examining, 
confronts the need for a more suitable term with which to measure description. Derrida's 
disturbance of Kant's notion of `beauty', and particularly the implications of `sans', introduces the 
role of concept over appearance and suggests alternative possibilities for an understanding of how 
elusive qualities operate. 
In The Truth in Painting, Derrida follows texts by Kant and Heidegger to question firstly, what 
determines our notion of art and aesthetics, and secondly, what elements within a work determine 
its quality, what elements can be judged as fulfilling aesthetic criteria (what is `beautiful'? ) He 
troubles terms in order to disentangle them from the ideologies that forge them and to undermine 
the preoccupation with `presence' and `beauty' in aesthetic discourse. The term `beauty' confronts 
a number of assumptions and mis-directions in the discussion of meaning for the contemporary 
context. Attempts to locate any elusive quality require criteria to establish its limits, and by 
definition are doomed to tautology and contradiction. For example Kant's criteria are 
fundamentally problematic as they do not entirely define the quality that is being described and 
Kant himself indicates a number of contradictions to his own premise. ' It seems that the limits of 
his criteria demand another dimension to the quality he describes; they are too logical, too 
restrictive and too loaded with subsequent connotations allied to pleasure and `pleasing'. Derrida's 
essay `Parergon'2 exposes contradictions permeating the boundaries of `beauty', and a language 
that struggles to explain visual conditions, properties, qualities and meaning that are non-verbal, 
that are intrinsically non-linear and which resist structures determined by language. Derrida 
identifies an area of essential non-logic, which does not conform to the requirements of definition, 
Kant, Immanuel, The Critique of Aesthetic Judgement (1790), trans. James Meredith, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952: 'To discern what 
is beautiful, It is a judgement, not a cognitive judgement, nor one pertaining to knowledge, but of imagination. Therefore not logical - it 
is an aesthetic judgement which means the determining ground cannot be other than subjective', p. 41. And having set the boundaries of 
what determines beauty he concedes: `The real meaning is that they (tones, colours) make this form more clearly, definitely, and 
completely intuitable, and beside stimulate the representation by their charm, as they excite and sustain the attention directed to the 
object itself. ' p. 68, § 226 
2 Derrida, Jacques, `Parergon' in The Truth in Painting (1978), trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod, University of Chicago Press, 
1987, pp. 37-82 
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but do depend on the principle of parergonic logic, which is contradictory. This is a quality that 
pervades rather than situates itself. 
Neither does the term `sublime' suffice as it requires a significance of magnitude or veneration, 
which does not fit the kind of quality to be found in a detail, and does not satisfy the manner of 
quality that I am seeking to describe. `Sublime' is that which is un-representable3 but that we can 
imagine; neither noumenal and outside of our experience, nor phenomenal and in the world as it 
appears to us. Accession of the unarticulated quality to the height of the sublime omits whole areas 
of possibility. If sublimity is a state that is ineffable, it cannot be depicted. This differentiates itself 
from what I am concerned with - aspects of something that is depicted and yet is ineffable (in the 
sense of indescribable). A photograph such as Evans's Allie Mae Burroughs (1936) might qualify 
as an example where `the expression of which all possible words are unsuitable'. ' In this regard, it 
is necessary to distinguish between those photographs that display unspeakable objects / things / 
events, and photographs that either amplify these qualities in the thing, or construct such qualities. 
However, a photograph of a person presents a conflation of this difference, in the `subject' and in 
the photograph of the subject, and elusive qualities in the person become elusive qualities in the 
image. In simple terms, the ineffable can be described as meaning that operates in an arena that is 
not confined to speech. A more suitable term then might be `indescribable', which allows for the 
possibility of speaking of an ineffable state whilst incorporating an acceptance of incompleteness 
and not necessarily `truthful' states. A configuration of ineffable as states or things (actual or 
possible) that cannot be linguistically expressed, `about the nature of which nothing literal can be 
said', ' moves toward the boundaries of the literal/figural as a key concern. 
Indescribable qualities are visually representable, can be experienced but are difficult to grasp and 
describe completely or adequately. The indescribable resides in the image and is immanent rather 
than transcendent in the sense of above and beyond experience and the mundane world. Thus 
`transcendence' is a problematic term, which whilst it is used to distinguish work that surpasses the 
object depicted and is often applied to Evans's work for example, it becomes a generalised and 
meaningless term that encompasses all manner of meaning from the everyday to the metaphysical. 
In order to chase the indefinable quality that is not bound by logic or limitation, I need another term 
that retains potency but encompasses divergent non-logical forms that can sustain boundless 
simultaneity of meaning in a photograph. It will need to be essentially self-referential and not 
dependent on the achievement of finality, but to admit qualities of disturbance and mobility. Using 
Derrida's examination in `The Sans of the Pure Cut', ' I shall firstly outline elements of property, 
Kant, The Critique of Judgement, p. 119. The notion of the 'sublime' is extensively discussed in Wassenberg, Martin, Tracing the 
Sublime, Transcendental Subjectivityfrom Burke to Lyotard, 2000 (unpublished, accessed Hallward Library, University of Nottingham) 
Kennick, WE. in E of Philosophy, p. 181 
5 Ibid., p. 181 
6 Derrida, 'The Sans of the Pure Cut' in The Truth in Painting, pp. 83-118 
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which, if the references to `beauty' were removed, appears to indicate an opaque quality that is not 
transparent to meaning and that approaches the ineffable. 
It is the without that counts for beauty; neither the finality nor the end, neither the lacking goal 
nor the lack of goal but the edging in the sans of the pure cut. ' 
Derrida amplifies aspects of Kant's descriptions that are tantalisingly close to an opaque quality; 
terminology that emphasises lack rather than possession, such as `non-knowledge', `without end' 
and `vague beauty'. Kant's `adherent beauty' refers to universal qualities that are generally 
recognised, whereas `free' or `vague' beauty is singular and depends on wayward and 
indeterminate qualities that emerge from perhaps an `insignificant detail', and approaches that 
`errant' but potent quality that I am talking about. Derrida agitates this and Kant's third moment8 
that significantly relies on figurative expression to clarify the difficulty of naming its properties and 
which determines `beautiful' as work that has finality but does not represent a purpose. He 
acquires, as metaphor for the beautiful, the wild tulip `in which the without-end or the without- 
concept of finality is revealed' and everything about it `seems finalised... seems to be organised 
with a view to an end'. ' Derrida spotlights those spaces (the sans, the `without' concept, the 
without purpose) that lie in-between the more easily definable bits, words that reference a 
fundamental state of indeterminacy attached to the concept of beauty, to be found in what is not 
described, what is lacking. Derrida's `logic' proceeds to explain that if the wild tulip can only be 
beautiful without a purpose, but appears to strive towards one, it is the without and the lack, which 
are essential to the property of `beauty'. `Beauty' depends on the `absolute interruption' of this end 
and, if this `cut' and interruption were not absolute, `if it could be prolonged, completed, 
supplemented, there would be no beauty'. Sans is not a lack in a negative sense therefore, as it is a 
required property of what is termed `beautiful' . 
'o 
Rational ideas (like that of beauty) require common accord and some sort of ideal that can conform 
to objective judgement. The `sans of the pure cut' interrupts the process of idealisation and 
differentiates pure property, the simple condition from the ideal. The sans is that wayward un-pin- 
downable element that adds something, or takes definition away and the ability to define it away. 
We end up with a set of essential oppositions: either the ideal of the imagination or pure property, 
either adherent and comprehensible or `vague', either with end or without end, either sense or sans 
sense or nonsense. The opposition between what is held to be beautiful in the ideal concept and 
what is held as beautiful in the particular. `Beauty' presupposes a `particular end' as if ideal, as if 
purposeful. Everything seems as if perfect, as if organised and natural but is `cut off before 
Derrida, The Truth in Painting, p. 89. Derrida's use of word sans accesses sense (intelligent), sense (phenomenal), non-sense, sense 
sans sense (without reference). 
'Kant, The Critique of Judgement , pp. 
61-80 
9 Derrida, The Truth in Painting, p. 85 refers to the reference by Kant -'a tulip is regarded as beautiful, because we meet with a certain 
finality in its perception, which in our estimate of it, is not referred to any end whatever. ' (Kant, The Critique of Judgement, p. 80) 
11 Ibid., p. 87 
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achieving totality. '" `The essential thing' is edgy hesitant and ambivalent, its nearness to purpose 
is on the edge of purpose, as it strains towards it. Derrida's `logic', of potency in lack and 
purposelessness, leads us toward an interesting, provocative conclusion, that artworks, by not 
applying themselves `to signify, show or represent"2 may be the only `freely wandering beauties'. 
A non-oppositional effect emphasises the divide between logic and non-logic, qualities of 
purposelessness and non-knowledge threaten the conceptual schema of `beauty' and yet share some 
of the properties. Derrida is attracted to the negativity or what opposes that urge to complete and 
the fluidity of a quality existing in what is not there - the without. Derrida's never ending allusion 
to the phenomenon of non-opposition, overflow, addition, supplement is equivalent to that which 
cannot be described adequately. The lack is the inexplicable and without naming it, essentially he is 
describing the ineffable quality that affects us. 
In terms of the photograph the `without end' (purpose) is pertinent to the accidental property of the 
photograph, which incorporates whatever the camera is 'pointed"' toward, indiscriminately; the 
`without end' (termination) is pertinent to its `naturally' endless connotation; the `lack' is pertinent 
to the propensity of the photograph to refer to what is absent; the `sense without reference' is 
pertinent to the contradictory fact that the photograph is tied to the referent, despite attempts to 
divorce it and `without' points to a direction in contemporary photography to leave out and deny 
content or authorship. These characteristics confirm the peculiar property of the photograph, rather 
than striving to contain it. Sans, the property of without, switches emphasis from what is there and 
can be described to what is not there and provides a context for the formulation of an aesthetic (not 
of beauty), which becomes important to aspects of contemporary art photography and will be 
further discussed in Section Three. Three key distinctions of the ineffable recur; the hiatus between 
showing and telling, presenting and describing (Sonja's ambivalence); the gap between content 
(what is there) and the form of the content - how Allie Mae Burroughs is inscrutable; the concepts 
associated with ineffable that straddle borders as with metaphor, sans and as will be seen figure. 
To insist on the musicality of every image is to see in an image its detachment from an object... 
as though a sensation free from all conception. '4 
Levinas articulates a sensation of meaning that does not require a criterion of location. His 
perspective on the `image of sound"5 suggests a means of finding suitable terminology. Levinas's 
`rhythm' accesses senses other than sight and removes experience from one that depends on 
language and sight to one that suggests a dimension of reverberation and tone reminiscent of 
Ibid., p. 89 
1z Ibid., p. 97 
13 Derrida's rhetoric exploits, for example the word 'pointure' to explore what 'point' is habitually sought, what is 'point-less' in the 
search for meaning and what is 'point-less' in the image. 
'a Levinas, Emmanuel, 'Reality and its Shadow', in Collected Philosophical Papers (1948), trans. Alphonso Lingis, Dordrecht Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1983, p. 5 
15Ibid., p. 5 
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Kristeva's semiotic: `Sound is the quality most detached from an object. Its relation with the 
substance from which it emanates is not inscribed in its quality. It resounds impersonally. Even its 
timbre, a trace of its belonging to an object, is submerged in its quality, and does not retain the 
structure of a relation'. 16 
`Rhythm' refers to the `sensible and the imaginary' and does not constrain or contain inherent 
criteria. " It emphasises instead affect and response over `what is' intrinsic in the work. It suggests 
that `poetic order affects us' 18, imposes itself on us and by our passive submission to it, forces us to 
participate. It conjoins the `I-actor' (who is active) with the `I-spectator' (who is passive), so that 
the subject becomes `a part of the spectacle'. Sensation, a `function of rhythm', is a `category 
independent from substance', not a residue of perception but an alternative means of perception. 
Levinas's `sounding' destroys the possibility of our apprehending a `thing' or a `subject' and thus 
destroys the question -'what is this about? ' It suggests another dimension of meaning that is more 
active, concerned with how and what is happening, more of a process. The dilemma is how to 
`tell' of this kind of meaning, what methods to employ that come anywhere near articulating it. 
Roquentin's experience19 highlights the realisation that words do not define what actually occurred 
at all. They are not the equivalent of, and can only be another version or distortion of, experience. 
Levinas's imposition of the world of objects on us, making us participants, together with the 
photographic property of simultaneity and absence and an apprehension more akin to sound rather 
than sight, contributes to an entirely different plane of reference. What happens is not the same as 
what is. What is, is not the same as what it is `about'. The notion of rhythm, sound and reception 
in passive participation is far removed from the intentional determination to `grasp' an object, a 
thing, a what-is. This is the arena that asks: what is a sensation rather than what is a `thing'. The 
participation of the viewer-subject effects `a reversal of power into participation, ' an involvement 
of a `sphere situated outside of the conscious and unconscious', one of `rhythm and dreams'. The 
image `as a rhythm' and belonging to another dimension of interaction with reality, is a 
`disincarnation of reality' that disallows the possibility of us (as subjects who `normally' dominate 
objects) `capturing' reality. The condition of rhythm heralds an alternative to the hierarchy of 
subject/object, reminiscent of Baudrillard's `disappearance' and proposes an interaction with 
reality other than through seeing as verification, and subject defining a `thing'. 
I am approaching a dynamic of potency that I can name, which can encompass the contradiction of 
lack and possession and indicate without defining, allow movement and meaning without linearity. 
Immanent property can only indicate that which is qualitative and add to the import of an image; it 
Ibid., p. 4 
"See for example discussion of the 'boundaries between entrenched domains of knowledge' in Davies, Martin L. & Marsha 
Meskimmon (eds. ) Breaking the Disciplines, Reconceptions in Knowledge, Art and Culture. London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 2003 
'8 Levinas, 'Reality and its Shadow', p. 4 
19 Sartre, Jean-Paul, Nausea (1938). Hamondsworth: Penguin, 1965, pp. 182-187 
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cannot be pinned down because it reverberates. 20 Resonance is a term that allows objects in the 
image to have simultaneous meaning, to speak to each other, to be active, mobile and not static. 
Resonance does not imply resolution or end (termination). Elements can be non-teleological - sans 
- without-end (purpose). The properties of resonance encompass the contra-linguistic and amplify 
the non-formal, non-sequential, the importance of tonal and rhythmic qualities that are 
symptomatic of simultaneity and sonority. Resonance allows meaning across oppositions and is not 
transparent to meaning but is opaque and signifies potency and possibility rather than certainty. It is 
a term that encourages disturbance and mobility without the necessity of logical meaning, without 
the sense of literal translation. Resonance confirms what is without narrative within un-purposeful 
properties in the photograph. In the examinations of detail and metaphor that follow, I shall 
establish a foundation for `resonance' in the photograph as potent and opaque, which can be more 
practically explicable in terms of metaphoric function for example. Firstly I discuss Derrida's 
premise of differance, which provides a poststructural frame for many of the qualities articulated 
here as `resonance'. 
DIFFERANCE AND THE PHOTOGRAPH 
Differance `is not a being-present, however excellent, unique, principal or transcendent one 
makes it. It commands nothing, rules over nothing, and nowhere does it exercise any authority. 
It is not marked by a capital letter. Not only is there no realm of differance, but differance is 
even the subversion of every realm. This is obviously what makes it threatening and necessarily 
dreaded by everything in us that desires a realm, the past or future presence of a realm"' 
Applications of linguistic theory have contributed to the task of reading photographs and have 
helped to establish the premise of looking at images as another form of reading. Derrida's writing 
is important because in the process of scrutinising other's theories about language (Husserl, 
Saussure), he questions the appropriateness and nature of the analysis of language itself. In reaction 
to structuralism, he reveals language as not being transparent to meaning and his exposure of texts 
are a persuasive argument against reliance on logical forms of analysis. The irony here for 
photography is that earnest attempts, evident in applications of structural analysis, " to find some 
respectable base for reading images, to elevate interpretation from vague speculation to validation 
founded on conforming criteria, echoes nineteenth century attempts to validate photographic 
practice itself by emulating principles of painting and dissipates the very qualities of photography 
that contribute to its particular process of meaning. Derrida's essential legacy is that of questioning 
assumptions at every level of meaning construction. Its relevance in this search to understand non- 
definitive meaning and resonant quality in photographs, centres around his preoccupation with the 
I Definition in Chambers English Dictionary, 'Resounding; sonority; sympathetic vibration. ' 
21 Derrida, Speech and Phenomena (1967), trans. David B. Allison, Evanston: North Western University Press, 1973, p. 153 
22 For example Umberto. Eco 'Critique of the Image' in Burgin, Victor, (ed. ) Thinking Photography. London: Macmillan, 1982 
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disturbance of what is considered the norm and as I seek to explore those facets of meaning that 
appear to defy structures of analysis, his procedure of looking at aspects of interstices is pertinent. 
Firstly as my exploration seeks what is there in a photograph besides what is depicted, Derrida's 
focus on absence and supplementation provides a starting point for its scrutiny. Secondly his use of 
language exploits what is absent in definition, what is inferred, what is intuited and forms the basis 
of the dynamic of differance23 that manifests expression visibly and requires an alternative 
approach to linear and linguistic translation. I concentrate on concerns of expression and rhetoric 
and the implications for photographic practice, rather than the mechanics of `signification', 
explored extensively elsewhere. 
In Speech and Phenomena, Derrida challenges assumptions about the relation between logic and 
rhetoric in the foundation of language. In the context of the medieval framework of grammar, logic 
and rhetoric, ' grammar can be understood as the mechanics of communication, logic as what lends 
it understanding as logical, absurd or contradictory and rhetoric as the mode of expression, the 
appropriateness to its context, the tropes and style used and the particular relationship of language 
to the world as expressed. This usefully gives us a comparative frame within which to look at the 
disturbance of sense addressed by Derrida. Applied to photographs, grammar equates with formal 
aspects such as depth of field, 25 logic with the photograph's indexicality and rhetoric with the more 
elusive aspects. Thus when looking at photographs we logically start with subject matter and ask: 
What is it? But as with Levinas's `sounding', Derrida attacks the tradition rooted in the restricted 
scope of logic and switches emphasis toward the manner and placement of expression. This upturn 
is of the utmost importance in the context of reading and using images, as it focuses on what is 
absent or concealed by assumptions, and suggests alternatives to an aesthetic that perpetuates 
`subject matter'. Applying this principle to photography generates such questions as: What is 
implicit or besides the subject depicted? What is not visible? What is provoked? How is meaning 
constructed around the object? How can we escape fixation on what it is? How can a photograph 
contradict its indexical and naming properties? How can a photograph break its own rules? 
Derrida's central idea of differance references Pierce's `pure rhetoric' (how one sign readily leads 
to another), which introduces an inclination toward meaning being dependent on interpretation 
rather than initial conception. Derrida amplifies this by rejecting idealised abstractions of meaning 
from the everyday experience of things and from their context. His provocative, often 
misinterpreted, statement `there never was any "perception", 26 in simple terms, rejects the 
understanding of perception as a notion of pure and immediate, unmediated awareness and 
"Deºrida's `definition' of differance in Speech and Phenomena, pp. 129-130 
I Suggested by Newton Garver in Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, p. ix-x 
u Durand, Regis, 'How to See (Photographically)'. In Petro, Patrice (ed. ) Fugitive Images: from photography to video. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995. Durand tantalisingly suggests `the essential dynamism of photographs lies in their 
implosive character' but disappointingly locates it in devices such as sequencing, superimposition, depth of field, double exposure. 
26 Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, p. 103 
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acknowledges experience as reliant on all kinds of context. Without the certainty of pure perception 
and interaction ('presence') or the existence of a pure essential meaning independent of the 
signifier, meaning must rely on context and interpretation. Context, a key element of 
`deconstruction', re-positions `presence' as not possible (or even desirable). Derrida extends 
Saussure's `play of difference '27that encourages `the condition of possibility', to become a process 
of meaning and the development of a `conceptual system': `every concept is necessarily and 
essentially inscribed in a chain or a system, within which it refers to another and to other 
concepts'. ' Differance introduces a profound uncertainty concerning definition and in consequence 
'fact', `consciousness'29 `truth', `reality` also, and refuses the presupposed question that prefaces 
philosophical thinking: what is? 
The structure of supplementation and the possibility of the existence of objects in their absence 
`gives birth to meaning'. This principle provides a key to confusions inherent in photographic 
meaning. As language substitutes a word for an object, we depend on reference to an object as 
sufficient to indicate meaning. The absence of the object does not `prevent a text from "meaning" 
something' and meaning tolerates `the total absence of the subject or object of a statement'. " 
Language depends on the oppositional nature of difference31 in order to distinguish one concept or 
thing from another, linked, maybe similar, but each different. It presupposes antithesis in any 
declaration. But as we yearn for certainty in sameness, primacy or unity, common sense has 
dictated that things, when represented and denoted as x, are the same when in fact a representation 
cannot be the same. A basic premise of communicating about existent objects depends on our 
ability to `imagine' the existence of something that is not there and both our understanding and 
communication assumes absence. The notion of supplementation emphasises the function of 
addition, inherent in that substitution process and adds another level of meaning to the sense of that 
object. There is an expectation of meaning `accompanying' an object that indicates a further 
dimension to meaning, existing outside the representation of the object (whether it be absent or 
present) so that language is full of expressions that lack an object but which are full of meaning (by 
connotation) or that are present in implied likeness (metaphor). The process of substitution then 
introduces elements of sense that are not straightforward and are potentially disruptive. 32 
Images, like words, operate as substitutes for objects. It is not necessary to `see' an object to 
understand its existence, as the object can be supplemented by a word (or a photograph). But in a 
photograph, every referred object is inescapably contingent and can be `seen', which confuses the 
-" Ibid., p. 140 -'Saussure had only to remind us that the play of difference was the functional condition, the condition of possibility of 
every sign. ' 
2' Ibid., p. 133 
'Ibid., p. 139 
1 Ibid., p. 93 
3' Ibid., p. 140: 'the other as different' 
32 Ibid., p. 88 -'What is supplementary is in reality difference, the operation of differing which at one and the same time both fissures and 
retards presence, submitting it simultaneously to primordial divisions and delay. ' 
113 
fact of its absence and any `intelligible sense' held in connotation. Despite photographs lacking the 
level of regularity and sameness required by a `system of denotation', 33 this principle of 
substitution exists in our reading of photographic images as a literal statement of the thing 
depicted, and is evident in the belief of photographs as transparent. In speaking of an image of 
someone, we commonly speak of that person, as if they were there, not the image. ' With regard to 
portrayal, what operates here is the emotional space triggered as response to both the image, as 
reference to that person, and to the person depicted (Sartre's affectivity). With the powerful 
propensity of a photographic image through metaphor and metonym to reference what is absent in 
the image as well as what is present, one can see how concepts and meaning can depend on 
oppositional relations to what is there within the image. Photographic texts can play with this 
riddle of absence. And whilst we have come to suspect the existence of `truths' on one level, 
perversely in an image, the reference to what is `outside' (what is not factual or physically 
referenced), is possibly what gives it its dynamic. 
Fig. 41 Arsen Savadov, Bloody Merry 
series, 1998 
In a photograph, the logic of sign determining meaning can be seen to be visually evident, as 
`reality' 
. 
Superficially, here is a picture of A- simple. On another level, it can be seen that there is 
all manner of complexity that separates `meaning' from `reality' or what is signified. This is the 
illogic of photographic depiction. The process of supplementation in a photograph is disturbed by 
the essential difference between object and photograph and conflicts with the premise of the 
photograph as being `truthful'. If we look at the style, the tropes and the relation to context, the 
indexical referencing will be simultaneously disrupted by the manner of expression, in the selection 
and framing of the image, in the context in which it is shown, in the position of those contained in 
' Goodman , 
The Langrniages ofArt, pp.. 26-30 
3'4 Garver in Speech and Phenomenon, p. xxiii notes Derrida echoing Wittgenstien's 'seeing' and 'seeing as' [Philosophical 
Investigations Part II, ¶ 11] and Goodman's 'representation as' similarly. 
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the image and so on. If we look at the `rhetorical structures' of contemporary photographic 
portrayal, it becomes ever more complicated as these expressive structures are deliberately 
manipulated and confused by the photographer. The significance for photographic images, of a 
switch of emphasis from logic to expression, can be seen in the false, artificial or declamatory 
expression used by those photographers that exploit style and mannerism, particularly prevalent in 
Eastern European; Arsen Savadov's work35 implicitly incorporates history in theatrical and absurd 
tableaux depicting a collapsed Soviet ideology that speaks simultaneously of tragedy and humour. 
The Bloody Merry series [fig. 41] relates the incongruity of the 1917 revolution and the interior of a 
slaughterhouse. A rhetorical perspective confirms the truism that `all is not what it seems' and 
refutes ' the camera never lies'. We have learnt to look for paradox, irony, omission, trope and 
allusion. Removal of logic allows absurdity, nonsense and banality. 
If it obeys certain rules, an expression may be (contradictory, false, absurd according to a 
certain kind of absurdity) without becoming nonsense. It may have no possible object for 
empirical reasons (a golden mountain) or a priori reasons (a square circle) without ceasing to 
have intelligible sense - the absence of an object is hence not the absence of meaning. 36 
Derrida alerts us to a number of assumptions in the project of finding transparency of meaning, 
which may lend understanding to what we take for granted in reading images. In `The Supplement 
of Origin', he exposes Husserl's struggle to stay with his own phenomenological principles whilst 
accounting for exceptions to them, the validity of which he does not question. 37 Derrida thus 
reveals contradictions (essentially the breaking of `rules') resulting from the constraints of a logic 
that cannot see outside itself, and sheds some light on similar constraints in the many contradictions 
of photographic aesthetics. Significantly for photography, the principle of `supplementation' in 
linguistic theory (which assumes that one form both represents and adds to another in the operation 
of signification) is exposed as fundamentally contradictory in its dependence on absence. The basis 
of contradiction in such images as Bloody Merry derives from this same operation. Derrida 
highlights a number of distinctions in Husserl's text that are typically representative of Western 
metaphysics; distinctions between indication (where one thing stands for another and can be 
communicated or verified) and expression, which is meaningful (where meaning intention animates 
a signifier). Distinctions between empirical sense (that refers directly to that which exists), 
intelligible sense (that may not exist but is not nonsense) and nonsense (that does not conform to 
grammatical sense), persist. These are essentially distinctions between elements of expression and 
elements of sense, 38 where sense here is understood as logical in relation to objects, on the basis of 
35 Arsen Savadov, born 1962 Ukraine, lives and works in Kiev. Another project refers to the Donbass Coal Mines where Savadov depicts 
coal miners in tutus, bringing the incongruous together; romance, high culture and industrialisation. 
I Husserl cited in Derrida, 'The Supplement of Origin'. Speech and Phenomena, p. 91 
37 Derrida, Speech and Phenomenon, p. 127 
'8 'Sense' is confused in translation and it is significant to note that Derrida's use of 'meaning' ("lens" and "vouloir-dire") incorporates the 
French sense that literally means `will to say' and which includes the understanding of purpose, intention in its foundation. See Derrida, 
Jacques. Positions (1972). trans. Alan Bass, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. p. 14. 
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`truth' being objectivity. The maintenance of such distinctions helps us to organise and clarify 
complexity. Their disruption, giving us no certain criteria to distinguish `an effective language 
from a fictitious language', 39 disturbs what is understood as reality, representation or imaginary and 
lead to different reconfigurations, hegemonies or fictions, such as visualised in Bloody Merry. 
Husserl's attempt to separate description (indication) from expression, reveals its own contradiction 
and introduces the ambivalence of meaning, its tenuous connection to things and the precarious 
property of `fullness' that is difficult to account for or explain. Derrida points out Husserl's 
contradictory statements regarding the limitations of objective expressions, for example: `try to 
describe any subjective experience in unambiguous objectively fixed fashion; such an attempt is 
always plainly vain. '40 And yet this is what is ideally striven for within the rules of truth and 
`presence'. He points out that such an obvious inconsistency explains the absence of `presence', 
which, because it is so ingrained and taken for granted as an `ideal', is not `seen' or understood as 
being absent. His exposure of the misalliance between meaning and indication, between meaning 
and absence, explained through examples of grammar, is at the root of his refutation of `presence'. 
The logic of grammar in formal analysis is therefore limited, as it does not explain meaning in its 
fullness; does not explain the potency of Allie Mae Burroughs for example. The existence of modes 
of sense that do not point to existing objects, which are equivalent to impossible imaginings, such 
as `square circle ' or `golden mountain', indicates the dimension of meaning that is not bound by 
factual reference. If meaning can exist outside literal reference, the distinction between expression 
and indication becomes shaky, " visibly apparent in literal depiction that also operates figuratively 
(Bloody Merry). The role of supplementation in the photograph, complicated by the confusion of 
absence and the misleading distinction between purely communicative (informative) language and 
expressive language, between indicative `sense' and `meaning'42, perpetuates the enigmatic 
whereabouts of potency. The conditions for resonant quality exist in absence and supplementation 
and encourage a meaning and aesthetic that is outside `presence' and that enjoys its absence. In 
photographs there are elements that supplement the `grammar', that make the image more than the 
sum of its constituent parts and which cannot be quantified. Such elements introduce the possibility 
of `empty' meaning and `full' meaning. The level of effective sense (Barthes's studium), as 
opposed to meaning which is not indicative, but perhaps more `full', more potent, but too complex 
or subtle to be determined. This is the pivotal difference between `sense' that can be defined and 
can answer the question "what is? " and `sense' that cannot. ' Derrida's recognition of rhetoric 
disrupts the common separation of what an expression means from how it is applied for the 
39 Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, p. 56 
40 Husserl, Formal & Transcendental Logic, First Investigation, p. 321-322 cited in Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, p. 100 
41 Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, p. 99 - 'All of which amounts to recognising an initial limitation of sense to knowledge, of logos to 
objectivity, of language to reason', and since knowledge is revealed as unattainable, this `presence' is unstable. ' 
I Garver explains terms used by Frege and Husserl that distinguish `sense' as timeless and context free from `reference' as time 
dependent, contextually variant. In Speech and Phenomena, p. xv 
43 Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, p. 55 
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purposes of aesthetic analysis and suggests that the two domains cannot be separated, giving 
emphasis to how rather than what. 
The significance of Derrida's premise of differance depends on the visibility of the written word. 
There are two elements in verbal meaning that are not definitive and which Derrida forefronts and 
uses. Firstly, the performativity held in utterance (akin to Kristeva's semiotic) and secondly, the 
very visibility of the written form which shows us differences that we cannot `see' in any other 
way; differences apparent in writing that cannot be heard in speech. He refers to the space between 
speech and writing where writing is visible and speech is not. Speech says other things that writing 
cannot - intonation, stress, implication, emotion. Writing can do things speech cannot - make visual 
connections - aesthetic connections. The consequent play of meaning resulting from its visibility as 
opposed to a different sort of performativity - of intonation, rhythm and speech in expression - is 
its visual equivalent. The written word plays on the grammatic difference of noun (object), 
adjective (as indicating property) and verb (as indicating action). It brings these different senses 
together - neither active nor passive, and both. The visibility of the different spelling of differance 
removes it beyond its sound and allows it to refer to the complexity of all its constituent meanings. 
It simultaneously places it between activity and passivity, and in using more than one sense or tense 
(like resonance is different from resonating), it demonstrates the potency of 'dissemination'. ' Thus 
it undermines two basic principles of writing - the logical sequencing down the page of one point 
following another and the logical definitivity of either/or. For example, he uses the metaphor of 
weaving /interlacing to explain his word differance, as an `assemblage' that allows `different lines 
of sense' to interweave and separate again. Derrida creates a situation in writing, which will extend 
meaning rather than constrain it and as we saw in Droit de Regards, his theoretical position is 
inseparable from expression. Meaning is implicit within the delivery45 and an extension of the 
structure of the text; a strategy sans finality. His play of words exploits and performs the element of 
meaning that does not relate exactly to the representation of an object or any thing; it is a procedure 
that parallels a similar rhetoric that operates elusive elements in photographs. 
Much of the impact of differance is in the disruption of oppositional hierarchies. Whilst Derrida 
sees a series of oppositions as a sort of inevitability, ' differance questions the oppositional 
symmetry of, for example, `sensible/intelligible, intuition/signification, nature/culture', 47 
presence/absence, inside/outside and works to undermine the `representation of a presence' in what 
44 Derrida, Positions p. 45 Dissemination is distinguished by its refusal to be `led back to a present of simple origin', whilst polysemia 
represents a progress dependent on a linearity `that is always anxious to anchor itself' and `is organized within the implicit horizon of a 
unitary meaning. ' 
°S Derrida's manner of writing could be said to equate with Barthes's definition of rhetoric as the `signifying aspect of ideology', Roland 
Barthes, Image: Music: Text. London: Fontana Press, 1977, p. 49 
46 Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, p. 148. Much of Derrida's writing is allied to that which is contrary to itself, inconsistent, as it 
uncovers the paradoxical nature implicit in the assumptions of thinking. For example, Johnson points out in her introduction to 
Dissemination (p. x) that Derrida's account for the error of truth is forced to use the tools derived from the notion of truth. 
I Derrida, Jacques, Positions, p. 9 
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seem to be `natural' oppositions. The logic of supplement promotes the co-existence of addition 
and substitution, or, for example, poison and remedy (Pharmakon). 48 No one meaning is privileged 
over another and a text (image) offers signification in a number of directions simultaneously, which 
puts identification in question; `A and B' are no longer opposed nor even equivalent. 49 This co- 
existence deconstructs the `either/or' logic of contradiction or non-contradiction. `An [image] 
signifies in more than one way and to varying degrees of explicitness'S0 and suggests divergent 
elements that are not oppositional but are simultaneous and heterogeneous. Meaning can be seen to 
oscillate across possibilities that are seemingly at odds. What we might have understood as 
contradiction (denial of what is affirmed, assertion to the contrary), is not, and is but another 
expression of difference. Meaning is constituted by `the very distances and differences it seeks to 
overcome. To mean, in other words, is automatically not to be. As soon as there is meaning, there 
is difference'. S1 One cannot simply overturn an opposition as it `can only dig up something that is 
really nothing, a gap, an interval, a trace. 'S2 Differance embodies apparently digressive directions - 
temporally and spatially, such as the photograph's stance of both presence and absence, which, in 
referring to what is not there, is its own difference from itself. 53 
Any subsequent use of the term `contradiction' carries with it the insistence on asking: Is there an 
assertion not compatible with the explicit meaning? Is there an invisible or repressed assertion? 
Where I am tempted to refer to contradiction, I acknowledge difference and deferment that inhabit 
everything that seems to be present and certain. ' Parenthesis and ellipsis, 55 rather than 
contradiction, permit the necessity of something existing side by side with something that is 
apparently at odds, incongruent, inconsistent or absurdly associated. Both functions interrupt 
purpose, introduce a disturbance, are discontinuous and destabilise. Something can be this and this 
(and this and this) at variance, dissenting, but not opposite, not incompatible, not negating, not 
disagreeing. 
The principles demonstrated in the written neologism differance are pertinent for visual texts in the 
way that we understand an idea and indicate pivotal points for this thesis: that necessitate a 
reflection on meaning in the visibility of a text (word or image) itself; that promote the non- 
oppositional nature of visual meaning in the possibility of multi-faceted and simultaneous meaning; 
I Derrida, Jacques, Dissemination (1972), trans. Barbara Johnson, University of Chicago Press: 1981, pp. 100 `when a word inscribes 
itself as the citation of another sense of the same word, when the textual center-stage of the word pharmakon, even while it means 
remedy, cites, re-cites, and make legible that which in the same word signifies, in another spot and on a different level of the stage, 
poison... There is no contradiction between this proposition (poison) and the preceding one (remedy). ' 
Johnson, Barabara, `Introduction', Dissemination, p. xiii 
50 Ibid., p. xv 
51 Ibid., p. ix 
Ibid., p. x 
Ibid., p. xiii : '[A and B]... are their own differences from themselves'. 
54Ibid., p. ix 
Chambers dictionary: Parenthesis suggests the use of something inserted in something `which is already complete without it': a 
digression, an interval, space or interlude. Ellipsis is 'a figure of syntax by which something is left out and implicated': it is obscure or 
circumlocutory. 
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that suggest the conceptual system of meaning in the visual propensity to make connecting 
references, to find allusion, metaphor and temporality. Changes in such assumptions allow those 
functions of meaning (of absence, supplement and insignificance), to work implicitly and 
simultaneously (rhetorically), to agitate and make uncertain and to operate more centrally. This 
gesture of visual meaning is a significant shift in emphasis. Its conjunction of meaning and 
expression shifts our manner of understanding from a translation of text governed by the logical 
progression of verbal language, toward a conceptual framework that can grasp the scope of an 
`idea' visually, as with Bloody Merry. Applying Derrida's dynamic of differance to the visual 
photographic context, threatens a number of the `rules' of certainty found in aspirations to 
`presence' in (modernist) photography, such as expectations of the depiction of `reality', of 
authenticity, of the transparency and universality of meaning. It challenges the boundaries of the 
definitive, the authority of, what Allan Sekula calls, the `cult of the self-sufficient image' that 
expects `unqualified objectivity"' or expressions of transcendence. Many of the ideas that I later 
explore in relation to the photograph can be seen to emerge from conditions associated with 
differance. Conditions such as the conflation of the literal and figural and the difference between 
effective, empty and full meaning. For example Nan Goldin's description of subjective experience 
by the `objective' means of photography provides an implosive instance of `objectivity' conflated 
by its rhetorical expression. Differance, as it conflates difference (the spatial) and deferral (the 
temporal), is principally a decentring dynamic, which denies the logic of diegesis and definition 
and encourages dialogue and dispersal. 
Derrida reminds us that a logical conception of the world is not necessarily `common sense'. 
Logical truths and trust in certainty are dependent on the notion of an entity, entire unto itself, and 
separated from time and thought in its constitution, a thing that has an essential nature that does not 
change. The disturbance of which touches on a number of questions for the photographic image. It 
is worth noting here that the status of the photograph, with regards to its `representation of reality', 
remains at a point of conflicting interpretations. On one level it is popularly considered as a mirror 
of the world, a transparent mediation of 'reality'. ' On a post-structural level, and in contradiction, 
this is seen to be misguided and contrary to the fictional properties of the photograph. In this 
context we have come to accept the premise of `presence' as a series of received ideas that affect 
metaphor, difference and expression, as suspect. Having accepted the notion that signs, reference 
and meaning, sense and expression cannot be kept separate, contemporary understanding is that 
meaning and the relation of signs to the world is dependent on time and context. Contemporary 
photographs can be seen as texts that undermine themselves, that contain contradictions, gaps and 
I Sekula, Allan, Performance Under Working Conditions. Hatje Cantz, 2003, p. 246 
s''This is an absolute unqualified objectivity. Unlike the other arts, which are really anti-photographic, this objectivity is the very 
essence of photography, its contribution and at the same time its limitation. ' 'Paul Strand, 'Photography' (1917). In Trachtenberg, Alan 
(ed. ) Classic Essays on Photography. New Haven: Leete's Island Books, 1980, pp. 141-142 
1 For example Paul Strand: 'This is an absolute unqualified objectivity. ' in Trachtenberg, pp. 141-142 
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disruptions and provide examples of how, rather than reflecting a transparent reality or authenticity, 
photographs can construct reality as opaque. The discontinuous space of the photograph is both 
continuous in its interminable reference and discontinuous in its destabilising incompletion. In 
attacking the tradition of logic, Derrida invites and appears to celebrate logical absurdities in texts 
as a necessary consequence of their disturbance. 
That Derrida's `logic' can now be seen as in itself a `common sense', suggests the need for further 
examination of the possibilities and direction in the use of photographs to express ideas. The 
procedure of differance, which may now seem `natural', encourages approaches to meaning that lie 
outside literal reference, forces challenges to the prime distinction of form and subject (matter), 
which persists, but is somehow now inadequate when reading photographs. And its reliance on the 
wider scope of metaphorical and conceptual frameworks, rather than ones that are required to be 
more definitive, more suitably accommodates the possibilities of the photograph. In Chapters Two 
and Three I describe those functions in particular that contribute to the power of the image and that 
challenge the distinction between `form' and meaning and how these principles are conjoined in an 
image. I ask how might differance work as a dynamic that dislocates the photograph's property of 
empirical reference, 59 disrupt the function of naming, indicating and objectifying and establish a 
more dangerous place in between non-sense and `grammatical sense'? How might the discourse of 
photographic practice proceed to break its own rules? 
"9 By this I mean the way that the photograph points to an object, rather than the Peircean index, which indicates causal affect. Charles 
Sanders Peirce's term icon is more accurate as referring to an object due to its resemblance, but is problematic because of its 
connotations. His term symbol is a sign that is recognised due to cultural convention and habitual use. 
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Chapter Two: THE DYNAMICS OF DETAIL 
DYNAMICS OF PARERGON 
But this frame is problematical. I do not know what is essential and what is accessory in a work. 
And above all I do not know what this thing is, that is neither essential nor accessory, neither 
proper no improper, and that Kant calls parergon, for example the frame. Where does the frame 
take place. Does it take place. Where does it begin, Where does it end. What is its internal limit. 
Its external limit. And its surface between the two limits. ' 
Following The Critique of Judgement 2 Derrida adopts the term parergon (`frame', `edge') as a 
metaphor for an addendum (and supplement) to Kant's theory and explores the assumptions made 
at the start of any aesthetic `judgement', and the characteristics of visual supplement, which 
contribute to the potency of the work. He challenges the persuasive reasoning of Kant's 
`disinterested pleasure' in aesthetic appraisal, `letting us think that everything comes from the 
object, which pleases" rather than from ourselves as viewers. ' The text `Parergon' is fundamentally 
important for problematising aesthetic analysis rather than for an exploration of the function of the 
parergon, which his examination invites. The text is responsible for an adjustment in approaches to 
art history, such as that of Mieke Bal whose emphasis has moved from a `disinterested' analysis to 
a focus on who is looking and how they are looking, necessitating reference to historical, social and 
subjective contexts. ' It initiates many questions, such as what is central and what is peripheral to a 
work, but leaves the application of alternative criteria in `judgement' to others. In general, the 
procedure of differance, as a dynamic, encourages dispersal and is responsible for a decentred, 
more digressive approach to reading images. Parergon is pertinent in that its properties describe 
aspects of the photograph, which come close to the indescribable and that quality I have identified 
as `resonance'. Parergon provides a term for the detail in the image, which may only apparently be 
insignificant and is the major dynamic of detail. After outlining a context for some of the most 
pertinent points raised by Derrida's examination of the properties of parergon, I will return to 
worry, in the manner indicated in the above quote, the more specific function of parergon in 
photographs. 
Parergon indicates what has been dismissed hitherto as peripheral and marginal and not as 
important in determining the aesthetic quality of a work. Derrida agitates the literal meaning of 
Derrida, `Parergon' in The Truth in Painting, p. 63 
2 Kant, The Critique of Pure Judgement, § 14, p. 68. This summary also uses Craig Owens's translation of 'Parergon', October 9, Summer 
1979 
`Derrida, The Truth in Painting, p. 47 
"Ibid., p. 45 
5 Bal, Mieke, Looking In. The Art of Viewing, Amsterdam: G+B Arts International, 2001, e. g 'What kind of act of viewing is at stake? ' 
p. 60. Bal presents a clear argument of the influence of Deirida in this regard in 'Dispersing the Image: Vermeer Story' p. 67: `Derrida's 
concept of dissemination is a powerful tool for breaking open the monolithic discourse of origins that appears to be the stronghold of the 
discipline' (art history). 
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parergon. It is `neither plus nor minus, neither outside nor inside, accident nor essence. '6 It is what 
is extra, in addition to, beside, beyond (para) the work (ergon), but is not incidental. It assumes 
those qualities which are `supernatural' (as in not `common sense') or transcendent, or at least not 
explicable, and which are exterior to pure reason. The parergon is not integral to the representation 
or the empirical `sense' of the object but belongs to it extrinsically `as a surplus, an addition, an 
adjunct, a supplement'. The notion of supplement incorporates a number of principles, which are 
`naturally' in opposition: absence and presence, lack and `fullness', sufficiency and insufficiency, 
inside and outside, the disturbance of which creates the dynamic of parergon. 
The conflict inherent in opposition is central to the logic of parergon, which is principally one of 
contradiction. Parergon, in itself, references that which is an intrinsic component and yet is in 
addition and detachable. It suggests that placement either involves integrity or detachment and 
externality. Kant, referencing what is at the edge or is `merely' ornamentation 
(drape/column/frame), ' assumes that there is a more centred, essential part to the image that is 
`beautiful' without parerga, which are superfluous to the `essence'. Derrida asks: `Where does 
parergon begin and end? Would any garment be a parergon? A parergon, the necklace she wears 
around her neck? " His extension to what a parergon might be, indicates adjuncts to the body in 
particular, and in Droits de Regards he suggests `two sorts of significant "details", two types of 
6 Derrida, Positions. p. 43 
7 Kant, The Critique of Pure Judgement, § 4, p. 68 
8 Derrida, The Truth in Painting, p. 57 (and Owens translation, p. 22) Bal's essay `Dispersing the Image' p.. 84 references this section in 
introducing the term `textual navel' and echoes Barthes's necklace as punclum in Camera Lucida, p. 53 
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Fig. 42 Annelies Strba, Sonja with a Glass, 1991 
fetishistic genres', ' two types of metonymy, those connected with the body and those not. Derrida's 
quote above facetiously emphasises the literal aspect of the metaphor `frame' and the principles of 
beginning and end, inside and outside and thereby aesthetic judgement, which assumes that we can 
distinguish between what is extrinsic and what is intrinsic in an image. Derrida's procedure 
questions the hierarchies of what is essential and what is peripheral, what matters in an image, and 
has the effect of readjusting the logic of parergon in terms of its function. It is now not as simple as 
`this essential' or this `mere ornament'. 10 
It is not because [parerga] are more detached but on the contrary because they are more difficult 
to detach and above all because without them , without their quasi-detachment, the lack on the 
inside of the work would appear ... or would not appear. What constitutes them as parerga is not 
simply their exteriority as a surplus, it is the internal structural link which rivets them to the lack 
in the interior of the ergon. And this lack would be constitutive of the very unity of the ergon. 
Without this lack, the ergon would have no need of parergon, The ergon's lack is the lack of a 
parergon. " 
By this logic the parergon is the element that gives a work a unity and a resonance, and without 
this supplement, the work would be mechanical, powerless, meaningless. It is `riveted' to the 
internal dynamic of the work, injects its `internal structural link' and animates it. 12 It is a logic of 
contradiction. The logic of supplement requires a lack or an absence in the work, in the first place 
in order for it to be supplemented. " One logically then asks `what is it that is lacking? ' But if we 
remember the `structure of supplementation' that is the foundation of language and the procedure 
of substituting an object with a reference to it (a word in linguistics, an image in thought), then we 
can see that its absence may not be a lack in itself, but a procedure of communication. It may be 
that it is the unique element of supplement that communicates with us, that gives the work its 
potency. Derrida troubles Kant's original constitution of parerga, shakes the whereabouts of what 
is integral and what is detachable, and for whom and illuminates contradictions held in judgement 
of where that elusive quality is and where it is not and how it comes to be there or not. Derrida thus 
uses the term parergon to explore aspects besides the obvious physical embellishments that 
augment the story or object. Aspects which impact on meaning, but which are supplementary to the 
`essence' or the focus of the image (photograph); supplementaries to the text, perhaps concepts 
underlying the text; subtle attachments that are insignificant and yet function as connotation: `the 
indeterminate "black holes"... an indeterminate, indifferent or aleatory basis for meaning, as 
9 Derrida, Jacques, Right of Inspection [Droit de Regards] with Marie-Francois Plissart, trans. David Wills, Art &Text 32,1989, p. 34 
'0 Derrida's discussion of the form of parergon in Truth in Painting (1978) is followed through in Droits de Regards (1985). 
" Derrida, The Truth in Painting, p. 59 
12 Giles, K. W. 'The Expectation of Narrative in the Photograph'. Ph. D., Kent, 47-10542 
13 Derrida talks of the addition and the supplement in The Supplement of Origin' in Speech and Phenomena (1967) 
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insignificant as the discourse you might imagine in the place of the punctuation mark'. 14 Both sans 
and parergon confirm the positive necessity for lack and absence. 
In pursuing the whereabouts of parerga in the image Sonja with Glass [fig. 42], 15 I resume an 
examination of the function of parerga, suggested by Derrida's text, and highlight what is 
concomitant with the insistence on differance. In asking questions, I expect no answers but 
confirmation of contra-positional elements of dynamic in the image, that produce the elusive 
quality that I have termed `resonance'. `Where does the parergon begin and end? ' 16 How might the 
features of parerga help to identify the origination of resonant meaning in a photograph? What 
determines whether a parergon contributes to or subtracts from the work as a whole, its `beauty' or 
resonance? Such questions refer to criteria on three levels. Firstly, applying the oppositional 
dynamics of parerga, those of absence/presence, lack/fullness, inside/outside, 
sufficiency/insufficiency; secondly Kant's `moments"' of `disinterest', universality, 
purposelessness and necessity; thirdly the consideration of formal/definitive aspects over non- 
formal/non-logical features. Barthes's earlier structural thought provides a model for levels of 
significance18 in an image, from informational, symbolic through to `something else' and in some 
respects helps to distinguish aspects that are `merely' indicative from aspects that impart quality, 
and content that is intrinsic or extrinsic can be described in these terms. I shall not reiterate such 
analysis here19 but shall return instead to Kant's premise for aesthetic quality ; what is central and 
intrinsic and what is extrinsic and superfluous. According to Kant, aesthetic judgement is neither 
evaluative judgement in terms of the object's function nor the subjective `interest' of the viewer, 
but should instead restrict itself to `intrinsic' factors. 2° So what is precisely intrinsic in Sonja with a 
Glass? " 
Intrinsic is defined as inward, genuine, inherent, essential, belonging to the point at issue, and 
Extrinsic as external, not essential, not contained or belonging to the body. 22 How does what is 
intrinsic, conform to the formal aspects of the image? Do formal aspects like the composition of the 
image help in clarifying what is an intrinsic quality? In this image the formal aspects do not tell us 
much at all, are underplayed and hardly seem to be what is important. The colour is commonplace 
and does not seduce in the sense that Kant suggests might be a distraction. The image does not 
assault me with sensation. Can I dismiss these aspects as missing the point entirely? The image 
appears to be deliberately unconsidered, approaching the accidental. So it appears that the 
14 Derrida, Right of Inspection p. 40 
'S Annelies Strba, Shades of Time, 1991 
t6 Derrida, The Truth in Painting, p. 57 
"Kant, The Critique of Pure Judgement, pp. 41-85 
'8 Barthes, Roland, 'The Third Meaning' (1970). In Image Music Text, trans. Stephen Heath, London: Fontana Press, 1977, pp. 52-68 
19 See Shawcross, N, Roland Barthes on Photography: The Critical Translation in Perspective, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 
1997, and Burgin and Eco 
Kant, The Critique of Pure Judgement, pp. 43-44 
21 Annelies Strba, Shades of Time, 1991, p. 119 
Chamber's English Dictionary 
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dominant non-form is important here and, with the dismissal of `formal' considerations, the image 
conflates form and meaning. This then becomes the `formal aspect' - the integrity of accident and 
the assimilation of de-formalising. What about the dirty grainy effect that imbues the whole image? 
Is that intrinsic too? If it was taken away the room may be bright and clear and clinical and I may 
see Sonja as efficient and alert. What would be a contemporary equivalent to a distracting feature 
of subjective `interest' in this image? Perhaps only my very subjective response to the person I 
imagine Sonja to be; such a performer, so composed, yet so unpretentious in the banality of her 
situation. With the absence of Kantian formal aspects, `free of interested pleasure', not dependent 
on `empirical inclination' (experience? ), how can the image `appeal universally', as it so blatantly 
courts the attributes of the non-formal and of non-art? 
Following the above logic, if I consider the non-formal features to be intrinsic and contributing to 
the quality of the image, what does distract and function as parergon, as ornament? What is 
detachable? The function of parergonality is found in details, such as Sonja's earring, literally an 
item of adornment. Does it remain as mere ornament and `harm the beauty of the work'. ' And if it 
contributes, must it make extensive or indeterminate reference outside itself? Is it sufficient to be 
recognised as an adornment that touches her body? Or is it that it adds poignancy in its glitzy 
contrast with the drab kitchen? Or is it, because it provokes metonymies, which accord with 
specific associations of `knowledge': a whole discourse concomitant with Barthes's necklace, ' the 
extensive culture of The Girl with a Pearl Earring and a history of Vermeer appraisal, not least 
Bal's25 in this respect. If a detail is to contribute something besides its reference, and if it is not to 
be merely adornment, then must it acquire metonymic or metaphoric attributes? How grand must 
an obvious association be for it to be universal and how universal before it is tired? Can I 
distinguish the detail that seems superfluous from that which is necessary and `sufficient' and how 
does it contribute to resonance? How sufficient does a meaning have to be for it to contribute and 
how ornamental before it detracts? What is just sufficient? How small and insignificant does it 
have to be to remain insignificant - the number of knobs on the cooker? When is it sufficient 
enough to be small but significant - her earring? When is it significant only in my private reverie - 
her blouse? Perhaps the confusion on the table is necessary only in as much as the objects (books 
and cartons) indicate reading and eating. And if this confusion was not there at all, her position 
would reside in a more considered formality; her elbow resting on a clear and uncluttered corner of 
the table in the right hand corner of the image. How superfluous is the large but insignificant coffee 
pot on the left? If it were removed, Sonja's head would become the apex of the image. Superfluous 
items appear only to affect the formality of the image and perhaps cannot be escaped, but it appears 
that resonance for me lies elsewhere. 
23 Kant, The Critique of Pure Judgement, p. 68 
34 Barthes, Roland, Camera Lucida, Reflections on Photography (1980), trans. Richard Howard, London: Vintage, 1993, p. 53 
u Bal, 'Dispersing the Image: Vermeer Story' in Looking In, in which Bal discusses the role of light a as a 'typical parergon' in the 
painting Woman holding a Balance. 
125 
If a parergon is not necessary, how is it unnecessary and to what? To the comprehension of the 
image, the `sense' of the image - i. e. its reference to what is there, its mimetic value? If that is so, 
and I can say that I recognise that as being a glass of water, then marks on the glass of water or 
what I can see through the glass become superfluous. But clearly the potency of the object does not 
stop at the recognition of it for what it is as object, but at the status or quality of that object - i. e. as 
a marked, scratched glass. What is extrinsic to the glass of water? - its reference to what is outside 
the image, to what I associate with it? Or is it what is peripheral to the content - to its being a glass 
of water, for example the size of the glass? What part of the glass of water is necessary? Which is 
more resonant - the glass, the transparency of the glass, the dinginess of the glass or the water in 
the glass? If I were to substitute details for details in the image, it would doubtless make a 
difference, for example if it were milk in the glass. What element in this image is intrinsic to the 
particular effect (physical event) but extrinsic to the meaning held in the effect? Is this meaning 
more potent because of personal association (punctum) or more potent because of a bald, 
unmediated content? If it is the potency, then the personal association, which contributes to that 
may be entirely unnecessary. 
What is larger and significant and too central to be parergon - the glass of water? If I consider 
Sonja's stare to be the focus of the image, then what is the glass of water? Is the glass of water 
parergon or another focus of the image? Is it the inseparability of these two features in terms of 
dominant focus that contributes to the meaning of the image overall? Or is the central feature the 
dynamic of her gesture? What is indicated in the image is inextricable from the meaning of the 
gesture: Sonja is about to pick the glass up or she has just placed the glass down on the surface 
beside her. Her right arm works as if independently and separately from the intensity of her look, 
which is serious and concentrated. The normal activity of the arm contrasts with the event, which is 
isolated and special. She sits in a very relaxed way, sat sideways on a kitchen chair, her left 
forearm relaxed and resting on the table, her hand dropping down over the edge. Her right hand 
hovers, holds, looms over the glass. It is this possibility of directionless movement and uncertainty 
that is the focus and essentially intrinsic; a `form of kinetics"' of possibility that works 
metonymically and resides in imminent possibility. 
Kant's certainty requires either-or definitions, which the photograph does not concede, but which 
displays instead the simultaneity of meaning that presents a work `without end' (without purpose or 
without termination). The dynamic of parergon works against logical structures and requires the 
readjustment of oppositions. It emphasises and animates the simultaneity of detail that encourage 
reverberation and mobility, without teleological progression. It accesses parts of the image that 
26 Derrida, Right of Inspection p. 40 
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disturb the certainty of the established hierarchies of finality and definition, parts that reverberate 
instead, but do not find resolution. It contributes to resonance by acknowledging the ambivalence 
of its residence (both outside and inside) and the significance of the incidental, the marginal and the 
peripheral, contradicting the search for ultimate meaning. Parergon confirms also, the 
inappropriateness of the linear model, which originates in a linguistic resolution and the 
unsuitability of the narrative implication, so often imposed on interpretations of the photograph. 
And yet there remains a compulsion to construct narrative. Firstly, via metonym and fiction, driven 
by desire, and secondly, via logic, toward narrative. 
Burgin describes the photograph as `purposive movement with causes and intentions' and accepts 
the compulsion to invent and insert narrative, despite the photograph not being a `linear form' but 
one that `like a chord, vibrates simultaneously. ' Whereas Laura Mulvey makes a brief but 
interesting assertion that invites a move to `breakdown the inside of narrativity', 27 to find new 
structures that play against the normal constraints of narrative pattern. David Phillips interprets 
parergon as `the constitutive role of textual anchorage and of determining contexts and pictorial 
conventions. '28 I see the role of parergon as one of boundless possibility, as does Bal, but toward a 
possibility of narrative. She speaks of parergon as the element that activates narrative in an image, 
that makes something happen: `something is happening, the still scene begins to move' and `the 
surface is no longer still but tells a story'. 29 This stillness of moment (the has-been), `captured', 
`frozen' in a photograph is the antithesis of narrative. In their anxiety to make `something happen', 
theories of narrative in the photograph tend to deny its properties of differance, its perverse 
propensity to show, despite its stillness, independent moments and details, simultaneously. With 
the purpose of narrative comes interpretation that is constrained by the weight of decision, the 
enormity of the either/or, the `this or that', `this way or that way'. This is the assumed necessity of 
directional implication in the interpretation of event that it must go forward or go back. Yet it 
doesn't have to be that way and the image can do both and simultaneously; it is fiction but a 
simultaneous fiction. A photograph offers the opportunity to sustain the simultaneity of different 
interpretations; of ... and... and... and. 
Hitherto emphasis has rested on the stillness of the frozen 
time element. With its contra-oppositional dynamic, parergon provides a means to shift the 
emphasis toward the possibility invited by simultaneous and contradictory elements within the 
photograph and its resonant purposelessness, which is not inclined to resolve itself in a structure, 
such as narrative. 
r Victor Burgin and Laura Mulvey speaking at the Photoforum conference, Stillness and Time: Photography and the Image, Kent 
Institute of Art & Design, Canterbury, 7'h--8's May, 2004 
1 Phillips, David, 'Photo-Logos: Photography and Deconstruction', in The Subjects of Art History. Cheetham, Holly and Moxey, 
Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 167 
29 Bal, Looking In, p. 77 
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DIMENSIONS OF PUNCTUM 
It is an addition (supplement): it is what I add to the photograph and what is none the less 
already there. 3o 
Parergon, the supplementary element that can contribute resonant meaning, has another dimension, 
that of a subjective punctuation, Barthes's punctum. His `sensitive point' is to be found in chance 
elements of detail and is provoked by incongruity, irony, repellence that invoke a sense of place or 
`a kind of tenderness'. Fundamentally, punctum can be an entirely personal recognition, coming 
from a wholly singular experience of an incidental detail, apparently insignificant, `which 
addresses me', that speaks directly to me, confronts me. Punctum is the point (centre) of 
significance that plays with the point (place) in the image that can become the point (purpose) of 
the image it inhabits. " As it implies (or promises) purpose in its name, it contradicts itself in its 
teleological pointlessness. Its characteristics are unlocatable and not part of the image that is coded 
or explicable. Its `incapacity to name is a symptom of disturbance'32 in the image and its 
unqualifiable properties indicate how it interrupts the empirical sense of the image. The punctum's 
dynamic is its latent subjective potentiality, " its dissimulation and its positional absence. Most 
importantly, it shares with parergon its marginal reference and its metonymic expansion. And like 
parergon it is a sort of power that is not dependent on the narrative progression of time and place, 
does not contribute to the logic of making stories and works in another dimension to linearity. 
What drives this fascination with the potency resident in the surprisingly incidental, is a 
`metonymic force'. ' What is called the punctum illuminates the `scandalous' metonymic power of 
detail more acutely than parergon. It is the `force' and the dynamic of the punctum that moves the 
`original' figure of Sonja to something other than merely reference to her and which becomes 
Sonja's dynamic. 
It is `the place of the irreplaceable singularity and the unique referential, the punctum irradiates 
and, what is most surprising, lends itself to metonymy. As soon as it allows itself to be drawn 
into a system of substitutions, it can invade everything, objects as well as affects. This 
singularity which is nowhere in the field (of codes of meaning) mobilizes everything 
everywhere; it pluralizes itself. '35 
30 Barthes, Camera Lucida, p. 55. He gives examples of punciwn in incongruity (bad teeth, dirty nails), irony (nuns walking behind 
soldiers), repellence (Warhol's hands) p. 43 
31 Derrida disturbs the word point in 'Restitutions'. 
32 Bartfies, Camera lucida, p. 51 
Derrida, Jacques, 'The Deaths of Roland Barthes', in H. J. Silverman, (ed. ) Philosophy and Non-philosophy since Merlau Ponty, trans. 
Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas, New York: Routledge, 1988, p. 288: 'The value of intensity (dynamis, force, latency) which I 
am now in the process of tracking down, leads to a new contrapuntal equation, to a new metonymy of metonymy itself, to the 
substitutive virtue of punciwn'. 
34Ibid., p290: 'The metonymic force divides the referential line, suspends the referent and leaves it to be desired, while still maintaining 
the reference'. 
35 Ibid., p. 285 
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In The Deaths of Roland Barthes, Derrida fondly explores the dimension of punctum, as he 
amplifies concerns expressed in `Parergon'. Derrida sees the logic of punctum as confirming the 
impossibility of `presence' and emphasises its elusiveness, its dependence on absence and its 
metonymic power, only briefly referred to by Barthes in Camera Lucida. Derrida uses the analogy 
of music in his attempt to describe the peculiar cadence of the punctum. `The punctum gives 
rhythm to the studium, that is, `scans it' and resembles `forms of counterpoint and polyphony and 
fugue'. 37 His resort to this analogy indicates a dimension that is not lucid but resonant and which 
`no longer speaks of light or photography or anything to be seen' and which invokes other senses 
instead, other than sight. One cannot identify it precisely and say `look at this! ' It cannot be pointed 
to as a substance or `thing' and just as differance is elusive, resonant and indeterminate, so is the 
punctum. Just as the meaning of the word differance defies its own property of utterance and relies 
on the visual dimension to provoke the full possibility of its meaning, so punctum denies its own 
visuality and relies on `something else'. Because where is it exactly? It is unlocatable and inhabits 
the dimension of rhythm and tone, the language of sensation and dimensions of the semiotic, rather 
than aesthetic `disinterest'. 
36 Ibid., p. 264. A detail that 'punctures the surface of the reproduction... of analogies, likenesses and codes. It pierces, strikes me, 
wounds me, bruises me, and, first of all, seems to look only at me; it is the Referent which, through its own image, I can no longer 
suspend, while its 'presence' forever escapes me, having already receded into the past. ' 
Ibid., p. 269: 'It is supplementary and musical' originates with Barthes use of the word 'scan' in Camera Lucida, p. 26 
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Fig. 43 Philip-Lorca diCorcia, Heads #10,2001 
Derrida labours the distinction between the terms referent (what he calls that `vast and vague 
category') and reference, the confusion of which contributes to the notion of transparency. 38 The 
photographic referent (e. g. Sonja's earring) unavoidably `adheres to itself' 39 but `doesn't relate to a 
present or to a real but, in a different way, to the other', 4° its absence. Like Barthes, Derrida speaks of 
the relevance of this absence as deriving from the `having-been-there' of a unique occurrence, rather 
than from the significance of the object alone. `In the photograph, the referent is noticeably absent, 
suspendable, vanished into the unique past time of its event, but the reference to this referent, let us 
say the intentional movement [in the phenomenological sense] of reference, also implies irreducibly 
the having-been of a unique and invariable referent'. 41 So it is that absence recurs again. In 
`DIFFERANCE AND THE PHOTOGRAPH', I iterated that the object referred to in a photograph 
was allied to the linguistic function of supplement together with its dependence on the absence of 
what is referred to. And that connotation, (Barthes' `imposition of second meaning42), which is found 
in the reference, resides in the supplement. What is depicted in the image is the referent. The 
referent, the earring as it was, resides in the photograph and what it refers to, the earring, exist 
independently. The photograph refers to the earring that is absent in reality and not there in front of 
us now. The reference in a photograph, to the referent underlines the absence of the object depicted 
(the earring). The punctum `suspends the referent (the earring), not the reference's to it and inserts a 
further dimension to the reality of the earring, which is the reality of subjective thought, provoked by 
the image of it. `However lightning-like it may be, the punctum has, more or less potentially, a power 
of expansion. This power that accesses another sort of reality is often metonymic'44and `metonymy 
is no mistake or falsehood; it doesn't speak untruths'. 45 If the metonymic power exists, if it occurs, it 
possesses a sort of truth, not in its reality but in the fact that Sonja's earring is pertinent in the 
poignant contrasts it refers to. Contrasts that are absent, but which we grasp conceptually. It is this 
point in the definition that is important here; the `reality' of the image is the metonymic content, 
rather than what one can imagine about the specific time and place depicted in the image. The 
photographic reference is `haunted' by the referent, which follows the image in its absence and 
reverberates. The metonymic reference inhabits the object's absence and it is the uniqueness of its 
having-been-there that lends it its poignancy. The punctum has double resonance; it amplifies the 
possibility of metonymy with its reference to this unique occurrence and as a result, accesses a 
special sort of absence. 
See Walton, and Friday, Part One, p. 20 
39 Barthes, Camera Lucida, pp. 5-6 
40 Derrida, `The Deaths of Roland Barthes', p. 275 
Ibid., p. 281 - my parenthesis. David Phillips itemises Derrida's concern with the 
`Referent' in `Photo-Logos, Photography and 
Deconstructi on' in The Subjects and Objects of Art History, note 60, p. 176 
°= Barthes, `The Photographic Message' in Image. Music. Text, p. 20 
43 Derrida, 'The Deaths of Roland Barthes', p. 275 
44 Barthes, Camera Lucida, p. 45 
45 Derrida, 'The Deaths of Roland Barthes', p. 293 
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What is it in the portrait that operates in this way? In my description of A, I have deliberately 
eliminated all references outside her head and hands. My attempt to decribe A cannot strictly carry 
the dimension of punctum which, as Barthes defines it, arrives by accident, not artistry, and is 
unlikely to be a result of the photographer's intention. But, in seeking what defines A as A, as I 
know her to be, I rely entirely on that personal address to me and her expression and gesture in the 
constitution of the dialogue between us. 46 If it is not punctum, then I have found a kind of `sensitive 
point'. Whereas, with images of strangers, the `pointed' emotional hook is more likely to reside in 
the surrounding paraphernalia or in the subject's features. In this respect, what I am looking for in 
images generally, is the element that awakens my response, my very subjective interest, that alerts 
me, perhaps only me. 
The dog looks at me, is alert and keen and makes me smile. The central subjects are occupied 
elsewhere. The light catches the toes on Auden's feet and the way the feet rest on the stool is 
interestingly precarious. The door handle is `interesting' more in the manner of `disinterest', 
intelligible interest, concerned with shape, placement and is wholly explicable. 
46 See Affective Reaction, Part Two 
4' In Philip-Lorca diCorcia, New York: The Museum of Modem Art, 1995. Philip-Lorca diCorica, born 1953 Hartford, Connecticut. 
Following this earlier series of friends and family in the 1970s (and featuring his brother Mario), other series include 
in 1980s of 
hustlers in Santa Monica using more limited staging and in the 1990s, Streetwork and Heads are both taken remotely. A Storybook Life 
records incidentals over a period 20 years from 1978. 
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Fig. 44 Philip-Lorca diCorcia, Auden and Emma 1989.47 
Tatooed, amidst the disarray of what looks like spartan living, he appears tough and scrawny. There is an 
inkling of `tenderness' in the creases, tiny folds of his lean stomach. He is soft and flesh afterall. Is then 
what induces this kind of response, some element that reveals vulnerability? But his hands too are 
important to my response - his right arm outstretched, his hand holding a cigarette appears to be 
adjusting the typewriter. It is a hand with purpose, an imminent gesture (as with Sonja's in the kitchen), 
that which points from the future, on the verge of taking place and from which emanates the possibility of 
either /or, as it indicates backwards or forwards. His left hand rests in the foreground of the image on 
his knee passively. There is an indicative contrast of gestures, but the potency lies in the possibility of 
neither one thing nor another. 
There is no sentiment to be had in diCorcia's images; the subjects are not pitiable and the scenes 
awaken no nostalgia. These are carefully staged, with the intention of keeping interpretation open 
and not prescriptive in any way. What lets me in, are little suggestions of incongruity and paradox. 
Like Ruff's portraits, devoid of expression or context, diCorcia's later series Heads' isolates the 
head and the power of the image relies more on facial expression, gesture and the effect of 
monumentality rather than in details of context. In portraits such as these, the `piercing' described 
by Barthes is not obvious; in #8 her open mouth and the eyebrow ring reveals vulnerability, in #10 
[fig. 43] it is perhaps the incongruity of the serious inward reflection with the apparel of youth and 
in #02 the signs of preoccupation; bottle of water, tickets and her attention caught, the light 
illuminating her pockmarked face. 
Metonym, metaphor, allegory are frequently referred to under the umbrella of metaphor. Whether 
we stick to a classic interpretation of metaphor, that of substitution of one signifier for another, or 
I Philip-Lorca diCorcia, Heads, New York: Pace Wildenstein, 2001 
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Fig. 45 Philip-Lorca diCorcia, Bruce and Ronnie 1982. 
whether it is extended to include a metonymic process, that of a part implying the whole, these 
processes function in our thinking as a move to ideation. Metonymy is a more poetic shortcut, 
where `the name of one thing is put for that of another related to it, the effect for the cause etc. ' (the 
earring as the move to womanhood, the water for thirst) and synecdoche, literally one part for 
another or a whole, or the whole for a part, (a book for a library or reading). `A sort of 
hallucinating metonymy" is the function that animates the absolute stillness and instantaneity of 
the photograph and that beguiles us into `seeing' it as more. 
CATALYSER CONTRA-NARRATIVE 
Taking a sideways step from the properties of detail in a photograph, I shall look at an example of 
how interpretations of its effect might differ. Barthes's early structural analysis50 of the role of 
detail in literary narrative is significant for its introduction of the notion of the constituent elements 
of meaning as being lateral (non-literal) as well as vertical (necessary for narrative progression). In 
the context of the photograph, it reminds us of the simple fact that content is presented obviously 
and simultaneously in a photograph, but that the impact of that fact is not so certain. The term 
`function' has already been assumed as useful in discussing meaning in photographs. In this text, 
Barthes uses it to determine the elements of content that indicate where a story might come from, 
or go to, and which set the boundaries of context and implication. In this respect, all details in an 
image have a function in that they all contribute to a context. There are those details that have 
particular import, which make reference symbolically (in the Peircean sense) in that elements have 
more cultural significance, and there are those, which are more idiosyncratic and have the potential 
for poignancy, nostalgia, memory, association. `Even were a detail to appear irretrievably 
insignificant, resistant to all functionality, it would nonetheless end up with precisely the meaning 
of absurdity or uselessness: everything has a meaning or nothing has"' and when it is in the context 
of an artistic statement, Barthes contends that `no unit ever goes wasted', which he later explores in 
The Reality Effect. 52 Thus the smallest element can contribute to the bigger picture by implying 
action, place, character or the qualitative value of the scene. This differentiation can be easily 
transported to the context of photographs and has been discussed with regard to the dynamics of 
parergon and punctum. It may seem a truism to state that all details in a photograph contribute to 
the meaning, so that the fact that Sonja's glass is a glass of water, and not a glass of milk, makes a 
difference. But the assumptions that follow this fact vary and are interesting. 
49 Derrida, 'The Deaths of Roland Barthes', p. 282 
50 Barthes, Roland, 'Structural Analysis of Narratives'. In Image, Music, Text. London: Fontana Press, 1977. Originally published in 
French in Communications 8,1966 
51 Ibid., p. 89 
52 Barthes, Roland, 'The Reality Effect' in Tzvetan Todorov (ed. ) French Literary Theory Today, trans. R. Carter, Cambridge University 
Press, 1982 
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What Barthes calls `distributional' elements, function as the suggestion of anticipated use, in much 
the way that we saw the implicit possibility and the ambivalent action of the glass of water being 
picked up or being put down, and `integrational' elements, which are more diffuse, psychological 
or atmospheric, for example the paucity of the scene being indicated by a mark on the wall or 
imbuing a `homeliness', a certain 'value', a set of priorities to home-life. In terms of literature, 
differentiation between verbal and adjectival functions support these distinctions, which I shall 
translate as eventful and qualitative in the context of the photograph. And further to that, Barthes 
aligns `metonymic relata' as possessing the verbal function and `metaphoric relata' has having the 
function of `being'. It may be that we could distinguish between these distinctions in a photograph; 
between images more ridden with `distributional' elements (eventful), relating to doing and 
narrative than `integrational' (qualitiative). But it is more likely that objects in the image relate to 
both functions, so that the glass of water is metonymic in the anticipation of it being picked up and 
the water being drunk, and metaphoric in the enormous implications of the concept `water', the 
implications of the glass being transparent and half full (or empty) and the implications of the hand 
nearly touching the glass. The visibility of differance presents active and passive elements 
simultaneously. 
In a photograph, unlike language, it is not only difficult to structurally determine the whereabouts 
of specific meanings, but also the qualitative elements, those that describe, cannot be separated 
from the event and content. The quality is both inseparable from the object depicted, and 
inseparable from the special absence of the metonym. The photographic property of absence thus 
brings together the dynamic of parergon, the special absence of the metonym and, as with 
differance, meaning and expression. As we saw with the density of implication of referent and 
reference, it is difficult to distinguish pure, functional notional reference in an image from that 
which indicates something else. The image of the glass refers to a glass (as we have seen - the root 
of transparency) and indicates other things, so that there are layers of reference. Removal of the 
cooker would place Sonja somewhere else, not in a kitchen. Replacement of the glass for a cup 
would alter the tone and the possibility in metonym, not the central content, which is Sonja. We 
can thus verbally describe the possibility of two similar images, similarly as `Sonja is sitting in the 
kitchen with her arm outstretched, touching a glass of water' or `Sonja is sitting in the kitchen with 
her arm outstretched, touching a cup of water'. It would appear to make little difference verbally 
until we behold that implication visually. Objects, which inform in a photograph are always also 
`implicit signifieds' and in this respect it would be difficult to argue that anything was totally 
insignificant. 
In speaking of literary narrative, Barthes indicates details, that act as `cardinal functions', which 
help to conclude a story in terms of action (which might equate with what we might term key 
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points in an image), and details as `catalysers', which contribute to the tone rather than the action, 
`but their functionality is attenuated, unilateral, parasitic'. " One could see these details, as Giles ' 
does, as being consequential in establishing a narrative interpretation or, as I do, as being key in 
producing the opposite effect, of disrupting the narrative and in consequence contributing to the 
potency of the image, just because they do not determine anything in particular. Catalysers are in- 
consequential (literally) in that they are not causal in a way that produces an effective action, but 
may be more affective, via tone and quality. `Cardinal functions' accomplish a `telescoping of 
logic and temporality', `the risky moments of narrative', the will she, won't she, the uncanny 
moment, decisive points that anticipate important action. It is this anticipatory `distributional' 
function that is central to what has been valued as indicative of the `photographic eye' or even 
`decisive moment', which anticipates action or feeling, coupled with moments of action. 
`Integrational' elements may not contribute to `the economy of the message'S5, but instead provide 
tension to what Barthes calls the `discursive function' and which `accelerates, delays... and 
sometimes even leads astray' (delays, defers as with differance). And in a photograph, there is no 
requisite conclusion, all elements could be `dilatory', all could be seen as central. So that the prime 
function of detail in an image is discursive and rhetorical, that expression and meaning are 
apprehended simultaneously with action or content, as opposed to a narrative interpretation, which 
encourages a conclusive direction. 
The expectation of a photograph as a text that constructs meaning is not one that necessarily 
equates `text' with `meaning' or `meaning' with `narrative', as Giles suggests. Because we are able 
to fabricate a narrative from an image, does not define that facility as a determinate norm. In 
response to Barthes's The Reality Effect, Bal suggests that details that deny definition, `ulitmate', 
indivisible details, may `make a connotation of realism shift to a place of denotation because there 
is no denotative meaning available' and so contribute to a construction of meaning as something 
`real'. There are thus aspects of any one detail that contributes to the assurance of what is real and 
there are aspects that cannot be accounted for. Barthes explanation is cryptic but I interpret him as 
saying that it is the genre that represents the `real', the category that acts on behalf of the `real' and 
`not its various contents', which is being signified; in other words, `the very absence of the 
signified... becomes the true signifier of realism'. ' This asserts the significance of absence again 
over the certainty of the detail's contribution. It says that we cannot `see' the photographic content 
for the `reality' we `see' (understand) as being depicted by it. Giles contends that it is the useless 
details that make the photograph `real' for us and that it is through them that we can construct a 
story. He leaps from looking to articulating and draws a parallel between the articulation of an 
image and the verbal articulation of a fictional character in a novel and so describes the norm of our 
Barthes. 'Structural Analysis of Narratives', p. 94 
Giles, The Expectation of Narrative in the Photograph', p. 110 
55 Barthes, 'Structural Analysis of Narratives', p. 95 
16 Barthes, 'The Reality Effect', p. 16 
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`reading' photographs as a necessary translation into words, as a literal `reading' of the text. His 
parallel is dependent on a translation of literary terminology, such as `content', which assumes the 
same literal significance in a photograph, so that `content' in a photograph is translated as those 
features that support `narrative', as they would do in literature, rather than signifying a different 
constitution entirely; of being `integrational' features that are particular to the differance of the 
photograph. I suggest that `catalysers', so far as they exist, contribute equally to the photographic 
tone overall and that, rather than constructing the narrative (Giles), or becoming indicative of a 
`realism' and in consequence further denotation (Ball'), they animate the overall quality of resonant 
meaning. It may be possible then to sidestep the interpretative position, which assumes literary 
functions literally and look at alternative and more pertinent, figurative possibilities. 
PURE MEANING 
Fig-47 Richard Avedon, William Casby, 1963 
So far, two different types of significance have consistently emerged, which I shall refer to as 
effective and affective meanings. As we saw in `CATALYSER CONTRA-NARRATIVE', detail may 
be seen as consequential, as effective in helping to establish the active content, or, as not 
contributing to causal effect, but important in terms of tone and quality and being affective. The 
non-causality of the catalyser enters an arena of ambivalent and more elusive meaning, which I 
would describe as non-definitive or non-effective meaning, but which can achieve affect in some 
way. I equate this `affective meaning' with Barthes's term `pure meaning'. This notion unites a 
number of issues discussed previously, in the contexts of Parergon (of what is extrinsic) and 
Differance (of what is absent) and its clarification correlates constructive models of elusive 
meaning found in detail. A clearer apprehension of what constitutes pure meaning approaches a 
"Bal, 'Dispersing the Image' in Looking In, p. 74. Comment derived from Barthes's essay `The Reality Effect. ' 
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definition of what is resonant and ineffable quality in photographs and introduces discussion of 
photographs that question the condition of meaning. 
In his writing about `meaning', Barthes repeatedly assigns importance to the role of the 
insignificant in achieving an indefinable and elusive photographic quality, which he variously 
described as `obtuse meaning'. 58 `pure meaning' and' punctum'. His brief explanation of' pure 
meaning"' importantly distinguishes between the degree of meaning and effect and explains the 
contradiction that an image must `go beyond the nominal subject to be great'. He states that, as 
every photograph refers to the specific, in order to generate general meaning and thereby `signify' 
in a universal way, it has to assume a mask -a definitive, mythic image that will sustain, such as 
Avedon's portrait of William Casby, which he refers to as `the essence of slavery is here laid bare' 
and where `the mask is the meaning'. Society wants meaning, but translated ('less acute') as 
opposed to `absolutely pure'. It mistrusts pure, raw meaning, without a mask, which is more 
dangerous. His reflection here points to the degree of balance between being explicit enough to be 
readable generally, and discreet enough not to disturb too much, enough 'to disturb' and not so 
discreet as to be ineffective. Photography then is most effective `not when it frightens or repels but 
Figs. 46,4 -51 Bons Mikhailov, Case History 
series, 1999 
Barthes, Roland `The Third Meaning' , 
Image, Music, Text, pp. 52-68 
See Barthes's brief logic of 'pure meaning' in Camera Lucida p. 34-38 and his discussion of the incidental yet insignificant object or 
`punctum' p. 45-59. Parallels can be drawn between Barthes's pure meaning and his reference to the mask and Baudrillard's allusion to 
the mask as being a more fruitful presentation in itself than trying to get behind it, in `For Illusion is... ' Baudrillard also uses the term 
literal in a similar sense to Barthes as having more integrity, being more powerful, in `It is the Object that Thinks Us', Photographies. 
Barthes uses literal in the sense of bald rawness or pure meaning. 
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when it is pensive, when it thinks'. How general or specific an image must be to be meaning-ful or 
meaning-less and how meaning and potency is constituted is clearly confusing. Barthes's 
discussion is difficult, perhaps because he relies on the distinctions between political and aesthetic, 
between generality and particularity, and implicitly, between public and private, whereas 
contemporary uses of photography do not always retain these distinctions. Barthes indicates that a 
translated photographic image, an image already explained by the author, misses the essential and 
raw import of what is photographed. He suggests that the `invented' image leaves the viewer no 
room for response or interpretation because the image is already loaded with obvious meaning. 6" 
Any expectation of some special quality in a photograph is closely allied to an expectation of the 
author translating experience, via commentary or metaphor into some universal meaning. If, to 
achieve this quality of `universally true', photographs must signify more generally, must lose 
particularity, then according to Barthes, they must lose their very particular idiosyncratic and 
perhaps hidden history and ultimately their potential power as images. The specificity of context 
and the visually insignificant is vital to images if they are to retain an inexplicable rawness, and not 
be clothed in symbolism or mythic representation. 6' The implication here is that universal narrative 
(meaning that is trans-historical and trans-cultural) might eventually become insignificant i. e. 
generality leads to insignificance. Significance must therefore require particularity. If nothing is left 
for the viewer 
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60 See quotation cited by Nancy Shawcross as her translation of 'Photo-chocs', a commentary by Barthes on an exhibition in Shawcross, 
Roland Barthes on Photography: The Critical Translation in Perspective, pp. 3-4 
61 Roland Barthes, 'The Great Family of Man' (1957). In Mythologies, London: Vintage, 1983, pp. 100-102 
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to contribute, Barthes's indefinable quality cannot exist and the image is ultimately meaningless. 
Interpretation, of Strba's images for example, is left with the viewer and is reinvented with each 
viewer's own reference. Boris Mikhailov's brutal images are situated between pictures being too 
confrontational and being illegible. Are these an example of what Barthes called literal, pure 
meaning; too raw to be effective? They present brutality in a theatrical way, a deliberately posed 
way that is obviously not a `realistic' presentation in the sense of a likeness that is `true', `sincere' 
and `revealing' in the humanist tradition. What is impressive about these alarming images is the 
way they cut through the search for a definitive statement that might express `dignity' and 
eventually sentimentality. They disrupt sympathetic perception; they are so awful. Their exposure 
repels us; they distort and subvert that temptation to prettify, sanitise, and exalt, in a way that 
alienates us from his subjects, rather than creating the illusion of bringing them nearer, in shared 
humanity. This illusion of nearness in the photographer's packaging of different worlds is 
something Levinas avoids in his acceptance of alterity. Mikhailov avoids mythic representation in 
presenting unrefined versions of experience from a position of immersion in a very particular place 
and history. Margarita Tupitsyn says of Mikhailov's work that `being part of it' makes the `intrinsic 
meaning' unavoidable. 62 Involvement `from below' rather than `from above' explains and gives his 
work its precipitous position - on the edge of decency and documentary. The abandonment of 
analysis or comment of the Russian situation is the comment. Mikhailov himself talks about 
`being' rather than seeking a marked event ('the more we can exclude (event) from representation, 
I Tupitsyn, Margarite, `Photography as a Remedy for Stammering' in Boris , tilikhailov, Unfinished Dissertation, Zurich: Scalo, 1998, 
p. 219 
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the closer we can approach the most important thing - being') advocating `being' or `the real' as 
unremarkable and non-eventful. `Unvarnished "representation" of "reality", a naked account of 
"what is" (or was), thus looks like a resistance to meaning, a resistance, which confirms the great 
mythical opposition between the true-to-life (the living) and the intelligible" - pure description. 
Thus Mikhailov's work offends on two counts; the particular rawness of subject matter and the 
disconcerting place of `reality'. 
Perversely, photography cannot help but elevate the subject, into an object of display, elevate the 
insignificant into the `significant', and traditionally it has been the purposeful photographer's 
obligation to do so, to transcend what is commonplace. Baudrillard shares with Barthes a horror of 
over-construction and both encourage `the possibility of pure event that can no longer be 
manipulated, interpreted or deciphered by any historical subjectivity"'; they are looking instead for 
something `without culture" something `more radical'. Baudrillard warns that `when the image is 
buried beneath commentary... walled up in aesthetic celebration, it is finished', becomes `aesthetic 
stupefaction'. 67 Ultimately, they both suggest that photographs with `artistic' intention lose their 
potency and both move towards an unresolved poetic that defies logic and which is reminiscent of 
the consequence of Derrida's sans, rather than eventful resolution. As we shall see in Part Three, it 
is this defiance of logic, the elusive quality, the concept of raw apprehension approaching non- 
meaning, which is being simultaneously pursued and obscured, repeatedly, in contemporary 
practice - Barthes's `absolutely pure', Baudrillard's `figure of nothingness, absence and 
unreality'. 
Persistent divisions between indication and expression, `distributional' and `integrational' 
elements, intended/authorial and received/subjective meanings all suggest a consistent and essential 
difference that distinguishes effective from affective, so that the degree of effective meaning is 
derived from the level of indication, the level of successful communication of intended meaning or 
the level of `distributional' elements contributing to clear, `meaningful' causal signs. Signs, which 
reflect cause and effect are the result of their being informational or authorial. Similarly 
metaphorical references can be seen as outspoken and effective or more obscure and ineffective. 
There comes a point however when an image can become too clear (cliche) and lifeless and thereby 
becomes ineffective and without potency. `Living' metaphors need to disturb continuously to be 
Boris Mikhailov quoted in Unfinished Dissertation, p. 219 
Barthes, The Reality Effect', p. 14 
Baudrillard, Jean, 'Forget Baudrillard', interview with Sylvere Lotringer, 1984-85, in Mike Gane (ed. ) Baudrillard Live: Selected 
Interviews. London and New York: Routledge, 1993, p. 100 
Barthes, Camera Lucida, p. 7 and see Baudril lard's 'allergy to culture' in Gane, Baudrillard Live: Selected Interviews, p. 24 
c' Baudri Ilard, `Aesthetic Illusion and Virtual Reality' in Zurbrugg, Nicholas (ed. ) Jean Baudrillard: Art & Artefact. London: Sage 
Publications, 1997, p. 22 
' Baudril lard, 'For Illusion isn't the Opposite of Reality... ' in Wiebel, Peter, ed., Photographies 1985-1998 Within the Horizon of the 
Object, Objects in this Mirror are Closer than they Appear, Hatje-Cantz Publishers, 1999, p. 139. Baudrillard's definition of punciwn. 
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meaningful. Indicative statements are the equivalent to rational function, to the 'symbolic', 69 and 
`expression' equivalent to Kristeva's semiotic function, which disturbs and is driven by the pre- 
symbolic. Effective meaning is not ambivalent and leans towards definition. Efficacy is dependent 
on the comprehension of the image, the `sense' of the image - i. e. its reference to what is there, its 
mimetic value. In fact it may have nothing to do with potency. Affective meaning can be 
ambivalent and indeterminate. The definition of pure meaning clarifies the difference between 
meaning with purpose, which is effective, and meaning, which is potent but either purposeless or 
ineffective. Avedon's portraits of the Mid West [fig. 11]70 are definitive and startlingly clear and 
`effective'. Evans Polaroid portraits on the other hand are non-definitive, have no clear apparent 
view and make no statement, yet possess resonance. Thus if we separate Effectiveness from 
Potency and assert that one does not derive from the other, we establish a place prior to this 
persistent assumption of cause and effect, regarding `good' and powerful images. Images can be 
effective and potent (Avedon), and can be ineffective and potent (Evans). 
As we saw in The Reality Effect, if one takes `insignificant notation' in photographs to contribute to 
the mood and character of the whole effect, it would be difficult to determine which detail 
contributes to which aspect of character. The possibility of 'pure' indication or pure description is 
an interesting one in relation to photographs. In photographs, the function of 'descriptive passages' 
are interpreted as indicative of something `real' and whilst one could describe any photograph as 
being `descriptive only', the indicative content will always suggest otherwise, caught as it is in the 
inevitable cycle of cause and effect. And so Barthes distinguishes descriptive detail that is 
`irrelevant' to the narrative structure, `attached to no functional sequence, nor to any signified 
characteristics, atmosphere or information'. He suggests such description as interwoven with the 
'imperatives of realism' - so that `referential constraints' are interwoven with `aesthetic 
constraints'. " Works of `pure description', which doggedly resist ulterior meaning, such as Ruff's 
attenuated portraits, only contribute evidence of something taking place and are barely `evidence of 
`what-was-there'. 72 They reflect aspects of Baudrillard's `disappearing subject'. They are both non- 
expressive and expressionless, having effected a subversion of direct expression. (The extreme 
deliberateness of von Zwehl and Lundin contrive its total rejection. ) Ruff plays out Baudrillard's 
impossible realm of reality in photographic practice, of no representation and no meaning. His 
authenticity lies with the primacy of the image and his determination not to succumb to the illusion 
of being able to represent, which he implicitly holds as a weakness. He appropriates and combines 
two forms; the formal portrait and the passport photograph and presents the person as a reductive 
abstraction rather than a reference, a 'kind of second reality', which is a `thing' rather than a 
I See p. 120, note 59 70 Richard Avedon, in The American West, 1979-1984, exhibition catalogue, Centre for Creative Photography, University of Arizona, 
2001 
71 Barthes, 'The Reality Effect', p. 14 
1 Ibid., p. 15 
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person. But rather than a concern with the `thingness' of the object depicted, Ruff is concerned 
with the `thingness' of the photograph and its surface quality. The physical presence of the subject 
in the photograph approaches a subject that refers only to itself. He arrives at a sort of simplicity; 
his own brand of purity which avoids the dilemma of both subjectivity and confrontation. 
Clarification of pure meaning exposes what are assumed to be the necessary conditions for 
`meaningful' images, such as the equivalence of universal meaning with the degree of 
meaningfulness (Kant's second `moment' again), and the equivalence of meaning with authorial 
intention. Assumptions regarding what is necessary for `meaningful images' rely on such 
expectations, and preface subsequent judgements of quality. Derrida's disturbance73 between 
determinant judgement (where the general comes first and determines the particular) and reflective 
judgement (which begins with the particular and must retrace the way to the general) provides a 
way to encompass works such as Mikhailov's and has motivated new readings in art history74 that 
require a more interactive process of engagement than a reliance on didactic information. 
As we saw in `DIFFERENCE AND THE PHOTOGRAPH', the perpetuation of distinctions helps to 
organise complexity and to dispel uncertainty. Any disruption to this established order will 
contribute toward a different hegemony, an assertion of the figural over the literal. Oppositional 
assumptions originate in implications of words such as `purpose', `insignificant' and `meaning' and 
lead to a dependence on unquestioned premises, which maintain the existing hegemony. A premise, 
which equates `meaning' with narrative relies on the primary placement of authorship, to determine 
what is meaningful and typifies a common assumption concerning the relationship between 
description, authorial intention and meaning, and parallels the still dominant distinction between 
indication and expression. Giles's interpretation75 distinguishes between meaning with intention or 
purpose, and meaning which is only `descriptive' and not expressive of any purpose. The naming 
of photographs with no apparent purpose as `only descriptions' implies that a very `straight' 
`descriptive' depiction may not have meaning beyond being a sign for a certain type of a thing, e. g. 
`an unclothed man'. `Purpose' is distinguished still further by `purpose' that is communicated and 
`purpose' that is unknown. In this scenario, anonymous `purpose' is problematic. Giles's statement 
`only purposeful signs are meaningful' assumes the priority of intended purpose and reflects a 
common point of view. Without purpose, signs are deemed to be worthless and meaningless (worth 
is assumed to be attached to communicated `meaning' and vice versa), and in turn, are dependent 
on the premise of authorship that does not include the possibility of a correspondingly active role of 
the reader. Thus all the power is given to the author / narrator / photographer and none to a 
subjective reading. This premise is positionally at odds with the `logic of contradiction', the 
Derrida, `Parergon', The Truth in Painting, p. 51 (Owens, p. 16) 
74 See for example Bal, Holly, Moxey, Jones 
Giles, `The Expectation of Narrative', p. 109 
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`without' function (and Kant's third `moment') or the possibility that meaning can arise in a 
senseless, purposeless way, as with Barthes's description of useless detail, punctum or air and 
Derrida's parergon and sans. The position and clarity of `purpose' is central to the condition of 
`meaning' and its status of quality. For an image to be powerful in the sense of pure meaning, I 
suggest it requires a position that side steps originating distinctions and is at the edge of 
significance, purpose and effectiveness. 
Just as expression is not added like a "stratum" to the presence of a pre-expressive sense, so, in 
the same way, the inside of expression does not accidentally happen to be affected by the 
outside of indication. Their overturning is primordial; it is not a contingent association that 
could be undone.. . 11 indication is not added to expression, which is not added to sense, we can 
nonetheless speak in regard to them, of a primordial "supplement": their addition comes to 
make up for a deficiency, it comes to compensate for a primordial nonself-presence. 76 
Pure Meaning returns to the issue of what is seen as being `real', where expectations reside 
persistently in truth, verisimilitude and `realism', where the implicit and particular nature of 
`purpose' is obscurely embedded and established by the current norm of `reality'. But Barthes's 
speculation reminds us that any description is relevant only in the terms verified by the particular 
`rules of the discourse genre', " so that in some genres, verisimilitude is vital and, in others, 
aesthetic attenuation. Genres have different functions; some with more `effective' functions than 
aesthetic (in the sense of exciteful and meaningful) and some with different desires other than 
realism as truth or verisimilitude. It might seem an obvious statement to make that `meaning' 
cannot be separated from the context in which it is read. But what happens in discussing 
photographs, is that the `discourse genre', the particular norm of reality in any particular context, 
can be forgotten; 78 for example, `documentary' photographs with effective purpose cannot be cited 
in contrast to `art photographs' without inviting confusion. 79 Genres are less distinct or explicit in 
contemporary practice and confused functions can dictate different meanings and thus `judgement' 
can be meaningless or ineffective. The notion of realism need not be constrained by verifiable 
`truth' and can be descriptive in a different way, in the manner of `dream' or `poetic' logic as 
Kristeva describes80 or, as in pre-modernity, when `plausibility was not referential, but overtly 
discursive'. "' There remains an expectation of `realism', which is not a law but a habit. It is 
possible that meaning can be attached more directly as symbolic with aspects of description that are 
not essential to the message, that embellish and are integrated with the `imperatives of realism' 82 
(the illusion of realism), where the aesthetic is embedded in its effect. 
Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, p. 86. 
Barthes, 'The Reality Effect', p. 13 
Ibid., p. 12. 
As sometimes is the case - see Kippen, Gillian, 'The Critical Language of Photography', Ph. D. University of 
Manchester, 1997 
sD See Julia Kristeva's discussion of Bakhtin's dialogism in 'Word, Dialogue, Novel' in Desire in Language, p. 70 
8' Barthes, 'The Reality Effect', p. 13 
82 Ibid., p. 14 
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Pure meaning also returns us to the distinctions between indication and expression, between 
`reality and representation', the `veridical and the imaginary' and between presence and 
repetition. Derrida's refutation of `presence' emerges from Husserl's failure to explain the part of 
expression that exceeds the indicative and the consequent misalliance between meaning and 
indication, and indicates instead the alliance between meaning and absence, explained through 
examples of grammar. At the root of an explanation for pure meaning are those elements that 
exceed explanation and the indicative. Derrida exposes `pure logical grammar' (the formal in 
photographic terms) as therefore limited, as it does not explain meaning. He derives `form' from 
`sense', which is restricted to what we know, to what we can anticipate. There is always that which 
supplements the `grammar', that which makes up the image, a gestalt that is more than the sum of 
its constituent parts and cannot be quantified. Pure meaning is that latent area of possibility, not 
defined, which can overturn established assumptions of concept and norms of genre. What is `non- 
presence' allows and confirms the possibility of meaning that approaches unacceptability or 
meaninglessness in terms of the norm, and the possibility of abstraction or non-meaning in terms of 
the indexical photograph and to which I return in Part Three. 
The range of mechanisms discussed confirm the difference between what is reference and what is 
image; the distinction between efficacy and potency clarifies a point of departure for resonance 
from that of communication and indicates a meaning derived from other than what is referenced. 
The role of supplementation explains the central importance of absence, which invites metonym, 
the imagination and allegory. Having located positions of instability that present meaning as an 
area of possibility, the next chapter considers how this instability refers outside the photograph 
itself, explores the mechanics of what is absent, the possibilities of metaphor and ultimately the 
interdependence of meaning and expression validated by differance. What is crucial is the manner 
in which photographs can be discursive, reflect ideas, demonstrate attitudes, without translation 
into words. The photograph necessitates a comprehension derived from its immediate impact 
independently from verbal translation. Barthes's `rules of discursive genre' could suggest a 
significant leap from the literal to a discourse that operates visually. 
I Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, p. 50 
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Chapter Three: THE MECHANICS OF METAPHOR 
MARIO'S FRIDGE' 
This chapter explores the conceptual domain that constructs visual meaning by firstly describing an 
image that provokes thought, but possibly not by means of a personal sensitive point (punctum). 2 It 
highlights the conflict between our compulsion to define the subject ('thing') and our inclination to 
conceptual speculation. In `CHASING THE NON THING', I explore aspects of the metaphoric 
process that give more direct access to the meaning in photographs and which continues to 
contradict narrative interpretation. 
`From the dark opening of the cluttered insides of the fridge, light shines forth. ' Within the 
shelves of the door, jars sit next to wine next to beer, pasta piles on cheese. In the fridge, 
`vibrates the silent call of' food and nourishment, the prospect of cooking and care. `This 
equipment is pervaded by' the promise of provision, of white goods, utility and domesticity. It 
promises more; more comfort, nurture, sustenance and certainty. Mario is still. He stands as if 
chilled by the preservative powers of the fridge. He stares fixedly within, at what I cannot see. 
He is expectant; he is submissive before its power, its electric energy, its light. When he shuts 
' Mario's Fridge refers to `Mario. 1978' in Christine Liotta, (ed. ) Philip-Lorca diCorcia, Museum of Modem Art, 1995 
2 See Bal `s discussion of meaning, other than by the 'rules imposed by language' (p. 74). Bal, Mieke, `Dispersing the Image'. In 
Looking In: The Art of Viewing, pp. 65-91 
3 The phrases in quotes in these two paragraphs are from Martin Heidegger's The Origin of the Work of Art (1935) in Cazeaux, Clive 
(ed. ), The Continental Aesthetics Reader, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 87. The rest is my speculation derived from this text. 
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Fig. 52 Philip-Lorca diCorcia, Mario, 1978 
the door, the light will go and whilst it is open, he absorbs its strength. The manner of 
placement in the fridge door is the one visible trace of human uncertainty in a room of clean 
lines and decisive surfaces. It is night. Six black windows, two obscured by the fridge door, tell 
me it is dark outside, but warm; the bottom window is open to the night air. It is dark outside, 
but light inside the fridge. It is as if Mario feeds off the light, the source of sustenance. There is 
light at the bottom of the fridge; in the midst of darkness there is light; the silver lighting. 
The illuminated space is surrounded by edges, framing the interior and the light that emanates 
from it. 4 Within the frame of the picture, at least six successive vertical edges echo the frame of 
the fridge door. `On the edge of the void, we follow the line ... we follow them on the edge, the 
edges, the multiple edge which detaches the being-product from ... its subjective scope? It is a 
simple frame, an edge around the interior of the fridge `depicted in absentia'. The interior is 
seen only by Mario, who can see the top, the bottom, the underneath of successive shelves, the 
layers of shelves, one upon another, the provisions placed and piled, ordered, or disordered, 
within. The content of the fridge ordered, by Mario or another, a testament to taste, priority and 
housekeeping. `Into this subjective scope, cut off from' my knowledge, will come the one who 
fills and empties the space, successively replenishing and using its content; the fridge, an ever 
full cave of sustenance. This is `the usefulness of the useful, the presumed essence of the 
product', but useless to Mario, now frozen and detached from reaching into the fridge and 
taking out what he wants, what he needs, what he desires. What nourishment does he seek? And 
is it there for him to take? Is he forlorn because what he expected is not there or is he not 
focused on the content, but on the light - of the future or of the past? Is it the future that he sees, 
as if in full cine-colour, illuminated and moving before him? The fridge, full of light, promises 
much; food, nourishment, time travel, the mystery of the universe. The opening of the door is 
absolute. My position, my view cuts me off from the view inside the fridge; cuts me off from the 
meaning that is within. `Not a more or less of stricture but a determined (structured) form of 
stricture: of the outside and the inside, the underneath and the top. The logic of detachment as 
cut leads to opposition, it is a logic or even a dialectic of opposition... It has the effect of 
sublating difference. And thus of suturing. The logic of detachment as stricture is entirely other. 
Deferring: it never sutures. i6 The fridge defers, it is neither accessible nor inaccessible, it is 
open now and will close soon, it is neither full nor empty, neither sustaining nor unsustaining, 
neither giving nor taking. 
"Recalls Indiana's description of the fridge as an 'abyss' in Indiana, Gary talking about Mario in 'The Nights of a Dreamer', ArtForwn, 
January, 1993 
5 Derrida, 'Restitutions' in The Truth in Painting, p. 339 
6Ibid., p. 340 
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`Here you are picking up on what was started in `The Sans of the Pure Cut' concerning 
artificial and "defunct" products" an implement without its handle', a fridge without provision, 
dislocated from its function, cut off from its purpose ('vague beauty'). A near beautiful `white 
good', having a hole, a cavity, a cave. The light ('unconcealedness'), revealing truth. `The truth 
of the useful, in other words the being-product of the product... appears in the instance' of 
opening the fridge door. `This movement of truth passes via the possibility of fetishisation, but 
ends up... only confirming the very thing it seems to efface' The `truth' of the product fridge' is 
not a fridge; it is a cave, a nourishing light, the end and the beginning of the world, the rebirth 
of Mario. 
The passage above describing Mario is linear only out of necessity; it is a linear, verbal 
approximation of a non-linear conceptual speculation. Contained within the sequential structure of 
words and sentences, it attempts to relate the simultaneous event of looking.. The meaning here is 
the conceptual frame which encompasses the focus of Mario in the image and Mario's focus on the 
fridge interior; Mario's look and the light. But this is not narrative. In order to interpret metaphor, it 
is necessary to resist the linear, the consequential and the narrative. What I say in words in 
attempting to describe what I see in an image, images do by default when not troubled with words, 
when not forced into some defining logic or `pointed' argument. Images open up possibility. It is 
easy then to conceive of abstract ideas with the depicted object as metaphor; to look at objects and 
photographs and allude to abstract concepts. Metaphor is a process that enables defamiliarisation 
with the object ('thing') depicted. This is thought derived from visual reverie - the void of the 
space, the intertwining laces9, the back and forth of association. Words close down, explain and 
clarify. 
`The thingness of a thing is particularly difficult to express and only seldom expressible''' 
When looking at images, we generally start with the subject matter and ask what is it? And then 
what does it mean? 'MARIO'S FRIDGE' demonstrates the malleability of any subject depicted; the 
`thing' that is much more than the `thing', as we construct meaning around it. In The Origin of the 
Work of Art, Heidegger's concern is that a work (of art) should disclose the `truth' of a `thing', in 
its `unconcealedness'. His speculation is grounded in `presence, ' and a concern to locate the 
essential nature of a `thing', as determined by the manner in which it is made (`pure'-thing, 
'equipment'-thing, `work'-thing). He tries to bypass the prevailing thought about that `thing', the 
`thing-concept, that `obstruct(s) the way toward the thingly character of a thing', which `constitutes 
its artistic nature', the `thingly element'. He tries to see the `thing' as it is. " 
Ibid., p. 346 
8 Kant, The Critique of Judgement , p. 
80 
9 Derrida, 'Restitutions' in The Truth in Painting, p. 299 
Heidegger, The Origin of the Work of Art in Cazeaux, p. 86 
Heidegger, 'Van Gogh's painting is the disclosure of what the equipment. The pair of peasant shoes, is in truth', in Cazeaux, 
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Derrida's concern in contrast is to chase the manner of meaning rather than `truth' and the essential 
`thing'. In Restitutions, 12 Derrida `discloses' the contradictions in Heidegger's definition of 
significance of Van Gogh's painting of shoes and his attempt to explicate a `thing' that is a work of 
art. Derrida's discussion of whether the `work of art' is a thing or something else, questions the 
distinction between matter and form and points to the fixation with `subject' (in the sense of 
subject-matter). In looking for `truth', discussion focuses on what it is, where it has come from, 
what it represents. This fixation is revealed in the naming of things, fixing things, confirming 
things and relies on 'semi o-linguistics' dominated by `the matter-form couple', where form 
correlates with the rational, matter with the irrational. As Heidegger's speculation demonstrates, a 
very simple image allows an array of `subject' to emerge. It is a `thing' that manifests `allegory and 
symbol' which `provide the conceptual frame'. For example, in describing the nature of the 
`thing', he reveals that his intention is to transcend the representation as he speaks of what is not 
there, what is held metonymically in the shoes and yet is absent: `From the dark opening of the 
worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth. ' 13 Here Heidegger projects 
onto a 'mere thing' with subjectivity or accesses what Derrida calls `its subjective scope', 14 the 
subject who is absent but inferred by an object present. 
It is the persistence in describing the `subject' in a photograph, the what of the `thing', that 
contributes again to us seeing photographs as transparent to the world, that blinds us so that we 
perhaps do not see the metaphoric meaning that accompanies the photographed reference to that 
object (the fridge, the earring, the glass of water) and our mediated perception of it. Derrida's use 
of the metaphor of lacing and shoelaces to expound the movement from inside to outside and back 
- of the picture and the `thing' itself, demonstrates how easily, when talking about a picture, we 
confuse - the subject as being there - as if it were a `thing' 
in front of us. `It seems to be situated 
between the thing and the work of art ... 
When the "product" is the subject of a "work", when the 
thing-as-product (shoes) is the "subject" presented or represented by a thing-as-work'. IS Our 
presumption tends to look for what a `thing' has to give it quality, on substance rather than lack. 
`Restitutions' extends the premise of differance by insisting on moving away from the subject- 
smatter, the `what is'. Derrida speaks of the struggle to find a language that describes visual 
conditions adequately, that is non-linear and which takes place between what is the content of the 
work and some particular element within it. He invents new logics of `detachment' as cut16 and as 
contradiction. The contradictory logic of supplement (as we have seen with parergon), sits 
uncomfortably with the tradition of `thingness'. 
p. 88 
'2 Derrida, 'Restitutions' in The Truth in Painting, pp. 255-382 
13 Heidegger, The Origin of the Work of Art in Cazeaux, p. 87 
14 Demda, `Restitutions' in The Truth in Painting, p. 339 
's Ibid., p. 297 
16 Ibid., p. 340 
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The dominating concern `thingness' is doubly pertinent for C20 photography. `Modernist' 
photography has assumed this prevailing aesthetic in a particularly acute manner; that a photograph 
should not only show a `thing' in a simple and `straight' way but should reveal some `truth' about 
that `thing'. As an example, Ware observes of Walker Evans that rather than seeking `to recreate 
reality from metaphors', " he looks to `reveal the metaphors that were already there in reality' in the 
object. This revelation of `thingness' is the origin of a particularly photographic aesthetic 
concerned to `transcend the everyday'. It has forefronted the essential element of an object beyond 
its resemblance and yet, simultaneously and in contradiction, insists on the very `straight' depiction 
(likeness) of that same object. The paradox for the photograph in revealing `something else' is that 
its photographic property must also inevitably reference `things'. This `thingness' and absence 
indicates a central concern for directions in photography emerging in the late C20. Part Three 
articulates strategies evident in photographic practice that demonstrates the ambivalence regarding 
thingness and its absence. Firstly I will articulate an emphasis as metaphoric procedure as a way to 
circumnavigate the inclusion of concept with that of absence. 
CHASING THE NON- THING 
The term `concept' is problematic as it is commonly allied to language and words, whereas here the 
context of `reading' a photograph is determined by visual apprehension that accesses `concepts' via 
visual figuration. A word attempts to identify a meaning or thing, whereas a photograph 
circumscribes meaning and things. A photograph refers to what things look like, but `naming' 
objects that we recognise is not how we respond to a photograph; this is a more complex process of 
seeing, thinking and collating. The sort of thinking that a photograph provokes is one that expands 
thought rather than defines or confines, and the ambiguity of the term `concept' is useful because it 
suggests networks of meaning and thinking besides (or before) something is named. When I refer 
to a `concept', I am assuming that its reliance on visual play encompasses a dimension besides one 
that it is determined linguistically. I emphasise the distinction between Derrida's `intrinsic 
multiplicity' of thought and its verbal articulation. How one articulates thought is determined by 
the language one uses. For example, Levinson1' states that if a language lacks the word "if' then 
one can only express a conditional by saying in effect `perhaps A, perhaps B', which might mean a 
host of other things, including perhaps A, perhaps B. And it suggests the interesting possibility of 
'iffing' an image: seeing perhaps this and perhaps that. 
" Ware, Robert, `Walker Evans, Impersonality and Metaphor'. History of Photography, vol. 17, no. 2, Summer 1993, pp. 147-151 
1e Levinson, Stephen C., `From Outer to Inner Space: linguistic categories and non-linguistic thinking'. In Nuyts, Jan (ed. ) Language and 
Conceptualisation. Cambridge University Press, 1997 
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In the field of cognitive linguistics, the precise nature of conceptualisation and the extent to which 
it is shaped by linguistic representation is unclear. Nuyts outlines an interdisciplinary debate, which 
acknowledges both `linguistic' and `conceptual' knowledge and explores how their relationship 
may be organised. 19 There are various theories and explanations about what goes on in our heads - 
about how language is processed, how abstract concepts are conceived and how conceptual 
knowledge is organised, but because the operation of the mind only appears to us in our behaviour 
- indirectly, it is difficult to find evidence for any particular view. Views range from the formation 
of concepts being dependent on language (thinking is linguistic) to the other extreme that separates 
language and thought2° and sees absurdity in the `idea that thought is the same as language'. 21 
Intervening theories vary according to how the nature of the relationship between language and 
concept is drawn; some recognise non-linguistic representation and some recognise `semantic 
form' as conflated with `conceptual structure'. All these theories describe models of categorisation. 
Seen as a form of categorization, a `concept' is a way of establishing a type of entity, condition or 
event by ordering its features or properties, which can be seen to be at odds with Derrida's critique 
of the existence of essential meaning and things. However in apprehending images we assimilate, 
condense and shift elements without necessarily naming them; it is a more fluid assemblage of 
`multiplicity'. Rather than aligning `concept' with essential substance, 22 what is important here is 
its capacity to conflate several elements (its holding-function), and the configuring process of 
accumulating qualities, as yet un-named, and which I call `conceptual'. 
[Metaphor] speaks obliquely, exploits lateral connotations, insinuates things without really 
saying them, suggests ideas without making them explicit. ' 
In an attempt to understand how photographs `speak obliquely' without being explicit, I explore the 
possibilities of the metaphoric process as a model that exemplifies the conflation of unrelated, 
incongruous elements. In so far as the term `metaphor' is applied to the analysis of images, many 
of the properties described in literary analysis can be applied to imagery and are already familiar, 
such as `substitution'. But despite differance, which has gone some way to disperse `centre' and 
`presence', and to involve the reader, and thus subjectivity, in interpretations of the image, there 
remains a compulsion to make `sense', to validate by using procedures also borrowed from literary 
analysis, which affirm more purposeful intentions, such as narrative. Rather than assuming that 
because images may share similar properties of analysis with literature, they necessarily share a 
similar purpose or consequence, I shall identify those properties that confirm visual rather than 
verbal processes and effects. I shall assert properties of meaning construction that relinquish the 
'9 Nuyts, Jan and Eric Pederson (eds. ) Language and Conceptualisation. Cambridge University 
Press, 1997, p. 1 
20 Ibid., p. 4 
21 Levinson refers for example to (Miller 1982: 66-6) and (Pinker 1994: 57). In Nuyts and 
Pederson, p. 14 
1 Prasada discusses Aristotle's question `What is it? ' Sandeep Prasada 'Name of Things and Stuff: An Aristotlean Perspective'. In 
Jackendoo, Ray, Paul Bloom and Karen Wynn, Language, Logic and Concepts. Cambridge, blass: MIT Press, 2002 
-' Bennington, Geoffrey, Jacques Derrida. London; Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991, p. 119. Bennington describes 
metaphor as having a primary place in Derrida's writing. 
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urge to pull elements together and look instead at processes that move against narrative. Derrida's 
distinction is useful here, between polysemic meanings, which can be gathered together and 
totalised (as in narrative), and disseminated meanings, which remain fragmented, multiple and 
dispersed. ' As such it is not the distinction between visual or verbal nature of texts that make sense 
or non-sense but the manner of display. As an alternative, I want to amplify what proceeds from 
the metonymic procedure, in the primary moves of contiguity, substitution and analogy in the 
process of making visual meaning. After describing what metaphor does and how it works, I shall 
relate three perspectives on the function of metaphor that support a simultaneous reading, a 
perquisition of the photograph and, which add a dimension that is particularly pertinent to the 
understanding of meaning in photographs and to this argument: Black's consideration of potency 
and `interaction' 25; Lakoff's 'conceptual schema' 26; Paul Ricoeur's alliance with the metaphysical 
and the psychological 27 Whilst they speak of the principles of linguistic metaphor, in each case 
many of the terms, properties and processes discussed can constructively be applied to the reading 
of photographs. I shall emphasise the operation of `conceptual knowledge', rather than that of 
language, as the function that assembles concepts, which is most pertinent to apprehending 
photographs and where the meaning process in photographs occurs. 
Simply put, metaphor is another process of substitution, where the meaning shifts from one domain 
to another, where it speaks of (sees) one thing in terms of another. ' Different theories have 
emphasised different aspects of the properties of metaphor; `comparison theory' defines metaphor 
as a form of ellipsis, comparing things rather than substituting; `controversion theory' emphasises 
some kind of logical contradiction between terms, where meaning, via connotation, is shifted from 
the centre to the margins and where the `twist of meaning is forced by inherent tension or 
oppositions, within the metaphor itself. " Metaphoric procedure originates from contiguity and 
resemblance and proceeds inevitably from resemblance to substitution and supplementation (as we 
have seen in Differance). Procedures of connection are related to the basic brain functions that 
process thought and language and assemble concepts. 3° Absent terms are brought to the present 
through connection, selection and substitution and are part of the same operation. 
I Derrida, Postions, pp. 61-2 
's Black, Max, 'More about Metaphor'. In Ortony, Andrew, (ed. ) Metaphor and Thought, Cambridge University Press, 1993 
26 Lakoff, George, 'The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor' in Metaphor and Thought 
I Ricoeur, Paul, The Rule of Metaphor, trans. Robert Czerny, London & Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978 
1 From Aristotle, Poetics 21.1457b. 6-7. cited in Karsten Harries, 'Metaphor and Transcendence'. Critical Inquiry, Autumn 1978, vol 5, 
no. 1, p. 74 
1 Beardsley, M. C., 'Metaphor' in Edwards, Paul (ed. ) Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Crowell, Collier and Macmillan, 1967, p106 
30 The conditions Dysphasia and aphasia demonstrate how brain function operates when the 
links between thought and language are 
disrupted. Patients following a stroke with aphasia often make words up or display semantic paraphrasia, which is the substitution of 
a semantically related but incorrect word. The condition demonstrates the capacity of the 
brain to assemble concepts. 
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Metaphor is divided into two parts; the primary subject or the literal frame ('tenor', `referent') and 
the metaphoric secondary subject, the figurative concept, ('vehicle"', ` relatum'). Max Black 
emphasises the `interaction' of these two domains. Thus importantly for the reading of 
photographs, a metaphorical process works both ways; tenor and vehicle can affect each other, 
reverberate back and forth between the two and is a more profound process than a mere 
comparison. Already there are significant parallels for meaning in photographs, discussed as the 
properties of parergon; substitution supplementation; comparison resemblance; opposition 
contradiction absurdity; interaction dialogue; tension> resonance. 
I shall call metaphorical utterances that support a high degree of implicative elaboration 
resonant. Resonance and emphasis are a matter of degree. They are not independent: Highly 
emphatic metaphors tend to be highly resonant, while the unemphatic occurrence of a markedly 
resonant metaphor is apt to produce a dissonance, sustained by irony or some similarly 
distancing operation. 32 
Black's `interaction' view describes the metaphoric process as a system, an `implicative complex' 
of relationships, where the metaphor `vehicle' projects associative implications on the topic 
(subject depicted) and the reader selects and contributes properties to both primary and secondary 
subjects. Interestingly, he also employs the term `resonance' to describe the degree of implicative 
elaboration and thereby the potency of the metaphor and the more complex the association the 
stronger the resonance. This is a marked difference in criteria from other theories, which suggest 
that it is the distance between domains connecting the literal and the figural that makes for strong 
metaphor. Thus Mario's fridge is implicatively complex and not just a `thing', as is the glass of 
water. The glass of water can be as simple as the association of bread and water, or as vague and 
indefinite as the metaphysical attributes of life giving sustenance. The fridge can be associated with 
the function of the kitchen and cooking or it can access the abyss and the unknown. This allowance 
of complexity is most apposite in visual metaphor where grammatical structure does not dictate 
primary and secondary positions as it does in language. It becomes a system of reverberating ideas 
rather than `things'. Strong visual resonance may be dependent both on the degree of multiplicity in 
implication and in the degree of interaction between all parties. The assertions, which may be 
numerous, are indeterminate. But in a photographic image, the literal object to which attributes are 
asserted becomes more fixed than with literary metaphor. Tension may be created between a 
conception of the real world as the photograph refers to it and my conception of the world as I 
might imagine it. A resonant metaphor may be as near our `image' of the real world or as far away 
from that `image' without being implausible. A visual metaphor, to be resonant, cannot be too 
obvious, but perhaps it can be as implausible as it likes. 
31 Ortony, Andrew, 'Introduction' in Metaphor and Thought, explaining I. R Richard's terms - tenor and vehicle, : Miller - referent, 
relatum, p. 3 
31 Black, 'More About Metaphor', p. 26 - metaphoric resonance recalls 'psychological resonance' (Kozloff. ) 
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I need now to step aside from metaphor to look at our understanding of where the reverberation of 
meaning takes place. An instinctual prejudice exists that separates perception from thinking. This 
distinction is longstanding and then only superseded by the supremacy of vision above all the other 
senses. 33 Theories concerning the nature and function of metaphor in language and thought have 
shifted around the problem of `thinking' and `looking' and concentrate on the structure of 
language. Rudolf Arnheim uses the broad term apperception, to encompass more than the mere 
physical implication of `perception' and extends the meaning of the term 'cognitive' to include 
perception, association and context. He asserts that `thinking' forms part of perception and vice 
versa; they are not separate functions and include: `such operations as active exploration, selection, 
grasping of essentials, simplification, abstraction, analysis and synthesis, completion, correction, 
comparison as well as combining, separating, putting in context'. ' Following his thesis further: 
thoughts and images are interchangeable, from the early acquisition of sensory elements to the 
processing of more abstract `theoretical' ideas. Arnheim asserts that 'visual thinking is indivisible' 
and assumes the purity of a kind of seeing that cannot be translated linguistically. A person looking 
at an image is supposed to reach beyond the image directly, connect with experience from memory 
and organise a lifetime into a `system of visual concepts'. The `mental grasp' encompasses 
fragmentation, totality, difference and subtle distinction, and the physical object itself is different 
and stands alone; its own reality is isolated from anyone's `mental grasp' of it. Apperception 
assumes integrity in the apprehension, a type of clarity. Thought is often spoken of as continuous, 
perhaps not logical but understandable and clear and in relating thought we speak as if we had one 
thought at a time. But as Derrida explains, the nature of thought is chaotic, multi-faceted, 
simultaneous and disordered. 
A method of analysis in the construction of metaphor proposes that in reading a text we use 
`memory images' to gather information from the passage and make sense of it. 35 This process 
neither insists on anything purely visual nor relies on translation from the visual to verbal language. 
The process is first constructive, setting a context for understanding and then selective, becoming 
more abstract in understanding concepts. We then use 'semantic models', a set of alternative 
possibilities in which all the information can apply to the text. This is open and can allow for 
change; it is fluid. A `semantic model' contains different representations which may be 
incompatible even contradictory. They allow an idea to hold an image and at the same time allow 
that model to change and fluctuate - so that ideas can contain, for example, the possibility of a 
situation with `snow' and `not snow' simultaneously. If we apply this theory to the looking at 
photographs, it opens up the recurrent opposition of absence / presence in a logical way, so that 
;; See Jay, Martin Downcast Eyes. the Denigration of Vision, Twentieth Century French Thought. Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: 
University of California Press, 1993 
34 Arnheim, Rudolph, Visual Thinking, London: Faber, 1970, p. 13 
3s Miller, George A., Images and Modes, Similes and Metaphors', in Metaphor & Thought 
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when we see an image of an empty room, we also understand that room could be full in numerous 
possible ways. We can understand that there is no one there, but that there could be people there 
and the very fact that there could be people there, adds more meaning to the fact that there is not. A 
fridge may be seen as that particular fridge and ideationally as what a fridge does as a piece of 
`equipment'; the abstract model holds all the possible things contained in that fridge. In looking at 
Mario's fridge, I formulate a `textual concept' of what I am looking at. It also points to the 
similarity between photographs and metaphor in that they both can sustain numerous meanings. 
This understanding of difference within the concept of a thing is seen as positive: `incompleteness 
of the mental image is not simply a matter of fragmentation or insufficient apprehension but a 
positive quality, which distinguishes the mental grasp of an object from the physical nature of that 
object itself. '36 Resemblances invite us to use the knowledge we have; to search for possibilities 
which are similar but not the same; we look within the context for `plausible grounds' for a 
particular thing / event in a particular given context. We need to recognise and then we need to 
interpret. To understand metaphors we need to recognise, reconstruct, interpret. So when looking, 
we apply our existing knowledge of the objects involved, what the objects conventionally mean 
and then adjust according to the context. In novel juxtapositions or confrontations, such as an 
obscure photograph, our feelings in relation to the new relationship may have to adjust to 
accommodate an unfamiliar concept. We have to appreciate both the similarity to previous 
instances and notably the differences. It is the differences that redefine our response. And each of 
us does this differently. 
The generalisations governing poetic metaphorical expression are not in language, but in 
thought: they are general mappings across conceptual domains and apply to much of everyday 
language - everyday thought. In short the locus of metaphor is not in a language at all, but in the 
way we conceptualise one mental domain in terms of another. The general theory of metaphor is 
given by characterising such cross-domain mappings. And in the process, everyday abstract 
concepts like time, states, changes, causation and purpose also turn out to be metaphorical. 37 
In the interdisciplinary discussions of the function of metaphor, acknowledgement that the 
metaphoric instinct pervades thought (not just language) is important with regard to the recognition 
of `conceptual knowledge' as a primal process shared by both visual and verbal meaning. Lakoff's 
`contemporary theory' returns us to something like Arnheim's apperception but also explains and 
incorporates the ordering of context and culture. Lakoff's theory of metaphor questions the 
traditional literal/figurative distinction and presents a challenge to assumptions by some theorists 
who prioritise literal meaning; 38 he proposes that what we call `metaphor' is embodied in our 
I Arnheim, Visual Thinking, p. 107 
37 Lakoff, 'The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor' in Metaphor and Thought, p. 203 
1 Lakoff, p. 148 
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thinking and is the main mechanism through which we comprehend abstract concepts-'91 do not 
adopt this theory as any sort of structural law, but as another means to see a relationship between 
feeling, thought and concept, one which does not prioritise the role of language. Lyotard speaks of 
the violence of language, the nature of which insists on oppositional structures: `it is divisive 
because it externalises the sensible opposite itself, as an object, and it is divided because it 
interiorises the figural in what is articulated. ' He proclaims that language forms `the problem of 
knowledge' and `forces us to desire the true as... the fulfilled signification', which forces the object, 
in its constitution by language to be lost. 40 It this desire to find synthesis that swallows up 
resonance whereas the `figural' `is a process that negotiates figures and language' and `explains the 
capacity of the event to remain outside the grasp of structures, and yet to work within them. " 
Despite Lakoff's conclusion of underlying universal principles, which is at odds with 
deconstruction, his constructivist view of the process of cognition42 suggests that as soon as we talk 
about abstractions and emotions, rather than what is concrete and physical, `metaphorical 
understanding is the norm'. Linguistic metaphor depends on the breaking of the rules of sense and 
on the three basic functions of substitution, comparison and interaction. Lakoff's contemporary 
theory marks a main point in my argument against the containment of meaning in narrative 
interpretation. It is revelatory in its assertion of figurative expression being a prime necessity in the 
constitution of linguistic meaning and in the contention that metaphors are understood `effortlessly 
because experience is conceptualised' besides (if not before) language. Lakoff makes the switch 
from analysing metaphor in order to understand how it uses language, toward seeing how language 
is influenced by metaphoric thought. Language, which can only relate an approximation of the 
metaphoric movement in a photograph, rather than explain it, is relegated to a secondary role. 
Whether conceptualization is pre-linguistic, as Lakoff implies, or whether it is parallel to language, 
it can be conceived as not necessarily articulated by language. It is a theory that, like disseminated 
meaning, defers linguistic categorisation. 
Perversely, a contentious theory concerning the workings of metaphor in a linguistic context, 
releases the understanding of visual metaphor from the subordination to linguistic structures. 
Lakoff relates that what is called `metaphor' in language is a mechanism that `allows us to 
understand a relatively abstract or inherently unstructured subject matter in terms of a more 
concrete, or at least more highly structured subject matter" and contains a `conceptual system' of 
meaning, where understanding comes prior to translation into language. `Conceptual systems' map 
I Ibid., p. 203. Lakoff's premise is that conceptual habits frame our way of thinking and extends this to promote radical and political 
reconceptualisation. He also suggests that there are underlying universal principles embodied 
in metaphor - the 'event structure' metaphor 
being one such universal. This notion of universal principles is at odds with deconstruction which seeks to undermine universal principles. 
40 Lyotard, Jean-Francois, 'Taking the Side of the Figural' from Discours, figure (1971). In Crome, Keith and James Williams (eds. ) 
The Lyotard Reader and Guide. Edinburgh University Press, 2006, p. 38 
41 Crome and Williams. 'Introduction'. In The Lyotard Reader and Guide, p. 15 
42 Ortony, Metaphor and Thought, p. 13 
41 Lakoff, Metaphor and Thought, p. 245 
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knowledge, experience and meaning and work below the level of consciousness and incorporate 
psychological associations. Thus what we call metaphor is `the main mechanism through which we 
comprehend abstract concepts' and is `fundamentally conceptual, not linguistic in nature' and the 
locus of metaphor is in our conceptualising `one mental domain in terms of another' - `mapping 
across conceptual domains'. ` The notion of `conceptual schema' provides a different terminology, 
which accommodates the inexplicable before the interference and contribution of language. 
What Lakoff calls `event structure' pervades much of our speech (as does Reddy's `conduit 
metaphor'). So that we, for example, describe difficulties in terms of blockages; features of terrain; 
burdens; counter-forces; lack of an energy source. `Event structure' metaphor `shows that the most 
common abstract concepts - time, state, change, causation, action, purpose and means are 
conceptualised via metaphor. Since such concepts inhabit our language unconsciously, the fact that 
they are conceptualised metaphorically shows that metaphor is central to ordinary abstract 
thought. '45 What he calls generic-level schema explains a tendency of interpretation to personify 
and to make analogy so that many metaphors seem to fit a single pattern and form large generic 
metaphors : 
Events (like death) are understood in terms of actions by some agent (reaping). It is that agent 
that is personified. We thus hypothesised a very general metaphor, EVENTS ARE ACTIONS, 
which combines with other, independently existing metaphors for life and death. Consider for 
example the DEATH IS DEPARTURE metaphor. Departure is an event. If we understand this 
event as an action on the part of some causal agent - someone who brings about, or helps, to 
bring about, departure - then we can account for figures like drivers, coachmen and so forth. 
' 
Returning to the context of photographs, this as a principle can be seen to happen with the fridge. 
Thus the fridge is personified: the fridge emits light and is enriched by it; the fridge is a source of 
energy and will provide; the fridge, as container, is full and provides; the fridge will sustain Mario 
in some way; the fridge is intelligent and speaks; the fridge is an oracle. If we open the door we 
may find the answer. Mario confronts the question of life > LIFE IS A JOURNEY. The meaning 
encompasses both particularity and meta-metaphor. It accesses large `generic metaphors' such as 
`the meaning of life', `the mystery that is me, Who am I? What am IT 'the uncertainty of 
humanity', `mortality' and `life after death'. Thus the universe, life and death are accessible in the 
light in the fridge. It is a figurative concept, a space of meaning (a `conceptual schema'). 
The process of analogy is more familiar but approaches the same process of conceptual connection. 
The fridge is like a time machine, an abyss. As analogy, we arrive at interpretation via a number of 
conceptual leaps - light > emitting> utterance> speech - light is 
like speech - like knowledge - like 
I Ibid., p 203 
45 Ibid., p. 222 
46 Ibid., p. 232 
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oracle. Notably these leaps may be different and various and we understand them simultaneously. 
Lakoff finds that there is a pattern to the kinds of things that occur in schemata that relate to the 
abstract concepts of causal structure, temporal structure, shape of event and purpose structure. The 
relation of the specific to the general is significant, as is the relation between a specific knowledge 
structure and its generic-level structure; the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor. It is an extremely 
common mechanism for comprehending the general in terms of the specific 47 The generic schema 
maps against the specific instance of the image. One force > light, equates with another force > 
speech >knowledge > persuasion. A physical force equates with a psychological force. The point of 
this, in terms of reading a photograph, is that many such generic schema occur simultaneously. We 
cannot help but generate connections easily. They do not occur in sequence and whilst they may 
connect, one schema does not necessarily follow another; they are not diachronic. They need not 
make narrative, but they do generate other images. 
Paul Ricoeur's writing is important in asserting the more elusive elements of metaphoric function 
and in contributing emphasis on the `transference of feelings' that accompanies conceptual 
connection: `In symbolising one situation by means of another, metaphor "infuses" feelings 
attached to the symbolising situation into the heart of the situation that is symbolised'. ' Thus 
feelings and (resonance) can be carried in an object via some sort of conceptual interaction, which 
`extends the power of double meaning from the cognitive realm to the affective'. Ricoeur amplifies 
the boundary between semantic theory and the psychological theories of imagination and feeling' 
and sees metaphor as providing a `common frontier' between `a logical moment and a sensible 
moment', 50 between the verbal and the non-verbal; the meeting point of meaning and sensibility. s' 
He seeks an alternative to distinctions `held to be self evident between denotation and connotation', 
`between cognitive and emotive values of discourse', between `discovery and creating', `finding 
and projecting', `inside and outside'. In addition, he raises the question of the metaphysical and of 
immanence and transcendence: `The relation of analogy begins its migration towards the 
transcendental sphere when it is charged with expressing the identity of principles and elements 
that cut through the diversity of genera', 52 belonging to different domains. When this is transported 
to the context of the visual, we mistake the inability to translate or describe verbally, as that, which 
cannot be seen or understood conceptually. Our expectation is to explain, using language, images 
which may be indescribable in quality, which are not transcendent in the sense of beyond our 
understanding, but do deny verbal articulation. Ricoeur's distinction between transcendent analogy 
and immanent metaphor or poetic resemblance suggests that the metaphoric move, rather than 
47 Ibid., p. 235 
°s Ricouer, Paul, The Rule of Metaphor. multi-disciplinary studies of the creation of meaning in language, trans. Czerny, Robert, 
Kathleen McLaughlin, John Costello, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, p. 190 
' Ricouer, Paul, The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination and Feeling'. Critical Inquiry, Autumn, 1978, vol. 5, no. 1, 
pp. 143159 
50 Ricouer, The Rule of Metaphor, p. 208 
s' Ibid., p. 305 
52 Ibid., p. 271 
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being transcendent, can completely pervade an image and present `an experience that is completely 
immanent to it'. B The important difference is that an image is not required to make verbal meaning 
- an obvious difference, but perhaps one that is overlooked when interpreting visual work. The 
photograph, because it is non-verbal, can more easily express at a fluid, conceptual level that can 
resonate, if it is allowed to, interminably. 
Ricoeur stresses the tension at the intersection between literal and metaphoric interpretations 
(between the mundanity of life in the kitchen and the transcendence of life after death). Metaphoric 
interaction begins when an expression exceeds the capacity of language to express it and which can 
be explained by a reference to `primordial truths', metaphysical transcendence or by imagination, 
`the vivifying principle'. Ricoeur rejects both extreme semantic analysis, which dismisses 
ontological explanations of poetic expression and a highly spiritual `meta-poetics', and forefronts 
the imaginative force of conceptual thought as an alternative. He proposes the recognition of 
expression that allows a `pre-objective world' ' and identifies the place of power that animates 
thought as existing in the `paradox of copula'; the contradiction of `is / is not' that metaphor 
necessarily inhabits. A contradictory statement that simultaneously indicates both a resemblance 
(is), and the incongruity of its absurdity and `unreality' (is not), requires a concept of `truth' other 
than that of `truth-verification'. 55 Thus Ricouer's analysis brings together Black's `interaction' and 
Lakoff's `conceptual system', in bridging the structural and the emotional, the pre-linguistic and 
the rational, the imagination and the metaphysical in a `poetic reality'. His analysis is one that 
would support the origin of metaphor as pre-linguistic and suggests an alternative to seeing value 
only in definitive facts, things, places and more in terms of `seeing things as actions', process and 
event. ' Thus `what does it mean? ' becomes `what is happening? ' His discussion suggests the 
power to represent a `polysemy of being' in a `state of activity'S7 and introduces the notion of the 
metaphor as a `condition of possibility'. ' 
The underlying assumption in much of the discussion of metaphoric function appears to have been 
that literal statements are true and metaphorical assertions are not. Lakoff, Black and Ricoeur 
suggest that the `truth' of metaphoric implication or `how things are' S9, is where `truth' is not 
allied to fact necessarily, but to meaning and validity. Once the notion of `truth' comes into play, 
the agenda is bound to approach something more metaphysical. Lakoff contends that mental 
constructs are in themselves metaphoric and whether one follows the argument that conceptual 
Ibid., p. 271 
Ibid., p. 306 
Ibid., p. 305 
Ibid., p. 308 
Ricoeur cites Aristotle p. 307 
Ibid., p. 287 
Black, Metaphor and Thought, p. 38 
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metaphors define an outlook on truth and reality, and thus are metaphysical, they non-the-less 
readjust the hierarchy of the metaphoric function of constructive thought in relation to language. 
The distinction between literal and non-literal discourse... rests on the relation between what is 
said and what is meant. In literal utterances this relation is one of consonance: the implied 
meanings are consistent with the sentence meaning though they may range far afield from the 
actual statement. In non-literal utterances the relation is one of dissonance. 60 
The `is/is not' of Ricoeur's `poetic reality', sans and parergon confirm the positive necessity for 
lack and absence. The sans confronts the peculiar condition of the photograph, which 
simultaneously presents the opposition of truth and falsehood, as it invites both literal (due to its 
visual reference to things) and a figurative resonance (due to the power of metonymy) and the 
expectation of pictures as possibly fictional. In the contemporary context, we may now always 
expect fiction. Instead of constructing an interpretation that conforms to conditions in the actual 
world, we may suspend this reference to a certain extent, or construct one that conforms to the 
image, look for what it says about the world or `project ourselves into a metaphoric world'61 where 
anything is believable. The concept of the non-literal in photography is always difficult because 
we see the literal reference. The very literalness of Strba's images for example, imply a multitude 
of meanings other than the literal. Conceptual associations such as `Sonja likes to drink waten 
water is life-giving> she is thirsty > she is needy' occur whilst the content remains ultimately 
banal. In literal images the author means what is there and in addition promises `something else'. 
Non-literal photographs (Savadov) relate directly to authorial intention, and their appearance may 
be intentionally at odds with an aspect of meaning, as they may deliberately not mean what they 
say, and may be ironic or critical. Metaphor and irony have the common structure based on an 
opposition to the factual level: `what the speaker says is intentionally at odds with the way the 
speaker knows the world to be. ' What the photograph says may be different from what it depicts 
literally, but it is the relationship between what is presented and what is believed and meant that 
divides metaphor from irony. With irony the relation between what is said and what is meant is one 
of opposition. Metaphor can show something in a new light and irony comments, but can be deeply 
embedded. Strba's Shades of Time is metaphoric but not ironic. Andreas Gursky's `world' is both 
metaphoric and ironic. 
Derrida confirms the link between metaphor and metaphysics: `Only man imitates properly, takes 
pleasure in imitating. The power of truth, as the unveiling of nature (physis) by mimesis, 
congenitally belongs to the physics of man ... Such 
is the natural origin of poetry, and such is the 
60 Winner, Ellen and Howard Gardner, 'Metaphor and Irony', Metaphor and Thought, p. 425 
61 Levin, Samuel R., 'Language, Concepts and Worlds', Metaphor and Thought, p. 127 
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natural origin of metaphor. '62 Mimesis is never without a property of similarity, resemblance, either 
one of physicality or of function. Metaphor depends on resemblance in some way and works from 
the premise of exchange, which requires some shared similarity, for it to work. A photograph is 
mimesis. A photograph is metaphor or at least metonym. A photograph of a glass refers to the 
concept `glass' and in this respect is the equivalent to the word `glass' and is its metonymic visual 
equivalent, but it does not require further words to provoke metaphoric association. Additional 
contextual knowledge may be needed for personal and particular significance (punctum) and 
ideological` or historical knowledge may be required for certain meanings. However, in an image 
one cannot absolutely identify where meaning sits. So one might say there are metaphoric images 
where one can share possible meanings and others where the significance is pertinent on a personal 
level, where secret knowledge supplements meaning. The photograph essentially is self-contained 
in the sense that, like parergon, visual metaphor is not detachable, is indispensable to the meaning 
and its absolute inseparability from the object depicted. 
There are two consequences relevant to photography. As with the supplement, one is the 
dependence on what is absent to generate meaning and, as a result, the nearness of the play of 
metaphor to the `transcendental sphere' and the ineffable. The other is the level of deep 
embeddedness of metaphor within any ideological system (e. g. photographic practice). Derrida's 
example of the generic metaphor `sun', in its embodiment of the metaphysics of light and dark, 
exemplifies both of these. He discusses the heliotropic metaphor in the language of philosophy, as 
`the very opposition of appearing and disappearing, the entire lexicon of aletheia... of day and 
night, of the visible and the invisible, of present and absent - all this possible only under the sun', ` 
as illustrating meaning that is both sensory and that is exceeded by improper knowledge, and 
meaning that is non-sensory. In terms of effect, the metaphoric process, and as we have seen, the 
photograph itself, makes manifest metaphysical oppositional expressions such as absence, sense 
and nonsense. It is a means of approaching what is ungraspable65 and intangible. In this regard, 
Derrida notes the characteristic assumptions of access to opposite effect, via the properties within 
metaphor, of loss, of the unattainable, the ineffable and in that loss lies the promise of more than is 
given. ' 
What is emerging is a premise that asserts the notion of conceptual schema as a figurative space, 
which provides a fluid framework for the set of concepts provoked by the photograph, the ineffable 
and resonance. Indeed resonance may depend on the fundamental generic degree of the conceptual 
62 Derrida, Jacques, 'The Ellipsis of the Sun: Enigmatic, Incomprehensible, Ungraspable'. In Margins of Philosophy, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1982. First published in French 1972. In the book as a whole he works with reference to the writings of Hegel, 
Heidegger, Aristotle and Nietzsche. p. 237 
° As in Michael Craig-Martin's An Oak Tree, 1973. 
64 Derrida, 'The Ellipsis of the Sun', p. 251 
Ibid., p. 244 
I Jeffrey, Ian, 'Fragment and Totality in Photography'. History of Photography, Volume 16, No. 4, Winter, 1992, pp. 351-357: 
comments on Derridä s refusal to collate fragments. 
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transference from one domain to another, the degree of `implicative elaboration' or the degree of 
reference it encompasses. At the very least, resonance does not derive from that which contains and 
organises factually, sequentially or historically and so denies an interpretation leaning toward 
narrative. The `metaphotographic'67 acknowledges psychology and emotive factors and the role of 
concept as pre-linguistic and central to the dynamics of meaning and possibility. Ricoeur's `poetic 
reality' of metaphoric `interaction' makes `sense' of self-contradiction, simultaneity and non-sense 
of the need for narrative. It suggests instead moves from the diachronic (historic development) and 
diegetic (narration of facts) toward the dialogic of exchange and process, a stage before definition 
or resolution. It suggests moves to support abstract meaning and the logic of absurdity via 
contradictory and simultaneous meaning - the antithesis of narrative. 
Bal's image analysis incorporates both Derrida's dissemination and Kristeva's dialogism, inserts 
context, history and `localized contingent speech', ` emphasises recipricocity between the viewer 
and the picture resituated within the viewer's space, and importantly points to the conflation of 
narrator and author that exists in visual critique. Bal's readings start with the margins of detail 
rather than general overview and go some way to affirm the non-logical aspects of `polysemia' and 
to demonstrate a reading that uses visual and discursive elements. 69 However, Bal `s reference to 
`pure visuality'7° perpetuates an interpretation of meaning as implicitly verbal and assumes that, in 
its stillness, the image cannot speak sufficiently without the literal animation of narrative. Whereas 
Ware's position" states that photography's visuality, without verbal assistance, can close `the gap 
between the actual image and the mental image we form from it'. Thus a photograph makes 
connections more quickly from the object to our own interpretative mechanisms and set of 
conceptual frameworks - moves quickly to metaphoric relations. And Derrida's procedure of 
perquisition accesses strategies for thinking within the text against logic, playing with subjectivity, 
irony, `reality' and arrives at a process that is contra-linguistic. Dialogism is a different sort of 
`narration' (not narrative) that transgresses rules, structurally and socially. It relies on another 
logic, 72 of `distance and relationship' between different elements within the structure that indicate 
`a becoming' as opposed to `continuity and substance' and `thing'. It is a `logic of analogy and 
nonexclusive opposition' as opposed to one of causality and diachronic linearity. It is a `logic' of 
the 'transfinite' rather than the definite. Grammatical functions serve to facilitate an understanding 
of opposing concepts again, the assertion of process and spatialisation (verbal) rather than 
containment and object (noun). It returns us to the strategy of differance, that of temporal 
deferment and process together with spatial difference, without finitude. 
6' Derrida, Right of Inspection. p. 73 
68 Kristeva, 'How Does One Speak To Literature', Desire in Language, p. 115 
69 Bal, Looking In, p. 78: 'Dissemination has now even affected the classic distinction between the visual and the discursive. ' 
'° Bal, Looking In, p 69 
" Ware, Robert, 'Walker Evans, Impersonality and Metaphor', History of Photography, Vol. 17, No. 2, Summer 1993, p. 199 
72 Kristeva, "Word, Dialogue and Novel', Desire in Language, p. 71 
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There are then alternative dynamics to those that more `naturally' construct narrative. Photographic 
potency resides in the possibility of metonymy and the imaginary as opposed to elements of 
meaning confirming effective expression or causal effect; this happens and then this happens etc. 
Photographs are still and their potency resides in simultaneity. In a desire to find reasons, logic 
carries us away in readings that establish causal narrative interpretation at the expense of Barthes' 
`discursive function', which encourages delay, reflection and interaction. If instead we were to look 
at photographs in the way of dreams rather than `reality' defined by the informational and 
authorial, a photograph need have no requisite conclusion or consequence and all elements could 
be `dilatory'. 73 Barthes proposes a realism not restricted to verifiable truth, that asserts functions 
that work simultaneously with the urge to make stories and prior to the urge to explain or impose 
chronology and supposition. It is these possibilities that I pursue in Part Three. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In Part Two I establish the conceptual space of the photograph and locate aspects of poststructural 
thinking in specific examples of photographic practice, such as the delicate balance of meaning 
provoked in the simplest of images (Sonja). I assert the conceptual dimension to photographs over 
that of mimesis and the dominance of `thing', and offer alternative readings to those of narrative 
and transcendence. If there is a parallel with linguistic terms, it is seen to be that of `fiction' in the 
broadest sense. I collate writings that explain the ineffable in images and draw parallels between 
the different terminologies. The assertion of process established in relationships and individuation 
identified in Part One, is echoed here in systems of meaning reliant on a pre-linguistic process that 
incorporates other senses than the visual. For example, Kristeva's emphasis of intonation over 
literal substance is confirmed by Derrida's questioning of `thingness of thing' and his assertion of 
`hallucinatory metonym'. Levinas's compulsion toward more dangerous territory is seconded by 
Barthes's pure meaning and Ricoeur's `pre-objective' reality. Sartre's `order of qualities', 
Kristeva's semiotic dynamic and Levinas's conceptual space of `face' are paralleled by metaphoric 
mechanisms and the rhetorical manner of emergent meaning in Lakoff's `conceptual schema'. 
Importantly differance demonstrates a conceptual and fluid system that can encompass a range of 
ideas, and which provokes fundamental shifts in their apprehension. Differance indicates a 
dimension of meaning that is non-literal, equates with what generates meaning but cannot be 
described, and thus with the ineffable. The role of particular and insignificant detail is highlighted 
as an essential dynamic, without which the work is mechanical. It is seen as a powerful element of 
Derrida's dissemination and an alternative to the totalising compulsion to find `universal' meaning. 
Thus I forefront the non-literal aspects of meaning, which exploit `integrational' effect and begin to 
identify different conceptions of `realism' besides the reference to objects. I emphasise the 
73 Barthes, 'The Reality Effect', pp. 12-13 
162 
rhetorical manner of meaning that emerges through process and the implications of the photograph 
that access realities of subjective thought and of conceptual association. 
I establish the key term `resonance' and provide a context for quality without beauty, which begins 
to articulate an aesthetic that can accommodate purposelessness, happenstance and contradiction. I 
establish a premise of instability that promotes illogic, non-knowledge and absence as key 
properties, substantiated from a number of perspectives and the metaphoric process. I assert as 
positive the reverberation of nascent possibility in the photographic properties of non-oppositional 
simultaneous process and incompleteness, which inject figural dimensions to reference that cannot 
equate with anything that can be verified. The distinction between potency and efficacy clarifies 
much of the confusion surrounding the affect of images and realigns the assumption of cause and 
effect. Derrida's questioning of certainty, the decentring of meaning and of authorship, the 
suspension of equations of `content' with story or meaning with `purpose', Ricoeur's realignment 
of meaning and truth are some of the many disturbances that impact on conceptions of `portrait'. 
Part Three demonstrates contemporary depictions of people relying on strategies that accommodate 
these conditions. 
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PART THREE: CONTEMPORARY POSITIONS 
Introduction 
In a lecture presenting his essay `Restitutions'' concerning Heidegger's examination of Van 
Gogh's shoes, Derrida emphasises the voice that interrupts more formal discourse in a manner that 
recalls the `intrinsic multiplicity' of voices related in Part One. In this instance an hysterical and 
exasperated woman figure (another voice of Derrida) insistently interrupts `What pair? T 'Who said 
they were a pair of shoes? ' He thus questions the dependence firstly on our insistence on `subject 
matter' or of what the image is `about' and proceeds to explore alternatives, (as in perquisition). 
Part Three pursues alternatives to an aesthetic that perpetuates `subject matter'. Having established 
the fundamental premise of differance as asserting a figural understanding, and assigning a 
contemporary relevance to rhetorical expression, Part Three examines what this `expression' might 
be and positions theory in relation to a developing aesthetic that demonstrates poststructural 
thinking. Continuing to evidence the dynamics identified in previous chapters, Part Three serves to 
collate concepts of the encounter and process with authorship, systems of meaning with changing 
notions of `reality' and principles motivating aesthetics. I consider changes in aesthetic 
consciousness affected by attitudes to a world influenced by poststructural processes. 
Firstly I use Levinas's provocations to consider the role of absence in the process of meaning and 
to initiate consideration of how practice is located in relation to `reality' or Baudrillard's `irreality'. 
Secondly with reference to Kristeva' s principle of negativity as one explanation of motivation, I 
consider the more obscure and uncomfortable aspects of aesthetics that accommodate instability, 
incompleteness, the centrality of absence and which unite visceral response with conceptual 
configuration. 
Looking at the contemporary `portrait', I consider directions in aesthetics that counter comfortable 
expectations and discuss how practice widens the parameters of discourse. I focus in particular on 
the strategies adopted by photographers that highlight features, such as the ordinary and the banal, 
which reoccur throughout the thesis and which articulate a pattern of concern. Concerns for 
example that demonstrate the distrust of allusions to `truth' `essence' `certainty' and which are 
shown to focus and motivate photographic strategies. I appraise contemporary practice in the light 
of Jean-Francois Lyotard's `postmodern', Jeff Wall's `photoconceptualism' and reviews of 
postmodern practice, and situate directions in portrayal in relation to a wider aesthetic context. 
Finally I consider the equations of aesthetics with visuality and realism with the literal, I re-assert 
the conceptual and figural dimensions and indicate alternative directions for portrayal. I consider 
' Cited by Rosalind Krauss, `Poststructuralism and the "Paraliterary"', October, No. 13, Summer 1980 and reproduced in Krauss, R., The 
Originality of the Avant Garde and Other Modernist Myths, Cambridge, Mass. ; London: MIT Press, 1985 
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how the `ineffable' might be reconfigured in the light of poststructuralism and contemporary 
practice. 
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Chapter One: ABSENCE AND SHADOW 
ABSENCE OF THING 
Can one speak of a disengagement on the hither side of an interruption of time by a movement 
going on the hither side of time, in its `interstices'? To go beyond is to communicate with ideas, 
to understand. Does not the function of art lie in not understanding? Does not obscurity provide 
it with its very element... foreign to dialectics and the life of ideas? Will we then say that the 
artist knows and expresses the very obscurity of the real? But that leads to much more general 
question.. . in what does the non-truth of being consist? Is it always to be defined by comparison 
with truth, as what is left over after understanding? Does not the commerce with the obscure, as 
a totally independent ontological event, describe categories irreducible to those of cognition? 
We should like to show this event in art. Art does not know a particular type of reality; it 
contrasts with knowledge. It is the very event of obscuring, a descent of the night, an invasion of 
the shadow.. . art does not belong to the order of revelation. Nor does it belong to that of 
creation, which moves in just the opposite direction. ' 
Levinas's brief passage Reality and its Shadow, 3 provides an interesting link between art, the 
ineffable and the semiotic and serves to collate a number of themes in relation to writings discussed 
earlier. His use of terminology, such as interstices, ineffable, rhythm, within, the real, resounds 
uncannily with a series of conceptual associations central to this thesis such as the interruptive 
process, the in between, resonance, participatory constructions of meaning , non-effective meaning 
and affectivity. He underlines two premises: firstly, conceptions of reading photographs that 
disrupt the author/viewer divide, echoing Kristeva, and secondly the interrelation of meaning with 
reality, anticipating the consequences of its dislocation. This passage introduces the main points for 
discussion in Part Three: conceptions of reality and photographic practice, conceptual domains of 
the photograph and the intersection of the ineffable and differance. 
Levinas's use of the term `interstices' to encompass the disturbance of the norm, anticipates 
Derrida's discussion in `Parergon'. Together, the two texts demonstrate the arbitrariness of 
oppositional paradigms whereby Levinas's terms within and in-between parallel Derrida's terms 
outside and inside, which are literally in opposition, but which figuratively describe the same 
uncomfortable, liminal position of uncertainty and the ineffable. Recalling for example Sartre's 
`affective sense' and assuming Derrida's assertion of `lack', Levinas's logic confirms an alternative 
apprehension of photographs that relies on the sensible and imaginary rather than knowledge and 
an explanation for meaning firmly situated in conceptual domains besides the reference. Levinas's 
simplistic statements of the obvious such as perceived elements are not the object but like its `old 
2 Levinas, Emmanuel, 'Reality and its Shadow', in Collected Philosophical Papers (1948), trans. Alphonso Lingis, Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1983, p. 3 
3Ibid., p. 1 
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garments', and `a represented object, by the simple fact of becoming an image, is converted into a 
non-object', ' recognise the string of assumptions so easily subsumed within the logic of referent = 
absent object = meaning. He underlines two fundamental properties of the photograph central to 
my argument; firstly, the importance of absence and the consequent active process of involvement 
in understanding, and secondly, his notion of `rhythm' (or resonance) that differentiates meaning, 
not as a `some-thing', but as a manner of meaning that is `detached from an object', the emphasis 
being on affect rather than what it is. 
The condition of `non-object', initiated by the principle of substitution of image for absent object, 
in turn affects a fundamental, perceptual shift from direct engagement with things, to what Levinas 
calls `sensations'. The resemblance of a photograph (like the object itself) imposes itself on us; 
invites a process of action and interaction, association and reverberation. But because visual 
meaning (unlike a symbol or word), does not stop with the reference to concept alone and 
continues to reverberates beyond resemblance to the object referred to, the process becomes a kind 
of doubling of reality which separates us and creates a fissure, a `meanwhile'. He thus establishes 
resonant meaning as residing, not in transcendence, but in our reading - in our own reality. 
His metaphoric use of `shadow' indicates `resemblance' as belonging to, but not grasping the 
original and as neutralising the object it represents, placing it alongside the object as its shadow. 
This logic of resemblance as shadow, as opaque, is allied to the notion of large generic models of 
metaphor, as with `life is a journey'. In this scenario, a different conception of resemblance, unlike 
that of `realism', converses with `reality', this time as an allegory, as `an ambiguous commerce 
with reality in which reality does not refer to itself but to its reflection, its shadow. ' He asks in what 
sense is the imaginary world more unreal than the empirical one? Where and what is the `sensation' 
of the image and how is it different from the perception of the original object? Rather than `reality' 
being represented by resemblance, Levinas asserts that the image accompanies `reality', giving 
direct access to the imaginary without the need for intervention of words. This places a 
representation of `reality' alongside itself, rather than as `reality' behind appearance. In disturbing 
the duality of appearance and reality, he disturbs also the conception of `being and essence' and 
creates a `fissure' between them. Thus Levinas, instead of finding the place of real meaning in 
transcendence, places it firmly on this side of the object, beside me and not in the repository of 
`beyond', but in my reality as viewer, as I move towards it. So that a photograph, as Levinas 
implies, cannot and need not transcend `reality' or seek universal significance, as modernist 
photography has assumed. This reverberation of resemblance is another model of Sartre's 
affectivity where the imaginary, association and projection become a reality that incorporates the 
I Ibid., p. 5 
5 Ware, Robert, 'Walker Evans, Impersonality and Metaphor', History of Photography, Vol. 17, No. 2, Summer 1993, pp. 147-151 
6 Levinas, 'Reality and its Shadow', p. 6 and see Levinas 'becoming' in Part Two 
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`paradox of rhythm and dreams' with interpretation, so that the subject becomes part of the same 
world, `is exterior to itself, but with an exteriority which is not that of the body'', but of the 
imagination. So that in this, another version of the dialogical matrix, the photographer, the subject 
and the viewer all participate in the photographic event. 
Levinas `non-object' echoes Derrida's refutation of the fixation of `thing', denying Heidegger's 
`thingness' and preferring the move toward absence/lack. His metaphor `shadow' is a reflection, 
both in the sense of its mirror image, and in the sense of association or contemplation. It functions 
in a similar way to Derrida's written neologism differance, to keep meaning moving, re-sounding 
reality, rather than reproducing it, negating the sequential logic of one point following another, and 
in its place asserting a procedure between activity and passivity. More traditionally `reality' is most 
dependable and comfortable when confirming a diachronic progression through time and when 
locating cause and effect. The principles found in both Levinas's and Derrida's theses shift the 
manner of understanding from sequence and chronology toward a conceptual framework and 
indicates an alternative grasp of `reality', of the world of ideas rather than `things'. The importance 
of the simple fact of simultaneity and absence of `real' object, inherent in photographic property, 
necessitates an equality of oppositional presentation and the power of 'polysemia'. 
Reality and its Shadow introduces the idea of art's function to obscure and succumb to the figural 
rather than to clarify. Levinas's speculation about `artistic expression' connects a number of the 
aspects addressed in Part Two and indicates much of what I argue in this section as conceptually 
ungraspable. Fundamentally it is his implicit interest in the possibilities dormant in not 
understanding artworks; what is non-literal; a kind of non-aesthetic, which lies both at the heart of 
this text and my thesis. He asks what is real? Where is the meaning? Is there `eternal' significance? 
If we put aside Levinas's assertion that artists `know and express the very obscurity of the real', 
what he says about its position interprets intuitively a good deal of later debate concerning the 
`real'. He disturbs assumptions that concern what is `true' and `real' and states a paradoxical 
position whereby `art' interrupts `reality' and moves against established aesthetics. The function of 
`art' is not to communicate, not to be understood, not to create, but to obscure and present a non- 
truth; something that disengages or disturbs the approach to an answer, which is nearer to what is 
`real'. It does not have to reveal, expose or enlighten or to aspire to `truth' or `realism' and can 
embrace instead those elements that are not understood. This is a very different sort of `reality', to 
that of the empirical world, one in its shadow that moves away from definition, where the literal 
succumbs to the figural. 
' Levinas, 'Reality and its Shadow', p. 4 
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BAUDRILLARD'S `IRREAL' WORLD AND THE PHOTOGRAPH 
The assumption that `the aesthetic potential of photography resides in the revelation of the real'8 
determines subsequent critique and practice and Levinas identifies the problem of aesthetics as 
depending on what is meant by the use of the word `real' and the confusion between `reality' and 
`realism', paralleling Goodman's distinction between representation and resemblance and Barthes's 
in Reality Effect. His use of the word `real' appears to refer to what is either imagination or before 
language (more akin to Lacan's real that resists the symbolic). His condition of `non-object' 
underlines the fundamental significance and effect on our engagement with the `real world' as 
being detached, and anticipates many of the ideas embraced by, for example, Vilem Flusser's 
`dislocated world'. ' His description of image, non-object and reality heralds Baudrillard's 
questioning of subject over object in `disappearance' in the way he intimates the possibility of 
detaching a photographic image from its object, of breaking down the mind/body divide, where the 
clear division of `I' (mind) becomes part of the world (body) in spectatorship, beginning to 
`disappear'. As we saw in `SUBJECTS LAST ADVENTURE', Baudrillard suggests that by 
displacing the photographer as subject, photography can have a dimension of the `real' that escapes 
the complication of 'representation' and thus can get nearer to producing no meaning at all. 
Ironically our understanding of the world, mediated by photographs, reflects a consciousness that 
has assimilated the inauthenticity of `reality'. Baudrillard's discussion of representation and 
simulacra, expounds the suggestion of re-seeing as a consequence of the photograph and concludes 
that we can no longer distinguish between real and imaginary, original and copy, surface and depth 
and that reality is constructed by the image, in a `panic stricken production of the real'. '° 
Baudrillard speaks of an order of hyperreality, which disrupts the world of simple meaningful 
communication and abolishes discourse focused on `the play of real and appearance. '" 
`Hyperreality' and `aesthetic illusion"' reposition photographs as equivocal documents rather than 
a reflection of reality. He assumes that the real is lost (is its own `shadow') and identifies a series of 
conditions that increasingly remove us from the original interaction with the object (Levinas's 
`meanwhile'). His notion of `successive phases of the image' identifies the first, as the reflection of 
a basic reality, the second, as masking and perverting a basic reality, the third, as masking the 
absence of a basic reality and the fourth, as `bearing no relation to any reality at all,. 13 The tradition 
of modernist photography could be said to equate with Baudrillard's first phase, of reflection, with 
8 Bazin, Andre, `The Ontology of the Photographic Image'(1967). In Trachtenberg, Alan (ed. ), Classic Essays on Photography. New 
Haven: Leete's Island Books, 1980 
9Flusser, Vilem, Towards a Philosophy of Photography (1983). London: Reaktion Books, 2000. p. 17 
'o Baudril lard, Jean, Simulations, trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton and Philip Beitchman, New, York: Semiotext [e], 1983, p. 13 
11 Gane citing Simulations p. 123 in Gane. Nlike, Baudrillard's Bestiary, Baudrillard and Culture. London and New York: Routledge, 
1991, p. 99 
12 Baudrillard, Jean, `Objects, Images and the Possibilities of Aesthetic Illusion'. In Zurbrugg, Nicholas (ed. ) Art & Artefact, , 
London: 
Sage Publications, 1997, pp. 7-18 
13 Baudri l lard, Simulations, p. 11 
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the additional requirement that a `good photograph' must reveal a more meaningful `real' behind 
appearance, transcending the real. 
Do photographs ever capture any reality? Between reality and its image, exchange is 
impossible. There is at best a figurative correlation. `Pure' reality, if it exists remains a question 
without an answer. '4 
In his writing on photography specifically, Baudrillard proposes an un-definition of what is `real'. 's 
He describes photography as `irreal', empty, a kind of untruth, an absence, a toppling over into the 
un-real. This term `irreal' embodies many of the conditions in which photographic practice 
participates, described in this thesis. It encompasses the instability of reality and certainty, 
questions our attitude to the `subject', challenges what seems `obvious' and natural' and promotes 
a fundamental shift in consciousness. Baudrillard sees banality16 as the inevitable consequence of 
our belief and reliance on representation and verisimilitude, where the photograph, aware of its 
own deceit, and self-conscious in its fabrication, absorbs the consequences of cause and effect and 
creates an `implosion of meaning. ' Echoing Levinas as he does so often, his critique of our 
acceptance of the `referent' as `real' in its absence, where we are expected `to glide in a kind of 
frictionless space from the perceptual to the conceptual, '" parallels description of the photographic 
contradiction that leaves us believing in what is not there. His argument comes to rest in his 
reference to Barthes's punctum: `that figure of nothingness, absence and unreality which stands 
opposed to the "studium", the whole context of meaning and references. It is the nothingness at the 
heart of the image which lends it its magic and its power and which is most driven out by 
significations. ' 18 
Again like Levinas, instead of `treating' the world and others as `objects', he focuses on 
`exhuming' the alterity, amplifying the difference that makes it `other', exactly that which alienates 
us. Baudrillard's discussion fundamentally concerns what he calls the `symbolic process' as a 
radical alternative to the concept of sign and signification. Baudrillard is concerned that `no 
adequate analysis of systems of representation can, simply, refer to the `real' world (the referent) as 
if this was unproblematic... What tends to happen is that in each phase of representation a former 
dominant conception of the `real' is taken as a reference model of `current' reality, always already 
out of date. "9 His notion of `the symbolic is neither a concept, nor an instance or category, nor a 
14 Baudrillard, Jean, 'Poetic Transference of Situation' in L' Autre, London: Phaidon, 1999, unpaginated 
's Baudril lard, Jean, `The Art of Disappearance' in Art & Artefact, pp. 28-31 
16 Baudtillard, Jean, `For Illusion isn't the Opposite of Reality... ' in Wiebel, Peter (ed. ) Photographies 1985-1998 Within the Horizon of 
the Object, Objects in this Mirror are Closer than they Appear, Hatje-Cantz Publishers, 1999, p. 140 
"Baudrillard, 'For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign' (1972). St Louis: Telos, 1981, cited in Gane, Baudrillard's Bestiary, 
p. 3 
'8 Baudrillard, 'For Illusion isn't the Opposite of Reality... ', p. 139 
19 Gane, Baudrillard's Bestiary, p. 95 
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`structure', but an act of exchange and a social relation which puts an end to the real, which 
resolves the real, and in the same stroke the opposition between the real and the imaginary"' 
The function of absence in photographic texts confirms dependence on reference to the absent 
object by unavoidably `seeing' photographs as transparent. In attacking the easy shifting between 
reality and sign as if they were the same and the assumption that things are logically related to one 
another, photographic practice is able to disturb and threaten a number of the `rules' of certainty, 
which photographic properties confirm. Given that photography confirms `seeing' as being 
intrinsic to our understanding of reality, it is its own contradiction in that it must always, by its very 
nature, reflect appearance. Its counterpart the `real' behind appearance is central to the irony of the 
photograph and meaning, and the equivocal role of photographs is key in the evolution of aesthetic 
strategy. With this propensity to reference what is absent as well as what is present, photographic 
texts can play with this riddle of absence. What is directly referenced is deferred, displaced and 
repositioned as possibly irrelevant or meaningless, echoing Barthes's distinction between 
meaninglessly effective and ineffectively meaningful. 
THE EXTRA-ORDINARY 
l> 
Fig. 53 Nick Waplington, from Indecisive Memento, 1998 
In the current climate of self-conscious cultural awareness, an aesthetic has arisen, which assumes 
methods that divert interaction and expression in hiding, or even averting the eyes whilst taking the 
photograph (Baudrillard's `disappearance'). Distrust of authorship and authenticity generates 
anxiety and ambivalence and encourages an abdication of authorial responsibility, an undercurrent 
of denial, an implicit trait of avoidance, resulting in an aesthetic of `without', as a subtle parallel to 
Derrida's sans. No underlying truth or essence, no ultimate description, no definitive image, no 
`moment', is seen to be celebrated in such documents as Nick Waplington's Indecisive Memento, 
21 
20 Baudrillard, L'Exchange Symbolic et la Mort, Paris: Gallimard cited in Gane, Baudrillard's Bestiary, p. 2 
21 Waplington, Nick, Indecisive Memento, London: Booth Clibborn Editions, 1998 
171 
which exploits the use of series and displays an imperative to avoid direction and definition - 
typical characteristics of Derridean texts interrupting and subverting traditional forms with 
interference and obscuration. Liberated from an expectation of representation, denotation is 
paradoxically used in a way that is a form of abstraction, a kind of non-representation developed 
through the play of avoidance. A common feature of much contemporary practice is one that makes 
no comment or any point at all and presents deliberate images of the very ordinary and very 
familiar. Here I discuss this effect in the work of Strba and Lundin, this time with regard to the 
particular and irrelevant and Beat Streuli and Philip-Lorca di Corcia via the anonymity of the street 
and the use of happenstance. As instances of the denial of anything special, these images exploit 
non-eventful depiction. 
Fig. 54 Ulf Lundin, Pictures 
of a Family series, 1996 
Both Lundin's Pictures of a Family, spying on a family, " and Strba's Shades of Time give us 
visions of family life in parenthesis, Lundin's via avoidance and Strba's via intimacy. We associate 
photographs of family with event and interaction and thus of relationships, but Lundin's images 
document the non-event; they highlight relationships by showing us the lack of interaction. They 
focus on remnants, what is normally left over and discarded, because the main subjects are 
obscured or blurred. They look sideways at a life, indicating what is incidental and ordinary, what 
is not said and what remains undefined. They are fragmentary in two respects, as they constitute 
pauses in the process of a distinct set of continuous lives and as partial glimpses of a whole. They 
are reposeful and yet there is usually something going on. The activity is steady and unremitting. 
They present us with physical obstruction and distancing devices: a lamp post vertically dissects 
the woman; the man appears to walk through a wall; a board shuts off his facial features; we see his 
body and head but not his eyes and mouth; something in the foreground slices diagonally across the 
top right hand corner of the image, obscuring his head. But a number of them together display a 
I The Pictures of a Family series, 1996 records a family over the period of a year. Lundin makes a contract with an old school friend 
that allows him to photograph them at any time as long as they do not know he is there. 
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rhythm, a gentleness and the methodical logic of day-to-day activity, which forms an emergence of 
the life of an individual. Lundin deliberately obscures `reality' and provides us with a suspension of 
vision and judgement or involvement. He places our response at a remove, creating a situation 
where the vision is oblique, indirect and impeded. 
As Strba's Shades of Time assumes such an easy appropriation of the snapshot as valid portrayal, 
one might say `but what is the point or how are they significant? ' Their distinctive qualities reside 
in the fact that they are not in themselves special; they highlight the non-speciality of domestic life 
and of relationships. Because they are so familiar, so ordinary they are recognisable and because 
these images do not isolate, determine one story alone or make any point whatever, they can 
perhaps reflect a more `normal' presentation of others. They are a simultaneous, collective telling 
of the eventless-ness of domestic life. The subjects are not elevated beyond the appearance of what 
is there; they are ordinariness in the extreme. But unlike the family album, Strba's subjects tend not 
to smile, are indeed often expressionless with studied seriousness and quiet concentration, not 
presented in the manner that normally displays `happy' moments. Strba presents a digressive 
sequence that does not conform to the logic of time or centrality; there is no sequential logic 
explaining behaviour, location or stories The emphasis is on descriptive aspects of Sonja rather 
than someone in a narrative. And Sonja, is diffused by the countless depictions of her through the 
years amidst the insistent inclusion of incidental detail and disarray, of bedding, cats, pots and 
pans, clothing. Strba's strategy of no authorial comment results in images that are reduced in 
obvious meaning whilst full of reference to the reality of the situation. The kitchen table presents 
neither aesthetic formality nor any obvious significance and any import of meaning is dependent on 
the viewer, as it is not shared explicitly and remains a secret between the photographer and subject. 
Such dialogic imagery is dependent on singular context, which approaches a sort of 
meaninglessness. The very incidental shots display successive focus of figure and ground as we 
spotlight every object in the image in turn, as each is of equal significance. The significance or 
`universality' of these images resides exactly in specific detail and ordinariness. They don't offer 
us any answers; they are not a substitute for experience and are bereft of a directed expression, 
dilemma or passion. If there is purpose, it is for the a-special moment, the retention of particularity, 
without irony or cute reference. Metaphoric reference is minimal or indistinguishable. 
Lundin and Strba both assume the validity of photographic series confirming its significance as a 
method of `realism', replacing the more definitive dualism of essential being and appearance with 
emphasis on a process where there is no ultimate end; where all one can find is a series of 
manifestations; where beings change and will present themselves differently at different times. By 
giving us the ordinary and refusing the extra-ordinary (literally outside the norm), their work gives 
us back what is potentially our own experience and undermines the presumption that the 
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photographer has something to say or must search for resolution and significance through a shared, 
greater meaning. These are more discursive, more overtly inter-subjective, unrehearsed, 
uncontrolled methods that lead us away from the presumption of `presence' to a more open field. 
Fig. 55 Beat Streuli, New 
York, 2000 
In contrast Streuli and Di Corcia exploit the blandness and arbitrariness of the crowd and present 
the ordinary as extra-ordinary in the sense of an excess. Both series depend on automation and 
chance in some way. Streuli' uses the preset determination of the long distance lens and diCorcia', 
with the use of a tripwire, involves the unwitting participation of those photographed. Both 
photographers present a highly edited selection from the great number of pictures taken and both 
appear to relinquish any attempt to elevate the implication of meaning beyond the very ordinary 
appearance of what is there. They too do not search, frame or construct by any direct intervention 
with the `subject'. This is ordinariness taken to an extreme; the ultimate in glorification of the 
ordinary; `elevations of the banal', 25 or sanctification by the spotlight in Di Corcia's case. Streuli 
presents us with what we may encounter everyday in every city, what we already know. His work 
has been variously described as `boring', 26 as `marvellous' , 
27 as not expressive and with `no 
existential note, no pain, no criticism, nor judgement'. 28 Streuli's approach is an extreme version of 
`straight' photography, or in his terms more `democratic'. His translation of a `feeling of reality', 29 
as opposed to the more usual direct translation, acknowledges implicitly the impossible project of 
depicting reality, while recognising our desire to be given the illusion of it. 
Di Corcia dramatises the banality of what we know, in his presentations of latent drama in the 
street. We don't have to have a `special eye' or an expressive vision to see (understand) what he 
23 For example, Portraits 98-00, La belle estate, Torino: Galleria Civica d'Arte Moderna e Contemporanea, 2000 
24 For example Streetwork series (1993-1997) and Heads series (2001) 
Pfab, Rupert, 'Photographs of Modem Life'. In City, Hatje-Cantz, 1999, pp. 23-29 
Imhof, Dora, Review in Kunstforum International, no. 148, December 1999 
Williams, Gilda, Art Monthly, no 210, October 1997 
28 Valtorta, Roberta, 'The Crowd as Body, The Silent Photography of Beat Streuli'. In Beat Streuli, Portraits 98-00, Torino: GAM - 
Galleria Civica d'Arte Moderna e Contemporanea, 2000, pp. 25-31 
29 Pace, Allessandra, Interview with Beat Streuli, in Beat Streuli, Portraits 98-00, pp. 115-119 
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wants us to see is there and in that respect his intention follows the tradition of inviting us to look 
more acutely via the photograph. However he uses his `vision' self consciously and strategically, 
careful to remove vestiges of interpretation. `The pictures are "non events" both because I see that 
as interesting and because I want to remove photography's biggest attraction - the offering of a 
second hand experience'. 30 The selection is both particularly bland and grandiose in contradiction. 
diCorcia's images in particular have become solid and separated from the background and appear 
unreal, 31 as cold isolations, which turn-to-object each highlighted individual. Perversely, the effect 
is of a super-reality, ultra-aliveness, whilst perpetually frozen. They spotlight individuals in the act 
of doing, rather than waiting or being reposeful, that suggests it is the act of process which sustains 
our interest. They are literally dramatic and have turned the ordinary into a theatre. 
Fig. 56 Philip-Lorca 
diCorcia, Naples, 1995 
Streuli's and di Corcia's work remains ambiguous. They make no comment, do not `document', do 
not engage with any moral concern or intention, do not actively `search for real faces'32 and neither 
do they present a taxonomical archive and yet ostensibly they present epic fables of the ordinary. 
These do not have that humanist intention pointing to the universality of Man, of explaining, of 
showing how we belong, nor do they easily access meaning in the way more introspective studies 
do, such as Delahaye's Subway and Evans's Metro series. It is hard to utilise these images as 
metaphors for our own states of being, as confirmation of our own existence, as they seem too 
bland for this. In consequence, they are not doing what `photographic vision' is supposed to do; 
they do not fulfil the desire for a new photographic vision. They are not violating ordinary vision 
but violating what is thought to be `photographic vision' and as such have invited responses for 
their amateurishness and indifference to photographic history ('but this is not photography! '33) The 
images are superficially unmediated and relinquish an overtly expressive use of the medium. The 
30 Di Corcia, Philip Lorca, Streetwork 1993-97. Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1998 
31 See for example Naples 1995, Tokyo 1994. Naples 1996 
32 Sontag, Susan, On Photography, Penguin, 1979, p. 104 
33 von Amelunxen, Hubertus, `Beat Christoph Streuli (II)'. European Photography 57, Spring/Summer 1995, pp. 55-58 
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work is `stripped', `reduced' and `in a sense free of the excesses of language'" or photographic 
heritage. Described as the work of `flaneurs''35 the term is implicitly critical for the lack of search 
and for its aimless purpose. But in avoiding the chase, there is still serious effort here; carefully 
prepared strategies that avoid interpretation and intent on achieving something by any means other 
than confrontation or posing. 
Figs. 57-58 Beat Streuli, 
New York, 2000 
It is the nature of all these images to present no more than what is there, little scope to render the 
subjects as anything beyond themselves, whether it be `mortality, vulnerability, mutability'. 36 They 
undermine the search for presence, significance or profundity through metaphoric reference. But 
despite the eschewal of the `captured' moment, despite a kind of metaphoric minimalism, as 
Derrida demonstrates, the `metaphotographic event'37 is impossible to avoid; what went before; 
what comes after; what is imagined; metaphor; metonym is held in each of these ordinary eventless 
moments. In reading these images, even the most simple statement such as `her right hand hovers 
over the glass' leads us elsewhere, to what has gone before, to our imagination, penetrating `the 
abyss of these metonymies'. 38 The viewer is thus assigned a speaking role that can speculate and 
position, where `there is reversibility, irreversibility, diachrony and simultaneity'. 39 Sonja's glass of 
water, whilst not significant in itself, even irrelevant, is integral to the import of the image as a 
whole, which would be meaningless without it. We compulsively project meaning and elements of 
such projection will thereby imply `essential features' that can be metaphorically applied to aspects 
of existence. There is plentiful discourse prompted by the work of Streuli and diCorcia, which 
confirms that this is the case. Bonami describes diCorcia's photographs as a vast `family album' 
that records the despair and disappointment of failure, as having the grandiose purpose of 
Valtorta, 'The Crowd as Body', p. 25 and recalls Sartre's `stripped' Being and Nothingness, p. xxxvin 
35 Dister, Alain, in L'Oeil (Lausanne Switzerland) no 498, July/Aug `98, pp. 54-57 
Sontag, On Photography, p. 14 
37 Derrida, Jacques, Right of Inspection. [Droh de Regards, 1985]. Trans. David Wills, Art & Text 32,1989, p. 73 
-'ibid., p. 70 
1 Ibid., p. 42 
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displaying American culture. i40 Danto, discussing Streuli's Oxford Street, Q' sees the work's 
subject as the `modality of being human in the world's cities' whilst Streuli's themes of 
`transitoriness and process' interrupt the flux and confront us with ourselves. 42 
So despite these contradictions, what is it in these images that I implicitly appreciate? They are 
minimally constructed, push the lack of significant content to the limit and are refreshing in that the 
metaphoric use is minimal. The `subjects' are not necessarily the focus. The incidental is allowed 
to reveal meaning without authorial assistance and if there is anything to be revealed, then it will be 
I who determines it. Presentation is simple, without reference to conditions such as `vulnerability'. 
They invite meaning without effort, are open, less determined and avoid cliche, due to lack of 
commentary, for a short time at least. For everything `becomes cliche' eventually, even this new 
unnew vision - as a device for making special something that is not special. Being suspicious of 
attempts to express or to insist on passion, what I appreciate about this work is that it allows room 
for reflection. This too can be seen to be another take on `disappearing as a subject', of disrupting 
the pose, allowing the subject to be and not forcing them to become something else -a hero, a role, 
an expectation, a pleasure. These photographs remind us that we know that photographs are not 
real and that we are not obliged to reveal the world as beautiful. On the edge of purpose and 
aimlessness, of objectification and control, communication and meaninglessness, the work 
confirms Baudrillard's project disturbing the control of the subject and Barthes's precipitous `pure 
meaning'. 
At the end of 20th century, this approach seems an obvious reaction to what has gone before; the 
concerns of expression and the moral obligation to reveal through the `art' of photography. a3 They 
40 Bonami, Francesco, 'Clean Clusters in a Shopping Mall'. Flash Art, no 183, Summer 1985, pp. 105-106 
4' Danto, Arthur C., 'Beat Streuli's Gesamtkunstwerk'. Parkett 54,1998/99, pp. 126-127 
42 Ammann, Jean-Christophe, 'Beat Christoph Streuli (1)'. European Photography, Spring 1995, pp. 51-52 
I Sontag, On Photography, p. 30 
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question their position as `good photographs', subverting, as they do, what this is expected to 
mean. But are they doing something different or are they merely `wrenching things from their 
context (to see them in a fresh way)', confirming what has long been held as photography's 
`commitment to pure seeing'? If there is a difference, it is that they do not overtly offer us an 
alternative view or any kind of subjective view. If these images are too ordinary to offer us any 
substitute for experience, what effect does this very ordinariness have on us? Can extreme banality 
and ordinariness be a metaphor for consciousness? Do they escape the ambition of transcendence 
evident in the likes of Steiglitz's Equivalents or do they land straight back in there? For how long, 
can this `ordinary', this new `straightness' avoid metaphor, nostalgia and triteness? Can we stay 
content with this ordinariness? 
APPEARANCE AND EXISTENTIAL INDIFFERENCE 
Fig. 59 Philip-Lorca diCorcia, 
New York, 1993 
In perception there is always the construction of a figure on a ground. No one object, no group 
of objects is especially designed to be organized as specifically ground or figure; all depends on 
the direction of my attention... Each element of the setting, a person, a table, a chair attempts to 
isolate itself, to lift itself upon the ground... I am witness to the successive disappearance of all 
the objects which I look at - in particular the face, which detain me for an instant. 
` 
Streuli's City and diCorcia's Streetwork series confront the phenomenon of our looking at and 
relating to others, present the opportunity to stare at our leisure45 and to indulge in a way that is 
normally forbidden; they encourage our fascination and voyeuristic nature. The effect, however, 
produces an indifference or separation, at least between the viewer and the `scene'. It questions the 
extent to which we can be interested beyond a conceptual appreciation of the cleverness of the 
construction; the extent to which we can care or become involved. We are fascinated, but they 
invoke the contradiction of compelling us to look, whilst remaining indifferent, as neither comment 
44 Sartre, Being and Nothingness (1943), trans. Hazel Barnes, London: Routledge, 2000 edition, pp. 9-10 
'S Wylie, Charles, 'Streets of Paradox'. Art on Paper, v3, no. 4, Mar/April, 99, pp. 43-45 
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nor expression is put before us. They invite reverie and speculation concerning a global condition, 
but not in terms of individual psychology; these images have entered a dreamlike world where no 
one has a face. The protagonists are visually held outside and beyond the natural world, within the 
photograph, where they highlight an active world, as all the subjects depicted are in the process of 
movement and doing and proceeding. As instances of inter-subjective activity, these images 
illustrate both the `world of objects', acted upon by the photographer, and the world of conscious 
and active subjects, `doing'. They are both. They are devoid of emotive relation, visually stunning, 
yet giving us no point of emotional contact. To make sense of them, we are compelled to objectify 
these other `someones'. ' They give us a world that is opaque, a world that has so much hidden 
from us, namely the psychological life of the protagonists. In literally spotlighting them, diCorcia 
illuminates them and obscures them. They are distant and removed from us, and leave us with no 
experience beyond marvelling at this other world, which happens to be identical with our own. 
They present, as far as is possible, `pure appearance', 47 in the sense that they exist for us only to the 
degree that they appear, indicating a lateral depth of meaning, but not giving us sufficient 
information to gain insight into what that might be. They present our own experience, of the street, 
and of our direct relation to the world and its appearance. 
We can equally well reject the dualism of appearance and essence. The appearance does not 
hide the essence, it reveals it; it is the essence. The essence of an existent ... is the succession of 
appearances. ' 
However, expecting the duality of appearance and essence, we are used to looking for the hidden 
reality assumed in the pursuit of `good' or more traditional photographic portraiture; the word 
`appearance' suggests the existence of something, which is not appearance, always something as 
well, behind the surface, so it carries with it an inherent negativity. In these photographs, `others' 
are revealed to us `in a succession of glimpses, shadings, profiles', not `exhausted by... 
appearances, which are infinite' They present us with no `beyond' to speak of, no clues but invite 
us to look at a series of appearance. Sartre relinquishes the idea of appearance hiding some thing 
else and states that there is no hidden interior or thing beyond the exterior to be found (no 
`presence'), that appearances are equal and none are privileged as more meaningful. 49 Appearance 
is all, subverting the desire to reveal the true nature behind the mask. Thus Baudrillard, echoing 
Sartre, proposes that we should seek the mask (the appearance) rather than anything else; but both 
projects, whether seeking what lies beneath the mask or denying its existence, acknowledge the 
duality of mask and something else. And a number of contemporary photographers work from this 
premise of the `appearance is all', present superficiality, banality, ordinariness and, as with 
46 Derrida uses this term for 'others' in Amy Ziering Kofman and Kirby Dick's film, Derrida, 2002 
'' Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 17. Sartre's notion of essence is not timeless and substantial and anticipates Derrida - essence is ever 
changing and idiosyncratic and constructed by the individual: 'the objective will never come out of the subjective' p. xxxvii 
48 Ibid., p. xxiii - 'the infinite in the infinite'. 
49Ibid., pp. xx -xxii: 'There is no longer an exterior for the existent if one means by that a superficial covering which hides from sight 
the true nature of the object' and 'appearances ... are all equal, they all refer to other appearances, and none of them is pri vileged. ' 
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diCorcia and Streuli, are not seeking other inward beings. Infinite series replaces dualism and 
suggests another trait of current work as the acknowledgement of a process where there is no 
ultimate or end, where all one can find is a series of manifestations, where things change and will 
present themselves differently. 50 Here there is no more than appearance and there will always be 
more than can be presented. 
Streuli's and diCorcia's work explains, in a simple way, the notion of semantic models; alternative 
possibilities in understanding concepts and images. In their presentation of appearance only, they 
refer us to the possibility of other appearances, of what is not there. Sartre's notion of stripping `all 
human projections of meaning"' from experience (epitomised by Roquentin's encounter with the 
tree root 52) suggests the possibility of a situation where `the veil is torn away... words have 
vanished and with them the meaning of things. 'S3 Here lies the possibility of seeing something 
entirely without projection, structure or meaning that leaves us with images, which make it difficult 
to project our own meaning, and yet we are compelled to try. Explanation and meaning depends on 
what is not there and the subjective impression of the viewer, and the foundation of our subjectivity 
lies in the `infinite totality of the series of appearances' that conjures up what is absent and 
projects towards the `realm of possibilities'. 55 What is absent, can be anticipated in imagination 
and is as much present as what is referenced in the image. In the sense that an object/image is 
context-dependent for its definition, and that we can only understand it in relation to everything 
else, all that it is not, and all that it could be, is there in the image also. Thus confronting the image 
can be seen as an act of consciousness, rather than of a `thing'; confronting this realm of 
possibilities is more a process of meaning. These photographs, with the lack of any relation 
between `subject' and `object', are impenetrable. The lack of `contact' makes it difficult to 
penetrate their opacity, but despite the lack of emotional projection, they engage the intellect in 
projecting meaning and allusion. Clearly they show that there is no literal, positive characteristic of 
being (or representation) possible. Being is `beyond' activity and passivity, temporality and change, 
possibility and necessity. These images present the contradiction of apparent translucency of 
appearance, the opaqueness of subjects and consequent emptiness. ' 
I Ibid., p. xxii 
51 Hammond, M. and J. Howarth R. Keat, Understanding Phenomenology, Blackwell 1991, p. 114 
52 Sartre, Jean-Paul, `Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl's Phenomenonology', trans Joseph P. Fell, Journal of the British 
Society of Phenomenology, 1,2, May 1970, pp 4-5 'the tree escapes me and repulses me, and I can no more lose myself in the tree than 
it can dissolve itself in me. I'm beyond it; it's beyond me. ' and Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea (1938), Hamondsworth: Penguin, 1965, pp. 185 
Sartre, Jean-Paul , 
Nausea, p170 
Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. xxxvi 
55Ibid., p. 224 
See Sartre's distinction between the translucence of consciousness and the opacity of objects as they appear to us in Being and 
Nothingness p. xxxiii: I cannot 'reduce this table to a synthesis of subjective impressions' and pertinently here `we discover ourselves 
on the road, in the city, in the midst of the crowd, thing among thing, men among men. ' 
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It is true that things give themselves in profile; that is, simply by appearances. It is true that each 
appearance refers to other appearances..... It is futile... to attempt to found the reality of the 
object on the subjective plenitude of impressions. " 
Sartre, in questioning what is subjective and what is absent, describes the impenetrable 
complication of consciousnesses reflecting on other consciousnesses and might be describing these 
very photographs. It is as if Streuli and diCorcia were set the task to produce photographs, 
`stripped' of meaning, 58 of all conceptual i sati on, all differentiation, all features or characteristics 
and thereby betray `their solidity, density, their `full positivity'. ' These images are indicative of 
current themes in contemporary photography as they present, in their ordinariness, an ontology of 
boredom and indifference. They give us simple appearances that ultimately obscure our view. 
However, photographs that in different ways circumvent intentional search, looking sideways, 
outside the frame, via anonymity, banality and intimacy, arrive ultimately at the same place, in an 
affirmation of `the real' displaced as `irreal'. In avoiding the extraordinary and the transcendent, we 
achieve a provocative banal and photographs, `apparently created in an artificial manner... reveal 
the natural'. 60 Coming full circle, in avoiding one kind of objectivity (or subjectivity), there is 
immersion in another. 
' Ibid. p. xxxvii 
' Ibid., p. 112 
Ibid., pp. xx -xxii 
60 Sviblova, Olga, 'Sergey Chilikov'. Imago, vol. 14, Summer 2002, p. 25. Chilikov calls his method 'provocation'. 
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Chapter Two: AESTHETIC FRAMES 
Just as such non-eventful photographic texts present expressions of an aesthetic without authorial 
interpretation, so they parallel a number of theories that encourage a move from comfortable 
totality toward meaninglessness. As Levinas's shadow works against transcendence, Baudrillard's 
irreality establishes a place of excess, where the `impenetrable enigma' resides, and Barthes's 
phenomenon of pure meaning straddles the borders of non-meaning, the consequence of which 
might be images that are too dangerous; too bald or abject, too banal, too extra-ordinary to be 
acceptable as meaningful. Kristeva's assertion of the semiotic explains an un-nameable force, 
where pure meaning approaches the `boundary of what is assimilable, thinkable, abject'. Pursuing 
this compulsion toward the boundaries of aesthetic, I look firstly in this chapter at Kristeva's notion 
of negativity as one theory that offers explanation for what is unspeakable and lies at the edges of 
meaninglessness. Secondly I establish connections between the emergence of aesthetic change, its 
confirmation in photographic practices, before examining where ineffable domains meet 
conceptual portrayal. As this thesis chases what is ineffable, I am particularly interested in 
explanations for the compulsion that moves practice away from conformity and understanding and 
that `resides in the passage between (the) desire to signify the asymbolized and the 
asymbolizable. " Kristeva introduces the possibility of the unspeakable (ineffable) and nonsensical 
into poetic meaning, which establishes these elements as a `normal' consequence of psychology 
and structure and as a verifiable challenge to any established norm. The foundations of the 
signifying process is reorganised and controlled by social and psychic constraints that surface as 
disturbance of this order, `as poetry', the `part of meaning that cannot be accounted for - that part 
that doesn't mean: nonsense, tones, rhythms. '2 Kristeva's explanation for the compulsion toward 
poetic meaning could be said to equate with Ricoeur's, which grounds `poetic reality' in the 
imaginative realm of conceptual thought. 
Kristeva's application of the theoretical to creative texts contributes to a shift in the perspective of 
what is important to practice, and to a trans-disciplinary base from which to commence practice. An 
important consequence of her work is the introduction of a very material and `sensible' dimension 
to interpretation, which distances us from metaphysical notions of transcendence and moves toward 
an emphasis on affect and response instead. Kristeva's approach is one that asserts process rather 
than product as being central, and indicates a theory of signification where meanings in verbal and 
visual texts (photographs) are equivalent. 
' Kristeva, Julia, 'How Does One Speak To Literature'(1971) in Desire in Language, trans. Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine and Leon S. 
Roudiez, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980, p. 118 
2 Lechte, John, Julia Kristeva. London: Routledge, 1990, p. 91 
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CONTRA-AESTHETICS 
Powers of Horror3 explores the region of the abject as one that might perversely reveal, and 
simultaneously push, the limits of aesthetic convention. The abject, lying at the edge of what is 
repressed, holds the secret of what attracts me, of what will be meaningful for me or what repels 
me. As such it is fragile, unclear and not fixed and originates in those aspects of my psyche that are 
sublimated, either personally or socially or both. Straddling categories of `Pure and Impure, 
Prohibition and Sin, Morality and Immorality', it skirts around what is not acceptable, what is 
taboo. Confronting the abject, returns us to the dangerous arena of encounter with someone else, 
with what I desire, but cannot know, where my identity can be overwhelmed and `the distinction 
between subject and object removed'. ' The possibility of `abreaction', and the contradiction of, on 
the one hand being attracted, and on the other being repelled, touches the root of my desire and 
approaches a realisation of loss, of all that has formed me. Tantalised by a photograph, `the object 
of want's taunts, seduces, `beseeches and pulverises the subject'. 6 (For Barthes, it is the absence of 
his mother, within his memory. For myself it is the total absence of my mother, without memory. ) 
When looking at photographs, when confronting the mess of my thinking and the multitude of 
associations, the abject provides both an entrance and an exit, simultaneously toward and away 
from what I repress, a within and a without. What I reject allows me to approach a meaning for 
myself and allows me to avoid what I cannot 'face'. And where these are articulated, they find a 
symbolic existence, perhaps an epic or mythic one. 
Iddol 
Fig. 60 Andres Serrano, Snoop Dog from the series 
America, 2004 
In looking at artistic practice, Kristeva identifies the territory of the abject as that which `does not 
respect borders, positions, rules' and which, through content and style, approaches `the in-between, 
the ambiguous, the composite. " In a photographic context, we similarly might cite the breaking of 
3 See quote in Part Two citing Kristeva, Julia, 'Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection' (1980), trans. Leon S. Roudiez, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1982. Reproduced in Cazeaux, Clive, ed., The Continental Aesthetics Reader. London: Routledge, 2000, 
pp. M2-552 
4 Kristeva in Cazeaux, p. 500 
s Ibid., p-544 
6Ibid., p. 544 
7 Ibid., p. 544 
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Fig. 61 Martin Kollar, Slovakia, 2001 
a number of taboos: of indignity, exposure and exploitation (Mikhailov's Case History) or of the 
grotesque (Cindy Sherman's Sex Pictures1992-4 significantly left out of the retrospective show at 
the Serpentine, 20038) or of death and sanctity (Andres Serrano's series ) or of sex (Robert 
Mapplethorpe before him) or of what is clumsy, obscene, pretty, sentimental or 
indulgent... whatever is unacceptable at any one time. But a common aesthetic, such as the current 
sensationalism and sensuousness typified by Serrano's Baroque use of colour and subject [fig. 
60], 'o can eventually anaesthetize what is dangerous, can make safe and sanctify: `The various 
means of purifying the abject - the various cartharses - make up the history of religions, and end 
up with that catharsis par excellence called ... the artistic experience, which is rooted in the abject it 
utters... by the same token purifies. " It could be said that it is the `abyss of incompatibilities, 
rejections and abjections"2 that invents forms of convention such as artistic practice, that enable us 
to confront what is uncomfortable. In so doing, a process of aestheticisation assimilates and 
generates material that might at first be challenging before becoming common currency, for 
example the extra-ordinary, the grand-normal and the super-banal. 13 [fig. 61] `Desire, thus 
normalised in order to escape abject concupiscence sinks into a banality that is sadness and 
silence. "4 Where Sartre and phenomenologists use philosophy to sanctify and release them from 
the base and uncomfortable aspects of being human, Kristeva confronts them and accepts them as 
inescapable and as a positive force. In Powers of Horror, she aligns the `artistic' with the perverse 
and where she speaks of the abject, she could as well be speaking of aesthetic evolution: `The 
abject is perverse because it neither gives up nor assumes a prohibition, or a law; but turns them 
aside, misleads, corrupts; uses them, takes advantage of them. "' 
8 Cindy Sherman, bom 1954 New Jersey, has been instrumental in normalising the use of photography in art practice. Significantly in the 
series pertinent to Kristeva's discussion, Disasters and Fairy Tale 1985-89 and Sex Pictures 1992-4, she does not use herself as model. 
9 Andres Serrano, born 1950, lives and works in New York. Raised a strict Catholic and from a mixed race background, much of his 
work challenges all manner of cultural taboos. In this context significant images and series are Piss Christ 1987, Blood and Semen 1990, 
the Morgue series 1992, A History of Sex 1997. His work principally takes the form of portraits - Nomads 1990, Native American 
Portraits and America 2004 
10 Bal discusses implications of Serrano's work in Bal, Mieke, Quoting Caravaggio: Contemporary Art, Preposterous History. Chicago 
and London: Chicago Universoty Press, 1999, pp. 45-75. This description could also be given to works by Arsen Savadov. 
1' Kristeva in Cazeaux, p. 552 'Through that experience... "subject-and "object-push each other away, confront each other, collapse 
and start again - inseparable, contaminated, condemned, at the boundary of what is assimilable, thinkable: abject'. 
12 Ibid., p. 555 
D Martin Kollar, born 1971, Zilina, Slovakia 'I travel through Slovakia and imagine it as a miraculous and exotic country'. Imago 13, 
Winter 2002 
14 Kristeva in Cazeaux, p. 560 
15 'Perverse or artistic' in Kristeva in Cazeaux, p. 551 
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A number of Kristeva's texts bring to mind equivalent expressions in photographic practice. Her 
description of the characteristics of carnivalesque as rebellious, `anti-rationalist' and challenging 
established order, `parodies and relativises itself, repudiating its role in representation', is `both 
representative and anti-representative' 16 and is recognisable in contemporary moves in art practice 
of displaced realities or more spectacular dimensions. Tales of Love, reminds us of images that 
portray the more dangerous aspects of relationship, rather than images that idealise, beautify and 
clarify as with more classic portrait tradition [see Avedon fig. 11]. Images which, in describing 
someone that one desires or loves, suggest photographic pursuits on the edge of capability, `painful 
or ecstatic states where the object slips away' 17 (Evans, Goldin) or are ugly and uncomfortable 
(Mikhailov) or do not translate insignificance (Strba). It is recognisable as paralleling descriptions 
of the dual roles assumed by both Evans and Strba and their respective `subjects', where 
participants and texts collide, contradict and reconstruct each other, where each `participant is both 
actor and spectator... loses [their] sense of individuality... and splits into a subject of the spectator 
and an object of the game... the subject is reduced to a nothingness, while the structure of the 
author emerges as anonymity that creates and sees itself created as self and other, as man and 
mask. ' 18 As we have seen, intimacy, intrusion, anonymity are possible strategies for muddling the 
borders in the photographic encounter. 19 Kristeva's emphasis introduces the possibility that images 
might offer a kind of equivalence to feeling, not the metaphysics of Steiglitz, and not so definitive 
as that evoked by words, but more equivocal, visceral and uncertain. 
`Negativity is the liquifying and dissolving agent that does not destroy but rather reactivates', that 
affirms and `links/unleashes the "real" and the conceptual' the objective and the subjective. 20 The 
notion of rejection, " deriving from Freud's `expulsion', establishes an outside that is never 
definitely separate from, but which disturbs the unity of the subject. It explains the psychological 
origins of the dynamics of meaning such as parergon, cataylser and punctum, which are neither 
intrinsic nor extrinsic, neither significant nor insignificant. Within the signifying process, rejection 
provokes reaction and renewal, motivates metaphor and is the basis of a `metonymic desire', 22 as 
opposed to the repetition of established norms. As one of the "ultimate" mechanisms of psychic 
functioning, ' 23 rejection is the negative force that reactivates practice, `re-constitutes real objects, 
"creates" new ones, reinvents the real, and re-symbolizes it'. ' Kristeva describes negativity as the 
process that mediates drives such as rejection, and `pure abstractions' such as `being and 
16 Kristeva, 'Word, Dialogue and Novel'. In Desire in Language, p. 79 
"Kristeva, Julia, 'Throes of Love: The Field of Metaphor'. In Tales of Love, (1983), trans. Leon S. Roudiez, New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1987, p. 267 
'8 Kristeva, 'Word, Dialogue and Novel', p. 78. In a similar split, Levinas asserts that the 'poetic order' forces the participating reader as 
both ' I-actor' and 'I-spectator'. 
19 Kristeva, 'Throes of Love: The Field of Metaphor', p. 268 
20 Kristeva, Julia, Revolution in Poetic Language (1974). New York: Columbia University Press, 1984, p. 109 
21 Ibid., pp. 147-148 
22 Ibid., p. 178 
-; Ibid., p. 160 
14 Ibid., p. 155 
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nothingness'. It is the `movement of heterogeneous matter' emphasising the performance in 
meaning construction25 that challenges logical negation, which merely replaces something with its 
opposite rather than fundamentally changing it. 26 The function of negativity challenges true/false 
and logical/non-logical oppositions, and `recasts' dualities like universal and particular, 
indeterminate and determinate, quality and quantity, negation and affirmation, " replacing them 
with the trajectory of "primary process" (displacements, condensations)' instead. ' Negativity is the 
principle that motivates change in the dynamics of significance, that mobilises what is static, that 
contradicts, that moves between abstraction and the material, objectivity and subjectivity and that 
determines what is resonant in an image as increasingly uncertain and a-logical. It is a difficult 
concept but somehow central for my purpose of finding the logic of resistance and ambivalence 
over acceptance, and the relation of an `ineffable mobility' to its determination. 29 In the 
photographic context it disturbs the normative rules of aesthetic and can be seen in the un- 
remarkable or the awful as `good' in portrayals disregarding 'objective vision', or in images that 
dismantle photographic assumptions of control and objectivity, now established as a genre 
disturbing conventional subject /object relations and sitting on the edge of taste. 
A conception of art that `pluralises, pulverises, musicates' truths, is very different from one that 
represents established progressive ideology. It is not a separating or uplifting process but brings us 
back to the corporeal rather than the transcendent (a kind of `transubstantiation') something 
altogether more dangerous. Kristeva affirms all that is a-logical and a-knowledgeable and suggests 
an alternative to unity - in non-meaning and chance. Her thesis anticipates much of the oblique 
sentiment evident in photographic depictions of avoidance or that encompass boredom as a result 
of the superfluity of meaning and the consequence of excess. 
Kristeva's address to the forces that motivate, confirms the derivation of meaning in what is absent, 
displaced or disguised and, with regard to the photograph, to what is shown or not shown. 
Fundamentally what drives us is the motivation to retrieve what we have lost, hence the recurrence 
and importance of absence throughout the process of meaning. In psychoanalytic terms, every 
object of desire is a substitution for the real object, as the `real' itself cannot be signified, only the 
desire for it in its absence. What gives us the `affirmative moment' and ensures its maintenance, is 
not the object produced but the process of its production. Whilst desire perpetuates absence, it 
provokes contradictions and keeps us interested. This is the contradiction that defeated Sultan in his 
desire for the `identity of substance' in the portrayal of his parents; when sought it becomes elusive 
I See for example essays by Amelia Jones and Karen Lang in Jones, A. and Stephenson A. (eds) Art History/ Art Criticism: Performing 
Meaning Performing the Body, Performing the Text. London & New York, Routledge, 1999 
16 Kristeva's negativity derives from her close reading of Hegel cited throughout 'Negativity: Rejection' in Revolution in Poetic 
Language. in which she argues the connection between Hegel's 'repulsion' and 'negativity' and Freud's 'rejection'. 
27 Kristeva, Revolutiuon in Poetic Langauge, p. 109 
28 Ibid., p. 125 
1 Ibid., p. 109: Negativity 'figures as the indissoluble relation between an'ineffable' mobility and its'particular determination'. 
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and results in substituting fictions. Thus desire seeps through a text via what is referred to and what 
is absent and is resolved via fetish, universal appeal or fiction. Learning that we are separate, that 
we cannot become an `other', we are left with desire as a consequence of this lack and strive to 
achieve a commonality with the cause of this lack - others - the contradictory base from which 
signification begins. The idea of the fetishistic object3° derives from this place of lack, which the 
photograph can serve to amplify, particularly in images of people (Barthes's mother in the Winter 
Garden or my `self-transcendence' constructed in my depiction of A). This psychological 
contradiction, of seeking fulfilment in the source of lack, signals a fundamental parallel in 
representation, where meaning that does not speak to the individual can be meaningless and 
meaning that appeals universally can be empty. 31 Emptiness comes down to the lack of individual 
fullness where meaning is normalised, standardised, made common to all (the contradiction of pure 
meaning again). Dijkstra's desire to describe both the universal and the individual significantly 
reveals the in-between place of contradiction and irony: `I discovered that if you want to give a 
general impression, you should be very specific, "' and illustrates the myth of the individual 
originating in psychoanalysis and confirmed in Western constructs of existentialism and 
modernism. 
AESTHETIC HISTORIOGRAPHIES 
The forces explained by psychoanalysis confirm, from another perspective, the basis of conceptual 
transference from one domain to another (in metaphor), on the level of primal function and the 
level of expression. It explains our compulsion to react and confront on the one hand, and cling to 
stability and the familiar on the other. Kristeva explains mobility as fact and the mechanisms, 
which counter stasis and `thing' as change and resonance. Kristeva's positive negativity and 
Derrida's sans are both moves that confront lack and take a different direction that move away 
from fetish and universality. The consequence for the photographer is the exploration of areas that 
encompass desire for representation and an understanding that it cannot be satisfied via 
resemblance alone and may only satisfy in unexpected ways. Visual personifications of these states 
return to an overt even ostentatious use of metaphor as can be seen in the stripped down portrayal 
of the Face (Ruff) or Jeff Wall's pictoramas. 
Many of the attributes identified above as goal-less and as disregarding the dominant modernist 
aesthetic to find completion or to define or mythologize, are articulated in different terminology as 
30 Laura Mulvey's essay 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema'. Screen, Vol. 16, no. 3,1975 establishes this idea, which Burgin explains 
in 'The Absence of Presence' in The End of Art Theory, pp. 42-44: 'The fetish is pure presence... its function being precisely to deny 
absence to fill the 'lack' in being'. And Burgin again explores fetish in 'Newton's Gravity' in Squiers, Carol, (ed) The Critical Image 
: essays on contemporary photography. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1991 
;' Oliver, Kelly, 'The Crisis of Meaning' (1998). In Lechte, John and Mary Zoumazi (eds. ) The Kristeva Critical Reader. Edinburgh 
University Press, 2003, p. 51: 'To be full is to be content; to be empty is to be hungry for something else. ' 
32 Rineke Dijkstra in interview with David Brittain, Creative Camera, April/May, 1999. In contrast to this would be a generalising 
conception such as The Family of Man, Edward Steichen's photography exhibition at the Museum of Modem Art, New York, 1955. 
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`postmodern photography'. 'Postmodernism', in Jean-Francois Lyotard's terms is defined as a 
consistently dislocated relation to the world, 33 as a recurring state, of attitudinal adjustment that 
precedes assimilation, where `beliefs are shattered' and where other realities are invented. 
Following this reasoning, successive reactions to experience test the rules of existing aesthetic 
practice, provoking successive conceptions of the real, in a series of `anti-aesthetics' ` currently 
located in conceptual shifts of understanding with regard to positions of authenticity, authorship 
and meaning. Whilst this condition of `postmodernism' is currently being questioned as `fading 
into the background', 35 there appears to be confirmation, in photographic practice at least, of 
Lyotard's assertion that the project of modernity, as the pursuit of universality or `some grand 
narrative', 36 has been relinquished. Photographic discussion echoes Lyotard's suggestion that a 
postmodern aesthetic `denies itself the solace of good forms' or searches for presentations that can 
`impart a stronger sense of the unpresentable'. 37 I have suggested more pervasive effects than mere 
`postmodern' quotation, where for example photographers circumvent the impossible task of 
making definitive photographic statements by assuming methods that avoid expression and 
`meaning'. Procedures of deconstruction and an obligatory awareness of the conditions of power 
and positioning have long since been assimilated in the careful avoidance of directorial authoring. 
A changing (anti) aesthetic, no longer reliant on universal certainties, is malleable rather than 
fixed or permanent'38 and moves towards forms of local specific knowledge that can be seen in 
choices of subject matter as diverse as Strba's and Allan Sekula's. A quiet but substantial 
reformation is manifested in the way that photographers use strategies to dismantle hierarchies. It 
begins to suggest that a more appropriate term might be `poststructural photography'. 
Steve Edwards39 reviews the influences of poststructuralism on photography and its central 
identification of the `transcendental signified' as an illusion. He gives a clear and critical 
description of postmodern conditions of the `reality effect' and of its assumptions from a position 
that accepts the themes of postmodern having `attained the status of `radical' common sense'. His 
position concludes that postmodern theory is no improvement on what went before `in extremis' as 
authorial, aestheticised genius. What he calls `hermetic brilliance' has become the new form of 
totalisation, rather than confronting or exploring the effect on practice of this understanding. He 
presents too the problematic of the neat critique of modernism, which restricts itself to Greenberg 
and Schwarkowski and asks what of the other modernist histories? If `postmodernism' and 
33 Lyotard, Jean-Francois, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. G. Bennington and B. Massumi, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota, 1984 
' Foster, Hal (ed. ) The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays in Postmodern Culture. Port Townsend: Bay Press, 1983 
35 Bate, David, `After Thought'. Source, 40,2004, pp. 30-33 He asks is it `another `ism", fading into the background'. He also asks: 'Is 
an end to the discussion of postmodernism the end of ideology? ' and suggests the current era of `neo-realism'. 
Jurgen Habermas prefers 
to label reaction as `anti-modernism' , see `Modernity - an Incomplete Project' in Foster, The Anti-Aesthetic. 
I Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. xxiii 
31 Ibid., p. 81 
38 Moxey, K.. 'The History of Art after the Death of the "Death of the Subject" 1999. in [J Visible Culture, 
http: //www. rochester. edu. in-visible_culture, 
39 Edwards, Steve, `The Snapshooters of History: Passages in the Postmodern Argument'. TEN 8, International Photography Magazine, 
UK, no.. 322,1989. pp. 2-21 
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associated theories teach us anything it should teach us not to be `totalised' by any theory and to 
see it in the context of its own history. How does post-modernism challenge any further or 
differently? 
Gerard Mermoz's appraisal40 suggests that metaphor pervades art history just as it does 
philosophy41 and that what is at issue is the process in which truth-values are embedded in a critical 
framework, so that the `telling' of a history can mute the practice and render it irreversible. He 
describes the arena as a `metaphorical auditorium' that re-creates meanings in the image of the 
presiding ideology. In such a way a particular body of work will come to signify a typical example 
of a `trend', and become inscribed as permanent (e. g. Walker Evans of modernism, Sherrie Levine 
of `postmodernism'). Conceptions of certain heroes can confirm `teleology' and gather validations, 
desires as `an anchor, or focus of historical significance'. Rosalind Krauss describes the 
construction of artistic value based on the biography of one such hero42 as a regrettable trait of art 
history, and Evans provides an example of another, more subtle evolution of heroic aesthetic, 
articulated in his own writing on `quality'. ' Evans's work, assumed as exemplary of photographic 
modernism (typified by Allie Mae Burroughs), is contradicted with his Polaroid portraits, which 
could be described as more characteristically `postmodern'. Like Derrida's procedure of differance, 
historiographies such as those of Evans, suggest that where we can see certainty, we should look 
for evidence of counter-argument. Currently, for example, there is an anxiety to reappraise what 
has been previously dismissed in aesthetics - i. e . beauty. 
" 
Since the writing of these reviews (1989), at the time of a very typical use of `postmodern parody', 
the impact of digital technologies has forced a relinquishing of the preciousness of photography's 
ontological nature to confirm what matters. It is now visual reference that accesses meaning, which 
the range of practices and uses of photography in fine art practice has opened up, incorporating its 
own tautology and reinventing criteria of beauty and form. Rather than being fearful of its new 
consciousness, photography has embraced `ideological fiction' as its own domain. Rather than 
`truth', it assumes a more abstract functioning, fiction and an embodiment of desire itself in the 
ready presentation of whatever one wants. Twenty years later, I see more deep-seated adjustments 
to the conceptual framework of photographic practice than a literal translation of deferment for 
example. It may be possible now to survey some aspects of practice for what they tell us about 
ideology in the light of subsequent softening of reaction, as evident of an implicit awareness or 
consciousness. 
40 Mermoz, Gerard, `Rhetoric and Episteme: Writing about "Art" in the Wake of Post-structuralism'. Art History, vol. 12. no. 4, 
December 1989, pp. 497-509 
al Derrida, Jacques, `White Mythology'. In Margins of Philosophy (1972). University of Chicago Press, 1982 
42 Krauss, Rosalind, `In the Name of Picasso'. In The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths. London: MIT Press, 
1985 
11 Evans, Walker, `Categories of Quality' (1969). In Walker Evans Archive, 1994.250.5-1(18), Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York 
44 Meyer, James and Toni Ross, `Aesthetic/Anti-Aesthetic: An Introduction'. Art Journal, Summer 2004, pp. 20-23 
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The conversation between Peggy Phelan and Irit Rogofr5 displays a determined critical disavowal 
that avoids definitive positions, putting themselves in an in-between disassociated position in order 
to allow `something else to emerge'. Applying this precarious model of enquiry of `without' to 
photographic practice brings us back to the necessary tactic of a participatory exchange both in 
terms of the relationship between operator and spectrum and in terms of critique. Much 
photography anxiously disavows any position in an attempt to allow `something to emerge'. What 
Rogoff refers to as `participatory' exchange, shifts the position from which one views an exchange. 
Rogoff and Phelan's anxiety to `unthink ourselves away from... certainty' parallels the 
methodologies adopted by photographers who avoid the definitive and who anticipate all the angles 
of framework and possible certainty. This can take a literal form in avoiding technical control by 
embracing `amateurish things' and the `non-moment', 47 or in using sometimes perverse strategies 
that are ambivalent and non-determinate, or adopt a deliberately crude form of realism. The goal 
ultimately appears to be the same, but rather than critically challenging one version of truth, they 
propose starting from a position of what we don't know -a participatory methodology that does 
not exclude. 
Two more recent essays articulate different attitudes to what is considered aesthetic and the 
significance of meaning. On the one hand Nick Zangwill' brackets off those examples of work 
found to be problematic (Duchamp's and Warhol's, referred to as `aberrant works') and disallows 
an engagement with more contemporary developments. On the other, Roger Seamon49 identifies the 
association of `visual' with what is aesthetic as being a fundamentally misleading premise. 
Zangwill's essay provokes a number of tantalising questions regarding the notions of aesthetic and 
non-aesthetic. Firstly, the notion of anti-aesthetic or negative-aesthetic as being bland or ugly. His 
use of the term `negative aesthetic function' for what lacks an aesthetic function invites enquiry of 
the difference between this and a position of neutrality, if that were possible, or between that and 
ugliness. We could then formulate two different anti-aesthetics; one of ugliness and one of 
neutrality. Secondly, the dependence of so called anti-aesthetic works, or Lyotard's `postmodern 
condition', on our prior knowledge of and involvement with existing established aesthetic 
properties requires the definition of the aesthetic state that we are avoiding and must be therefore 
`second-order works', thereby establishing originality as the prime criteria. Thirdly he reminds us 
of the difference between having no aesthetic purpose at all and having a non-aesthetic purpose, 
which requires the properties of the original aesthetic to remain the same. Fourthly he discriminates 
45 Phelan, Peggy and Irit Rogoff, "WITHOUT" A Conversation'. Art Journal, Fall 2001, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 34-11 
46 Graham, Paul, 'I Blame Elvis' an interview with Jennifer Winters. In End of an Age, Berlin: Scalo, 1999 
Waplington, Nick, Indecisive Memento, London: Booth Clibborn Editions, 1998 
48 Zangwill, Nick, 'Are There Counterexamples to Aesthetic Theories of Arty The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. 60: 2, Spring, 
2002, pp. 111-118 
49 Seamon, Roger, 'The Conceptual Dimension in Art and the Modem Theory of Artistic Value'. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism 59: 2, Spring, 2001, pp. 139-1S1 
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between meaning (narrative point) and `aesthetic point' and works that may have one or the other 
or both and that meaning can only have aesthetic significance if it is confined to narrative as 
Zangwill assumes. However he does supply the clue to resolving this aesthetic impasse, whilst not 
allowing it as valid, as residing in his own dilemma as those `purely conceptual works... . that I have 
overlooked that make no attempt to have an aesthetically interesting visual or aural aspect". 
Assuming a more contemporary scene, which has assimilated the notion of the readymade, it is 
evident that much current discussion on aesthetics depends on visual association. On the other 
hand, if one equates aesthetic with perceptual, `sensible' over visual qualities, then it makes 
definition and analysis, in my terms, a lot simpler. It simplifies too an understanding of works 
which attempt to access more than the perceptual; a more conceptual dimension. It is helpful to 
remember Levinas's `sense' as rhythm and as a more participative access to `poetic order'. Seamon 
clarifies the whole notion of contemporary aesthetics by simply adding the conceptual to the three 
more assimilated criteria - of mimetic, formal and expressive. He points out that the conceptual has 
always been there, carried by the visual - in allegory. What confronts us now is the possibility of 
fore-fronting the conceptual over the visual. The major conceptual framework of vision is a large 
generic metaphor that is difficult to shake off. Speech is ridden with references that allude to the 
image; it is fundamental to our descriptions of our thinking and helps give form to it. Photography 
confirms and embodies this metaphor for understanding (I see what you mean), which in turn is 
embedded in our conception of reality and aesthetic. What persists is the comfort of the visual 
providing definition. 
Discourse arising from the awareness of our assumed dependence on visuality51 and the consequent 
assumptions that result from that has lead to a profound disturbance of the complacent contentment 
that is provided by `seeing is believing'. But it takes more than awareness to shake belief and 
W. J. T. Mitchell doubts the degree to which the nature of visuality and our relation to it has 
changed. Mitchell traces the developments in art history deriving from `turns' in philosophy and 
discusses the legacy of various analyses. His `pictorial turn' refers to a reaction to a self-conscious 
awareness of the problems arising from `spectatorship' and `reading' that grapples with the 
complexities between visuality and discourse. On the one hand everything to do with looking and 
on the other everything to do with reading. What might change more easily is the way that we 
articulate ourselves, the way we explain the problematic. The biggest adjustment is an acceptance 
that we `are constituted by both language and imaging"' rather than either/or. However, as 
language has dominated discourse (over the visual), visuality has dominated in terms of providing a 
metaphor and reference for explanation. Mitchell refers to a critical `postmodern iconology' that 
50 Zangwill, 2002, p. 114 
51 Jay, Martin, Downcast Eyes. The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought. Berkely; Los Angeles; London: 
University of California Press, 1994 
Mitchell, WIT., Picture Theory. London and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994, p. 24 
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supersedes language as being dominant, because it suppresses language and `sutures image and 
text'; he suggests that each now `supplements the other'. This would alleviate the contradiction 
between work that either forefronts visuality and sensation over conceptual resonance, or forefronts 
the conceptual at the expense of visual potency. In `CONCEPTUAL DOMAINS' I consider 
examples where the conceptual might be assimilated with potency. 
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Chapter Three: CONCEPTUAL DOMAINS 
`NEITHER WORD NOR CONCEPT' 1 
Before returning to situate the photographic portrait in relation to contemporary directions in 
practice, I want to clarify here the conceptual space of the photograph and ideas, in relation to 
differance and the ineffable, to correlate these terms with those of Derrida and Lyotard. Being 
concerned with ideas that are not confined by `naming', I have identified the `conceptual system' 
of metaphor and `resonance' as terms that approach a sense that switch the emphasis to 
`capacities '2 and more active `production', rather than one that indicates something more definitive. 
I consider here the `ineffable' as residing in the conceptual domain of the photograph. I go further 
and equate the conceptual domain and different modes of the ineffable with differance. 3 
Discussion of the ineffable and the photograph is framed within the complex arena of concept, 
meaning and description and reliant on distinctions between object and concept, between 
describing and naming and between the photograph `naming' an object and intending a concept. ' 
The principle of `naming' can be seen to problematise a discussion that is concerned to assert the 
figural over the literal, and possibility over definition. The implications of `is', being instrumental 
in the linguistic procedure of `naming', encapsulates the defining process that separates it from 
what it `is not', which is indeterminable. Looking for examples of `concept' beyond the correlation 
with a word and its meaning, Frege's logical notation is useful in its adjusting the emphasis of 
designation. Using the nominal expression `Dobbin is a horse', he suggests that `is a horse' works 
not as a reference or a name, but as a description that is applied to what is being described - 
Dobbin. Thus `is a horse' signifies the concept of being a horse rather than signifying `horse' as an 
object. When we describe, we `have' a concept that remains vague until it is articulated, when it 
begins to find form and move towards definition. As soon as it is articulated it becomes a 
nominated subject, where before that `concept' was unformed and formless, not a subject, not any- 
thing. Frege distinguishes between reference (the entity Dobbin) and sense designated by the 
expression that describes it. His logic extends the idea of a single nominated element to that of a set 
of properties or attributes rather than one. This equation of a predicate as a concept, approaches 
what happens when looking at a photograph. The relevance of Frege's distinction between object 
and concept provokes a question so obvious that we do not ask it when looking at a photograph, 
' Derrida, Jacques, 'Differance' (1968). In Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass, Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1982, p. 7 
2 Honderich, Ted, (ed. ) Oxford Companion to Philosophy. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 389: `concept' is 
defined as `cluster of capacities'. 
3 Derrida, , 
Margins of Philosophy, p. 26 `Differance has no name in our language. But we `already know' that if it is unnameable, it is 
not provisionally so, not because our language has not yet found or received this name, or because we have to seek it in another 
language, outside the finite system of our own. It is rather because there is no name for it at all... not even the name of diferance, which 
is not the name, which is not a pure nominal unity, and unceasingly dislocates itself in a chain of differing and deferring substitutions. ' 
4 Frege, Gottlob, 'On Concept and Object' in Geach, P. T. and Max Black (eds. ) Translations From the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob 
Frege. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952, p. 54 cited in Glendinning, Simon (ed. ) Arguing with Derrida. Oxford: Blackwell, 2001, p. 62: 'By 
a kind of necessity of language, my expression, taken literally, sometimes miss my thought; I mention an object, when what I intend is a 
concept. I fully realise that in such cases I was relying upon a reader who would be ready to meet me halfway. ' 
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which encourages the procedure of defining meaning in terms of what is photographed. Can we 
differentiate between the objects referred to and the concepts apperceived in consequence? The 
answer might appear equally obvious - we cannot. But what is not so obvious is that the concepts 
are lost behind the very obviousness of the objects. 
I think that the distinction between the effable and the ineffable is best drawn as a distinction 
between states of knowledge. And an ineffable state of knowledge is one that cannot be 
expressed by means of a truth. It doesn't have content; if you like it doesn't share content with 
any truth - where that truth is for these purposes, is just a declaritive statement... .1 don't define 
the ineffable in terms of the impossibility of stating this or that truth. ' 
As Moore explains it, Frege's semantic conundrum is fundamentally addressing the distinction 
between thought and reality, which situates the ineffable in terms of the failure or impossibility of 
reconciling language and reality. Moore points to Derrida's differance as a version of ineffability, ' 
or as I see it, as a possible way of coming to terms with the ineffable. In the sense that the ineffable 
operates `in a field larger than speech', the visibility of differance offers an alternative to the 
urgency for linguistic equivalences and identifies two conditions for the ineffable - temporal and 
spatial. The notion of the ineffable as indeterminacy lends a temporal nuance without limitation, as 
different versions proceed indefinitely, avoiding precise definition. The ineffable as `un-nameable' 
is different, is spatial in terms of questioning where it is, what it is exactly. 
One could simply say that it is the limits of language that define what is and what is not ineffable, 
but this understates the procedure. Moore's statement quoted above suggests that the ineffable is 
not the inadequacy of description, but the absence of anything to express or describe. Moore 
equates the ineffable with an absence of content and opens up the question of equivalence between 
ineffability and a certain sort of knowledge, between knowledge and expression of that knowledge, 
between experience and knowledge, between `truth' and declaration. It is the relationship between 
experience and understanding, and between understanding and language that creates the ineffable. 
Certainly what this discussion confronts repeatedly is the discrepancy between verbal description 
and what is conceived as possible visual meaning, which is not identifiable in a specific location. 
Moore's definition of ineffable - is not the impossibility of stating this or that truth. 
He is talking 
about `ineffable knowledge' - that does not equate with truth statements - where the equation of 
truth is inappropriate as a definition - as there's no `truth ' to be stated. He equates 
`ineffable 
knowledge' as being characterised by `knowing how' rather then `knowing that'. 
Why should there not be a playful use of [image] in what might have been thought of as 
'unsuitable' contexts, perhaps involving contradictions, perhaps involving nonsense, whose 
5 Moore, A. W., in Arguing with Derrida, p. 78 
6 Moore, Arguing with Derrida, p. 76 
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effect, given the meanings [concepts] of the objects in play is, if only a matter of brute 
psychological fact, that those who encounter these uses, have insights that are in some perfectly 
orthodox sense, ineffable? ' 
As I move toward a version of conceptual practice, this possibility of a `different state of 
knowledge' as a particular `conceptual space' makes sense. When I `translate' Moore as above, 
what's interesting in switching the context to photographs, is that the play of `words' becomes the 
play of `objects' and one cannot easily use the word `meaning' applied to objects. An object has a 
concept - not a meaning. Thus to talk of a photograph as having meaning, when it clearly displays 
`objects' is inappropriate. What could be more appropriate and effective than `what does this 
photograph mean? " would be to ask "what concepts does the photograph provoke? ' And if we do 
not use the word `meaning', we can remove the equation of meaning=truth. We thus remove the 
necessity of description validated by the affirmation of truths. This would liberate the photograph 
from its historical and phenomenological link to `truth'. It also releases it from finding `meaning' 
justified by linguistic expansion or routes such as narrative. 
Moore considers Derrida and Wittgenstein as both being concerned with the impossibility of 
reconciling `the unity of thought with the unity of reality. 'S Wittgenstein's thesis on description and 
discourse presents a series of provocative statements that question our understanding of the nature 
and certainty of declaration, description, proposition and our use of language, which is interwoven 
with tautology and contradiction. Statements such as `what can be shown, cannot be said'9 point 
toward the obvious (taken for granted) difference between the event and the description of event. 
The distinction between content (what is there) and the form of the content (how it is shown) goes 
some way to explaining the limits of description and that one version (its form and presentation), is 
not the whole substance of a fact or possibility communicated at any one time. This division 
depends on the assumed binary opposition of form and content and what is explored here is the 
possibility of their non-opposition, in alternatives conceived as differance or figure that incorporate 
content in the form of its expression. Wittgenstein provokes possibilities that conflate description, 
understanding and meaning, as they are, as he suggests, irreconcilable and the question of veracity 
irrelevant. `What a picture represents it represents independently of its truth or falsity, by means of 
its pictorial form'. And apprehensions of `pictures' can bypass or not recognise the `pictorial form' 
that determines them (in a portrait-form for example). Thus, as Wittgenstein points out `a picture 
represents a possible situation in logical space"' and will accommodate itself to the particular 
context in which it is presented. It thus represents its own sense; it asserts a kind of fiction as it can 
' My `translation' of Moore, Arguing with Derrida, p. 67: 'Why should there not be a playful use of language... whose effect, given the 
meanings of the words in play... ' 
8 Moore, Arguing with Derrida, p. 61 
9 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, London and New York: 
Routledge, 1974,41212, p. 31 
11 Ibid., 2.202, p. 12 
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only ever be a `model of reality'. " The additional dimension of belief (of truth and falsehood) 
attached to meaning is a complication, particularly pertinent (or ironic) for the photograph that 
carries the weight of `truth' and `reality'. As Derrida questions assumptions, so Wittgenstein 
questions predetermination - the logical sequence and inevitability of rules, the obviousness of 
what he calls `super-order'. 12 Wittgenstein's `family resemblance' suggests a pool of features 
/capacities (meanings) from which a group of words/concepts can borrow. 13 Following this 
procedure, and liberated from supposed access to `truth', meaning can work in a way that allows a 
`condition of possibilities' ('semantic models') that surround an image - that is if we can resist the 
desire to fix meaning. Seen like this meaning can be fluid and evolving. 
The ineffable is not the inadequacy suggested by `indescribable' but is a conceptual space and a 
`different state of knowledge'. And a photograph operates in this space within its own terms of 
rhetorical dynamics (perquisition) that work in advance of what may be articulated in words. In 
this sense it is pre-linguistic and can anticipate ideas expressed verbally. It anticipates not by 
naming in a way that defines signification, but in conveying the concept, in the manner of `is a 
horse', which maintains with its indeterminacy more capacities, more possibilities. It is a different 
way of understanding meaning (what is provoked). Liberated from the need for a supposed 
universal property or access to `truth' behind appearance, photographs work in a way that allows a 
number of possibilities to inhabit it. Visualisation of a concept, because it uses appearance to 
trigger recognition, assumes by default the notion of `likeness' and the degree of `truthfulness' 
understood in the likeness. But as we make connections between properties and qualities, concepts, 
in the sense that they are capacities, are only required to accumulate likenesses, not resolve them. 
TOWARD THE FIGURAL AND FICTION 
The figural itself is unrepresentable. Only the trace of its action appears, and the function of the 
artwork is to reveal its effects. '4 
Lyotard's figurality emphasises a condition of non-thingness that identifies it as a force rather than 
a thing, as a dynamic that interrupts the move toward coherence or completion, extends the logic 
that makes sense of Wittgenstein's assertions of `picture'. It straddles also the borders of the 
`knowable and communication'. 15 Lyotard describes the figural as `the visible (figure/ground), the 
rhetorical (figural/literal), work, the Unconscious, the event' and the `process of representation by 
concepts'. 16 Lyotard's figural engages both conceptual and psychological domains, as does 
" Ibid., 2.12, p. 9: 'A picture is a model of reality' and 'What a picture represents is its sense', 2.221, p. 12 
12 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations (1953), trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2001, pp. 96-97 
"Magee, Bryan, Confessions of a Philosopher, London: Phoenix, 1998, pp. 146-148 
14 Bogue, Ronald, Deleuze on Music, Painting and the Arts, New York and London: Routledge, 2003, p. 115 
15 Jay, Downcast Eyes, p. 564 
16 Readings, Bill, Introducing Lyotard: Art & Politics, London & New York: Routledge, 1991, p. xxxi - p. 3 
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Kristeva's semiotic. `Figural space' approaches the world of Lakoff's conceptual domains - an 
interim realm of mutable meaning, never to be determined, ineffable and resonating. This is a space 
without regularity, which is ungraspable spatially and temporally unlocatable, and not confined to 
past, present or future, dispenses with the photographic `moment'. It is the `unspeakable other' that 
works within and against discourse, that is `radically incommensurable with that of discursive 
meaning' and that resists the aim to order. Like Derrida's undecidable, the `unspeakable other' 
asserts difference over opposition, not in a reversal of oppositional hierarchy but as equivalence. 
Thus `irrational' does not displace `rational'. The term figural potentially suits my purposes as it 
describes a space that is resistant to signification and recognises a `sense' about an object that 
cannot be communicated so `that an object always in some sense remains `other' to any 
discourse'. " Lyotard's figural secures a place that touches Derrida's disseminated meaning and 
differance, Kristeva's semiotic space and Ricoeur's poetic process in metaphor, and establishes the 
advent of fiction. It is an expression that `breaks down the `opposition between textual and 
figurative representational space''' and encompasses the potential of contemporary media 
processes and displays19 that amplify the limitations of linguistic signification. 
J. F. Lyotard's , 
Dicours Figure (1971) is not in English translation. My references are from Readings, Rodowick, Reading the Figural, 
or Philosophy After the New Media, Durham and London: Duke University 
Press, 2001, who provide discussion of its contents with 
their own translations. 
"Readings, Introducing Lyotard, p. 4 
is Ibid., p. 7 
19 For example the exhibition Making Things Public, ZKM, Karlesruhe, 2005 
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Fig. 62 Jeff Wall, Insomnia, 1994 
The aesthetic idea is a representation of the imagination with which... such a multiplicity of 
partial representations are bound up, that no expression indicating a definite concept can be 
found for it. 20 
Processes of representation by concept and imagination return discussion to Kant, who articulates 
the key relationships between understanding and imagining, between what is demonstrable and 
what is not, between what is explicable and what is not. He speaks of concepts as elements that 
form an understanding of something in an objective sense (rational) so that a `concept of 
understanding' is demonstrable and as such is seen as total and graspable and exponible. He then 
distinguishes `ideas from concepts of understanding' and describes an `aesthetic idea' as `that 
representation of the imagination which induces much thought, yet without the possibility of any 
definite thought whatever i. e. concept being adequate to it, and which language, consequently can 
never get quite on level terms with or render completely intelligible. "' An `aesthetic idea' 22 is an 
intuition (of the imagination) and is subjective. Rational ideas are objective, some of which may be 
demonstrable by some measure, and some not and are indemonstrable concepts of reason. Concepts 
such as magnitude and cause may be verified empirically with an example, whereas an aesthetic 
idea is inexponible (not able to be explained). A concept of understanding is demonstrable and 
immanent. A rational idea that cannot be verified is transcendent. In these terms we have the 
difference between an aesthetic idea that follows the subjective principle and cannot be explained 
and rational ideas that cannot be demonstrated by example, but which are rationally explicable 
following objective principles. So we might have an idea, so conceived that we cannot imagine it 
and not demonstrate it. And we might not understand an aesthetic conception, might not be able to 
grasp completely the manner in which our imagination apprehends what is presented, which is 
inexponible - this is ineffable. As Kant defines it, the ineffable resides in the relationship between 
imagination and understanding - the possibility for imagination or idea to exceed understanding. 
As described in Part Two, the notion of beauty is inappropriate in contemporary practice, but 
before he assigns categories of beauty, Kant's analysis presents a succinct description of a concept 
of imagination that expresses the possibility of ineffable attributes and is nearer to what I term 
conceptual space. Kant's distinction between `rational concepts (intellectual ideas)' that give 
some semblance of an objective reality' suggests the order of photography known as `straight', 
whilst `representations of the imagination' termed as ideas, which can be fabricated and speculative 
begin to identify the order of fiction, exemplified as we shall see in the work of Jeff Wall. This 
20 Kant, Immanuel, The Critique of Aesthetic Judgement (1790), trans. James Meredith, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952, pp. 179,212, 
where definite is equivalent to determinate. 
21 Ibid., §49, p. 175 
'~' Ibid., §57, Remark 1, pp. 209-213 
I Ibid., §49, p. 176 
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distinction separates `rational concepts' from `aesthetic ideas', which are indeterminate and 
ineffable and which are determined from within the photograph and from the experience of the 
viewer / reader, 24who induces `such a wealth of thought as would never admit of comprehension in 
a definite concept... (that) exceeds what can be laid hold of in that representation or clearly 
expressed. '25 Somewhere here is the distinction between photographs that are expected to access 
transcendent (rational) ideas and photographs that retain `immanent resonance' (Ricouer) and 
which are ineffable and not necessarily rational. 
A string of oxymorons provides a continuous texture of contradictions, an aporia by which 
language deletes itself as quickly as it sets itself down; it is a useful device for alluding to the 
ineffable, which is more likely to be found in erasures and other sorts of verbal limbos than in 
precise settled description. 26 
`CHASING THE NON-THING' established metaphor as straddling boundaries between conceptual 
domains, linguistic barriers, naming categories. It is Western linguistics that contains knowledge in 
arbitrarily assigned characters that represent sounds, rather than in pictograms for example that 
contain a cluster of concepts within one image. `An ineffability then, may be imagined 
indifferently, as a hieroglyph... an instantaneous autotely... that will suffer dilution and corruption if 
translated, compelled to channel itself into some consecutive time-bound language'. 27 Ultimately I 
am asserting explanations for meaning other than a resort to transcendence or the sublime and a 
consideration of the ineffable in relation to the photograph as autotelic (its own justification, its 
' Ibid., pp. 176-7 
25 Ibid., p. 177 
26 Kelly, Michael (ed) Encyclopedia of Aesthetics. New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 495 
27 Ibid., p. 494 
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own self contained `manifestation of knowledge', that `will suffer dilution if translated'), as 
immanent, and aporetic for its propensity to invoke doubt and undermine itself. As differance 
permits digression and interrupts purpose, the term aporia (unpassable path, impasse, not knowing 
where to go) introduces doubt and incorporates plausible possibilities that are inconsistent or 
cannot be solved or concluded. Derrida refers to aporia to indicate the undecidability of what 
cannot be reduced to binary opposition. `The nonpassage, the impasse or aporia, stems from the 
fact that there is no limit. There is... no longer a border to cross, no opposition between two sides: 
the limit is too porous, permeable and indeterminate. " Aporia refers to the co-existence of 
contrary elements, side by side, in the same way that `semantic models' refer to our capacity to 
conceive them. Derrida's expansion on aporias acknowledges `the margins, the levels, or the marks 
of individuality and the interminable list of all the so-called undecidable quasi-concepts that are so 
many aporetic places or dislocations"' As ` aporetic dislocations' 30 photographs `[put] to test a 
passage', 31 provoke both a sensual and conceptual response, a fusion of image and concept. Ruff's 
portraits are simple, direct and self-contained and yet complex, divergent and ambiguous; thus they 
can be seen as both autotelically and aporetically unnerving in their knowing `straightness'. My 
interest in the photographic lies with its very self-contained properties, its capability for generating 
metaphoric association without the need to access the attributes of other media or for physical 
effects that conform to `artistic' hierarchical ideals - i. e. painterly effects. I want to disassociate the 
power of the photographic ineffable from any such necessity. If the ineffable is to be found in 
`erasures and limbos' rather than `precise settled description', it will be found in the photographic 
propensity for a kind of oxymoronic description precisely within its own `settled description'. An 
image already simply presents multiplicity, as one object and another object and another, not 
constrained or compromised by each other's presence. 
The procedure of differance identifies the dynamic of conceptual reverberation, whereas Lyotard's 
figural and Deleuze's adoption of the term can be confused by their application to specific 
instances of artistic practice, just as Kant's apprehension of `aesthetic idea' makes sense before its 
application to notions of beauty. It is for this reason that whilst Deleuze's reference to immanent 
difference and `concepts' as a point of indeterminacy touch my concerns, I have chosen not to 
include his writing in this exploration beyond mention. In addition his privileging of sensation, 
which centres the visceral impact of painting bypasses the photographic impact of metaphoricity 
and forefronts instead the metamorphic. My concern with the power of photographs is for how they 
work through their indexical reference, not though photographic effects that emulate painterly 
effect as in mirroring, blurring, deformation, distortion. Like Krauss's applause of surrealist 
28 Derrida, Jacques, Aporias., trans. Thomas Dutoit, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993, p. 20 
29 Ibid., p. 15 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., p. 17 
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photography for such effects, Deleuze's focus on painterly deformation (as with Bacon's faces32) 
does not address my question and diverts attention away from the indexical to properties of 
materiality that photographs do not share. And it is this division of materiality from sensation in 
Deleuze's conception that is problematic. Somewhere in the distinction between art's `becoming' 
as the `possibility' and philosophy's `plane of immanence"' is a dynamic that recognises a created 
universe of what is possible - as an aesthetic category. But just as this universe of possibility points 
out the limitations of normality and legitimise art's project to extend this beyond pictures - more 
conceptually and appears to approach a `conceptual schema', it digresses. Deleuze's distinctions 
between different kinds of thinking move away from the conceptual field and when addressing 
painting specifically it begins to explain `possibles' as possible worlds - as `pictures'. This is not 
the same as reverberation, resonance or immanent quality and suggests instead that art's possible 
worlds are not virtual in the same sense that `philosophy's 'plane of immanence' is, that art is a 
virtual that requires subdivisions of `technical plane' (of materiality) and `aesthetic plane' (of 
sensation). Lyotard and Deleuze in including examples of `art' are mostly concerned with painting, 
such as distortion (Deleuze on Bacon) or abstraction (Lyotard on Pollock) and whilst commentaries 
on them refer briefly to Levine for example, ' in the context of Lyotard's conception of the 
postmodern, there is little inclusion of photographic practice and reinforce a privileging of painting 
as 'art'. In addition these works take little account of the history of Conceptual art for example, 
which is in itself a profound omission for discussion of photographic practice. 
DISPATIALITIES 
Before reviewing indications of practice amplifying poststructural writing, I want to consider first 
instances of discussion that exemplify the photograph's pivotal reliance on absence and presentness 
that come close to a recognition of the photographic power of conceptual resonance and which 
identify the crucial departure for my argument as figurality. The debate that exists between two 
attitudinal poles relating to photographic indexicality, is typified by Clement Greenberg's statement 
condemning the photograph's inability to transcend its position as `literal and anecdotal"' that 
identifies the attitude that persists of the photograph being bound to the object rather than to ideas. 
It also typifies the assumption that to be meaningful, an image must transcend itself. Szarkowski on 
the other hand, as an advocate of photographic transcendence, ironically indicates a central point 
for postmodern disturbance as fictionality, and `asserts that the fragmentation created by cropping 
32 Deleuze, Gilles, Francis Bacon, The Logic of Sensation (1981), trans. Daniel W. Smith, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2002 
1 Deleuze, Gilles, Negotiations, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 148 cited in Bogue, p. 174 
34 Readings, Introducing Lyotard, p. 74 
35 Greenberg, Clement, `The Camera's Glass Eye: Review of exhibition of Edward Weston'. In O'Brien, John, Collated Essays and 
Criticism Vol. 2, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986, p. 60 cited in Soutter, Lucy, 'The Photographic Idea Reconsidering 
Conceptual Photography'. Afterimage, vol. 26, no. 5, March/April, 1999, p. 9: It is probably for this reason that it proves so 'difficult to 
make the photograph transcend 
its almost inevitable function as document' and 'obligations of the medium' is bound to be 'literal and 
anecdotal'. 
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photographs allows an image to function as a symbol rather than a story because it is cut off from 
spatial & temporal continuity' 36 And it is the degree of literal or figural translation of this 
disturbance, which I differentiate here. 
Krauss's conception of temporal/spatial discontinuity articulates a version of differance that does 
not translate figurally and remains literal. In 1976 she describes the photographic image as `the 
object freed from the conditions of time and space that govern it'. 37 In discussing the influence of 
poststructuralism on artistic practice with reference to examples of displacement in Surrealist 
photography, she consistently interprets photographic distortions of time and space as being 
physical - `fuzzy, distorted, discoloured. '38 Krauss emphasises that `the sign, as a function of 
absence rather than presence, is a coupling of signifier and immaterial concept in relation to which 
there may be no referent at all'. 39 The principle of montage (a physical escape from the literal) was 
considered to advance the possibilities of `realism' because of it's capacity to connect, in a- 
temporal sequences, discrete bits of the world. 40 Krauss's discussion of Surrealist photography 
introduces the possibility of discursivity and dispersal of `moment' but similarly focuses on form 
and physical reference to what is absent, which relies on methods of doubling, mirroring, cropping, 
cutting, framing, prioritising `anti-realist' effect over indexical function and denying the 
photograph's property of conceptual power, its simultaneity. The photographic image, thus 
`spaced' is `deprived of one of the most powerful of photography's many illusions' that `destroys 
the fateful linkage of vision with pure synchronous presence and introduces the interruption of 
discursivity'. But while it `banishes the unitary condition of the moment"' it refuses photography's 
temporal figurality. John Roberts points out that Andre Breton's original attack on representation 
and transparency of meaning and the subsequent Surrealist photograph, intends a more direct 
access to `the production of signification' using the photograph's `indexical function', 42 and that 
more relevant to later developments in photography, is Surrealism's engagement with realism as a 
social intervention rather than a critique of `all things naturalistic'. What is pertinent here, is that 
unlike the physical dis-spatiality in Krauss's example, elements in a picture draw us away from 
what is pictorially there and can refer allegorically to the implication of what was there, as with 
Martha Rosler's Bowery. 
36 Soutter, pp. 8-10 
;' Krauss, `Rosalind, `Notes on the Index: Seventies Art in America' (Part One). October 3,1976, p. 203 
Ibid., p. 203 
;' Krauss, Rosalind, `The Photographic Conditions of Surrealism'. In The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist . \1vik . 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985, p. 107 
°0 Ibid., p. 104 
41 Ibid., p. 109 
42 Roberts, John, The Art Of Interruption, Realism, Photography and the Everyday. Manchester and New York: Manchester University 
Press, p. 102 
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Fig. 63 John Baldessari, Somewhere Between 
Almost Right and Not Quite Right (With Orange), 2004 
Similarly, in a consideration of women's contemporary photography with regard to Levinas's 
`face', Robin Durie43 cites as examples of `non violent, non objectifying representation', portraits 
that rely on a sort of visual obliteration in blurring and physical effects. Photographers such as 
Deborah Klomp present a literal `veneer' to `cover the nudity of the face' with closed eyes, make- 
up or obscuration, rather than tackling the question in a directly photographic way. Durie thus 
translates Levinas's nudity of the face literally, by advocating the presentation of a physical mask 
to protect the face from an objectifying gaze and reduces Levinas's `face' to plastic materiality, to 
the physical effect of the photograph rather than the significance of the encounter itself, or the 
expressivity of the face. Durie's description confirms the existentialist view as closing the 
photographer's subjectivity from the viewer as `structural indeterminacy' as `irrecoverable absence 
in the work' and epitomises a distrust of certainty displayed in the disturbance of authorial control 
evident in physical dispersal of focus - in blur. ' More recently John Baldessari, via montage and 
removal of much of what is there, continues methods of physical disturbance that deny 
photographic reference and that become a formal ambiguity. as 
DIFFERANCE AND THE PORTRAIT 
I want now to pursue aspects of critiques that identify a `deconstructive' move as a more 
conceptual development in practice. ' I am interested in how the photographic can work more 
figurally, how it can set up `discourse in place of presence, a discourse founded on a buried origin, 
a discourse fuelled by that absence', 47 without resorting to physical strategies such as doubling, 
blurring etc. My argument seeks to reassert the conceptual shift that enlivened photographic 
practice in the 1980s and to emphasise the contribution that practice makes not only to changes in 
I Durie, Robin, Face to Face, Directions in Contemporary Women's Portraiture. London: Scarlet Press, 1998 
44 Smith, Lindsay (1992) in Kember, Sarah, Virtual Anxiety : Photography, New Technologies and Subjectivity. Manchester. Manchester 
University Press, 1998, p. 26 
45 John Baldessari, Intersection series, 2001-2, Somewhere Between Almost Right and Not Quite Right (With Orange), 2004 
46 Owens, Craig, 'Allegorical Impulse: Toward a Theory of Postmodemism'. October 12,1980 
4' Krauss, `The Photographic Conditions of Surrealism', p. 107 
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aesthetic consciousness but to conceptual configuration more generally. Demonstrating the 
photograph to be fiction (as Levine does) questions what there is left to say about representation, 
what remains of `presence', how that can be exploited, and to what extent the photograph can 
dispense with mimesis and escape dependence on what-was-there. Suzi Gablik, describing a 
practice that reflects a condition of non-determinacy and of `anything goes', resists acceptance of 
the loss of totality beneath appearance and meaning that offers no resolution. She asks `do we 
know what the necessary ingredients might be for making a transition between the old existential 
meaningfulness and new images of value', as something that `reconnects with its visionary function 
of healing and social interaction? " In contradiction to its intention perhaps, this question identifies 
for me a possibility that removes the `visionary' role, and focuses on art as a means of discussing 
social interaction instead, and which has no fear of fictive means to traverse our existential 
alienation or to explore social and aesthetic realms. 
The dynamic of differance is largely concerned with the contradictions concomitant with absence 
and supplementation, which we `understand' as necessary in verbal texts but struggle with in 
relation to visual texts. Martha Rosler's series of photographs Bowery in Two Inadequate 
Descriptive Systems(1974-5) marks a point that challenges the assumed necessity in photographic 
representation of depicting the `thing' (as 'picture'). It contains references to the structures and 
relations of event and situation without any visual representation of its `subject' (those people 
inhabiting the area of Manhattan) whose lives are affected by such structures. Rosier deliberately 
constructs this reference as `unauthored, collective, historical, vernacular and nuanced, '49 by 
leaving out indexical depiction of the central `subject matter' and focusing on the `theme' instead. 
Rosler's project parallels a structural critique of `presence', by absenting what is central literally, 
but which results in a profoundly more figural use of indexicality. More contemporary examples of 
similar positions begin to effect the same denial but through reference to the `subjects' themselves. 
Thus the effect of absence is disguised. Ruff's `portraits' belie detachment from the subject matter 
in their apparent `straightness' that conflate expression in a way that confuses distinctions between 
the literal and the non-literal and express more abstract qualities that are not expressed by the face 
itself. Combining traditional constraints with contemporary psychological strategies they construct 
`ideas' of a contradictory character as self-contained conceptions that undermine themselves and 
which invoke doubt. 
''s Gabllik, Suzi, `Postmodernism and the Question of Meaning'. Art Criticism, Vol. 3, No. 3,1987, p. 70 
4' Rosier, Martha, Interview with Benjamin Buchloh in Catherine de Zegher (ed. ) Martha Rosler: Positions in the Life World. 
Birmingham: Ikon Gallery; London: \ffT Press, 1998 
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The two reigning myths of photography - the one that claims that photographs are `true' and the 
one that claims they are not - are shown to be grounded in the same praxis. 50 
Indications of profound conceptual digression can be seen in aspects of photographic practice that 
explore the possibilities of dismantling its dependence on the defining indexical nature of the 
photograph and its alliance with `reality'; works for example by Jeff Wall and projects by Allan 
Sekulas' and Alfredo Jarr52 operate more conceptually, toy with strategies that conflate and disrupt 
assumed restrictions in translating `reality' and stretch self-imposed limits of `transparent' 
photographic reference. In Jarr's anxiety to assert significance in the face of tragedy, he uses 
structural devices that present events obliquely, using what is absent or not said; he focuses on 
50 Wall, Jeff, "`Marks of Indifference": Aspects of Photography in, or as, Conceptual Art' (1995). In Fogle, Douglas (ed. ) The Last 
Picture Show, Artists using Photography. Minneapolis: Walker Art Centre, 2003, p. 37 
51 Allan Sekula, born 1951 Pennsylvania, lives and works in Los Angeles. Has been photographing and writing since the early 1970s. On 
the invention of Photographic Meaning (1975) and Photography Against the Grain (1984) still challenge preconceptions of 
documentary and realism. 
Alfredo Jaar, born Chile 1956, lives and works in New York. Generally his work is challenging and concerned with political change. 
Lament of the images presented 3 photo-based installations 1994-98 as a result of his recording the testimonies of those surviving the 
genocide in Rwanda. 
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Fig. 64 Alfredo Jaar, The Eyes of Gutete Emerita, 1996 
constituent details that do not contribute to the event but build a reality by recording the peripheries 
and rely on imagination, association and memory; he focuses on one individual history rather than 
that of thousands. [fig. 64] His rhetorical approach forces us to interact with the images and 
acknowledge their performance as fiction. Sekula investigates possibilities of realism that avoid the 
`cult of the self-sufficient image' in extended projects ( Fish Story 1990-93, Black Tide) that 
address a number of tangential events simultaneously. ' They weave a network of cause, 
consequence and coincidence - of tangential events that are trans-historical. These parallel threads 
of content work across a number of evolving `chapters' and `plots', for example one on cargo and 
industrial capital, another on pollution and include incidentally specific individuals such as David 
Brown telephoning home [fig. 65]. 
Fig. 65 Allan Sekula, David Brown telephones his wife, 
from Fish Story, 1993 
Wall relates the story of what he terms `photoconceptualism's quintessential "anti-object" that 
broke the spell of modernist photography's bid for transcendence'. -" Bracketed off from `aesthetic 
evolution', it introduced reportage as parody and the possibility of literal performance, both of 
which have proved to contribute to the development of a profound discourse within the portrait 
specifically that plays with the pose as performance as double inflection evident in Dijkstra, or as 
implosion in Strba. The central role of parodic document in acts of positive denial in Lundin or 
Streuli owes a debt to Nauman's self conscious acting out (Self Portrait as Fountain, 1966-67), an 
example that legitimates photographic processes to effect an idea as a record, as an event. What 
happens now is that the photograph subsumes both the aesthetic, the anti-aesthetic that legitimises 
it and the idea that is proper to meaningful art, so that photography no longer has to legitimise itself 
through purity true to its productive process. 
9 Sekula, Allan. Perf®rmance Under Working Conditions. Hatje-Cantz, 2003, p. 246 
54 Wall, 'Marks of Indifference' in Fogle, pp. 32-35 
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Douglas HueblerS5 inserts the possibility of `emptying subject matter' ' in photographing ideas 
where resemblance is not what is at issue. Huebler's pieces mark a step away from representation, 
toward independence from mimesis, toward a synthetic photographic practice. Variable Piece IA, 
The Netherlands 1973 depicts eight people photographed immediately following their being told 
`you have a beautiful face' or `you have a very special face' or `you have a remarkable face'. The 
preconception of the piece determines a reaction in the subjects. The contradictory use of indexical 
properties `is the necessary centre of these works' that assert the project itself (the concept) as the 
essential creative element, rather than its visuality. The photograph becomes a presentation of 
photographs of things rather than a `representation of absent things'. Conceptual art is a tradition 
that is assumed now in the artificiality determined by deliberate interventions with the 
photographer, seen frequently in contemporary strategies that determine the programme such as 
von Zwehl's theatrical control, Dijkstra's double inflection, Lundin's disappearance. The need for 
`good' portraiture is excluded by the creative programme. And reportage bequeaths reportage 
without event, narrative or commentary and highlights photography's depictive qualities as 
something that can be interfered with, allowing photography to underwrite appropriation and 
fiction as central conditions of poststructural art. Contemporary photography inherits `the 
experimentation with the "anaesthetic" and "the loss of the visual" in `photoconceptualism'. 5' 
Further to this, amateurism, long since validated by Warhol, and Ruscha's reductivism, denies 
representation of its theme and is seen as `an economy mirrored in the structure' as are Ruff's 
portraits. Where Rosier removes the subject and speaks of them, Ruff removes the subject by 
depicting them and speaking of other things than what is depicted. Sensuousness is replaced with 
discourse. Instead of replacing the picture with a text literally, we get pictorialism celebrated by 
Wall as text. `Dragging its heavy burden of depiction... Conceptualism ... cannot provide the 
experience of the negation of experience' but `revolutionalised our concept of the Picture' . 
s9 
Modernism `took as a given that it was in the connative richness and density... the intension - of 
the aesthetic sign that it lay claim to being art at all'. 60 And it is this that photography was anxious 
to aspire to via such as Evans's `lyrical documentary' - `documentary (what photographs are good 
at) touched with expression' (the artist's mark). The history of C20 photographs invited metaphoric 
interpretations that lead toward romance, narrative or sentimentality and more latterly self- 
reference. Sekula's suspicion of the photograph to symbolise ideologies such as Steiglitz's The 
Steerage `that transcend the perceptual', derives from the photograph's capacity for metonymic 
power. `Steiglitz's reductivist compulsion is so extreme.. . that he 
denies the iconic level of the 
I Huebler, Douglas, Variable Piece no. 101, West Germany, March 1973, of Berndt Becher 
Wall, `Marks of Indifference', p. 38 
57 Ibid., p. 40 
Ibid., p. 43 
`' Ibid., p. 44 
60 Krauss, "In the Name of Picasso' in The Originality of the Avant-Garde, p. 27 
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image and makes his claim for meaning at the level of abstraction. ' 61 His logic proceeds to equate 
Kant's aesthetic idea with idealism as a kind of indulgence that distinguishes itself from a Lewis 
Hine photograph, which `in its original context is an explicit political utterance. ' What Sekula 
despises here is the removal of specificity that transforms meaning into generality and myth, a 
`devolution into mystic trivia" or `abstract 'fetish'. Thirty years later, photography has shown that 
one can have metaphor, aesthetic and authorial dispersal in portrayals that represent individuality, 
specific locality and difference (Jaar). And ultimately Sekula's work demonstrates the use of 
photographs to express ideologies and ideas as far removed from idealised metaphor as may be 
possible. 
Craig Owens reveals the dependence of the image upon interpretation whilst also `dispersing, 
disseminating the `natural' content of things'; in this way allegory levers open the apparent 
continuity of time, nature and history providing an open space for a materialist/ postmodern 
reinterpretation and eventual transfiguration. 62 Owens's discussion of the 'deconstructive impulse' 63 
promotes the use of image to problematise reference and exploit the `gap' between the signifier and 
what is signified and importantly marks a recognition of the allegorical potential in photography. `M 
In 1980, he indicates that it is to be found in properties of impermanence, site specificity and 
strategies of accumulation, hybridisation and discursivity. These are more fundamental than merely 
stylistic effects and different from notions of allegory as necessarily romantic, mythical or 
fantastical. Owen's postmodern art is characterised as allegorical because it stresses ruins and 
spaces, fragmented images from art history mass media and `in its impulse to upset stylistic norms, 
to dissemble modernist form, to redefine conceptual categories, to undo usual stereotypes'65 and 
connects postmodern fragmentation to notions of poststructural decentring, which inserts the 
`emotion of language into the aesthetic field'. ' His recovery of allegory from prejudices of history 
reveals a conceptual framework that has been confused if anything by semiotics and the desire to 
establish structure in the understanding of artwork (another aspiration to `truth'). The allegorical 
impulse as a `consequence of a self conscious preoccupation with reading, ' exemplifies 
deconstruction as it works against contemporary myths and the `symbolic totalising impulse' `to 
narrate its own contingency, insufficiency, lack of transcendence'. 67 With reference to Derrida's 
fundamental premise of differance and to addition and supplement, he likens the dynamic to a 
`conceptual force" that can inhabit the photograph. 
61 Sekula, Allan, `On the Invention of Photographic Meaning' (1975). In Victor Burgin (ed. ) Thinking Photography. Basingstoke 
Macmillan Press, 1982, p. 100 
62 Muir, Peter, 'Signs of a beginning: October and the Pictures exhibition' 
° Owens, 'Allegorical Impulse Part IF, p. 79 
e4 Owens, 'Allegorical Impulse Part I', pp. 56-7 
1 Ibid., p. 58 
' Ibid., p. 57 
67 Ibid., p. 56 
Ibid., p. 58 
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Depiction is an act of construction; it brings the referent into being... depictions are generic 
because.. 
. there.. . 
is always something... ghostly... This quality is a sort of resonance, or 
shimmering feeling. 69 
Differance suggests a disturbance that stops asking `what is', interrupts the causal move toward 
narrative, points to the paradox indicated by photographic reference that is removed from the 
materiality to which it refers. Uses of photography to express concept alone challenge the 
photograph as a fact, challenge where the `subject' is, play a game with mimesis and assert idea, 
content and context as central, not the `picture'. Wall's fictional yet `realist' constructions7° remind 
us that we assume a necessary relationship of `adequacy' that depends on mimesis, which implies 
that the referent has precedence over the depiction and proceeds to contradict this relationship. His 
engagement with fiction releases the constraint of dependence on depiction of the referent. Wall's 
conceptual pictorialism presents the antithesis of attempts to find `essence' via photography's 
literal access to the revelation of the real. Instead he reconfigures `according to my feelings and my 
literacy', no longer as documentary (objective) touched with expression (subjective) and no longer 
subjectivity at a distance - masked, hidden or un-stated. He uses themes, ideas and the picture, 
confronts photographic literalness and presents conceptual assimilation in his use of `realist' 
fictional depictions. Rather than Krauss's intervention of effect, Wall resumes Breton's purpose of 
social interruption and incorporates Kristeva's psychological space into the photograph. He 
incorporates poststructural effect without resorting to abstraction or visual ambiguity, gestural 
69 Wall, Jeff, in dialogue with Anelle Pelenc, in Jeff Wall, London: 
Phaidon, 1996, p. 14 
70 Ibid., p. 14 
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Fig. 66 Jeff Wall, Adrian Walker, 199? 
vagueness or fragment and accesses meaning, so that dis-spatiality is figurative not literal, 
conceptual rather than physical. Like Ruff's conflation, Wall's `literal' image works like a double 
negative that is more `figural' than literal imagery, which `transcends' its own literalness. 
The fact of it being or not being a `portrait' of a specific real person, may be secondary in the 
structure. The title, because it names him, makes it appear that he is such a specific, real person. 
But it's easily possible that Adrian Walker is simply a fictional name that I decided to make up 
to create a certain illusion, like `Emma Bovary'. Even though that's not true and there is such a 
person, and that is him, I don't think there is necessarily any resonance of that in the structure of 
the work, generically speaking. The nature of the picture gives no guarantee that that 
identification matters at all. So, like a lot of pictures, it is a bit of a hybrid. Portraiture seems to 
be a social relationship, sustained by empirical and historical evidence, corroborating the 
identity of someone who appears in a particular picture; it doesn't seem to be a pictorial 
relationship or a pictorial phenomenon, as such. " 
I arrive at a correlation between the acceptance of fiction with the revival of allegory, the dynamic 
of differance that liberates the image from naming mimetically, the arrival of fiction that 
incorporates the photographer's subjectivities and the psychological. Wall and Sekula both shift the 
founding premises of photographic portrayal in fundamental ways. Wall, by introducing fiction, 
Sekula with the specificity of local context. Both use allegory; Wall via pictorial realism and 
Sekula via a `critical realism'. 72 Both are forms of non-transcendent portrayal. Wall questions the 
assumed goal of `truth' as being necessary and suggests that fiction may be just as important. His 
`portrait' of Adrian Walker is one such example, which demonstrates an indifference to the verity 
of subjects. Speaking of this particular work, he questions the relevance of awareness, non 
awareness or the objectification of the subject as necessarily defining a portrait. He refers to 
Michael Fried's distinction between `absorptive mode' and `theatrical mode' of where absorptive 
pictures of people portray `being' in their worlds rather than acting it out. `Both of course are 
modes of performance. I think Adrian Walker is absorptive'. The `naming' is defined by the 
operation of the title that states his occupation and `Drawing from a specimen' operates in the 
manner of Frege's `is a horse' in identifying a conceptual domain of activity 
in which Adrian 
Walker participates. Activity identifies `less by their personal, empirical, 
historical, social identity 
and more by their generic identities controlled by the type of picture they're 
in. ''3 The absorption 
evident in Adrian Walker is indifference to an objectification, caught 
in the event of being 
photographed. `Adrian Walker' is both nominal and participatory. 
" Wall, Jeff , 
'Restoration, Interview with Martin Scwander (1994), in Jeff Wall, London: Phaidon, 1996, pp. 127-8 
72 Critical Realism in Contemporary Art: around Allan Sekula's Photography, 
Symposium, Lieven Gevaert Research Centre for 
Photography and Visual Studies, Leuven, Belgium, September 2005 
73 Wall, Jeff Wall, p. 128 
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The reference to Emma Bovary suggests a conception of portrayal that incorporates different vistas, 
different self contained chapters, which can be read independently, a-chronologically and only 
become narrative if following a diegetic pattern. In the contemporary tradition of dialogue, Adrian 
Walker is a chapter in the fiction that is the reality of Adrian Walker. In effect, unless the person is 
known to us personally, whether it is fact of fiction is only relevant to its resonance if one believes 
in the essential character or possibility of `truth to reality' in `straight' depiction. `The fact that 
someone really is what they appear to be in a picture is not a picture matter. '74 Once someone is a 
portrait, they are in a picture and performative, either performing another or themselves. 
Kaela Economou gestures as she describes to incredulous anarchist-sniffing reporters a beating 
at the hands of the Seattle police. Lubov Khouyakova poses in a cramped studio amidst her 
paintings depicting the industrial landscape and war time graves of the Black Sea port of 
Novorossiysk, standing incongruously on an infants's chair. Michel Boireau stetches for the 
hundreth-thousandth time to grab the controls for an overhead gantry. There is no need for 
fiction here, for actors or models for staging. Nor is there any need for an overtly archival (that 
is, serial) association of the three portraits, such as one might find in August Sander's Antlitz 
der Zeit. The links between these photos may well pass through others that I am not describing, 
but there is also a sense in which all three persons - for all their differences - inhabit a shared 
existential domain, outside the parameters of successful manoevring in a "globalized" life 
world: the activist who rebels against the future, the painter who sticks to a realist idiom and to 
regional motifs, the manual worker who sticks to the same job for more than twenty years. 75 
The portrait of Lubov Khoudyahova, the Russian painter (fig. 70), functions as if she were a 
character in a novel; she is both herself and her role in TITANIC's Wake, along with the characters 
of Bill Gates, Frank Ghery and Wilmslow Homer. Sekula's projects suggest the `epic sweep and 
resonance of a historic novel, without in any way trying to be a historic novel and without 
departing from the pictorial possibilities of careful documentary photography' . 
76 The projects 
demonstrate Lakoff's `generic is specific' structure and maintains difference in specificity as one 
element within a global schema, that presents the general in terms of the specific rather than 
`generalising'. The fact of Sekula's `documentary', defined in the context of `art', in itself 
transforms the possibilities of documentary and demonstrates it as artistic fiction. His novelistic 
approach acknowledges the fictional elements within work whilst being concerned with the 
realities of global economies and relationships. 
`There are two general conditions for working in 
this way: a person or a place must 
be compellingly portrayed in visual terms and plausible 
if unexpected essayistic threads must bind 
one picture to others. ' Here are realistic portrayals presented 
in the midst of tangential and 
'4 Ibid., p. 128 
75 Sekula, Allan, TITANIC's wake, Liege: SNEL, 2003, pp. 107-8 
76 Ibid., p. 107 
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Portrait of Kaela Economou, beaten 
by the Seattle police, 
2 December, 1999 
, ý.: Tý 
Portrait of Michel Boireau, 
Biemont Factory, Tours 
Portrait of Guillaume Blanc with 
oysters, Sache 
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Figs. 67-69 Allan Sekula, from TITANIC's wake, 1998-2000 
specifically contextual content contained by the metaphor `wake' - of the sea and of its 
reverberation, more `real' than any searching beneath masks can achieve. Here is a presentation 
that does not transcend its content and sits knowledge besides knowledge and yet is more 
`essential' in portraying what we cannot name or describe. Here is a release from the portrait that 
defines and reveals what is hidden. These pictorial possibilities of critical realism, along with those 
of Wall's fictional pictorial realism, example the borderlines of genres and the diversity of 
conceptual domains encompassed by contemporary photography. 
Projects such as Allan Sekula's TITANIC'S wake use simultaneous reference in different ways; 
visual projects that use the concept of parallel discourse, but which deny linearity; works that 
present simultaneous `stories' and which feed off each other but without privilege; translations of 
experience that avoid transcendence, teleology or any notion of superior position and which adopt 
participatory strategies of equivalence instead. These are modes of realism that encompass fiction, 
allegory and critique, which no longer have to justify artistic validity or objective reality and which 
move on from the veracity of the snapshot typified in Goldin or Strba, The mirroring of everyday 
reality in an evermore `natural' realism is one subversion of the modernist transcendence of the 
everyday that still depends on a belief that there can be a pure perception, unconditioned by time 
and space. As such it fails ultimately to undermine presence. Particpative practice such as Evans's 
Polaroids and Goldin's work break down the author-subject divide and ultimately describe 
themselves. Whereas Sekula's novelistic realism, using subject matter as merely a vehicle for an 
idea, returns to the function of allegorical painting, when the substance was idea rather than objects 
(which give effect to the idea). `Any interest I had in artifice and constructed dialogue was part of a 
search for a certain "realism": a realism not of appearances or social facts but of everyday 
experience in and against the grip of advanced capitalism. This realism sought to brush traditional 
realism against the grain. ' " We are reminded here of other conceptions of `realism' in Barthes's 
alternative unconstrained by verifiable truth, Moore's interpretation of content as absence and 
Kristeva's `poetic logic'. 
Wall, Ruff and Sekula insert the conceptual back into `realism', 78 confronting modernist taboos of 
pictorialism or social documentary and refuse the ideal of spontaneity, refuse the poetic of Cartier 
Bresson's moment of `just one thing', 79 refuse the dogmatic ontology of Andre Bazin's `real', 
" Sekula, Allan, Photography Against the Grain, Essays and Photo-works, 
The Press of the Nova Scotia College of Art& Design, 1984, 
P. x 
's WaII, Jeff Wall, p. 13 
Cartier-Bresson, Henri, An excerpt from 'The Decisive Moment'(1952) in Vicki 
Goldberg, Photography in Print : Writings from 
1816 to the Present: 'Sometimes you have a feeling that here are all the makings of a picture except 
for just one thing that seems to be 
missing. But what one thing? ' 
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refuses the instinct of Evans's `real thing'80 or Strand's `unqualified objectivity', "' challenge 
Heidegger's `thingness of thing' and move toward images that reflect the conflation of temporal 
deferral and spatial difference, and construct a conceptual fiction. 
a 
ý' 
'Y 
3` 
Fig. 70 Allan Sekula, 
Lubov Khoudyahova in her 
studio, TITANIC's wake, 
1998-2000 
"Evans, Walker, manuscript notes on 3x 5" index cards, notes for lyric documentary on cards - 'the real thing always has PLRITY-, 
CERTAIN SEVERITY, RIGOR, SIMPLICITY, DIRECTNESS, CLARITY, IS WITHOUT ARTISTIC PRETENSION, HARD + FIRM 
AS BASE, in Walker Evans Archive, 1994.250.51, Yale photography notes (11) 25 
81 Strand, Paul, 'Photography' (1917) in Trachtenberg, pp. 141-142 
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CONCLUSIONS: THE POSTSTRUCTURAL PORTRAIT 
The trajectory between Evans's Allie Mae Burroughs and Thomas Ruff's portraits parallels 
poststructural themes, the journey through Conceptual art and postmodern practices and determines 
the differences between a concern for transcendence and a knowing indifference inhabiting 
`straight' depiction. Evans, as a recurrent theme, can be seen as a `bridge' between ideational 
realism - documentary infused with sensibility (1936) and an extreme form of subjective realism 
(1974), which breaks the taboos of distance and objectivity. Evans represents both a break with the 
modernist ideal of distance by inserting himself as the `subject' in the image of others, and a 
contradiction to an increasingly aware authorship in an extreme form of authorial indulgence. His 
subject matter is not the subject-depicted, but instinct and emotional distance itself -a 
representation of the limitlessness of not knowing others or ineffability itself. 
This thesis offers an understanding of poststructural ideas from the perspective of visual practice, 
by relating directions of concern that confirm alternatives to modernist pretensions such as 
synthesising meaning and definition. Testing the hypothesis that photographic practice functions as 
discourse, I present a series of examples that articulate characteristics such as indeterminacy. 
Whilst contemporary practice confirms many of Lyotard's predictions for the `postmodern 
condition', I assert that the impact of such thinking on practice is underestimated, and more 
fundamental than the narrower, re-iterated aspects usually associated with postmodernism. I 
demonstrate that profound shifts in our assumptions and understanding are visualised in practice, 
more aptly named here as poststructural. As a phenomenon, poststructural photography borrows the 
appearance of photographic traditions, but is oblique, attenuated and contradictory. One is 
confronted with a series of contrasting traits; a pervasive display of uncertainty and an assertive re- 
generation of traditional genres; a refusal of narrative and an active engagement with narrative; a 
realism that is `natural' and raw, and a realism that is conceptually complex. Further to interpreting 
photographic representation as demonstrating a reflection of the contemporary condition, I claim 
that photographic practice, as a form of discourse, visualises implicitly held values, displays its 
own interventions and not only parallels, but via rhetorical viewing, participates in a way that 
extends verbal debate. In questioning the easy shifting between photograph and referent, 
poststructural photography explores the possibilities of dismantling the denotative power of the 
photograph and its alliance with `reality'. It incorporates alternative conceptions of what is `real', 
in the sense that it is forced to constantly discuss with 
itself - truth, reality, temporal deferral, 
spatial difference. It toys with strategies that conflate and 
disrupt assumed restrictions and moves 
toward a conceptual form, not in the sense of documenting an 
idea as it did in the 1970s, but by 
using its reference to objects to conceptualise. 
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I identify the need to adjust the frame in which the portrait can be read and propose a conceptual 
framework to explain meaning. By problematising the equations of art and aesthetics with 
visuality, and of `realism' with the literal, I assert conceptual interpretations over literary systems 
like narrative, immanent property over aspirations to `transcendence' or `essence' and nominate 
differance as a principle dynamic. I pursue the equivalence of the visual and verbal and establish 
alternative ways to articulate photographs by forefronting conceptual domains that assert a 
photographic discourse without recourse to verbal translation or narrative. I example theories that 
emphasise meaning besides `subject matter' and `object'; in Kristeva's semiotic, Levinas's shadow, 
Derrida's sans, all of which validate the move toward figural interpretation. By examining non- 
literal configurations of the image, I adopt a notion of photographic properties as capacities, which 
incorporate psychological, contextual and cultural associations and establish a framework with 
which to focus on what is provoked by the photograph subjectively, poetically and politically rather 
than on what is referenced. I propose a psycho-sensible dimension explained by Levinas's `face', 
which introduces a conceptual space that unites the encounter, the photograph and our response to 
both, which is seconded by Lakoff's theory of conceptual schema. Acknowledgement that the 
metaphoric instinct pervades thought (not just language) is important with regard to the recognition 
of conceptual reverberation as a process, prior to translation into language, which allows us to 
understand thematic projects with a complexity of reference and implication. 
I adopt Derrida's procedure of differance as a poststructural equivalent for the ineffable, which 
embodies an approach to thinking, encompassing many of the ideas discussed and which traverses 
those regions of meaning that are elusive and indeterminate. Notions such as the ineffable and 
transcendence, as persistent constituents of `art', change in the light of philosophical alignment and 
are accordingly manifested and re-interpreted differently. Explanations of the ineffable from 
different perspectives collated here, indicate a move toward opacity, immanence, dissemination, 
non-representation, non-narrativity. A poststructural reluctance to explain via metaphysical origins, 
is echoed in practice that insists on, for example, a stubborn ordinariness that resists transcendence. 
I assert the relentless uncertainty of ineffability as a constant provocation, and differance as an 
explanation for the ineffable, as an alternative procedure to the paradox of searching for `absolute 
representations'. 
The conceptual space validated in Part Two liberates the portrait from its function to define or its 
obligation to present `psychological focus'. Part One identifies 
`essential' descriptions as subjective 
and rephrases the questions provoked by Baudrillard and 
Ruff as `how does the portrait say 
something about relationship, or me as photographer or reader? 
' Levinas, like Sartre, establishes a 
reality for the meaning of photographs, not 
in transcendence but in our reading of them - our own 
reality and Derrida indicates the possibility of 
interpretation as psychological fiction, which mirrors 
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the photographer's consciousness. Echoing Levinas's insistence on alterity, Kristeva's on process, 
together with poststructural adjustments to authorship, three positions of practice become apparent 
that deny `essential' depiction and problematise objectification. These are participative dialogic 
portrayals that conflate the positions of author-subject and speak of themselves (Evans and 
Goldin); disengaged selfconscious authorship apparent in strategies that fabricate interventions to 
destabilise or avoid interaction and/or meaning (von Zwehl, Yokomizo); critical realism that does 
not attempt to transcend its content or privilege or totalise and subverts allegorically in 
presentations that situate knowledge beside knowledge, event beside event (Sekula). 
Finding pretensions to locate `essence' to be beside the point and that if there is `psychological 
focus' it is dependent on the nature of the exchange, I confirm Ruff's statement ('they're not 
depictions, they're just images) as appropriate. I reconfigure the portrait as a form of fictional 
description that presents a logical space for possibilities, rather than authenticity. Baudrillard's 
photographic project is seen to amplify this from the point of view of the photographer and 
Derrida's perquisition from that of the reader. As the procedure of dissemination does not 
endeavour to synthesise, contemporary practice likewise reverses the role of motif that generalises, 
and where more universal meaning might develop, it emerges from the specific (e. g. Sekula's 
Lubov Khouyakova and Dikstra's bathers). This notion of portrait as a conceptual fiction avoids 
intentional depiction of `essence' and escapes transcendence. I conclude that a parallel with the 
broad notion of `fiction', which can take a variety of forms, suggests a direction that includes more 
dangerous territories that challenge the established aesthetic (e. g. Sekula's ideology or Evans's 
poetic aberration). 
Procedures of encounter build a conception of a world made visible in the rhetoric of visual 
practice, in recurrent strategies that reflect extremes in the `subjective scope' of the photographer 
and in the self-conscious address to authorship. A `dialogic' perspective articulates a breakdown of 
the fixed oppositions of author/reader/subject and inserts interventions and structures that force 
alternatives to didactic narration following more familiar linear structures. The assumption of 
objectification (Sontag) is found to reside in more generalised meaning than in the specific and 
local, and the dialogic indicates a route through the conundrum of a meaningless generalisation via 
meaningful particularity. The protagonists in portrait fabrication are revealed as discontinuous and 
mobile and thus not static or consistent. Similarly the 
important element of the encounter is found 
to be process and exchange, largely responsible for the breakdown and realignment of genres 
whereby the `portrait', having lost its limitations as a genre, 
becomes a convenient term for a more 
complex `depiction of people'. Following 
discussion of metaphor, it becomes clear that the portrait 
functions as a generic metaphor for a `mirror to consciousness' on two 
levels. Ironically it proves 
to be a more accurate alternative to a `mirror to the world' and more extensive than 
is first 
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apparent. It emerges firstly with the interaction with others (Sartre), self-reflexive accounts of 
thinking (Derrida) and being in process (Kristeva). Following demonstrations of practice 
paralleling poststructural thinking, it can be seen at another level as an aesthetic consciousness that 
pervades photographic discourse and as a `reflection' that provides visible clarification of how we 
apprehend the world. 
Examining the same themes (e. g. absence, uncertainty and subject) from both psychological and 
analytical perspectives, I demonstrate that the portrait has been adjusted in the light of both. I find 
that both arenas provide verification of the motivating principle of absence, both validate the move 
from a literal toward a more figural place, and both contribute to an aesthetic evolution that 
accommodates dominant cultural ideas. Derrida, Levinas and Kristeva in turn articulate liminal 
positioning in readings that forefront the sensible and the imaginary over knowledge and object. 
Ricoeur stresses the tension at the intersection between literal and metaphoric interpretations that 
suggests an alternative to seeing value only in definitive facts, things, places (single images) and 
more in terms of `seeing things as actions', process and event and the relationship between things. 
He emphasises the boundary between semantic and psychological theories of imagination and 
feeling, and endorses the portrait as a `condition of possibility' and meaning as immanent 
resonance. Thus `what does it mean? and `what is it? ' becomes `what is happening? ' By 
`explaining' the figural in terms of what we as viewers do when looking, rather than what or how 
the piece is made, I position the ineffable as a conceptual domain of latent possibility and potency. 
The `meaningful' portrait is found not to be dependent on causality or efficacy and is reconstituted 
outside resemblance. Levinas's acceptance of alterity, when courted rather than modified, invites 
an ever changing contra-aesthetic that accommodates the discontinuous subject and encourages the 
simultaneity and divergent multiplicity that photographs must always display. Kristeva's emphasis 
on the visceral is echoed by Levinas's `hearing' the visual, suggesting a response other than visual 
sensation. Derrida emphasises aspects of art that are not dependent on resembling `reality', Levinas 
repositions resemblance as being alongside the depicted-subject, and representation shifts away 
from mimesis to conceptions of `realism' no longer constrained by verifiable `truth', toward less 
referential and more discursive models, as allegory. Extensive demonstration of extrinsic meaning 
for example in integrational effect and parerga, exposes absence and concept as the central 
factors 
of the poststructural portrait rather than resemblance or visuality. 
In exploring the discourse that 
occurs besides the reference to subject matter, what 
becomes apparent is that the photograph could 
usefully relinquish the obligation to demonstrate 
`meaning' and be seen as a means of provocation 
instead. 
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Derrida's logic of supplement, which disturbs, dislocates, interrupts and omits, indicates a 
procedure for exploring the image that encourages countless eventualities. I see the processes of 
deconstruction, metaphoric conflation and photographic provocation as linked by their obstructing 
the path to definitive meaning. Aporia, which `concerns the impossible', ' invoking doubt, inserting 
what appears to be no way forward, blocking our way and separating us from resolution, recalls the 
validation by psychoanalytic practice that there is no essential meaning to be found and that all that 
is found is meaningful, useful. 8' As alternatives to `essential' depiction, I assert the autotelic and 
aporetic properties of the photograph and promote `portraits' that incorporate the figural and a 
poststructural aesthetic that accommodates process and simultaneity, immanence and resonance. I 
correlate the revival of allegory, the dynamic of differance and the prevalence of fiction that 
incorporates subjectivity and the particularity of local context. I propose a conceptual aesthetic and 
a view that celebrates aspects of poststructuralism that is rooted in what the photograph provokes 
rather than what it depicts. 
This thesis contributes examination of three aspects in the consideration of contemporary art 
practice: the poststructural, the figural and the ineffable. Using the photographic portrait as an 
example, I provide a discussion of a developing aesthetic updated in terms of the poststructuralist 
theoretical context. I have focused on photographic aspects relating to the nature of content and 
construction of meaning but recognise the potential for consideration of additional issues, for 
example, the tensions caused by scale, presentation and context. My response has been principally 
with the cognitive and not the materiality of visceral impact; differentiations such as the 
photographs' colour, size or illumination do not feature here. I have examined rather what sort of 
knowledge a photograph provides: how meaning can be maintained as fluid rather than concrete; 
how the visual operation articulates without recourse to structured schema; how it speaks 
multiplicitly without implying oppositional structures and negative implications. 
I have identified figural space as being a direction from which to explore possibilities for 
perquisition of the contemporary photograph. Further consideration of encountering the `figural' 
may establish a different vocabulary from one which implies a dependence on verbal articulation to 
validate how a photograph `speaks'; what a photograph provokes exceeds any description or any 
one `reading'. Importantly, Lyotard forefronts the visual rather than the linguistic and adjusts 
phenomenological dependence on perception to encompass the unconscious. 
The term `figural 
space', used comfortably in the context of architecture or virtual 
design, encompasses habitation of 
a space, involvement within and through a space, 
in such a way that absence features as strongly as 
objects. If we incorporate this level of engagement with 
Kristeva's `psychic space', we may more 
readily encounter the photograph as 
figural and more allied to events and absence than 'things'. 
Dertida, Aporias, p. 13 
See p. 72 
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In terms of a response to photographs, I have focused on the affective notion of the ineffable. The 
`ineffable', as a notion rooted in metaphysics, has been a useful focus for what has long been 
explained as what is beyond us. I have repositioned what is provoked by our not knowing, by lack 
and by absence, with a more contemporary equivalent for the ineffable in differance. The ineffable 
is now embodied in poststructural disturbance, in theories that describe excess, difference and 
deferral: terminology more suited to the era in which it exists. 
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